CAMBRIDGE GREEK AND LATIN CLASSICS

CICERO

LAELIVS DE AMICITIA

EDITED BY KATHARINA VOLK AND JAMES E. G. ZETZEL

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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India

103 Penang Road, #05-06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, a department of the University of Cambridge.

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www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108832250

DOI: 10.1017/9781108935715

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When citing this work, please include a reference to the DOI 10.1017/9781108935715

First published 2024

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

A Cataloging-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

ISBN 978-1-108-83225-0 Hardback
ISBN 978-1-108-94085-6 Paperback

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For Bob Kaster and Gareth Williams
amicis optimis

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PREFACE

The publication of a new commentary on Cicero's *Laelius de amicitia* needs no justification: the last comprehensive scholarly commentary on the Latin text – C. F. W. Müller's revision of an earlier work by Moritz Seyffert – came out in 1876. As Cicero's *philosophica* are enjoying a scholarly renaissance, ancient virtue ethics has found a new audience, and friendship remains central to the human experience across societies and cultures, we hope that our commentary will provide the Latinate reader with improved access to this immensely readable, enjoyable, and poignant text.

The writing of this book has benefited from the *beneficia* of many friends and colleagues. First and foremost, we are grateful to Philip Hardie and Stephen Oakley, not just for accepting the commentary into the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics series, but especially for closely reading our text and offering numerous invaluable corrections and suggestions. Caleb Dance and Bob Kaster likewise were so kind as to read entire drafts, providing critical insights and improvements, for which we are greatly indebted. In addition, we are grateful to Sander Goldberg, Thomas Keeline, David Sider, and Peter White for answering queries or sharing unpublished material.

In the fall of 2020, KV had the pleasure of teaching a graduate seminar on *De amicitia* and wishes to thank her students José Antonio Cancino Alfaro, Olivier Bordeleau-Lavoie, Morgan Hallow, Nicholas Koudounis, Dan Sofaer, Arnav Tandon, and Lien Van Geel for trenchant questions and stimulating discussions. Some of the material contained in the commentary was presented to audiences at Durham, Bryn Mawr, and Poznań, for whose questions and comments we are most grateful.

Finally, we wish to thank Michael Sharp, Jane Burkowski, and the team at Cambridge University Press for their excellent services in seeing the book to publication.

We are honored to dedicate this commentary on friendship to Bob Kaster and Gareth Williams, great Latinists and dear friends.

ABBREVIATIONS

A&G	Allen and Greenough's *New Latin grammar*, updated by A. Mahoney, Newburyport, MA 2001.
*CAH*²	*The Cambridge ancient history*, 2nd ed., Cambridge 1984–2005.
DK	Diels, H. and Kranz, W. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th ed., Berlin 1952.
FRHist	Cornell, T. J. ed. *The fragments of the Roman historians*, Oxford 2013.
H–S	Hofmann, J. B. and Szantyr, A. *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik*, Munich 1965.
K–S	Kühner, R. and Stegmann, C. *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache: Satzlehre*, 4th ed., Darmstadt 1962.
LM	Laks, A. and Most, G. W. *Early Greek philosophy*, Cambridge, MA 2016.
LS	Long, A. A. and Sedley, D. N. *The Hellenistic philosophers*, Cambridge 1987.
LSJ	Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R. *A Greek–English lexicon*, rev. by H. S. Jones, 9th ed., Oxford 1968.
OCD	Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. eds. *The Oxford classical dictionary*, 4th ed., Oxford 2012.
OLD	P. W. Glare, ed. *Oxford Latin dictionary*, Oxford 1968–82.
TLL	*Thesaurus linguae Latinae*, Munich 1900–.

Abbreviations for ancient authors and texts used are those of the *Oxford classical dictionary*.

INTRODUCTION

1 CONTEXT AND COMPOSITION

Cicero wrote his *Laelius de amicitia* (*Amic.*) in the fall of 44 BCE, at a time when he was becoming increasingly drawn into the turbulent political events precipitated by the assassination of Julius Caesar on 15 March. He was 62 years old and could look back on a distinguished career as a statesman, orator, and author of rhetorical and philosophical works but – as so often during his life – he found himself deeply concerned about the state of the Roman commonwealth. Disregard for the republican political process, competing factions and individuals, and the growing threat of violence and civil war meant that Cicero had to fear not only for the well-being of the *res publica* but also for his own. His concerns were only too justified: before the end of the following year, Cicero was dead, murdered at the behest of the newly established Second Triumvirate.

M. Tullius Cicero was born in the Italian town of Arpinum in 106 and received his education at Rome, while also studying with Greek rhetors and philosophers during a sojourn in Athens and on Rhodes in 79–77.[1] He established himself as a leading orator and, despite being a *nouus homo*, swiftly made his way through the *cursus honorum*, which culminated in his consulship in 63. In what he considered his finest hour, Cicero uncovered plans for a violent coup by a number of senators led by the disaffected patrician L. Sergius Catilina, and was able to thwart their plot. Whereas Catiline fell on the battlefield in Etruria, those of his fellow conspirators who had been arrested at Rome were executed, a measure of doubtful legality that Cicero had advocated on the basis of a senatorial decree that (he claimed) granted emergency powers to the consuls.

Cicero considered himself Rome's savior and was hoping henceforth to play a role as a distinguished and influential elder statesman; however, the political situation developed in ways at odds with his moderate conservatism, turning more and more unstable and polarized in the course of the 50s. The informal power-sharing arrangement among C. Iulius Caesar, Cn. Pompeius Magnus, and M. Licinius Crassus (today often called the First Triumvirate, although it had no foundation in law), which lasted from 59 to Crassus' death in 53, left Cicero politically sidelined, while the tribunate of the rabid *popularis* and Cicero's personal enemy P. Clodius

[1] Rawson 1975 remains the best general biography of Cicero. For greater detail, see Mitchell 1979 and 1991, as well as Marinone and Malaspina 2004 for matters of dating. For the historical background, see the relevant chapters in *CAH*[2] 9.

Pulcher in 58 spelled disaster: Clodius passed a law banishing anyone who had put a Roman citizen to death without a trial, a tailor-made measure directed at Cicero for his execution of the Catilinarians. Cicero fled to Macedonia, and while he was recalled the following year and made a triumphant return to Rome, he continued to find the state of the *res publica* deeply depressing.

It was at this time that Cicero wrote his first major dialogues, *De oratore* (55) on excellence in oratory and *De re publica* (51) on the best form of government, both of which are colored by his concerns for the political situation. In the middle of the 50s, Rome descended into political violence as Clodius and his opponent T. Annius Milo led rival gangs, and elections and other political business were often interrupted or prevented from taking place altogether. In 51–50, Cicero was abroad governing the province of Cilicia, and by the time he returned, civil war was on the horizon. After the death of Crassus, Caesar had become increasingly alienated from Pompey and was seeking to shore up his position for his anticipated return from Gaul, where he had been campaigning since 58. Wary of Caesar's power and armies, the senate dithered, ultimately refusing him the right to run for a consulship without first dismissing his legions. In response, Caesar in January 49 led his army across the Rubicon into Roman territory, effectively starting a civil war, one in which Pompey now took the role of defending senatorial rule.

As Caesar quickly established control of Italy and forced Pompey to retreat to Greece, Cicero for months agonized over which course to take, but ultimately joined the Pompeian army. After Pompey suffered a decisive defeat at the battle of Pharsalus in August 48, however, Cicero returned to Italy and after some delay received the pardon of Caesar, who was by now de facto sole ruler of Rome. Under Caesar's dictatorship, Cicero had no opportunity to exercise political influence and instead devoted himself to writing, producing in the years 46–44 both major works on oratory (especially the *Brutus* and *Orator*) and a series of philosophical writings. The latter corpus presents a semi-systematic course on the subject, moving from an exhortation to philosophy (*Hortensius*) to epistemology (*Academica*), ethics (*De finibus, Tusculans*) and physics and theology (*De natura deorum, De diuinatione, De fato*), before treating specific ethical topics in *De senectute* (old age), *Amic.* (friendship), and *De officiis* (moral action).

In these works, Cicero does not espouse the doctrines of any particular philosophical school. Claiming allegiance to the so-called New or Skeptical Academy (the anti-doctrinaire branch of Academic philosophy predominant since the third century and represented by Cicero's main teacher Philo of Larissa), he instead lays out the opinions of Stoicism, Epicureanism, and other sects and explores their respective strengths and

weaknesses. While Cicero does occasionally express or hint at his own opinion, he in Skeptical fashion leaves many questions open, inviting his readers to come to their own conclusion.[2]

Cicero viewed his philosophical writings as both a distraction and a consolation, not only for the loss of Rome's political freedom but also for the death of his beloved daughter Tullia in early 45.[3] At the same time, he was hoping to educate his countrymen in philosophy and to create a body of philosophical writing in Latin to rival the works of the Greeks. By providing this benefit to the Romans, Cicero saw himself as continuing his previous public service by other means – and by stressing the importance of a life based on rational and moral principles, he was sending a message to a society that in his opinion had lost its moral compass. While the works written under Caesar's rule were not overtly political, presenting instead a retreat into a pointedly Caesar-free space,[4] those written after the Ides of March – *Amic.*, *De officiis*, and the lost *De gloria* – took a more didactic stance, signaling to Cicero's readers that ethical misconceptions were to blame for Rome's recent woes and that a functioning society needed to be based on an informed commitment to the morally good.

Caesar's death also led to Cicero's reentry into politics. While he had not been part of the group of men who under the leadership of M. Iunius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus had assassinated Caesar, Cicero wholeheartedly approved of their deed. To his despair, however, the self-styled liberators had no strategy for the aftermath of the Ides and allowed Caesar's right-hand man and fellow consul M. Antonius ("Antony") to consolidate his own position of power and stoke popular resentment against the conspirators. Matters were additionally complicated by the arrival on the scene of Caesar's great-nephew and heir, the young C. Octavius ("Octavian"). As it became increasingly clear that Brutus and his followers had utterly failed to reestablish a functioning republic, Cicero from early April onward spent most of the spring and summer at his various country estates, agonizing over the state of affairs and over what action he himself ought to take. He made plans to travel to Greece, but in August changed his mind and returned to Rome, where he immediately found himself in conflict with Antony. In a series of senate meetings, Antony first challenged Cicero (1 September), who issued a spirited reply (2 September, the so-called first *Philippic*), which in turn led to a violent attack by Antony

[2] On Cicero's philosophy, see Gawlick and Görler 1994 and Woolf 2015.

[3] Cicero's motivation and purpose in writing the philosophical works can be reconstructed from his extensive prefaces. See Gildenhard 2007, Baraz 2012, and Volk 2021: 149–55.

[4] For this interpretation, see Volk 2021: 155–8.

(19 September); the devastating denunciation of Antony that Cicero penned in response (the second *Philippic*) was never delivered and only circulated in writing. Henceforth, Cicero considered it his task to oppose Antony in what he saw as a last-ditch effort to save the Republic, ultimately writing a total of fourteen *Philippics* and attempting to rally the senate and the various political and military players.

The year 43 saw open civil war in northern Italy, and after Antony was defeated at Mutina in April in a battle that involved armies not only of the legitimate consuls but also of Octavian, it looked for a moment as though Cicero's objective had been attained. However, since both consuls – A. Hirtius and C. Vibius Pansa – had died in the conflict, Rome found itself in a power vacuum, and Antony was able to regroup and ultimately effect a rapprochement with Octavian. Together with M. Aemilius Lepidus, they formed the Second Triumvirate in late November and immediately proceeded to proscribe their political enemies, among them Cicero and his family.[5] Cicero was killed on 7 December; his severed head and hands were publicly displayed at Rome.[6]

Amic. is one of Cicero's last works and appears to have been written in September/October 44, at the time when he reentered the political scene and started to oppose Antony in public. A *terminus post quem* is furnished by the preface of the second book of *De diuinatione*, which was written shortly after the Ides of March. There, Cicero provides a list of his philosophical works so far, but does not mention *Amic.* By contrast, *De senectute*, to which *Amic.* is a sequel of sorts and which was likewise dedicated to Cicero's friend Atticus, is said to have been written only recently (*Div.* 2.3 *nuper*). This means that *Amic.* did not yet exist in March 44, and there is no indication that Cicero at this point had any plan to write such a work: the only future project mentioned in the preface is *De fato.*

As mentioned above, Cicero spent the late spring and summer of 44 away from Rome, a time that is well documented in his frequent letters to Atticus. In this correspondence, Cicero discusses his current literary projects, most notably *De gloria*, but never mentions *Amic.* A *terminus ante quem* is provided by the second book of *De officiis*, where Cicero explains why he is not discussing the topic of friendship in this work: "about friendship I have spoken in another book, which is titled *Laelius*."[7] As we learn from *Att.* 16.11.4, Cicero had completed the first two books of *De officiis*

[5] Unlike the informal three-man agreement of the 50s, the Second Triumvirate was an official board of three sanctioned by law.

[6] Descriptions of Cicero's death (and obituaries for him) by Livy and Asinius Pollio are preserved by Sen. *Suas.* 6.14–17, 22, 24–5.

[7] *Off.* 2.31 *de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur Laelius.*

by early November, which means that *Amic.* too must have been written before then. In the same letter, Cicero tells Atticus that he will put the last touches to a certain book that Atticus has asked for and will send it to him;[8] it is possible that this is *Amic.*, but there is no way to know.

It thus appears that Cicero composed the work in September and/or October 44, and the reason why we know nothing about its genesis is that for that period, there is next to no correspondence with Atticus, since the two friends were both at Rome. There were good reasons for Cicero to be especially interested in the topic of friendship at this time: his public falling-out with Antony involved accusations and counteraccusations of friendship betrayed,[9] and the question of loyalty to friends versus obligation to one's country was a topic much discussed in the aftermath of Caesar's death, as seen, among other places, in Cicero's exchange of letters with C. Matius (*Fam.* 11.27 and 28; probably late August 44).[10] Cicero may also have been feeling especially warmly toward Atticus at this time: during their separation in the summer, he had frequently written to his friend about how he was missing him and twice mentioned the tearful goodbye that took place when it looked as though Cicero was going to leave Italy.[11]

Cicero had been friends with T. Pomponius Atticus (110–32) since their student days and kept up this relationship throughout his life. (As Craig Williams points out, the Romans apparently did not have a concept of "best friend"[12] – but Atticus seems to have played this role for Cicero.) A wealthy equestrian, Atticus decided against entering politics and instead dedicated himself to managing his considerable wealth, notably by acting as a banker and moneylender to the Roman elite.[13] He was an invaluable adviser to Cicero on literary matters and also assisted in the production and circulation of his books. His own intellectual interests were wide-ranging: his Philhellenism and a long-time sojourn in Athens earned him his nickname "the man from Attica"; he was well versed in philosophy and personally espoused Epicureanism; and he engaged in historical research, producing genealogies of old Roman families and dedicating to Cicero his *Liber annalis*, a chronology of Roman history. Atticus' avowed

[8] *Att.* 16.11.3 *librum quem rogas perpoliam et mittam.*
[9] See *Phil.* 1.11, 1.12, 1.26, 1.28, 2.3, 2.6, 2.7.
[10] For the Matius letters, see the Appendix.
[11] *Att.* 15.27.2, 16.2.6, 16.3.4, 16.6.2.
[12] Williams 2012: 30.
[13] On Atticus, see Perlwitz 1992, Benferhat 2005: 98–169, and Volk 2021: 104–8. In addition to Cicero's letters, the most important ancient source is the biography by Cornelius Nepos, on whose relation to *Amic.*, see Nelsestuen 2019, 2023 and Stem 2019.

political neutrality, coupled with his social skills and shrewdness in keeping up friendly relationships with members of all factions, stood him in excellent stead throughout his life and especially during the Second Triumvirate: originally proscribed, he was saved by Antony and flourished during the uncertain times that followed. In philosophical fashion, he ended his life by suicide once he learned that he was suffering from an incurable disease.

What was the title of the book on friendship that Cicero dedicated to his friend? Ancient titles are notoriously hard to pin down: apparently the Greeks and Romans thought of the designations of books less as immutable paratexts than as convenient ad hoc ways to refer to a work or indicate its content. As we have seen in *Off.* 2.31, Cicero himself says that his dialogue "bears the title" (*inscribitur*) *Laelius* but also that it is *de amicitia* ("about friendship").[14] Both titles, either separately or in combination, are found throughout later references as well as in the manuscripts.[15] While the simple *de* + ablative topic-designating title was widespread in Latin writing, its combination with a preceding name is also found, most notably in the *Logistorici* of Cicero's friend and contemporary M. Terentius Varro, which survive only in fragments but apparently featured the speaker named in each title discoursing on the topic indicated with *de* (e.g., *Curio de cultu deorum*). It is impossible to know whether Cicero envisaged such a double title or whether *Laelius* and *de amicitia* are simply two alternative ways of referring to the same work;[16] however, *Laelius de amicitia* has become the accepted heading, and it is the one we have adopted as well.

2 ANCIENT FRIENDSHIP

The Greeks and Romans had friends, whose company they enjoyed, whom they cherished, and with whom they occasionally quarreled. They had ideas about what friendship was, how friends ought to behave toward one another, and what it took to be a true friend. They reflected on friendship in many contexts, from proverbs to poetry to speeches, and some of them even wrote philosophical treatises on the topic.

To be precise, the ancients did not have friends, but *philoi* (Gk.) or *amici* (Lat.), and what exactly these terms mean and to what extent Greek and Roman friendship is, or is not, like its modern counterpart

[14] In *Amic.* 4, Cicero similarly describes his companion dialogue as the "*Cato Maior*, which is written 'about old age' (*de senectute*)."

[15] See the apparatus in Powell 2006.

[16] See Gell. *NA* 17.5.1 *M. Cicero in dialogo cui titulus est Laelius uel de amicitia* ("M. Cicero in the dialogue whose title is *Laelius* or *De amicitia*").

has been much debated.[17] Thus, *amicitia* (to stay on the Roman side of things) sometimes seems to be what we understand by "friendship" while sometimes it does not, and depending on their outlook on this and other aspects of the ancient world, scholars have tended to stress either the similarity or the difference. What is at stake is first and foremost the emotional aspect of this relationship: did the Greeks and Romans think of friendship primarily as a warmly affectionate bond, as many people do today, or did they view it as a more pragmatic and utilitarian association?

Before attempting to decide this question, one needs to realize that just like English "friendship" (or the equivalents in other modern languages), *amicitia* did not have a clear definition and could be used to refer to a wide variety of relationships. As David Konstan has pointed out, the concept of friendship tends to be overdetermined, that is, capable of including so many cases and allowing for so many definitions as to emerge positively self-contradictory.[18] Friendship – unlike, say, cats or tables – is not something that has an independent existence in reality, but is an abstract idea of a relationship, and "friend" is a term that can be applied to many individuals in many situations. The question is thus not what *amicitia* and *amici* really *are*, but in what circumstances and with what connotations the Romans use these words.[19]

Ancient theorizing about *amicitia* (including *Amic.*) tends to be highly idealistic and to stress the emotional component of friendship.[20] By contrast, many modern scholars have viewed *amicitia* as a fairly unsentimental practice. The view promoted by such mid twentieth-century Roman historians as Ronald Syme and Lily Ross Taylor – that *amicitia* was a term for a political alliance or even party – has largely been laid to rest, thanks especially to an important article by Peter Brunt (1965). Surveying the use of *amicitia/amicus* especially by Cicero, Brunt not only showed that "true affection" is the "primitive significance of the word" (1965: 7), but that members of the Roman elite – far from reserving *amicus* for their political allies – urbanely used the term in interaction with nearly all their

[17] On ancient friendship generally, see Konstan 1997; specifically on Rome, see Brunt 1965, Verboven 2011, Williams 2012, and Rollinger 2014.

[18] Konstan 1997: 11–14.

[19] See Williams 2012: 54: "If writers of Latin texts refer to a relationship as *amicitia* or describe a person as someone's *amicus*, then, in the absence of any explicit indication that the words are being used in a transferred, metaphorical, or nonliteral sense, it is *amicitia* and they are *amici*, regardless of what else they might be."

[20] For convenience, we will continue to use "friendship" and "friend" for *philia/philos* and *amicitia/amicus*.

peers, creating a base assumption of *amicitia* that was only rarely disturbed by declared *inimicitiae*.[21]

A more persistent theory of *amicitia*, popular especially among Roman historians, is informed by anthropological studies of gift-giving and reciprocity in traditional societies. On this view, the relationship of *amicitia* is defined by an exchange of services that is not contractual, but based on the recognition of mutual obligation: if your friend, say, represents you in court, you may reciprocate by helping to arrange a favorable marriage for his daughter. This approach has a basis in ancient reflections on friendship and social interactions in general: the Romans took very seriously the notion of *beneficia*, the "good deeds" or "benefactions" that people bestow on one another and that recipients are honor-bound to repay. The topic plays a role in both *Amic.* and *De officiis* (especially 1.42–60, 2.52–85); a century later, Seneca would dedicate an entire treatise to the subject (*De beneficiis*).

Even if the Romans recognized and valued the exchange of services inherent in *amicitia*, however, it is clear that they did not consider this the only or even the most important aspect of such relationships. Both popular and elite reflections on friendship tend to dwell on its pleasant and affectionate elements, to idealize the friend as an *alter ego*, and to express the hope that true friendship will last forever.[22] With this recognition, there has been an, as it were, philological-humanistic backlash against the sociological-anthropological view: paying detailed attention to the ways the Greeks and Romans themselves talk about *philia* and *amicitia*, a number of scholars have concluded that ancient friendship (to the extent that it can be pinned down) is quite close to its modern counterpart and typically understood as an affective, non-utilitarian relationship.[23]

A working definition of *amicitia* thus would be a relationship between two or among a small number of individuals (in ancient discourse, predominantly men[24]) that is distinguished from kinship on one side and erotic love on the other. It is characterized by affection and benevolence, which lead to an exchange of good services of all kinds, a process that is viewed as voluntary and non-transactional. Friends are expected to reciprocate their friends' *beneficia* with grace and gratitude, to enjoy spending

[21] On *inimicitiae*, see *Amic.* 34n. *inimicitias* with bibliography.

[22] On such topoi of friendship, see Bohnenblust 1905: 26–44; Fürst 1996: 203–22, 231–42.

[23] Most influential in this paradigm shift has been Konstan 1997.

[24] In keeping with the male-centered focus of ancient discussions of friendship in general and *Amic.* in particular, we are using masculine pronouns unless women appear to be included.

time with them, and to remain faithful and loyal to them through good and bad fortune. According to popular moralizing, people make friends with those who are similar to them and ideally find themselves with a friend who is truly "another self."

Friendship was thus highly valued, but the Greeks and Romans were, of course, aware that reality did not always live up to such ideals.[25] What happened if friends disagreed? Was your friend really trustworthy or did he just tell you what you wanted to hear? And how could you be sure that your friend would not drop you in a crisis or once he thought you were no longer useful to him? Friendship – so everybody agreed – was a wonderful thing, but it was also a practice beset with anxieties. When philosophers turned their attention to friendship, they addressed and tried to resolve some of these inherent tensions.[26]

Socrates may have been in the habit of debating the nature of *philia* with his followers, judging from the fact that the topic appears in the dialogues of both Xenophon and Plato. In the second book of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Socrates considers a number of issues pertaining to friendship – notably the necessity of choosing one's friends wisely – some of which would become commonplaces in later discussions.[27] The question of the origin and nature of affection plays a role in numerous Platonic dialogues, notably the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, while the *Lysis* is dedicated entirely to the topic.[28] In this early dialogue, Socrates questions the eponymous young man about what exactly it is that makes someone *philos* ("dear, beloved, a friend") to someone else. One of the answers mooted is the idea (prominent also in the *Symposium*) that one loves and desires that which one lacks onself. However, the dialogue ends in *aporia*.

The most important ancient philosophical discussion of friendship is that of Aristotle, who treats the topic most prominently in Books 8 and 9 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[29] Famously, Aristotle distinguished three types of friendship, based on their ultimate object, which may be the good, the pleasant, or the useful. Only the first – friendship among the virtuous for

[25] On ancient responses to the challenges faced by friendship, see Fürst 1996.

[26] Fürst 1996 and Pangle 2003 discuss a variety of ancient philosophical approaches to friendship (for a list of ancient writings on the topic, see Fürst 1996: 244–6); compare also Powell 1995 and Evangelou 2022: 4–9, 19–64. Literature on individual authors appears below.

[27] Cf. *Amic.* 62 with commentary.

[28] On the *Lysis*, see Bolotin 1979, Price 1989: 1–14, and Pangle 2003: 20–36.

[29] See also *Eth. Eud.* Book 7; *Rh.* 1, 1371a17–24; 2, 1380b34–1381b37; *Pol.* 2, 1262b7–24, 1263a41–b5; [*Mag. mor.*] 2, 1208b3–1213b31. For discussion, see Cooper 1980, Price 1989, Pakaluk 1998, Pangle 2003, Whiting 2006, and P. L. Miller 2014.

the sake of the good – is perfect *philia*, but the lesser forms, too, are characterized by good will among friends. Intriguingly, Aristotle argues that the love of friends ultimately arises out of self-love: one relates to a friend as one relates to oneself, and can recognize oneself in one's *alter ego*.

No complete philosophical works on friendship survive from the Hellenistic period, but we know that thinkers from all schools discussed the topic. According to Aulus Gellius, Theophrastus' *On Friendship* was a source for Cicero and considered, among other issues, the vexed question of whether for the sake of a friend in need one might bend the rules of strict morality and/or legality.[30] The Stoics valued friendship and maintained that the wise were by definition linked by a bond of *philia*; however, they had to contend with the objection that a self-sufficient sage can hardly be said to "need" friends.[31]

The school that perhaps more than any other placed a high value on friendship was Epicureanism, but Epicurus' exact teachings on the topic were controversial already in antiquity and remain so today.[32] Holding that pleasure is the only good, the Epicureans had a utilitarian view of friendship: friends were an excellent means not only of procuring pleasure in the present moment, but also of creating a feeling of security concerning the future, since one could rely on one's friends to be there in a crisis. The fact, however, that Epicurus and his followers also extolled the affection and loyalty one felt for one's friends gave rise to the suspicion that their doctrine was self-contradictory: if friends are merely a means to an end, why would one, say, continue to love a friend once he has stopped being useful?

There are thus some central questions concerning friendship that individual philosophers and schools raise but do not always answer. One is the purpose of and motivation for friendship: is a friend just a means to some end, or is friendship born out of truly altruistic affection? A second question is that of the self-sufficiency prized by all philosophical schools: if our happiness depends entirely on our own mental disposition, do we even need friends? A third issue is that of a possible conflict of interest between friendship and moral or legal norms: how far can or should we go for a friend? And finally, there is the general problem of ideal versus reality: how can we establish and maintain true friendship in the real world? In *Amic.*, Cicero takes up all these questions, rehearsing some of the answers given by his philosophical predecessors and adding a few of his own.

[30] See Gell. *NA* 1.3 and *Amic.* 36–44, 61 with commentary.

[31] This problem is discussed by Seneca in *Ep.* 9. On Stoic friendship, see Banateanu 2001 and Long 2013.

[32] See Mitsis 2020, with a survey of scholarship.

In Cicero's own life, *amicitia* played an important role. Like no doubt all his fellow members of the Roman elite, he had wide, interlocking circles of *amici*, who ranged from fellow senators and business associates to such close intimates as Atticus. With Cicero, however, we are in the unique situation that we can observe the workings of friendship through the corpus of his letters, which number over 900 and include not only epistles written by Cicero himself but also some addressed to him. In these correspondences, we see *amicitia* in action, with writers affirming their mutual affection, referring to their common experiences, and asking, or expressing thanks, for favors from their friends. At the same time, the act of letter-writing is itself an important element of *amicitia*: correspondence is one way of exchanging *beneficia*, and the repeated claim to friendship found in the letters can be seen as a speech act establishing and confirming the correspondents' status as *amici*.[33]

In addition to performing friendship in his correspondence, Cicero presents an idealized form of upper-class *amicitia* in his dialogues, where members of the senatorial class meet in their country houses and engage in urbane and learned discussions of politics, oratory, and philosophy. Whether these conversations feature figures of the past (*De re publica*, *De oratore*, *De senectute*, *Amic.*) or Cicero and his own friends (all other dialogues), the work is never concerned just with the topic being discussed, but also with the community carefully constructed by the author. And this, finally, brings us to *Amic.* itself.

3 *DE AMICITIA* AND CICERO'S VISION OF FRIENDSHIP

(a) Dialogue set-up and speakers

In the preface of *Amic.*, Cicero draws attention to the similarity between this dialogue and *De senectute*, written only a few months earlier and also addressed to Atticus. The two dialogues are related in style, structure – they are both essentially monologues – and setting: while *De senectute* depicts a conversation taking place in 150 BCE among the elder Cato and his two younger friends Scipio Aemilianus and Laelius shortly before Cato's death, *Amic.* reports a discussion of 129 among Laelius and his two sons-in-law C. Fannius and Q. Mucius Scaevola shortly after the death of Scipio Aemilianus.[34] How Cicero came to know about a discussion that took place eighty-five years before he wrote the dialogue is described in

[33] See Wilcox 2012 and Volk 2021: 36, 42, 52.

[34] On the set-up of *Amic.*, compare Sedlmeyr 2021: 231–54.

the preface: as a young man, at the age of eighteen, he had heard about it from Scaevola, one of Cicero's own mentors, who was recollecting not long before his own death what Laelius had said about friendship forty years earlier.

Cicero constructed his dialogues very carefully:[35] he tried to have speakers and settings appropriate to, or at least not inconsistent with, the subject matter, and in the one case (the *Academica*) in which he felt in retrospect that his choice of speakers had been inappropriate, he revised the dialogue to make that aspect of it more convincing.[36] So too, he was concerned not only that his depiction of settings be historically accurate and without anachronism, but also, in the case of dialogues with a historical setting, that he provide a plausible explanation for his knowledge of what had been said. The one exception to this is *De senectute*: rather than pretend to be reporting a conversation that had taken place more than a century before the time of writing, he instead compared the verisimilitude of his use of Cato as a protagonist whose life and ideas were well known to the employment of a mythological character such as Tithonus by Aristo of Ceus (*Sen.* 3). That Cicero's narratives of transmission were fictions, and were not expected to be taken as true by readers, is much less important than the connections that Cicero establishes between himself and his speakers, and indeed among the speakers of the dialogues themselves. The setting and characters of *Amic.* are very closely linked to those of *De re publica*: both dialogues are set in 129; the three speakers of *Amic.* are also participants in *De re publica*; and the two conversations take place before and after a singular dramatic event that colors both dialogues: the sudden death of Scipio Aemilianus, the protagonist of *De re publica* and the close friend of C. Laelius, the protagonist of *Amic.*

Although (being dead) Scipio Aemilianus does not take part in the conversation of *Amic.*, his presence is constant and palpable, and Laelius repeatedly connects his own discourse on friendship with what Scipio had said about the subject in earlier discussions. P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus was the natural son of L. Aemilius Paullus, the great general who defeated the Macedonians at the battle of Pydna in 168; he acquired the name by which he is known through being adopted by P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of the Scipio Africanus who had defeated Hannibal in the Second Punic War. Scipio Aemilianus was himself a forceful political and military figure: twice consul (147, 134) and censor (142), he defeated

[35] See now Sedlmeyr 2021.
[36] See Griffin 1997b, Gurd 2012: 71–4, and Cappello 2019: 11–81.

and destroyed Carthage in 146 and Numantia in 133 and received triumphs for both victories.[37]

The three men who actually participate in the conversation of *Amic.* were all close friends of Scipio and also closely connected to one another:

C. Laelius was born in 186 or 185 and thus in his late fifties at the dramatic date of the dialogue. He was consul in 140, a member of the college of augurs, a man renowned for his judicious and practical approach to public life, and often referred to as Laelius Sapiens ("the wise"). He is the main speaker in *Amic.*, prompted by occasional questions and comments from his interlocutors, his two sons-in-law.

C. Fannius M.f. was born in the early 160s, and was thus in his late thirties in 129; he was married to Laelius' younger daughter. His career and activities are often confused with those of his homonymous first cousin, C. Fannius C.f. (hence the need to use filiation in referring to them); the C. Fannius of *Amic.* seems to have served as a soldier in the Third Punic War together with Ti. Gracchus; after the dramatic date of *Amic.* he became praetor (probably in 126), and as consul in 122 spoke against C. Gracchus' proposal to extend Roman citizenship to Latins and Italians. One of the two C. Fannii was a well-respected historian; it seems very probable that it was the one who was Laelius' son-in-law.[38]

Q. Mucius Q.f. Scaevola was a year or so younger than Fannius, but was married to Laelius' elder daughter. He too has a homonym, from whom Cicero is careful to distinguish him in the opening chapter of the dialogue: our Scaevola, known as Scaevola Augur, is an older cousin of Q. Mucius P.f. Scaevola, known as Scaevola Pontifex; both men were distinguished jurisconsults, Scaevola Pontifex much more so, and Cicero knew, and studied with, both of them. Other members of his family supported Ti. Gracchus' agrarian legislation, and the Augur too was apparently sympathetic to the Gracchi. He went on to the praetorship (probably in 120) and consulate (117), but he was far more active as a jurist than as a public figure.

The family relationship among Laelius, Fannius, and Scaevola is important in establishing the framework of the dialogue: like Cicero's other

[37] The most important treatment of Scipio's life and public career is Astin 1967.

[38] Fannius' identity problems have been much discussed but are largely irrelevant to *Amic.* The clear and useful survey of the evidence in Cornell 2013 gives a full bibliography of earlier discussions and inclines to identify C. Fannius C.f. as the historian.

historical dialogues, the conversation represents the transmission of knowledge and experience from one generation to the next, and here Laelius is contributing to the education of his daughters' husbands. The family relationship also explains why Fannius and Scaevola have come to visit Laelius at his home at this particular time. Cicero describes the occasion as *post mortem Africani* (5), and Fannius' opening sentence (6), beginning as if in the middle of a conversation, indicates that they have been discussing the virtues of the recently deceased Scipio. The subsequent conversation shows that, because Laelius has missed the monthly meeting of the college of augurs (of which all three men were members), the sons-in-law are worried about Laelius' state of mind and health. It is, in fact, a condolence call.

Scipio's sudden death in 129 was, and remains, mysterious, and it needs to be seen in its political context as well as in the context of the personal loss experienced by Laelius. When Scipio returned from Spain in 132 to celebrate his triumph over Numantia, the Rome he encountered was significantly different, at least in political terms, from the city he had left two years earlier. In the interval, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (who was in fact Scipio's cousin and brother-in-law) was elected tribune for 133; his agrarian program for the redistribution of public land to landless citizens – supported by a significant segment of the senate as well as being extremely popular – was passed only after Tiberius had his fellow tribune Octavius, who had threatened to veto the law, stripped of his office. In the aftermath of that unprecedented action, Tiberius sought reelection to the tribunate; that was equally unprecedented, and in the disturbances surrounding the election Tiberius was killed by a mob under the leadership of the pontifex maximus Scipio Nasica. The division of opinion about Tiberius – whether he had been a true hero of the people or had attempted to subvert the traditional constitution and seize power for himself – was both deep and violent.[39]

We do not know what Scipio actually thought about the substance of Tiberius' agrarian legislation, but his response to the sequence of events is clear: after his return, on being asked in a public meeting in 131 by Tiberius' supporter C. Papirius Carbo what he thought about Tiberius' death, Scipio said that if Tiberius had sought to seize power, then he was rightly killed: *iure caesum*.[40] That response did much to damage the popular

[39] On the tribunate of Ti. Gracchus, its background and its aftereffects, see Earl 1963, Badian 1972, and Stockton 1979: 6–97. A brief overview is found in Lintott 1994: 62–77.

[40] There are many versions of the episode, collected by Astin 1967: 264–5. The version of Vell. Pat. 2.4.4 gives Scipio's words (in indirect discourse) as *si*

support on which Scipio had built his career, and over the next two years he emerged as the leader of an attempt to reverse or at least reduce the effects of the Gracchan land program by taking from the land commission the power to adjudicate disputes over the property they were trying to redistribute. Scipio's efforts met with some success; but after delivering a public speech on the subject (which was met with shouts of "kill the tyrant" from his audience) and returning home surrounded by a crowd of admiring citizens, the next morning he was found dead. The cause of his demise is unknown, and it appears that there was no formal investigation. Cicero himself seems to have believed that it was murder, as did others at the time; suspects included not only Carbo and Tiberius' younger brother Gaius, but even Scipio's wife (and the sister of the Gracchi) Sempronia. There was an impressive funeral; the oration was delivered by Scipio's nephew Q. Fabius Maximus, but it was written by Laelius.

Amic. is set shortly after the death of Scipio, which provides its dramatic context; in that respect it is a companion piece for *De re publica*, which is set shortly before Scipio's death and which – at least in the prophecy in the *Somnium Scipionis* which concludes the dialogue – anticipates it.[41] The conversation of *De re publica* is referred to more than once in *Amic.*: Laelius mentions the *Somnium Scipionis* and its ideas about the immortality of the soul (*Amic.* 14), and Scaevola refers to Laelius' speech on justice in *De re publica* 3 (25). All three participants in *Amic.* took part in the conversation of *De re publica* – even if Laelius (or Cicero himself) forgets that Fannius was there, perhaps in order to have an excuse to report what was said then.[42]

The two dialogues take place in the same milieu, and between them they offer a picture of a harmonious group of well-educated and civic-minded aristocrats, stretching over several generations, from the oldest (M'. Manilius, cos. 149, in *De re publica*) through the generation of Scipio and Laelius, to the younger group including P. Rutilius Rufus and Q. Aelius Tubero in *De re publica* as well as Fannius and Scaevola in both dialogues. Laelius at one point describes relationships among the various friends as taking place *in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege* "in our group, so to speak" (69), and the two dialogues in combination have sometimes been taken as a true portrait of a "Scipionic Circle," an established and cohesive

is occupandae rei publicae animum habuisset, iure caesum; Cicero twice (*Mil.* 8; *De or.* 2.106) simply quotes *iure caesum uideri.*

[41] See *Rep.* 6.12. Scipio's death was almost certainly discussed by Cicero in the preface to Book 5 of *De re publica*; cf. Zetzel 2022: 285–9.

[42] Both Laelius and Scaevola (14, 25) state that Fannius did not participate in the earlier dialogue; see commentary.

group of friends with the same cultural ideals and aspirations, and perhaps with shared political beliefs.[43] Scipio himself was certainly well educated and knowledgeable about Greek culture: Aemilius Paullus gave his sons access to the library of the Macedonian kings, and Scipio knew well both the historian Polybius and the Stoic philosopher Panaetius. At least three of the other participants in *De re publica* (L. Furius Philus, P. Rutilius Rufus, and Scipio's nephew Q. Aelius Tubero) were also serious students of Stoicism. Scipio and Laelius were friendly with the satirist Lucilius, and they were said by some to have written one or more of Terence's comedies; Terence himself in the prologue to the *Adelphoe* proudly reports that some people claim that his plays were written by *homines nobiles* (15–21), and Suetonius' biography of Terence collects a number of reports about the connections between the poet and Scipio and Laelius.[44]

And yet, while Scipio and Laelius may have been friendly with all these people individually at one time or another, the groups defined by the two dialogues are in fact rather different, and there is no reason to believe in a "Scipionic Circle" that served as a center for cultural diffusion and philosophical humanism in mid second-century Rome. In constructing his historical dialogues, Cicero emphasizes the cultural attainments, political moderation, and intellectual powers of his speakers, often at the cost of understating both the breadth of cultural knowledge in Rome in this period outside this small group and the complexity of the political relationships in which they were involved: in Cicero's texts, the world of Scipio and Laelius, like the world of the great orators Crassus and Antonius in *De oratore*, is kinder, gentler, and probably a good deal more intellectual than it actually was.

Although Cicero had no interest in creating something like the modern idea of the Scipionic Circle, he was very much concerned to represent, not only in *Amic.* but in the group of historical dialogues taken together, an image of a humane and intellectually sophisticated Roman aristocracy that existed not at one particular moment, but over a long extent of time – lasting, in fact, from the dramatic date of *De senectute* in 150 to that of *De oratore* in 91 and, beyond that, extending to the world of Cicero himself. *Amic.* is the last of the historical dialogues, and its setting and conversation in many ways refer back to the three earlier works. In some respects

[43] The fullest (and most credulous) account of the Scipionic Circle in English is that of Brown 1934; more skeptical discussions in Astin 1967: 294–306, Zetzel 1972, and Hanchey 2013b.

[44] Suet. *Vita Terenti* 2–4; see *Amic.* 89n. *in Andria familiaris meus.* The most important contemporary text (quoted by Suetonius) is Porcius Licinus fr. 3 Courtney; Courtney 1993: 87–90 provides a good discussion of the evidence.

the closest relative of *Amic.* is *De senectute*, written a few months earlier and also dedicated to Atticus. In the preface to *Amic.* (4–5), Cicero draws attention to the parallel; within the dialogue, Laelius himself – who, with Scipio, is one of the junior questioners in *De senectute* – mentions his relationship with Cato (11, 76).

Laelius plays an important role in connecting these conversations and establishing the continuity of humane discourse over the generations. He takes part in three dialogues (*De re publica* and *Amic.* as well as *De senectute*, Scipio is a living presence in two of them and hovers over the third), and in two of them he is accompanied by his sons-in-law. The family connection continues through Scaevola Augur: like Laelius, he appears in three of the historical dialogues (*De oratore* and *De re publica* as well as *Amic.*), in two of them as a relatively young man attending his father-in-law, in *De oratore* as an old man visiting his own son-in-law, L. Licinius Crassus, the protagonist of that dialogue. In *De re publica* and *Amic.* he says little, as is appropriate for a younger man in the presence of his elders and betters; but in *Amic.* he also serves as the purported source for Cicero's knowledge of the conversation.

As Cicero tells Atticus in the dialogue's preface, he had learned about Laelius' views on friendship from Scaevola more than forty years earlier, in a conversation that took place in 88 BCE. The nature of friendship was then, he says, a topical subject, as Atticus' friend P. Sulpicius Rufus, one of the tribunes of that year, had just broken off his close friendship with the consul Q. Pompeius Rufus, resulting in severe political disturbances and indeed the death of Sulpicius; those events led Scaevola to recall Laelius' discussion of friendship in the similarly difficult circumstances of 129. Sulpicius Rufus is one of the younger participants in *De oratore*, the dramatic date of which is 91; his rupture with his former friends in 88 is described in almost identical language in the preface to Book 3 of *De oratore* (3.11), and he was (at least up to 88) a friend of Atticus, just as both Atticus and Cicero himself had received some training in law from Scaevola.[45] Friendships are, as the whole dialogue makes clear, not always easy to maintain, particularly in the world of public life; but as the dialogue also demonstrates, both through the account of its transmission and through Laelius' discourse, friendship does not just encompass contemporaries, but is also the context for the transmission of knowledge, experience, and affection over many generations.

[45] On Atticus and Sulpicius Rufus, see *Amic.* 2n. *utebare multum.* On Sulpicius' role in the events of 88, see Hodgson 2017 and Zetzel 2022: 60–1.

(b) Structure

The discussion in *Amic.* is loosely structured, keeping up the illusion of a real conversation in which Laelius at the behest of his sons-in-law shares his thoughts about friendship (see Table 1[46]). After the preface (A), the dialogue begins *in medias res* (B): as the three men are reminiscing about Scipio, Fannius directs their talk away from the dead man to Laelius himself, whose cognomen and status as *sapiens* he highlights before stating that everyone is wondering how Laelius is coping with the death of his friend. The ensuing preliminary conversation largely consists in Laelius' clarifying his state of mind: he is obviously affected by Scipio's death, but comforts himself with the recollection of their friendship and the greatness of his friend's achievements (referring to the visionary dream Scipio recounted in *De re publica*, Laelius further raises the possibility that the deceased is enjoying a blessed afterlife). Modestly deprecating his own reputation for wisdom, Laelius ends by saying that he would prefer for himself and Scipio to be remembered as a famous pair of friends.

The mention of friendship provides an opening for Fannius and Scaevola to ask Laelius to expound his views on the topic, "what your opinion is, what you think [friendship] is like, and what advice you give."[47] Laelius agrees and launches into his first speech (C), cautioning, however, that he will not give a philosophical disquisition but instead admonish (*hortari*) his sons-in-law to value friendship above all other things (17). The speech is thus a highly positive assessment or even praise of friendship, with Laelius establishing a number of basic axioms that will remain fundamental for the rest of the dialogue. Notably, friendship exists only among good people; it arises from natural sociability and affection; it is a mutual agreement on all things, which is inspired by and intrinsically connected with virtue; it offers many advantages and is approved of by everyone.

With this exposition, Laelius feels that he fulfilled his task, but he is playfully pressured by Fannius and Scaevola to go into greater detail. His short second (D) and extensive third speeches (E–I) treat, roughly, the origin of friendship and the many questions and problems that arise in

[46] In the table, capital letters designate the dialogue's major sections; these are used also in the commentary. On the structure of *Amic.*, see esp. Fürst 1996: 145–65, who builds on Combès 1971: xxiv–xxxviii and Neuhausen 1981–92: 48–88.

[47] *Amic.* 16 *quid sentias, qualem existimes, quae praecepta des.* This series of indirect questions has sometimes been seen as a *dispositio* or table of contents of the discussion that follows. However, the three "topics" are neither sufficiently distinct, nor can they be meaningfully mapped onto the remainder of the dialogue.

Table 1.

A. Preface (1–5)

B. Preliminary conversation: L.'s friendship with Scipio and reaction to his death (6–15)

C. L.'s first speech: general assessment of friendship (16–24)
- Friendship exists only among the good.
- Friendship arises from natural sociability and affection.
- Friendship is mutual agreement on all things; it arises from and is intrinsically connected to virtue.
- Friendship offers many advantages and is approved of by everyone.

D. L.'s second speech: origin of friendship (25–32)
- Friendship arises not from weakness but from natural love inspired by the other person's qualities.
- Advantage follows from friendship but is not its motivation.

E–I. L.'s third speech: maintaining friendship (33–104)

E. How far should one go for a friend? (33–44)
- Friendship is no excuse for evildoing.
- We must not ask our friends to do for us, or consent to do for them, anything that is not morally good.
- This is especially important in the realm of politics, where support for evil machinations threatens the commonwealth.

F. How much should one love a friend? (45–61)
- It is wrong to think that the wise man in his self-sufficiency does not need friends, or that emotional involvement in general is best avoided (against Stoicism).
- It is wrong to think that friendship is a matter of utilitarianism and is to be measured by the advantage gained from friends (against Epicureanism).
- It is wrong to circumscribe the affection one ought to feel for friends; love for one's friends should be absolute.

G. How should one establish (and end) friendships? (62–88a)
- One needs to be very careful in choosing one's friends; be aware of threats to friendship; and allow for and address inequalities between friends.
- When one needs to end a friendship, one should let it fade out and not descend into open enmity.

Table 1. (cont.)

- Friendship is caused by affection for a person's virtue; inspires virtue itself; and leads to the happy life.
- All philosophical schools are agreed on the value of friendship.

H. How sincere should one be with a friend? (88b–100a)

- Friendship is based on sincerity: one must be able to offer and take frank advice.
- Flattery is a great threat to friendship; one needs to avoid it oneself and detect it in others.

I. Conclusion (100b–104)

- Friendship is inspired by virtue, bridges the generations, and makes life worth living.
- After Scipio's death, L. is sustained by the memory of their friendship.
- Fannius and Scaevola ought to practice both virtue and friendship.

maintaining it. As for the former (D), Laelius reiterates that friendship (*amicitia*) arises naturally from love (*amor*), a love that is kindled when we encounter someone endowed with virtue. He thus argues strongly against the utilitarian view (Epicurean, but not identified as such) that people instead seek friendship because they need their friends to provide for them the things that they themselves lack; while friendship indeed leads to many practical advantages (*utilitates*), these are a byproduct, not the original motivation. Laelius ends his speech on the high note that true friendships inspired by love are by their nature eternal.

When, however, Laelius launches into his third and final speech, the outlook has changed (E). Citing conversations he used to have with Scipio (who emerges as rather more realistic or even pessimistic in his views on friendship), Laelius admits that it is difficult to maintain a lasting friendship in the face of changes in interest or potential conflicts. Since people often expect their friends to support them even in unethical enterprises, the fundamental question to be addressed is how far one should go for a friend. Here, Laelius unequivocally lays down the "law" (*lex*) that we must not ask our friends to do for us, or consent to do for them, anything that is not morally good (*honestum*; 40, 44). As he makes clear through many historical *exempla* from his own and earlier times, Laelius (not to mention Cicero) is especially concerned with the well-being of the *res publica*, which at the dramatic date of the dialogue is suffering from the aftermath of the

tribunate of Ti. Gracchus and which at the time of composition would be in turmoil after Caesar's assassination: those who would harm the commonwealth cannot do so without support; however, personal friendship can never be an excuse for aiding and abetting enemies of the state.

Laelius then proceeds to a more positive consideration of the affective bonds between friends (F), taking a stand against both Stoic and Epicurean views (though again, their philosophical pedigrees are not made explicit). As for the former, Laelius shows himself shocked by the idea that one ought to eschew the emotional entanglement of friendship in order to avoid mental disturbance, arguing forcefully that emotions – including negative emotions – are part of what makes us not only human but even virtuous. As for the latter, Laelius once more asserts that friendship arises from affection not want; after all, even if we were supplied with all earthly goods, we would not wish to live in solitude but crave human company. He then reviews four different theories about how much one should love one's friend, all of which he finds misguided and restrictive; instead, the love for a true friend should be absolute and may even lead one to deviate somewhat from the straight path of morality in the cause of helping one's friend in a critical situation (61).[48]

The remainder of Laelius' speech contains more practical advice about the establishment and conduct of friendship. He first considers how to begin (and, if necessary, end) a friendship (G), stressing again and again how important it is to choose one's friends carefully so as to avoid disappointment and conflict down the line. There are many threats to friendship, and it is only when one falls into misfortune that one can tell who one's true friends are. Old friends are generally best, but new ones should not be eschewed. If there is a difference in status or talent between friends, much discretion and tact are needed to bring the superior and inferior to the same level. Finally, if there is a need to end a friendship, one should endeavor simply to let it fade out and avoid open hostility.

Most of the threats to friendship can be avoided if the friend is chosen – as a true friend should be – purely because of one's naturally arising love for his manifest virtue. Virtue and friendship go hand in hand, with virtue inspiring friendship and friendship in turn acting as a "promoter of the virtues" (83 *uirtutum ... adiutrix*); in tandem, the two – thus Laelius maintains – bring about the final philosophical good, the *uita beata* (84). As it happens, all philosophical schools agree on the value of friendship, and

[48] This concession seems to fly in the face of the "law" of friendship formulated in 40 and 44, an apparent contradiction that has caused much debate; see commentary.

whatever one's other values or choice of lifestyle happen to be, friendship always has an important role to play.

It is, however, absolutely necessary that any such friendship be based on trust and sincerity. Laelius' last major topic is what one might call friendship's evil twin, that is, flattery (H). Friends need to advise and correct each other frankly and accept all criticism in good part, and while we are all susceptible to flattery, it is of paramount importance to be able to detect and deter it, if what we aspire to is real, not fake, friendship.

The speech ends with a rousing *peroratio* (I), in which Laelius reaffirms that friendship is inspired by virtue. It bridges the generations and makes life worth living; as for Laelius himself, he considers his friendship with Scipio the best thing that ever happened to him and even now sustains himself with his happy memories. He concludes by exhorting Fannius and Scaevola to value both virtue and friendship, according the latter a close second place after the former.

(c) Ideas

Apart from the brief initial conversation and a few later interjections by Fannius and Scaevola, Laelius is the sole speaker of the dialogue and the only one to put forth sustained views on the topic of friendship. We are working here on the assumption that these views are, by and large, those of Cicero himself, but that both the speaker's character and the dialogue's development add further nuances to the ideas conveyed. Despite the fairly monologic character of the work, there is a strong sense that Laelius' speeches are part of a larger conversation – not just the current one with his sons-in-law, but others in which Laelius has participated in the past or may yet engage. Leaving aside the prologue with its elaborate Chinese box structure, the dialogue itself abounds in references to discussions beyond its own frame: various conversations that Laelius, as well as Fannius and Scaevola, have had in other contexts;[49] the dialogues immortalized in Cicero's *De re publica* and *De senectute*;[50] and frequent debates Laelius says he used to have with Scipio on the very topic of friendship.[51] These last cases are especially interesting since they allow Cicero, as it

[49] See *Amic.* 7–8 (Fannius and Scaevola talk to others about Laelius' reactions to Scipio's death), 16 (Laelius is accustomed to hold forth on all sorts of topics), 25 (Fannius listens to philosophers debate friendship), 37 (Laelius questions Blossius of Cumae), 76 (Laelius witnesses an utterance by Cato; cf. also 90), 88 (Laelius hears – possibly from Cato – a saying by Archytas passed down through the generations).

[50] See *Amic.* 11 (*Sen.*), 14, 25 (*Rep.*).

[51] See *Amic.* 33–5, 59–60, 62.

were, to introduce a second voice into the discussion and to create a miniature debate *in utramque partem*. For, as it turns out, Scipio had a far more hard-nosed and skeptical view of friendship than Laelius, and his reported utterances present challenges that the speaker must address.[52] Thus, for example, Laelius' idealistic pronouncement that "true friendships are eternal" (32) is immediately complicated by the report of Scipio's pessimistic assertion that friendships rarely last a long time (33–5), which in turn leads Laelius to adjust his own discussion.

By presenting its protagonists in friendly conversation and involved in an ongoing debate even beyond the boundary of the dialogue itself, *Amic.* not only puts forth ideas about friendship but enacts the very phenomenon that is its topic. Just as, in the work's outer frame, Cicero writes to Atticus *ad amicum amicissimus ... de amicitia* (5), thus Laelius, famous for his friendship (5), both speaks about the practice in which he excels and exemplifies it. Spending time together, conversing, and giving advice are all part and parcel of *amicitia*, as is the fact that friendship spans the generations (101). Laelius thus links Fannius and Scaevola to his own friends of an earlier generation, just as Scaevola in turn will bring Cicero and by extension Atticus into the same nexus of ongoing *amicitia*.

Throughout the dialogue, Laelius affects an avowedly a- or even anti-philosophical stance, demarcating his pronouncements on friendship from those of *docti Graeci* who are accustomed to hold forth on such matters (17, 24). He never identifies a philosophical school by name while clearly referring to their doctrines,[53] and the only philosopher he names is Archytas, whose wisdom, however, is said to have been passed on orally by generations of Romans (88).[54] Socrates appears a number of times, but only as the man judged wisest by Apollo (7, 10, 13), while Empedocles is introduced as "a certain learned man from Agrigentum" (24).

Laelius is scathing about restrictive philosophical (in fact, Stoic) definitions of what counts as "wise" (*sapiens*) and "good" (*bonus*), clarifying that when he speaks of "good men," he is using ordinary language and means the kind of morally upstanding men approved by Roman public opinion.[55]

[52] This characterization of the two friends is in striking contrast with that in *Rep.*, where Laelius displays a skeptical, down-to-earth attitude that challenges Scipio's greater idealism. In *Off.* 1.108, however, Cicero confirms that Laelius possessed a cheerful outlook (*multa hilaritas*), while Scipio was of a gloomier disposition (*uita tristior*).

[53] For Cicero's tendency, throughout his work, to use circumlocutions to refer specifically to the Epicureans, see Hanchey 2022: 39–42.

[54] Additionally, at *Amic.* 59, Laelius reports Scipio's talking about Bias, one of the Seven Sages.

[55] *Amic.* 18–19; cf. 21, 38, 100.

This ostensible preference for Roman commonsense over Greek philosophical hair-splitting is a leitmotif of the dialogue, but is complicated by Laelius' own name and status of *sapiens*. While he himself deprecates the designation (9, 15) and suggests either granting it to other Roman statesmen such as Cato (9–10) or leaving it to Greek philosophers (18), it becomes clear that he is more invested in philosophical *sapientia* than he lets on. Thus Cicero uses Fannius' first intervention to let the reader know that Laelius' wisdom is not just a matter of innate character, but has been honed *studio et doctrina* (7); more specifically, Laelius is credited with the Stoic attitude of considering "all his goods placed in himself" (7 *omnia tua in te posita esse*). Within his various speeches, Laelius shows himself well versed in the philosophical doctrine of various schools and shrewdly constructs his own theory of friendship, which in according virtue a fundamental role is philosophically both sophisticated and demanding.[56] The modest rejection of *sapientia* thus turns out to be an ironic game: not aspiring to be wise, Laelius fully lives up to his reputation as *sapiens*, resembling in this way the arch-ironist Socrates, to whom he has been implicitly compared since the beginning of the conversation.

Notwithstanding the conversational tone and unsystematic nature of Laelius' exposition, *Amic.* develops a coherent theory of friendship that positions itself in the landscape of both earlier philosophical doctrines (Greek) and contemporary societal values (Roman).[57] Crucially, true friendship can only exist among the good (18 *nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse*), which means that among the three Aristotelian types of friendship, Laelius recognizes only that based on virtue.[58] He clarifies this

[56] Laelius' philosophical expertise is, of course, ultimately that of Cicero himself. The discussion in *Amic.* is informed by the author's broad knowledge of Academic, Peripatetic, Stoic, and Epicurean doctrine, which is in evidence also in his other philosophical works and was no doubt acquired both through study with his various philosophical teachers and through the reading of a variety of original texts and possibly some doxographical material. The idea that in *Amic.* Cicero is instead closely following one particular Greek source (e.g., Steinmetz 1967 suggests a section of Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος by Laelius' acquaintance, the Stoic Panaetius) both is inherently unlikely and leads to circular reasoning, since no such source survives and it would have to be reconstructed from Cicero's text itself. See also n. 58.

[57] For the interpretation of *Amic.*, compare esp. Bellincioni 1970b: 91–237; Bringmann 1971: 226–8; Narducci 1985: 5–48; Leach 1993; Fürst 1996: 138–82; Gotter 1996; Schievenin 2000; Pangle 2003: 105–22; Nicgorski 2008; Prost 2008; Lundgreen 2013; Auvray-Assayas 2019; and Lockwood 2019.

[58] With the exception of Theophrastus' *On Friendship*, whose use by Cicero is attested by Gell. *NA* 1.3, we do not know on which exact works by Aristotle or his successors Cicero drew in writing *Amic.*; nevertheless, his familiarity with Peripatetic views on friendship is obvious. On the difficult question of which parts of the Aristotelian corpus were known in the late Republic in general and to Cicero in particular, see Barnes 1997, Tutrone 2013, and Dillon 2016.

postulate by defining "good" not in the absolute Stoic sense, but in the ordinary Roman meaning (18–19), while also acknowledging that even the non-virtuous engage in relationships that resemble true friendship and that Laelius labels *uulgares amicitiae*.[59] There are thus, strictly speaking, three levels of friendship: (i) that of the truly wise; (ii) that of ordinary good men; and (iii) that of everyone else. Laelius barely touches on (i), but while his real concern is (ii), his discussion occasionally veers into (iii).[60] As a result, the boundary between true and "vulgar" friendships remains fluid: not being Stoic sages, good men may not be good men at all times and in all ways, and a discussion that also covers the threats to friendship must by necessity consider cases in which people do not behave wisely or virtuously.

As Laelius stresses again and again, friendship arises naturally out of affection. Human beings are by definition social and sociable, and their well-being relies on interpersonal relationships; friendship in particular is caused by the recognition of the excellence of one individual who is especially compatible with us and whom we therefore begin to love. This affection is not motivated by a need or want on our part, nor do we pursue friendship for the sake of advantage. As it happens, friends do provide each other with many useful services, but this usefulness is a side-effect of friendship, not its cause.[61]

This explanation of friendship as a natural result of human sociability is in agreement with Peripatetic, Stoic, and Antiochean ideas about human nature and fits with opinions that Cicero expresses throughout his philosophical works.[62] Here as elsewhere in the corpus, the main opposing doctrine is that of the Epicureans, whose utilitarian view of friendship comes in for harsh criticism;[63] at the same time, the rejection of need or want as a starting point for friendship would appear to be a criticism of the Platonic explanation of love as a desire for that which we ourselves lack.[64] In addition, the decoupling of friendship from the

[59] Laelius varies the adjectives used to describe this kind of lesser friendship, employing *uulgaris* (22, 76), *mediocris* (22), *communis* (77), and *leuis* (100).

[60] Laelius acknowledges this kind of slippage at *Amic.* 76, 77, 100.

[61] Put pithily at *Amic.* 51 *non igitur utilitatem amicitia sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est* ("thus, friendship did not follow advantage, but advantage followed friendship").

[62] See Wood 1988: 78–89. The "Old Academy" of Antiochus of Ascalon (second/first century BCE) was a movement to reinvent Academic philosophy as a doctrinal school after the skepticism of the "New Academy," to which Cicero himself adhered. Antiocheanism was popular in mid first-century Rome, and Cicero discussed its positions in the *Academica* and *De finibus*. See further Sedley 2012.

[63] Esp. *Amic.* 26–32, 46, 51–2; compare the criticism of Epicurean friendship at *Fin.* 2.78–80.

[64] See Section 2 above on Plato's *Lysis*.

seeking of advantage is clearly a reaction to popular views of *amicitia* as a mere exchange of services: friendship is not the keeping of a balanced account sheet (58), but an affectionate relationship based on moral and intellectual agreement.[65]

Laelius puts special emphasis on the emotional aspects of friendship, calling repeated attention to its sweetness and delights. Affective interpersonal involvement, however, on occasion also necessitates the more painful emotions that can arise from the care for a friend, such as worry or concern. In this context, Laelius strongly rejects the Stoic ideal of *apatheia* (Lat. *securitas*), arguing that one cannot in fact be a good friend or indeed a good person without "caring" (*cura*), even occasionally to the point of emotional anguish.[66]

In being a natural phenomenon in keeping with the innate qualities of human beings as both rational and social animals, friendship is intrinsically connected with virtue: two good men will begin a friendship because their mutual affections are aroused once their virtues become apparent to each other. Their friendship is cemented through continuous interaction and mutual benevolence, and is ideally based on their "agreement on all things human and divine."[67] In what can properly be described as a virtuous cycle, the friendship that has arisen from virtue becomes in turn productive of virtue (83 *uirtutum ... adiutrix*), as friends assist each other in performing the moral actions that they could not have executed in isolation.

The corollary of this is Laelius' "law" (*lex*) of friendship, viz. that we must not ask our friends to do for us, or consent to do for them, anything that is not *honestum* (40, 44). This *lex* is specifically directed against the popular misconception that there exists a *ius amicitiae* ("right of friendship," 35) according to which loyalty to a friend trumps moral considerations and friends are expected to stick to each other unquestioningly and regardless of circumstances. Laelius is particularly concerned with the corrosive effects this attitude can have on the *res publica*, citing the negative *exemplum* of Blossius of Cumae, who used his friendship with Ti. Gracchus as a justification for his support of the tribune's disruptive activities (37).

At the time of Cicero's writing, the demands of friendship were a particularly divisive topic in Roman political discourse: Julius Caesar had been assassinated by men at least some of whom had been his *amici*; were they vile traitors or had they done the morally right thing in placing the

[65] Nearly a century later, Seneca in *De beneficiis* would still endeavor to impress on his Roman readers the same message, i.e., that the exchange of friendly services is not a simple quid pro quo.

[66] See *Amic.* 45–8 and compare Laelius' avowed pain at Scipio's death (10).

[67] *Amic.* 20 *omnium diuinarum humanarumque rerum ... consensio.*

interests of the *res publica* above their friendship?[68] And how were other friends of Caesar's to act, now that his legacy was in doubt and the political situation at Rome was becoming increasingly volatile? These issues come to the fore in Cicero's exchange of letters with C. Matius, an *eques* who had been friends with Caesar and, after the Ides of March, found himself attacked for his continuing loyalty to the dead man (see Section 1 and the Appendix). In this context, *Amic.* sends the clear message that friendship can never be used as an excuse for moral wrongdoing. In fact, once a friend strays seriously from the path of virtue, the friendship – by definition a relationship of good men – no longer deserves its name and must be considered dissolved.

True friendship, by contrast, is accorded a most elevated position within the ethical system that Laelius develops: friendship is second only to virtue (105) and wisdom (20); it contains within itself many other goods (84); and, if practiced correctly, it leads to the happy life (84). Laelius has thus managed to promote friendship to the status of a moral good in its own right, which – notwithstanding its intrinsic connection with virtue – cannot be subsumed under the heading of general moral excellence. This move challenges both extant philosophical systems and cultural expectations at Rome: friendship as a new kind of *summum bonum* does not sit well with the doctrines of any existing school, however much they may value friendship, and the stipulation that *amicitia* has to be regulated by strictly ethical considerations or fail to qualify as *amicitia* altogether may well have struck many of Cicero's readers as outlandish.

Despite its aphilosophical presentation, then, *Amic.* is a serious intervention in the philosophical debate about friendship. At the same time, it is also a serious intervention in contemporary Roman discourse. Like Cicero's other post-Ides works, *De officiis* and *De gloria*, *Amic.* addresses traditional Roman values and practices:[69] all of Cicero's peers unquestioningly value friendship, wish to do their duty, and hope to achieve renown. As recent and ongoing events have shown, however, too many Romans misunderstand or willfully misinterpret the true meaning of these goods: they see friendship as blind loyalty or a mere exchange of services, believe that the advantageous trumps the honorable, and consider it acceptable to pursue fame at all costs. Cicero in these works affirms the traditional Roman valuation of *amicitia*, *officium*, and *gloria*, but gives them a strict moral definition meant to preclude all misunderstandings and abuses. According to *Amic.*, Romans ought to be good friends; to do so, however, they first need to be good men.

[68] See Volk 2021: 173–80. On the politics of *Amic.*, see further Bellincioni 1970b: 179–237, Bringmann 1971: 206–28, and Gotter 1996.

[69] See Bringmann 1971: 182–255, Long 1995, and Baraz 2012: 187–223.

4 STYLE

(a) Language

Cicero's public writings all share certain features of style: regularity of morphology and syntax; the avoidance of unfamiliar language; a concern with the balance and rhythm of sentences.[70] But although Cicero aims at regularity, his style is hardly uniform: it both changes over time and is shaped according to his audience and goals. Perhaps most important, Cicero recognizes the need to avoid complete predictability: while he is always comprehensible, different stylistic features are prominent at different times and on different occasions. That general pattern of variation within regularity is particularly important for Cicero's dialogues, in which Cicero's own language is filtered through the voices of his speakers and must reflect not only his own aims and choice of subject, but also the purposes and personalities of his characters – people who differ from one another and from Cicero himself in age, background, and date, just as the language appropriate to literary dialogues is not always what Cicero would use in addressing a jury or the Roman people.

In terms of speaker, dramatic setting, and approach, *Amic.* is most similar to the dialogue to which it was designed as a sequel, *De senectute*: both works present broad and untechnical discussions of practical issues of normal life, old age and friendship. In both cases there is a single dominant speaker whose interlocutors say very little. Both protagonists, moreover, lived well before Cicero's own lifetime: *De senectute* is set in 150 BCE, *Amic.* in 129. All these considerations affect Cicero's style: both dialogues have some archaic coloring to match the second-century setting, but nothing so archaic as to make comprehension difficult; both protagonists have an old-fashioned taste for homely proverbs.[71] Their syntax is also very similar: conditions, balanced comparisons (*ut ... sic*), compound sentences with multiple main clauses, phrases linked by anaphora or other forms of repetition, and simple relative clauses are frequent, while complex constructions and multiple layers of subordination are relatively uncommon. Cicero was probably reflecting the patterns of informal conversation; he

[70] For good introductions to Cicero's style, see von Albrecht 2003 and Powell 2013, both with useful bibliographies.

[71] In the case of Laelius, this also reflects Cicero's assessment of the style of the historical Laelius, which he describes (*Brut.* 83) as *uetustior et horridior*, noting that Laelius delighted in *antiquitas* and *uerba paulo magis prisca*. For archaisms in *Amic.*, note, e.g., the repeated use of *ut ne* where classical Latin normally uses only *ne* (42, 43, 60, 65, 78, 99) and the archaic *reapse* for *re ipsa* (47) and *quo* for *ut* (63). For proverbial expressions, see 18, 19, 22, 47, 59, 67, 68, 85, 97, 101. For Laelius' anecdotal style in *Amic.*, see further Grandl 2022: 113–25.

may also have meant to create a simpler Latin to evoke the language of the previous century.

The strong similarities of style, however, coexist with differences that help to individuate the speakers and reflect the rhetoric appropriate to quite different topics. For while our choice of friends ought to be governed by rational choices (or at least so Laelius believes), living to an advanced age is, for the most part, not a decision we control. Cato's speech reflects his subject and his character: it consists largely of anecdotes about people who have (or have not) achieved happiness in old age, interspersed with exclamations and rhetorical questions, which both guide the reactions of Cato's audience and reflect the somewhat impatient and indignant manner with which Cicero has endowed his protagonist.

Laelius' character and his mode of speaking are different, at least in Cicero's portrayal. While *De senectute* contains 18 exclamations, *Amic.* has only 8; and while both feature many rhetorical questions (57 in *Sen.*, 42 in *Amic.*), *Amic.* uses hortatory and jussive subjunctives 25 times as opposed to only 4 in *De senectute*. The dialogue is filled with expressions of encouragement and instruction: more than twice as many gerundives (including passive periphrastic constructions) as found in *De senectute* (107 to 49) and many more instances of other words of obligation or necessity (*debere, necesse, oportet*). Cato is descriptive, but Laelius is prescriptive: his language is normative and protreptic. So too, while Cato's advice is bolstered by anecdotes about grand old men, Laelius' instructions are supported by logical demonstrations: it is no accident that he uses inferential particles such as *nam, enim, autem,* and *itaque* far more often than Cato. Laelius' use of *igitur* is also quite different from that of Cato in *Sen.*: Cato uses *igitur* 22 times, of which 15 are questions; Laelius uses it 21 times, of which only one is a question. Cato is characterized as making use of rhetorical indignation (*num igitur*, 5×), while Laelius draws attention to the firmness of his conclusions. Cicero, through Laelius, wants to explain both the value and the ethical importance of friendship, and to do so he uses equal portions of encouragement and logic.

A clear example of Laelius' protreptic style is his exhortation about how to behave toward a friend (44):

> Haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur, ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus. ne exspectemus quidem dum rogemur: studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit. consilium uero dare audeamus libere: plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium ualeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur.

He begins by looking back to his negative statement of the "law" of friendship a few minutes earlier (40): *Haec igitur lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpes nec faciamus rogati.* The repetition of *haec ... lex ... sanciatur* draws attention to the change from the earlier prohibition of what is *turpe* to the positive exhortation to do what is *honestum*, but the repetition is not exact: *prima lex* looks back further, to 36 *id primum uideamus*, the more general introduction to the discussion of the limits of proper behavior in friendship. The rather formal hortatory *sanciatur* is then followed by no fewer than ten more present subjunctives, of which seven are hortatory or jussive.[78] The passage is marked by verbal repetitions (*ab amicis honesta ~ amicorum causa honesta*; *adsit ~ absit*; *adhibeatur ~ adhibitae*), and the repeated relatively terse instructions correspond to the language of the "law." The importance of hortatory and jussive subjunctives in *Amic.* has been mentioned above, and the use of repetition is a regular feature of Laelius' style: thus in 55 the verb *parare* is used five times, in 62 *experiri* three times, in 65 *fides* and related words five times. So too Laelius makes repeated use of balanced short phrases like *studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit* here, often with repetition or asyndeton: 26 *nihil fictum est, nihil simulatum*; 10 *huius enim facta, illius dicta*; 32 *nihil altum, nihil magnificum*; 90 *delicto dolere, correctione gaudere*; 97 *nihil fidum, nihil exploratum.* These often extend to sets of clauses or phrases linked by anaphora: 86 *et ei qui ad rem publicam se contulerunt et ei qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur et ei qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi, postremo ei qui se totos tradiderunt uoluptatibus*; 100 *in ea est enim conuenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia.*

Another kind of style, typical of informal argument, appears in Laelius' rejection of the narrow and unattainable definitions of wisdom (*sapientia*) promoted by Greek philosophers (19):

> agamus igitur pingui, ut aiunt, Minerua. qui ita se gerunt, ita uiuunt, ut eorum probetur fides integritas aequitas liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas libido audacia, sintque magna constantia, ut ei fuerunt modo quos nominaui: hos uiros bonos, ut habiti sunt, sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia sequantur quantum homines possunt naturam optimam bene uiuendi ducem.

A hortatory subjunctive again provides an opening statement, this time in a short sentence containing a proverb. The longer sentence that follows starts with a relative clause containing two parallel verbal phrases introduced by *ita*; that in turn introduces a result clause with three parallel ideas (*ut ... probetur fides ...*; *nec sit ... cupiditas ...*; *sintque magna constantia*),

[78] The first two (*petamus* and *faciamus*) are in a noun clause introduced by *ut*, and *rogemur* occurs in a temporal clause introduced by *dum*.

of which the first and last are positive, the middle one negative; the first two contain parallel lists of qualities in asyndeton, while the third mentions only the single virtue of *constantia*. The following clause of comparison *ut ei fuerunt*, from which depends the relative clause *modo quos nominaui*, encompasses all three lists: the men Laelius has been talking about exemplify all the characteristics mentioned. At this point, there is a slight anacoluthon: *hos* is not strictly necessary (replacing the unexpressed antecedent of the initial *qui*) and summarizes the entire preceding relative clause; what follows is an instruction to accept the judgment of contemporaries (*ut habiti sunt*) about the goodness of the men described. Laelius' meaning is not difficult to see, but it is a set of loosely connected thoughts: the passage contains a proverb; multiple examples of asyndeton (both the two verbal phrases beginning with *ita* and the two sets of nouns); a mild anacoluthon; and no fewer than three different uses of *ut*. And, characteristically, Laelius begins from a Roman proverb and ends with an allusion to the Stoic ideal of living according to nature.

Not every sentence in *Amic.* is so loosely constructed or so heavily dependent on parallel phrases or clauses as the ones just cited, but the basic techniques illustrated here are extremely common, and the typical Ciceronian period, containing multiple subordinate clauses or participial phrases and with the syntax not completed until the final word, is relatively rare. There is, however, one important exception to that. When Laelius' interlocutors reject his suggestion that they go ask a philosopher for more detailed discussion of friendship and he is compelled to begin his main discourse, his initial sentence is remarkably ornate (26):

> Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum uideri solet, utrum propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis, quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio uicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa.

The sentence is periodic, with two possible origins for friendship presented as alternative indirect questions (*illud considerandum ... utrum ... an*); the first one contains a complex purpose clause with two verbs within it, in turn governing a relative clause and a gerundive construction, while the second is far simpler; and the whole construction is not concluded until *alia causa* at the end of the sentence. The sentence is also marked by balanced pairs of words linked by connectives (*imbecillitatem atque inopiam*; *dandis recipiendisque meritis*; *acciperet ... -que redderet*; *antiquior et pulchrior*) instead of the groups of words in asyndeton frequently used by Laelius. But although this kind of complex sentence is not unusual in Cicero, what

is most striking is its opening: the first clause, with the use of *saepe* and the combination of the dative participle of *cogito* with *uideri solet*, is in fact an echo of several Ciceronian sentences, notably the opening sentence of Cicero's first dialogue, *De oratore*, the first clause of which (*Cogitanti mihi saepenumero ... illi uideri solent*) contains all three of these elements.[73] In other words, Laelius opens the main body of his discourse by recalling a Ciceronian opening sentence.

But if Laelius uses a complex Ciceronian sentence to begin his discourse, Cicero himself seems in some ways to do the reverse. Although Cicero's preface to *Amic.* contains a number of complex sentences, he begins with great simplicity, with indirect statements but only one result clause, one subjunctive *cum*-clause, and eight indicative main verbs in the opening six sentences, while the same sentences also contain several conversational touches and one archaism.[74] A key to this melding of styles between Cicero and his character Laelius perhaps lies in what Cicero says in his preface, first that in reading *De senectute* he sometimes thinks that it is not he but Cato who is speaking (4), and then that in reading *Amic.* Atticus should think that it is Laelius speaking, not Cicero (5). That Cicero makes himself and Laelius speak the same language is deliberate, and may well embody the ideal of friendship that the dialogue as a whole endorses: if a friend is another self and, as Laelius says, we feel affection for people whom we admire although they are no longer alive, then it is no wonder that Cicero and Laelius sound like each other.

(b) Prose rhythm

If syntax and vocabulary determine meaning, word order and rhythm play a large part in creating effective rhetoric; and for Cicero, in whatever form of prose he was writing, effect was of immense importance. When composing the last of his major works on oratory, *Orator*, in 46, he chose to end his account of the major elements of effective rhetoric with a detailed (if not always altogether clear) discussion of the importance of rhythmical prose.[75] Rhythm, as he says, is found in every human utterance, prose or verse; and the goal of effective and convincing speech is to find the mean between the fairly rigid metrical rules of elevated poetry and the completely unstructured rhythm of everyday speech. Rhythm,

[73] The other examples are the openings of *Div.* 2 and *Fam.* 7.3 (a very carefully composed letter). On *De or.* 1.1, see also Zetzel 2022: 36–9.

[74] Conversational: two ellipses (1 *de hoc alias*, 2 *saepe multa*) and 2 *admodum*; archaism: 1 *memoriter*.

[75] *Orat.* 168–233; see Kaster 2020: 26–32 and his notes on this passage.

moreover, appears differently in two aspects of artistic prose. On the one hand, there are the loose patterns that appear throughout a sentence; these are largely the inevitable byproduct of the author's choice of words and the order in which they are placed, and the most important rhythmical concern is that the patterns of prose should not closely echo the major poetic meters, the dactylic hexameter of epic and the iambic senarius of drama. On the other hand, there are the much more conspicuous, and deliberately cultivated, rhythms that conclude a clause or a whole sentence; these clausulae, as Cicero himself calls them (e.g., *Orat.* 213, 215, 216) are the special focus of the modern study of prose rhythm.[76]

Cicero himself (*Orat.* 215–19) is less clear than one might wish about just what cadences are desirable in a clausula. He is firm on the pleasure produced by the cretic (– ⏑ –) and its metrical equivalent the paeon, which consists of three short syllables and one long one in any order, the most common being with the long syllable first or last (– ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ or ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ –).[77] And he is equally firm in rejecting those feet which make the clausula sound like verse, particularly the iamb (⏑ –) and the dactyl (– ⏑ ⏑). Modern scholarship has analyzed Cicero's clausulae in much more detail; it is clear that his favorite is the combination of cretic plus trochee (including three variations in which one long syllable is resolved into two shorts); next in frequency comes the double cretic or molossus plus cretic (a molossus is simply three long syllables) with a further eight variants; third is the double trochee (with two variants). Thus, for example, *Amic.* 18–19 (*Sed hoc ... uiuendi ducem*) and 26–7 (*Saepissime ... esset habitura*), two of the passages discussed in 4(*a*) above slightly extended, contain between them thirteen sentence-endings; of these, eight are cretic + trochee (half with resolution), four are double cretic (one with resolution), and one is double trochee, preceded by a cretic.[78]

These two passages represent quite different styles of Laelius' speech, but they share the same approach to rhythm, and the same is true of Cicero's own preface: *Amic.* 1–3 contains nine sentences, and the clausulae include

[76] This and the following paragraph are heavily indebted to Keeline and Kirby 2019, the most important (and clearest) detailed discussion of Latin clausulae. For a good general introduction, see Wilkinson 1963: 135–64; for Cicero in particular, see Hutchinson 1995.

[77] As in the hexameter, where a spondee (– –) can regularly be substituted for a dactyl (– ⏑ ⏑) in the first four feet of the line, so too clausulae recognize the equivalence and generally the interchangeability of two short syllables and one long one; thus, for example, the first paeon (– ⏑ ⏑ ⏑) can be viewed as a cretic with two shorts substituted for the final long syllable.

[78] This summary does not include shorter units within sentences, many of which contain clausulae similar in pattern to those treated here.

three cretic + trochee (two with resolution), four double cretic (one with resolution), and two double trochee. Prose rhythm, as Cicero says, is universal, and rhythms that are pleasing in one speaker are equally pleasing in another. That is not to say that there is complete uniformity, either within a work or among different works. The percentages of sentences and major sentence divisions ending with artistic clausulae varies slightly among the speeches and among the philosophical works, as do the proportions found of the various types of artistic clausula; but on the whole, more than 80 percent of Ciceronian sentences contain such clausulae.[79]

Ciceronian clausulae play little role in either characterization of speakers or conveying meaning, but they are important in at least two ways. In the first place, they aid comprehension by serving as a kind of punctuation: recognizable rhythms indicate to the reader (and even more, to the listener) that a unit of thought or syntax has come to an end, in much the same way that conjunctions or vocatives often indicate that a new one is beginning. More broadly, as Cicero himself says (*Orat.* 227–36), rhythmical speech gives pleasure; through that pleasure the speaker keeps the attention (and in a trial, perhaps the sympathy) of the audience. The ability to construct elegant and rhythmical prose is not universal, and the virtuoso use of clausulae was a hallmark of eloquence. Cicero illustrates his account of prose rhythm with an anecdote about a speech by the tribune C. Carbo in an assembly in 90 BCE (*Orat.* 213–15): when the speaker produced three sentences in a row ending with the same (double trochee) clausula, the audience went wild: *hoc dichoreo tantus clamor contionis excitatus est ut admirabile esset* "such a huge shout came up from the crowd at this double trochee that it was amazing."

It was clearly a struggle for less skilled writers to maintain the right kinds of rhythm. Cicero himself was known to be fond of the rhythm of the phrase *ēssĕ uĭdēātur*, a resolved cretic + trochee, illustrated in the passages cited in 4(*a*) by *appellārĕ sāpĭēntem* at the end of the first sentence of the dialogue or *profĕct(a) ălĭă caūsa* at the end of Laelius' most Ciceronian sentence (26); the phrase became a hallmark of would-be Ciceros, as Quintilian notes (10.2.18): *noueram quosdam qui se pulchre expressisse genus illud caelestis huius in dicendo uiri sibi uiderentur si in clausula posuissent "esse uideatur"* "I knew some men who thought that they had done a brilliant job of reproducing the style of this divine orator if they had put *esse uideatur* at the end of a sentence."

[79] *Amic.*, *De senectute*, and *De officiis* (late works) are on the high end, containing (on the analysis in the supplementary tables of Keeline and Kirby 2019) 86.73%, 88.34%, and 90.12% artistic clausulae respectively. The highest percentage among Cicero's philosophical writings is found in the incomplete *Timaeus* (92.67%), the lowest in *De fato* (80.55%); the average for the speeches is 83.42%.

5 RECEPTION

Amic. was apparently never part of the school curriculum in antiquity – only the opening sentence is quoted by any grammarian – and there is no sign that the dialogue achieved any particular prominence.[80] As long as readers had access to other works that addressed the topic of friendship, *Amic.* was just one of many sources. Thus, Valerius Maximus in his chapter *De amicitia* uses Cicero's tale of Blossius of Cumae among other *exempla* to make the very un-Ciceronian point that a true *amicus* should remain loyal even to a seditious or otherwise compromised friend;[81] Seneca's theory of friendship may or may not have been partly influenced by Cicero;[82] and Aulus Gellius compares Cicero's discussion of whether one may deviate from strict morality for the sake of a friend unfavorably to that of Theophrastus, while also stating that the question has been treated by many other writers.[83]

Renewed interest in *Amic.* is found in the Fathers of the Church, who attempted to reformulate classical ideals of *amicitia* for a new Christian context. In his *De officiis*, for example, Ambrose not only creatively rewrites Cicero's *De officiis* but also in his treatment of friendship makes extensive use of *Amic.*[84] The Christianization of Cicero's thought is nicely apparent from a letter by Augustine to his friend Marcianus: Augustine uses Cicero's definition of friendship as *diuinarum humanarumque rerum cum beneuolentia et caritate consensio* to make the point that before he and Marcianus both became Christians, they were not in fact friends, since they lacked agreement on *res diuinae*.[85] In his extended discussion, "the quotation from Cicero is expounded as if it were a Bible text."[86]

It is in the Middle Ages that *Amic.* achieves its status as the classic treatment of friendship, a development that culminates in the twelfth century. The dialogue is one of the most-read Ciceronian works; serves as a school text and receives *accessus*;[87] and is increasingly transmitted together with its sister dialogue, *De senectute*. Medieval discussions of friendship often take *Amic.* as their starting point. Most prominently, Aelred of Rievaulx in his programmatically titled *De spirituali amicitia* (twelfth century) systematically sets out to rewrite Cicero's dialogue for a Christian, and especially

[80] For the reception of *Amic.* in antiquity, see Fürst 1996: 180–2.
[81] Val. Max. 4.7; Cic. *Amic.* 37 comm. See Baroud 2022.
[82] See Evenepoel 2007 with references to earlier scholarship.
[83] Gell. *NA* 1.3; Cic. *Amic.* 36–44, 61 comm. At *NA* 17.5, Gellius criticizes a rhetor who had unfairly blamed Cicero for using faulty logic at *Amic.* 30–1.
[84] Ambrose, *De officiis* 3.125–38 with Davidson 2001 *ad loc.*
[85] August. *Ep.* 258.1–4; Cic. *Amic.* 20.
[86] Hagendahl 1967: II 524.
[87] Pellegrin 1976.

monastic, setting: while the Roman author "wrote in detail about all matters that pertain to friendship in a delightful style," he nevertheless "did not know the virtue of true friendship, since he was entirely ignorant of its beginning and end, that is, Christ."[88]

The popularity of *Amic.* continues into the early modern period. It is one of the earliest Ciceronian works printed (1467, trailing only *De officiis* and *Paradoxa Stoicorum*), and there are a total of sixty-five incunables.[89] The text soon began to receive commentaries as well as translations into the vernacular languages, beginning with John Tiptoft's English version, printed by William Caxton in 1481. *Amic.* remained the classic guide to friendship, now supplemented by the newly discovered Ciceronian letters *Ad familiares*: in the early modern Republic of Letters, and well into the eighteenth century, Cicero could be relied upon to provide both the theory and practice of *amicitia*.

With the waning of Ciceronian influence in the nineteenth century, *Amic.* too ceased to be regarded as a work of practical wisdom. The dialogue continued to be read in schools, however, serving in many countries as a popular Latin text well into the twentieth century, a fact witnessed by the many extant editions and commentaries for scholastic use. By contrast, didactic, scholarly, and popular interest in *Amic.* in the last half century seems to have been muted, though note Jacques Derrida's *Politiques de l'amitié* (1994), which uses Cicero's dialogue as an important interlocutor.[90] In light of not only renewed academic interest in Cicero's philosophical works, but also the growing appeal of Hellenistic ethics to a wider public, *Amic.* appears poised for a rediscovery.

6 TEXT

Amic. is very well preserved; a dozen manuscripts (not all complete) survive that were written before the twelfth century, with a very large number, perhaps five hundred, written between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries.[91] And while there is a reasonable amount of textual variation among

[88] *PL* 195.662 *copiosissime de omnibus quae ad eam* [*sc. amicitiam*] *spectare uidentur iucundo stylo disseruit ... Tullium uerae amicitiae ignorauisse uirtutem, cum eius principium finemque, Christum uidelicet, penitus ignorauerit.* Note also the likewise very Ciceronian *De amicitia Christiana* by Peter of Blois, written after Aelred's work and much influenced by it; see Delhaye 1948 on both texts.

[89] See Hankins and Palmer 2008: 44–6.

[90] See P. A. Miller 2015.

[91] The fullest account of the manuscripts and their relationships is Powell 1998, modifying his earlier accounts in Powell 1983 and 1990: 24–6. For reports of manuscript readings, we rely largely on the apparatus in Powell 2006, although we have also consulted the earlier editions of Simbeck 1917 and Combès 1971.

the earlier manuscripts, there is no need to emend the text in more than about a dozen passages, other than correcting mistakes in proper names, a problem frequent in all textual traditions. The relationships among the earlier manuscripts, most of which fall into two fairly distinct groups, have been established in detail by Powell;[92] we follow his reports of the manuscripts, and, although we have changed the punctuation and paragraphing in a number of places, the text given here agrees with that of Powell 2006 in all but the following:

	This edition	Powell
4	fuisset	fuerit[93]
26	quisque	quis
41	in dies	diem e die
56	diligendi	deligendi
57	patiuntur	patiantur[94]
69	posse	per se
74	aestimandi	est <* * *>
89	ratio et diligentia	ratio diligentia

Our text contains no apparatus, but significant textual problems are discussed in the commentary. Note also that in the spelling of proper names we have followed Broughton 1951–86.

[92] Stemmata of the manuscripts appear in Powell 1998: 515 and 2006: liii.

[93] We assume that this is a typographical error (in both Powell 1990 and Powell 2006) as he reports no variant while earlier editions (Seyffert-Müller 1876; Simbeck 1917; Combès 1971) report *fuisset* with no variant.

[94] As with 4 *fuerit*, we assume that this is a typographical error.

M. TVLLI CICERONIS

LAELIVS DE AMICITIA

M. TVLLI CICERONIS

LAELIVS DE AMICITIA

[I] Q. Mucius augur multa narrare de C. Laelio socero suo memoriter et 1
iucunde solebat, nec dubitare illum in omni sermone appellare sapientem. ego autem a patre ita eram deductus ad Scaeuolam sumpta uirili toga ut quoad possem et liceret a senis latere numquam discederem. itaque multa ab eo prudenter disputata, multa etiam breuiter et commode dicta memoriae mandabam fierique studebam eius prudentia doctior. quo mortuo me ad pontificem Scaeuolam contuli, quem unum nostrae ciuitatis et ingenio et iustitia praestantissimum audeo dicere. sed de hoc alias; nunc redeo ad augurem. cum saepe multa, tum memini domi in hemi- 2
cyclio sedentem, ut solebat, cum et ego essem una et pauci admodum familiares, in eum sermonem illum incidere qui tum fere multis erat in ore. meministi enim profecto, Attice, et eo magis quod P. Sulpicio utebare multum, cum is tribunus plebis capitali odio a Q. Pompeio qui tum erat consul dissideret, quocum coniunctissime et amantissime uixerat, quanta esset hominum uel admiratio uel querela. itaque tum Scaeuola, cum in 3
eam ipsam mentionem incidisset, exposuit nobis sermonem Laeli de amicitia habitum ab illo secum et cum altero genero C. Fannio M.f. paucis diebus post mortem Africani. eius disputationis sententias memoriae mandaui, quas hoc libro exposui arbitratu meo; quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne "inquam" et "inquit" saepius interponeretur atque ut tamquam a praesentibus coram haberi sermo uideretur.

Cum enim saepe mecum ageres ut de amicitia scriberem aliquid, 4
digna mihi res cum omnium cognitione tum nostra familiaritate uisa est; itaque feci non inuitus, ut prodessem multis rogatu tuo. sed ut in Catone Maiore qui est scriptus ad te de senectute Catonem induxi senem disputantem, quia nulla uidebatur aptior persona quae de illa aetate loqueretur quam eius qui et diutissime senex fuisset et in ipsa senectute praeter ceteros floruisset, sic cum accepissemus a patribus maxime memorabilem C. Laeli et P. Scipionis familiaritatem fuisse, idonea mihi Laeli persona uisa est quae de amicitia ea ipsa dissereret quae disputata ab eo meminisset Scaeuola. genus autem hoc sermonum positum in hominum ueterum auctoritate et eorum illustrium plus nescioquo pacto uidetur habere grauitatis; itaque ipse mea legens sic afficior interdum ut Catonem, non me, loqui existimem. sed ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc 5
libro ad amicum amicissimus scripsi de amicitia. tum est Cato locutus quo erat nemo fere senior temporibus illis, nemo prudentior; nunc Laelius et sapiens (sic enim est habitus) et amicitiae gloria excellens de amicitia

loquetur. tu uelim a me animum parumper auertas, Laelium loqui ipsum putes. C. Fannius et Q. Mucius ad socerum ueniunt post mortem Africani. ab his sermo oritur, respondet Laelius, cuius tota disputatio est de amicitia, quam legens te ipse cognosces.

6 [II] FANNIVS: Sunt ista, Laeli, nec enim melior uir fuit Africano quisquam nec clarior. sed existimare debes omnium oculos in te esse coniectos: unum te sapientem et appellant et existimant. tribuebatur hoc modo M. Catoni, scimus L. Acilium apud patres nostros appellatum esse sapientem; sed uterque alio quodam modo, Acilius quia prudens esse in iure ciuili putabatur, Cato quia multarum rerum usum habebat. multa eius et in senatu et in foro uel prouisa prudenter uel acta constanter uel responsa acute ferebantur; propterea quasi cognomen iam habebat in
7 senectute sapientis. te autem alio quodam modo, non solum natura et moribus, uerum etiam studio et doctrina esse sapientem, nec sicut uulgus sed ut eruditi solent appellare sapientem; qualem in reliqua Graecia neminem (nam qui Septem appellantur, eos qui ista subtilius quaerunt in numero sapientium non habent), Athenis unum accepimus, et eum quidem etiam Apollinis oraculo sapientissimum iudicatum. hanc esse in te sapientiam existimant ut omnia tua in te posita esse ducas humanosque casus uirtute inferiores putes. itaque ex me quaerunt, credo ex hoc item Scaeuola, quonam pacto mortem Africani feras, eoque magis quod proximis Nonis, cum in hortos D. Bruti auguris commentandi causa ut adsolet uenissemus, tu non adfuisti qui diligentissime semper illum diem et illud munus solitus esses obire.

8 SCAEVOLA: Quaerunt quidem, C. Laeli, multi ut est a Fannio dictum. sed ego id respondeo quod animum aduerti, te dolorem quem acceperis cum summi uiri tum amicissimi morte ferre moderate, nec potuisse non commoueri nec fuisse id humanitatis tuae. quod autem Nonis in collegio nostro non adfuisses, ualetudinem respondeo causae, non maestitiam fuisse. LAELIVS: Recte tu quidem, Scaeuola, et uere. nec enim ab isto officio quod semper usurpaui cum ualerem abduci incommodo meo debui, nec ullo casu arbitror hoc constanti homini posse contingere ut ulla inter-
9 missio fiat officii. tu autem, Fanni, quod mihi tantum tribui dicis quantum ego nec agnosco nec postulo, facis amice sed, ut mihi uideris, non recte iudicas de Catone. aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo, aut si quisquam, ille sapiens fuit. quomodo, ut alia omittam, mortem fili tulit! memineram Paullum, uideram Galum, sed hi in pueris, Cato in perfecto
10 et spectato uiro. quam ob rem caue Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum quem Apollo ut ais sapientissimum iudicauit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur.

De me autem, ut iam cum utroque uestrum loquar, sic habetote: [III] ego si Scipionis desiderio me moueri negem, quam id recte faciam uiderint sapientes, sed certe mentiar. moueor enim tali amico orbatus qualis, ut arbitror, nemo umquam erit; ut confirmare possum, nemo certe fuit. sed non egeo medicina: me ipse consolor et maxime illo solacio, quod eo errore careo quo amicorum decessu plerique angi solent. nihil mali accidisse Scipioni puto; mihi accidit si quid accidit. suis autem incommodis grauiter angi non amicum, sed se ipsum amantis est.

Cum illo uero quis neget actum esse praeclare? nisi enim, quod ille 11
minime putabat, immortalitatem optare uellet, quid non adeptus est quod homini fas esset optare? qui summam spem ciuium, quam de eo iam puero habuerant, continuo adulescens incredibili uirtute superauit; qui consulatum petiuit numquam, factus consul est bis, primum ante tempus, iterum sibi suo tempore, rei publicae paene sero; qui duabus urbibus euersis inimicissimis huic imperio non modo praesentia, uerum etiam futura bella deleuit. quid dicam de moribus facillimis, de pietate in matrem, liberalitate in sorores, bonitate in suos, iustitia in omnes? nota sunt uobis; quam autem ciuitati carus fuerit maerore funeris indicatum est. quid igitur hunc paucorum annorum accessio iuuare potuisset? senectus enim quamuis non sit grauis, ut memini Catonem anno antequam est mortuus mecum et cum Scipione disserere, tamen aufert eam uiriditatem in qua etiamnunc erat Scipio. quam ob rem uita quidem talis fuit uel 12
fortuna uel gloria ut nihil posset accedere; moriendi autem sensum celeritas abstulit. quo de genere mortis difficile dictu est; quid homines suspicentur uidetis. hoc uere tamen licet dicere, P. Scipioni ex multis diebus quos in uita celeberrimos laetissimosque uiderit illum diem clarissimum fuisse, cum senatu dimisso domum reductus ad uesperum est a patribus conscriptis, populo Romano, sociis et Latinis, pridie quam excessit e uita, ut ex tam alto dignitatis gradu ad superos uideatur deos potius quam ad inferos peruenisse.

[IV] Neque enim assentior eis qui haec nuper disserere coeperunt, cum 13
corporibus simul animos interire atque omnia morte deleri. plus apud me antiquorum auctoritas ualet, uel nostrorum maiorum qui mortuis tam religiosa iura tribuerunt (quod non fecissent profecto si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur), uel eorum qui in hac terra fuerunt Magnamque Graeciam (quae nunc quidem deleta est, tum florebat) institutis et praeceptis suis erudiuerunt, uel eius qui Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est iudicatus, qui non tum hoc non tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem semper, animos hominum esse diuinos eisque cum ex corpore excessissent reditum in caelum patere optimoque et iustissimo cuique expeditissimum. quod 14
idem Scipioni uidebatur, qui quidem quasi praesagiret perpaucis ante

mortem diebus cum et Philus et Manilius adessent et alii plures, tuque etiam, Scaeuola, mecum uenisses, triduum disseruit de re publica, cuius disputationis fuit extremum fere de immortalitate animorum, quae se in quiete per uisum ex Africano audisse dicebat.

Id si ita est, ut optimi cuiusque animus in morte facillime euolet tamquam e custodia uinclisque corporis, cui censemus cursum ad deos faciliorem fuisse quam Scipioni? quocirca maerere hoc eius euentu uereor ne inuidi magis quam amici sit. sin autem illa ueriora, ut idem interitus sit animorum et corporum nec ullus sensus maneat, ut nihil boni est in morte sic certe nihil mali. sensu enim amisso fit idem quasi natus non esset omnino, quem tamen esse natum et nos gaudemus et haec ciuitas, dum erit, laetabitur.

15 Quam ob rem cum illo quidem ut supra dixi actum optime est, mecum incommodius, quem fuerat aequius ut prius introieram, sic prius exire de uita. sed tamen recordatione nostrae amicitiae sic fruor ut beate uixisse uidear quia cum Scipione uixerim, quocum mihi coniuncta cura de publica re et de priuata fuit, quocum et domus fuit et militia communis et id in quo est omnis uis amicitiae, uoluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio. itaque non tam ista me sapientiae, quam modo Fannius commemorauit, fama delectat, falsa praesertim, quam quod amicitiae nostrae memoriam spero sempiternam fore. idque eo mihi magis est cordi, quod ex omnibus saeculis uix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum, quo in genere sperare uideor Scipionis et Laeli amicitiam notam posteritati fore.

16 FANNIVS: Istuc quidem, Laeli, ita necesse est. sed quoniam amicitiae mentionem fecisti et sumus otiosi pergratum mihi feceris, spero item Scaeuolae, si quemadmodum soles de ceteris rebus quae ex te quaeruntur sic de amicitia disputaris quid sentias, qualem existimes, quae praecepta des.

SCAEVOLA: Mihi uero erit gratum, atque id ipsum cum tecum agere conarer Fannius anteuortit. quam ob rem utrique nostrum gratum admodum feceris.

17 [V] LAELIVS: Ego uero non grauarer, si mihi ipse confiderem. nam et praeclara res est et sumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi. sed quis ego sum, aut quae est in me facultas? doctorum est ista consuetudo eaque Graecorum ut eis ponatur de quo disputent quamuis subito; magnum opus est egetque exercitatione non parua. quam ob rem quae disputari de amicitia possunt, ab eis censeo petatis qui ista profitentur. ego uos hortari tantum possum ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tam naturae aptum, tam conueniens ad res uel secundas uel aduersas.

Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse. neque 18
id ad uiuum reseco ut illi qui haec subtilius disserunt, fortasse uere, sed
ad communem utilitatem parum: negant enim quemquam esse uirum
bonum nisi sapientem. sit ita sane, sed eam sapientiam interpretantur
quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus; nos autem ea quae sunt in
usu uitaque communi, non ea quae finguntur aut optantur spectare debe-
mus. numquam ego dicam C. Fabricium, M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium,
quos sapientes nostri maiores iudicabant, ad istorum normam fuisse sapi-
entes. quare sibi habeant sapientiae nomen et inuidiosum et obscurum,
concedant ut uiri boni fuerint. ne id quidem facient: negabunt id nisi
sapienti posse concedi. agamus igitur pingui, ut aiunt, Minerua. qui ita se 19
gerunt, ita uiuunt, ut eorum probetur fides integritas aequitas liberalitas,
nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas libido audacia, sintque magna constantia, ut ei
fuerunt modo quos nominaui: hos uiros bonos, ut habiti sunt, sic etiam
appellandos putemus, quia sequantur quantum homines possunt natu-
ram optimam bene uiuendi ducem.

Sic enim mihi perspicere uideor, ita natos esse nos ut inter omnes esset
societas quaedam, maior autem ut quisque proxime accederet; itaque
ciues potiores quam peregrini, propinqui quam alieni: cum his enim
amicitiam natura ipsa peperit. sed ea non satis habet firmitatis: namque
hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate beneuolentia
tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim beneuolentia amicitiae
nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet. quanta autem uis amicitiae sit ex 20
hoc intellegi maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani
quam conciliauit ipsa natura ita contracta res est et adducta in angustum
ut omnis caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur.

[VI] Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium diuinarum humanarum-
que rerum cum beneuolentia et caritate consensio, qua quidem haud scio
an excepta sapientia nihil melius homini sit a dis immortalibus datum.
diuitias alii praeponunt, bonam alii ualetudinem, alii potentiam, alii
honores, multi etiam uoluptates. beluarum hoc quidem extremum; illa
autem superiora caduca et incerta, posita non tam in consiliis nostris quam
in fortunae temeritate. qui autem in uirtute summum bonum ponunt,
praeclare illi quidem, sed haec ipsa uirtus amicitiam et gignit et continet,
nec sine uirtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest. iam uirtutem ex consuetu- 21
dine uitae sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti,
uerborum magnificentia metiamur, uirosque bonos eos qui habentur
numeremus: Paullos Catones Galos Scipiones Philos. his communis uita
contenta est, eos autem omittamus qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur.

Tales igitur inter uiros amicitia tantas opportunitates habet quan- 22
tas uix queo dicere. principio qui potest esse uita uitalis, ut ait Ennius,

quae non in amici mutua beneuolentia conquiescit? quid dulcius quam habere quicum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum? qui esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes qui illis aeque ac tu ipse gauderet? aduersas uero ferre difficile esset sine eo qui illas grauius etiam quam tu ferret. denique ceterae res quae expetuntur opportunae sunt singulae rebus fere singulis, diuitiae ut utare, opes ut colare, honores ut laudere, uoluptates ut gaudeas, ualetudo ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis. amicitia res plurimas continet: quoquo te uerteris praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, numquam intempestiua, numquam molesta est. itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, locis pluribus utimur quam amicitia (neque ego nunc de uulgari aut de mediocri, quae tamen ipsa et delectat et prodest, sed de uera et perfecta loquor, qualis eorum qui pauci nominantur fuit); nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia et aduersas partiens communicansque leuiores.

23 [VII] Cumque plurimas et maximas commoditates amicitia continet, tum illa nimirum praestat omnibus, quod bona spe praelucet in posterum, nec debilitari animos aut cadere patitur. uerum etiam amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui, quocirca et absentes adsunt et egentes abundant et imbecilli ualent et, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui uiuunt: tantus eos honos memoria desiderium prosequitur amicorum, ex quo illorum beata mors uidetur, horum uita laudabilis. quod si exemeris ex rerum natura beneuolentiae iunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit nec agri quidem cultus permanebit. id si minus intellegitur, quanta uis amicitiae concordiaeque sit ex dissensionibus atque discordiis percipi potest. quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma ciuitas est, quae non odiis et discidiis funditus possit euerti? ex quo quan-
24 tum boni sit in amicitia iudicari potest. Agrigentinum quidem doctum quendam uirum carminibus Graecis uaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent quaeque mouerentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam.

Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et intellegunt et re probant. itaque si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis aut adeundis aut communicandis, quis est qui id non maximis efferat laudibus? qui clamores tota cauea nuper in hospitis et amici mei M. Pacuui noua fabula! cum ignorante rege uter Orestes esset, Pylades Orestem se esse diceret ut pro illo necaretur, Orestes autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseueraret. stantes plaudebant in re ficta; quid arbitramur in uera facturos fuisse? facile indicabat ipsa natura uim suam cum homines quod facere ipsi non possent, id recte fieri in altero iudicarent. hactenus mihi uideor de amicitia quid sentirem potuisse dicere; si qua praeterea sunt (credo autem esse multa), ab eis, si uidebitur, qui ista disputant quaeritote.

FANNIVS: Nos autem a te potius; quamquam etiam ab istis saepe quaesiui 25
et audiui, non inuitus equidem. sed aliud quoddam filum orationis tuae.
SCAEVOLA: Tum magis id diceres, Fanni, si nuper in hortis Scipionis cum est de re publica disputatum adfuisses. qualis tum patronus iustitiae fuit contra accuratam orationem Phili!
FANNIVS: Facile id quidem fuit, iustitiam iustissimo uiro defendere.
SCAEVOLA: Quid amicitiam? nonne facile ei qui ob eam summa fide constantia iustitiaque seruatam maximam gloriam ceperit?
[VIII] LAELIVS: Vim hoc quidem est afferre! quid enim refert qua me 26
ratione cogatis? cogitis certe: studiis enim generorum, praesertim in re bona, cum difficile est tum ne aequum quidem obsistere.

Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum uideri solet, utrum propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis, quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio uicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa. amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad beneuolentiam coniungendam; nam utilitates quidem etiam ab eis percipiuntur saepe qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur et obseruantur temporis causa. in amicitia autem nihil fictum est, nihil simulatum, et quidquid est, id est uerum et uoluntarium. quapropter a natura mihi 27
uidetur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura.

Quod quidem quale sit etiam in bestiis quibusdam animaduerti potest, quae ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus et ab eis ita amantur ut facile earum sensus appareat. quod in homine multo est euidentius, primum ex ea caritate quae est inter natos et parentes, quae dirimi nisi detestabili scelere non potest, deinde cum similis sensus exstitit amoris, si aliquem nacti sumus cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus, quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et uirtutis perspicere uideamur. nihil est 28
enim uirtute amabilius, nihil quod magis alliciat ad diligendum, quippe cum propter uirtutem et probitatem etiam eos quos numquam uidimus quodam modo diligamus. quis est qui C. Fabrici, M'. Curi non cum caritate aliqua beneuola memoriam usurpet quos numquam uiderit? quis autem est qui Tarquinium Superbum, qui Sp. Cassium, Sp. Maelium non oderit? cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et Hannibale; ab altero propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos animos habemus, alterum propter crudelitatem semper haec ciuitas oderit. [IX]
quod si tanta uis probitatis est ut eam uel in eis quos numquam uidimus 29
uel, quod maius est, in hoste etiam diligamus, quid mirum est si animi

hominum moueantur cum eorum quibuscum usu coniuncti esse possunt uirtutem et bonitatem perspicere uideantur?

Quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto et studio perspecto et consuetudine adiuncta, quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris adhibitis admirabilis quaedam exardescit beneuolentiae magnitudo. quam si qui putant ab imbecillitate proficisci, ut sit per quem adsequatur quod quisque desideret, humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indigentia natam uolunt. quod si ita esset, ut quisque minimum esse in se arbi-
30 traretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus; quod longe secus est. ut enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit et ut quisque maxime uirtute et sapientia sic munitus est ut nullo egeat suaque omnia in se ipso posita iudicet, ita in amicitiis expetendis colendisque maxime excellit. quid enim? Africanus indigens mei? minime hercule, ac ne ego quidem illius. sed ego admiratione quadam uirtutis eius, ille uicissim opinione fortasse nonnulla quam de meis moribus habebat me dilexit. auxit beneuolentiam consuetudo, sed quamquam utilitates multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt
31 tamen ab earum spe causae diligendi profectae. ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus non ut exigamus gratiam – neque enim beneficium faeneramur sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus – sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus.

32 Ab his qui pecudum ritu ad uoluptatem omnia referunt longe dissentiunt. nec mirum: nihil enim altum, nihil magnificum ac diuinum suspicere possunt qui suas omnes cogitationes abiecerunt in rem tam humilem tamque contemptam. quam ob rem hos quidem ab hoc sermone remoueamus, ipsi autem intellegamus natura gigni sensum diligendi et beneuolentiae caritatem facta significatione probitatis. quam qui appetiuerunt, applicant se et propius admouent ut et usu eius quem diligere coeperunt fruantur et moribus, sintque pares in amore et aequales, propensioresque ad bene merendum quam ad reposcendum, atque haec inter eos sit honesta certatio. sic et utilitates ex amicitia maxime capientur et erit ortus a natura quam ab imbecillitate grauior et uerior. nam si utilitas amicitias conglutinaret, eadem commutata dissolueret, sed quia natura mutari non potest, idcirco uerae amicitiae sempiternae sunt. ortum quidem amicitiae uidetis, nisi quid ad haec forte uultis.

FANNIVS: Tu uero perge, Laeli; pro hoc enim, qui minor est natu, meo iure respondeo.

33 SCAEVOLA: Recte tu quidem; quam ob rem audiamus.

[X] LAELIVS: Audite uero, optimi uiri, ea quae saepissime inter me et Scipionem de amicitia disserebantur. quamquam ille quidem nihil

difficilius esse dicebat quam amicitiam usque ad extremum uitae diem permanere: nam uel ut non idem expediret incidere saepe, uel ut de re publica non idem sentiretur. mutari etiam mores hominum saepe dicebat, alias aduersis rebus, alias aetate ingrauescente. atque earum rerum exemplum ex similitudine capiebat ineuntis aetatis, quod summi puerorum amores saepe una cum praetexta toga ponerentur. sin autem ad 34
adulescentiam perduxissent, dirimi tamen interdum contentione, uel uxoriae condicionis uel commodi alicuius quod idem adipisci uterque non posset. quod si qui longius in amicitia prouecti essent, tamen saepe labefactari si in honoris contentionem incidissent: pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitiis quam in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae, ex quo inimicitias maximas saepe inter amicissimos exstitisse. magna enim discidia et plerumque iusta 35
nasci cum aliquid ab amicis quod rectum non esset postularetur, ut aut libidinis ministri aut adiutores essent ad iniuriam; quod qui recusarent, quamuis honeste id facerent, ius tamen amicitiae deserere arguerentur ab eis quibus obsequi nollent. illos autem qui quiduis ab amico auderent postulare, postulatione ipsa profiteri omnia se amici causa esse facturos. eorum querela non inueteratas modo familiaritates exstingui solere, sed odia etiam gigni sempiterna. haec ita multa quasi fata impendere amicitiis ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiae sed etiam felicitatis diceret sibi uideri.

[XI] Quam ob rem id primum uideamus, si placet, quatenus amor 36
in amicitia progredi debeat. numne si Coriolanus habuit amicos, ferre contra patriam arma illi cum Coriolano debuerunt? num Vecellinum amici, regnum appetentem, num Maelium debuerunt iuuare? Ti. quidem 37
Gracchum rem publicam uexantem a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum uidebamus; at C. Blossius Cumanus, hospes familiae uestrae, Scaeuola, cum ad me (quod aderam Laenati et Rupilio consulibus in consilio) deprecatum uenisset, hanc ut sibi ignoscerem causam afferebat quod tanti Ti. Gracchum fecisset ut quidquid ille uellet sibi faciendum putaret. tum ego: "Etiamne si te in Capitolium faces ferre uellet?" "Numquam" inquit "uoluisset id quidem; sed si uoluisset paruissem." uidetis quam nefaria uox! et hercule ita fecit uel plus etiam quam dixit: non enim paruit ille Ti. Gracchi temeritati sed praefuit, nec se comitem illius furoris sed ducem praebuit. itaque hac amentia, quaestione noua perterritus, in Asiam profugit, ad hostes se contulit, poenas rei publicae graues iustasque persoluit. nulla est igitur excusatio peccati si amici causa peccaueris; nam cum conciliatrix amicitiae uirtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere si a uirtute defeceris.

Quod si rectum statuerimus uel concedere amicis quidquid uelint uel 38
impetrare ab eis quidquid uelimus, perfecta quidem sapientia si simus,

nihil habeat res uiti. sed loquimur de eis amicis qui ante oculos sunt, quos uidemus aut de quibus memoria accepimus, quos nouit uita communis. ex hoc numero nobis exempla sumenda sunt, et eorum quidem maxime
39 qui ad sapientiam proxime accedunt. uidemus Papum Aemilium Luscino familiarem fuisse – sic a patribus accepimus – bis una consules, collegas in censura; tum et cum eis et inter se coniunctissimos fuisse M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium memoriae proditum est. igitur ne suspicare quidem possumus quemquam horum ab amico quidpiam contendisse quod contra fidem, contra ius iurandum, contra rem publicam esset. nam hoc quidem in talibus uiris quid attinet dicere, si contendisset impetraturum non fuisse, cum illi sanctissimi uiri fuerint, aeque autem nefas sit tale aliquid et facere rogatum et rogare? at uero Ti. Gracchum sequebantur C. Carbo, C. Cato, et minime tum quidem C. frater, nunc idem acerrimus.
40 [XII] Haec igitur lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpes nec faciamus rogati. turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda, cum in ceteris peccatis tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur. etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scaeuola, locati sumus ut nos longe prospicere oporteat futuros casus rei publicae. deflexit iam aliquantum
41 de spatio curriculoque consuetudo maiorum. Ti. Gracchus regnum occupare conatus est, uel regnauit is quidem paucos menses; numquid simile populus Romanus audierat aut uiderat? hunc etiam post mortem secuti amici et propinqui quid in P. Nasica effecerint sine lacrimis non queo dicere. nam Carbonem, quoquo modo potuimus, propter recentem poenam Ti. Gracchi sustinuimus; de C. Gracchi autem tribunatu quid exspectem non libet augurari. serpit in dies res quae procliuis ad perniciem, cum semel coepit, labitur. uidetis in tabella iam ante quanta sit facta labes, primo Gabinia lege, biennio post Cassia. uidere iam uideor populum a senatu disiunctum, multitudinis arbitrio res maximas agi: plures enim discent quemadmodum haec fiant, quam quemadmodum his resistatur.
42 Quorsum haec? quia sine sociis nemo quidquam tale conatur. praecipiendum est igitur bonis ut si in eiusmodi amicitias ignari casu aliquo inciderint, ne existiment ita se alligatos ut ab amicis in magna aliqua re peccantibus non discedant. improbis autem poena statuenda est, nec uero minor eis qui secuti erunt alterum quam eis qui ipsi fuerint impietatis duces. quis clarior in Graecia Themistocle, quis potentior? qui cum imperator bello Persico seruitute Graeciam liberauisset propterque inuidiam in exsilium expulsus esset, ingratae patriae iniuriam non tulit quam ferre debuit; fecit idem quod uiginti annis ante apud nos fecerat Coriolanus. his adiutor contra patriam inuentus est nemo; itaque mortem
43 sibi uterque consciuit. quare talis improborum consensio non modo excusatione amicitiae tegenda non est, sed potius supplicio omni uindicanda est, ut ne quis concessum putet amicum uel bellum patriae inferentem

sequi. quod quidem, ut res ire coepit, haud scio an aliquando futurum sit; mihi autem non minori curae est qualis res publica post mortem meam futura quam qualis hodie sit.

[XIII] Haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur, ut ab amicis honesta 44
petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus. ne exspectemus quidem dum rogemur: studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit. consilium uero dare audeamus libere: plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium ualeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur.

Nam quibusdam, quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia, placuisse 45
opinor mirabilia quaedam (sed nihil est quod illi non persequantur argutiis): partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus; satis superque esse sibi suarum cuique rerum, alienis nimis implicari molestum esse; commodissimum esse quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae, quas uel adducas cum uelis uel remittas; caput enim esse ad beate uiuendum securitatem, qua frui non possit animus si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus. alios autem dicere aiunt 46
multo etiam inhumanius (quem locum breuiter paulo ante perstrinxi), praesidi adiumentique causa, non beneuolentiae neque caritatis amicitias esse expetendas. itaque ut quisque minimum firmitatis haberet minimumque uirium, ita amicitias appetere maxime. ex eo fieri ut mulierculae magis amicitiarum praesidia quaerant quam uiri et inopes quam opulenti et calamitosi quam ei qui putentur beati.

O praeclaram sapientiam! solem enim e mundo tollere uidentur qui 47
amicitiam e uita tollunt, qua nihil a dis immortalibus melius habemus, nihil iucundius. quae est enim ista securitas? specie quidem blanda, sed reapse multis locis repudianda. neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemue, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere. quod si curam fugimus, uirtus fugienda est, quae necesse est cum aliqua cura res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit, ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia libidinem, ignauiam fortitudo. itaque uideas rebus iniustis iustos maxime dolere, imbellibus fortes, flagitiosis modestos. ergo hoc proprium est animi bene constituti, et laetari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis. quam ob rem si cadit in sapientem animi dolor 48
(qui profecto cadit, nisi ex eius animo exstirpatam humanitatem arbitramur), quae causa est cur amicitiam funditus tollamus e uita ne aliquas propter eam suscipiamus molestias? quid enim interest, motu animi sublato, non dico inter pecudem et hominem, sed inter hominem et truncum aut saxum aut quiduis generis eiusdem? neque enim sunt isti audiendi qui uirtutem duram et quasi ferream esse quandam uolunt. quae quidem est cum multis in rebus, tum in amicitia, tenera atque tractabilis, ut et bonis amici quasi diffundatur et incommodis contrahatur. quam ob rem angor

iste qui pro amico saepe capiendus est non tantum ualet ut tollat e uita amicitiam, non plus quam ut uirtutes quia nonnullas curas et molestias afferunt repudientur.

[XIV] Cum autem contrahat amicitiam, ut supra dixi, si qua significatio uirtutis eluceat ad quam se similis animus applicet et adiungat, id
49 cum contigit amor exoriatur necesse est. quid enim tam absurdum quam delectari multis inanibus rebus ut honore, ut gloria, ut aedificio, ut uestitu cultuque corporis, animo autem uirtute praedito, eo qui uel amare uel, ut ita dicam, redamare possit, non admodum delectari? nihil est enim remuneratione beneuolentiae, nihil uicissitudine studiorum officiorum-
50 que iucundius. quid si illud etiam addimus, quod recte addi potest, nihil esse quod ad se rem ullam tam illiciat et tam trahat quam ad amicitiam similitudo? concedetur profecto uerum esse ut bonos boni diligant adsciscantque sibi quasi propinquitate coniunctos atque natura; nihil est enim appetentius similium sui nec rapacius quam natura. quam ob rem hoc quidem, Fanni et Scaeuola, constet, ut opinor: bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam beneuolentiam, qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus. sed eadem bonitas etiam ad multitudines pertinet: non enim est inhumana uirtus neque immanis neque superba, quae etiam populos uniuersos tueri eisque optime consulere soleat, quod non faceret profecto si a caritate uulgi abhorreret.

51 Atque etiam mihi quidem uidentur qui utilitatum causa fingunt amicitias amabilissimum nodum amicitiae tollere. non enim tam utilitas parta per amicum quam amici amor ipse delectat; tumque illud fit quod ab amico est profectum iucundum, si cum studio est profectum, tantumque abest ut amicitiae propter indigentiam colantur, ut ei qui opibus et copiis maximeque uirtute (in qua plurimum est praesidi) minime alterius indigeant, liberalissimi sint et beneficentissimi. atqui haud sciam an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis: ubi enim studia nostra uiguissent si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset? non igitur utilitatem amicitia sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est.

52 [XV] Non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffluentes audiendi si quando de amicitia, quam nec usu nec ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt. nam quis est, pro deorum fidem atque hominum, qui uelit, ut neque diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia uiuere? haec enim est tyrannorum uita, nimirum in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis beneuolentiae potest esse fiducia: omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita, nullus locus
53 amicitiae. quis enim aut eum diligit quem metuat aut eum a quo se metui putet? coluntur tamen simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus; quod si forte, ut

fit plerumque, ceciderunt, tum intellegitur quam fuerint inopes amicorum. quod Tarquinium dixisse ferunt exsulantem, tum se intellexisse quos fidos amicos habuisset, quos infidos, cum iam neutris gratiam referre posset. quamquam miror, illa superbia et importunitate, si quemquam ami- 54
cum habere potuit; atque ut huius quem dixi mores ueros amicos parare non potuerunt, sic multorum opes praepotentium excludunt amicitias fideles. non enim solum ipsa Fortuna caeca est, sed eos etiam plerumque efficit caecos quos complexa est: itaque efferuntur fere fastidio et contumacia, nec quidquam insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest. atque hoc quidem uidere licet, eos qui antea commodis fuerint moribus, imperio potestate prosperis rebus immutari, sperni ab eis ueteres amicitias, indulgeri nouis. quid autem stultius quam, cum plurimum copiis 55
facultatibus opibus possint, cetera parare quae parantur pecunia – equos, famulos, uestem egregiam, uasa pretiosa – amicos non parare, optimam et pulcherrimam uitae, ut ita dicam, supellectilem? etenim cetera cum parant, cui parent nesciunt nec cuius causa laborent. eius enim est istorum quidque qui uicit uiribus, amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio, ut etiamsi illa maneant quae sunt quasi dona fortunae, tamen uita inculta et deserta ab amicis non possit esse iucunda. sed haec hactenus.

[XVI] Constituendi autem sunt qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini 56
diligendi. de quibus tres uideo sententias ferri, quarum nullam probo: unam ut eodem modo erga amicum affecti simus quo erga nosmet ipsos; alteram ut nostra in amicos beneuolentia illorum erga nos beneuolentiae pariter aequaliterque respondeat; tertiam ut quanti quisque se ipse facit, tanti fiat ab amicis. harum trium sententiarum nulli prorsus assen- 57
tior. nec enim illa prima uera est, ut quemadmodum in se quisque sit, sic in amicum sit animatus. quam multa enim quae nostra causa numquam faceremus, facimus causa amicorum! precari ab indigno, supplicare, tum acerbius in aliquem inuehi insectarique uehementius: quae in nostris rebus non satis honeste, in amicorum fiunt honestissime. multaeque res sunt in quibus de suis commodis uiri boni multa detrahunt detrahique patiuntur ut eis amici potius quam ipsi fruantur.

Altera sententia est quae definit amicitiam paribus officiis ac uoluntatibus. 58
hoc quidem est nimis exigue et exiliter ad calculos uocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum. diuitior mihi et affluentior uidetur esse uera amicitia, nec obseruare restricte ne plus reddat quam acceperit. neque enim uerendum est ne quid excidat aut ne quid in terram defluat, aut ne plus aequo quid in amicitiam congeratur. Tertius uero 59
ille finis deterrimus, ut quanti quisque se ipse faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis. saepe enim in quibusdam aut animus abiectior est aut spes amplificandae

fortunae fractior; non est igitur amici talem esse in eum qualis ille in se est, sed potius eniti et efficere ut amici iacentem animum excitet inducatque spem cogitationemque meliorem.

Alius igitur finis uerae amicitiae constituendus est, si prius quid maxime reprehendere Scipio solitus sit edixero. negabat ullam uocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri quam eius qui dixisset ita amare oportere ut si aliquando esset osurus; nec uero se adduci posse ut hoc, quemadmodum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus e Septem. impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi aut omnia ad suam potentiam reuocantis esse sententiam. quonam enim modo quisquam amicus esse poterit eius cui se putabit inimicum esse posse? quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare ut quam saepissime peccet amicus, quo plures det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum, rursum autem recte factis com-
60 modisque amicorum necesse erit angi dolere inuidere. quare hoc quidem praeceptum, cuiuscumque est, ad tollendam amicitiam ualet. illud potius praecipiendum fuit ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiis comparandis ut ne quando amare inciperemus eum quem aliquando odisse possemus. quin etiam si minus felices in deligendo fuissemus, ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat.

61 [XVII] His igitur finibus utendum arbitror ut, cum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum consiliorum uoluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas; ut etiam si qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum uoluntates adiuuandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de uia sit, modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur. est enim quatenus amicitiae dari uenia possit. nec uero neglegenda est fama, nec mediocre telum ad res gerendas existimare oportet beneuolentiam ciuium, quam blanditiis et assentando colligere turpe est. uirtus, quam sequitur caritas, minime repudianda est.

62 Sed – saepe enim redeo ad Scipionem, cuius omnis sermo erat de amicitia – querebatur quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent: capras et oues quot quisque haberet dicere posse, amicos quot haberet non posse dicere. et in illis quidem parandis adhibere curam, in amicis eligendis neglegentes esse nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas quibus eos qui ad amicitias essent idonei iudicarent.

Sunt igitur firmi et stabiles et constantes eligendi, cuius generis est magna penuria. et iudicare difficile est sane nisi expertum; experiendum autem est in ipsa amicitia. ita praecurrit amicitia iudicium tollitque expe-
63 riendi potestatem. est igitur prudentis sustinere, ut currum, sic impetum beneuolentiae quo utamur quasi equis temptatis, sic amicitia aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum. quidam saepe in parua pecunia perspiciuntur quam sint leues, quidam autem, quos parua mouere non potuit, cognoscuntur in magna. sin uero erunt aliqui reperti qui pecuniam

praeferre amicitiae sordidum existiment, ubi eos inueniemus qui honores magistratus imperia potestates opes amicitiae non anteponant, ut cum ex altera parte proposita haec sint, ex altera ius amicitiae, non multo illa malint? imbecilla enim est natura ad contemnendam potentiam; quam etiamsi neglecta amicitia consecuti sint, obscuratum iri arbitrantur quia non sine magna causa sit neglecta amicitia. itaque uerae amicitiae diffi- 64
cillime reperiuntur in eis qui in honoribus reque publica uersantur: ubi enim istum inuenias qui honorem amici anteponat suo? quid? haec ut omittam, quam graues, quam difficiles plerisque uidentur calamitatum societates! ad quas non est facile inuentu qui descendant. quamquam Ennius recte "amicus certus in re incerta cernitur," tamen haec duo leuitatis et infirmitatis plerosque conuincunt, aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt aut in malis deserunt. qui igitur utraque in re grauem constantem stabilem se in amicitia praestiterit, hunc ex maxime raro genere hominum iudicare debemus et paene diuino.

[XVIII] Firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque est eius quam 65
in amicitia quaerimus fides: nihil est enim stabile quod infidum est. simplicem praeterea et communem et consentientem, id est qui rebus eisdem moueatur, eligi par est; quae omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem. neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuosum, neque uero qui non eisdem rebus mouetur naturaque consentit aut fidus aut stabilis potest esse. addendum eodem est ut ne criminibus aut inferendis delectetur aut credat oblatis; quae pertinent omnia ad eam quam iamdudum tracto constantiam. ita fit uerum illud quod initio dixi, amicitiam nisi inter bonos esse non posse.

Est enim boni uiri, quem eundem sapientem licet dicere, haec duo tenere in amicitia: primum ne quid fictum sit neue simulatum – aperte enim uel odisse magis ingenui est quam fronte occultare sententiam – deinde non solum ab aliquo allatas criminationes repellere sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum, semper aliquid existimantem ab amico esse uiolatum. accedat huc suauitas quaedam oportet sermonum atque 66
morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiae; tristitia autem et in omni re seueritas habet illa quidem grauitatem, sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque procliuior.

[XIX] Exsistit autem hoc loco quaedam quaestio subdifficilis, num 67
quando amici noui digni amicitia ueteribus sint anteponendi, ut equis uetulis teneros anteponere solemus. indigna homine dubitatio: non enim debent esse amicitiarum sicut aliarum rerum satietates; ueterrima quaeque, ut ea uina quae uetustatem ferunt, esse debent suauissima, uerumque illud est quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse ut amicitiae munus expletum sit. nouitates autem si spem afferunt ut 68

tamquam in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiandae, uetustas tamen loco suo conseruanda. maxima est enim uis uetustatis et consuetudinis. quin in ipso equo cuius modo feci mentionem, si nulla res impediat, nemo est quin eo quo consueuit libentius utatur quam intractato et nouo. nec uero in hoc, quod est animal, sed in eis etiam quae sunt inanima consuetudo ualet, cum locis ipsis delectemur, montuosis etiam et siluestribus, in quibus diutius commorati sumus.

69 Sed maximum est in amicitia parem esse inferiori. saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro (ut ita dicam) grege. numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis. Q. uero Maximum fratrem, egregium uirum omnino, sibi nequaquam parem, quod is anteibat aetate tamquam superiorem colebat, suosque omnes per se posse esse
70 ampliores uolebat. quod faciendum imitandumque est omnibus, ut si quam praestantiam uirtutis ingeni fortunae consecuti sint, impertiant ea suis communicentque cum proximis; ut si parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant imbecilliore uel animo uel fortuna, eorum augeant opes eisque honori sint et dignitati; ut in fabulis, qui aliquamdiu propter ignorationem stirpis et generis in famulatu fuerint, cum cogniti sunt et aut deorum aut regum filii inuenti, retinent tamen caritatem in pastores quos patres multos annos esse duxerunt. quod est multo profecto magis in ueris patribus certisque faciendum: fructus enim ingeni et uirtutis omnisque praestantiae tum maximus capitur, cum in proximum quemque confertur.

71 [XX] Vt igitur ei qui sunt in amicitiae coniunctionisque necessitudine superiores exaequare se cum inferioribus debent, sic inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari. quorum plerique aut queruntur semper aliquid aut etiam exprobrant, eoque magis si habere se putant quod officiose et amice et cum labore aliquo suo factum queant dicere. odiosum sane genus hominum, officia exprobrantium quae meminisse debet is in quem collata sunt, non commemorare
72 qui contulit. quam ob rem ut ei qui superiores sunt submittere se debent in amicitia, sic quodammodo inferiores extollere. sunt enim quidam qui molestas amicitias faciunt cum ipsi se contemni putant, quod non fere contingit nisi eis qui etiam contemnendos se arbitrantur; qui hac
73 opinione non modo uerbis sed etiam opere leuandi sunt. tantum autem cuique tribuendum, primum quantum ipse efficere possis, deinde etiam quantum ille quem diligas atque adiuues sustinere. non enim tu possis, quamuis excellas, omnes tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere, ut Scipio P. Rupilium potuit consulem efficere, fratrem eius Lucium non potuit. quod si etiam possis quiduis deferre ad alterum, uidendum est tamen quid ille possit sustinere.

Omnino amicitiae corroboratis iam confirmatisque et ingeniis et aeta- 74
tibus iudicandae sunt, nec si qui ineunte aetate uenandi aut pilae studiosi fuerunt, eos habere necessarios quos tum eodem studio praeditos dilexerunt. isto enim modo nutrices et paedagogi iure uetustatis plurimum beneuolentiae postulabunt, qui neglegendi quidem non sunt, sed alio quodam modo aestimandi. aliter amicitiae stabiles permanere non possunt. dispares enim mores disparia studia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias, nec ob aliam causam ullam boni improbis, improbi bonis amici esse non possunt, nisi quod tanta est inter eos quanta maxima potest esse morum studiorumque distantia.

Recte etiam praecipi potest in amicitiis ne intemperata quaedam bene- 75
uolentia, quod persaepe fit, impediat magnas utilitates amicorum. nec enim, ut ad fabulas redeam, Troiam Neoptolemus capere potuisset si Lycomedem, apud quem erat educatus, multis cum lacrimis iter suum impedientem audire uoluisset. et saepe incidunt magnae res, ut discedendum sit ab amicis; quas qui impedire uult eo quod desiderium non facile ferat, is et infirmus est mollisque natura, et ob eam ipsam causam in amicitia parum iustus. atque in omni re considerandum est et quid postules 76
ab amico et quid patiare a te impetrari.

[XXI] Est etiam quaedam calamitas in amicitiis dimittendis nonnumquam necessaria (iam enim a sapientium familiaritatibus ad uulgares amicitias oratio nostra delabitur). erumpunt saepe uitia amicorum, tum in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos, quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. tales igitur amicitiae sunt remissione usus eluendae et, ut Catonem dicere audiui, dissuendae magis quam discindendae, nisi quaedam admodum intolerabilis iniuria exarserit ut neque rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit ut non statim alienatio disiunctioque facienda sit. sin autem aut morum aut studiorum commutatio quaedam, ut fieri solet, 77
facta erit, aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit – loquor enim iam, ut paulo ante dixi, non de sapientium sed de communibus amicitiis – cauendum erit ne non solum amicitiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae uideantur. nihil enim est turpius quam cum eo bellum gerere quocum familiariter uixeris. ab amicitia Q. Pompei meo nomine se remouerat, ut scitis, Scipio; propter dissensionem autem quae erat in re publica alienatus est a collega nostro Metello; utrumque egit grauiter ac moderate et offensione animi non acerba.

Quam ob rem primum danda opera est ne qua amicorum discidia 78
fiant; sin tale aliquid euenerit, ut exstinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae esse uideantur. cauendum uero ne etiam in graues inimicitias conuertant se amicitiae, ex quibus iurgia maledicta contumeliae gignuntur. quae tamen si tolerabiles erunt, ferendae sunt, et hic honos ueteri amicitiae tribuendus ut is in culpa sit qui faciat, non is qui patiatur iniuriam.

omnino omnium horum uitiorum atque incommodorum una cautio est atque una prouisio, ut ne nimis cito diligere incipiant, neue non dignos.
79 digni autem sunt amicitia quibus in ipsis est causa cur diligantur: rarum genus, et quidem omnia praeclara rara, nec quidquam difficilius quam reperire quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum.

Sed plerique neque in rebus humanis quidquam bonum norunt nisi quod fructuosum sit, et amicos tamquam pecudes eos potissimum diligunt
80 ex quibus sperant se maximum fructum esse capturos. ita pulcherrima illa et maxime naturali carent amicitia, per se et propter se expetita, nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt haec uis amicitiae et qualis et quanta sit. ipse enim se quisque diligit, non ut aliquam a se ipse mercedem exigat caritatis suae sed quod per se sibi quisque carus est; quod nisi idem in amicitiam transferetur, uerus amicus numquam reperietur: est enim is qui est tamquam
81 alter idem. quod si hoc apparet in bestiis, uolucribus nantibus agrestibus cicuribus feris, primum ut se ipsae diligant (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur), deinde ut requirant atque appetant ad quas se applicent eiusdem generis animantes, idque faciunt cum desiderio et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani, quanto id magis in homine fit natura, qui et se ipse diligit et alterum anquirit cuius animum ita cum suo misceat ut efficiat paene unum e duobus.

82 [XXII] Sed plerique peruerse, ne dicam impudenter, habere talem amicum uolunt quales ipsi esse non possunt, quaeque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, haec ab eis desiderant. par est autem primum ipsum esse uirum bonum, tum alterum similem sui quaerere. in talibus ea quam iamdudum tractamus stabilitas amicitiae confirmari potest, cum homines beneuolentia coniuncti primum cupiditatibus eis quibus ceteri seruiunt imperabunt, deinde aequitate iustitiaque gaudebunt, omniaque alter pro altero suscipiet neque quidquam umquam nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit. neque solum colent inter se et diligent, sed etiam uerebuntur; nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit qui ex ea tollit uerecundiam.

83 Itaque in eis perniciosus est error qui existimant libidinum peccatorumque omnium patere in amicitia licentiam: uirtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non uitiorum comes, ut, quoniam solitaria non potest uirtus ad ea quae summa sunt peruenire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera perueniret. quae si quos inter societas aut est aut fuit aut futura est, eorum est habendus ad summum naturae bonum optimus beatissimusque
84 comitatus. haec est, inquam, societas in qua omnia insunt quae putant homines expetenda – honestas gloria tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas – ut et cum haec adsint, beata uita sit, et sine his esse non possit. quod cum optimum maximumque sit, si id uolumus adipisci, uirtuti opera danda est, sine qua nec amicitiam neque ullam rem expetendam consequi possumus. ea uero neglecta qui se amicos habere arbitrantur tum se denique

errasse sentiunt cum eos grauis aliquis casus experiri cogit. quocirca 85
(dicendum est enim saepius) cum iudicaris diligere oportet, non cum
dilexeris iudicare. sed cum multis in rebus neglegentia plectimur, tum
maxime in amicis et deligendis et colendis. praeposteris enim utimur con-
siliis et acta agimus, quod uetamur uetere prouerbio: nam implicati ultro
et citro uel usu diurno uel etiam officiis, repente in medio cursu amicitias,
exorta aliqua offensione, dirumpimus.

[XXIII] Quo etiam magis uituperanda est rei maxime necessariae 86
tanta incuria: una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis de cuius utilitate
omnes uno ore consentiunt. quamquam a multis uirtus ipsa contemnitur
et uenditatio quaedam atque ostentatio esse dicitur; multi diuitias des-
piciunt, quos paruo contentos tenuis uictus cultusque delectat; honores
uero, quorum cupiditate quidam inflammantur, quam multi ita contem-
nunt ut nihil inanius, nihil esse leuius existiment! itemque cetera quae
quibusdam admirabilia uidentur, permulti sunt qui pro nihilo putent –
de amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt, et ei qui ad rem publicam se
contulerunt et ei qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur et ei qui
suum negotium gerunt otiosi, postremo ei qui se totos tradiderunt uolup-
tatibus: sine amicitia uitam esse nullam, si modo uelint aliqua ex parte
liberaliter uiuere. serpit enim nescioquo modo per omnium uitas amicitia 87
nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui.

Quin etiam si quis asperitate ea est et immanitate naturae congres-
sus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit, qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem
nescioquem accepimus, tamen is pati non possit ut non anquirat aliquem
apud quem euomat uirus acerbitatis suae. atque hoc maxime iudicaretur
si quid tale posset contingere ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum fre-
quentia tolleret et in solitudine uspiam collocaret, atque ibi suppeditans
omnium rerum quas natura desiderat abundantiam et copiam, hominis
omnino aspiciendi potestatem eriperet. quis tam esset ferreus qui eam
uitam ferre posset cuique non auferret fructum uoluptatum omnium so-
litudo? uerum ergo illud est quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici so- 88
litum nostros senes commemorare audiui, ab aliis senibus auditum: si quis
in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum
perspexisset, insuauem illam admirationem ei fore, quae iucundissima
fuisset si aliquem cui narraret habuisset. sic natura solitarium nihil amat
semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum adnititur, quod in amicis-
simo quoque dulcissimum est.

[XXIV] Sed cum tot signis eadem natura declaret quid uelit anquirat
desideret, tamen obsurdescimus nescioquo modo nec ea quae ab ea
monemur audimus. est enim uarius et multiplex usus amicitiae mul-
taeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur quas tum euitare,
tum eleuare, tum ferre sapientis est. una illa subleuanda offensio est ut et

utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur: nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et
89 obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice cum beneuole fiunt. sed nescioquo modo uerum est quod in Andria familiaris meus dicit, "obsequium amicos, ueritas odium parit." molesta ueritas siquidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est uenenum amicitiae; sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit. maxima autem culpa in eo qui et ueritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio impellitur.

Omni igitur hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est, primum ut monitio acerbitate, deinde ut obiurgatio contumelia careat. in obsequio autem (quoniam Terentiano uerbo libenter utimur) comitas adsit, assentatio uitiorum adiutrix procul amoueatur, quae non modo amico sed ne libero
90 quidem digna est: aliter enim cum tyranno, aliter cum amico uiuitur. cuius autem aures clausae ueritati sunt ut ab amico uerum audire nequeat, huius salus desperanda est. scitum est enim illud Catonis, ut multa: melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri quam eos amicos qui dulces uideantur; illos uerum saepe dicere, hos numquam. atque illud absurdum, quod ei qui monentur eam molestiam quam debent capere non capiunt, eam capiunt qua debent uacare: peccasse enim se non anguntur, obiurgari moleste ferunt, quod contra oportebat delicto dolere, correctione gaudere.

91 [XXV] Vt igitur et monere et moneri proprium est uerae amicitiae, et alterum libere facere, non aspere, alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter, sic habendum est nullam in amicitiis pestem esse maiorem quam adulationem blanditiam assentationem; quamuis enim multis nominibus est hoc uitium notandum leuium hominum atque fallacium, ad uoluptatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad ueritatem. cum autem omnium rerum
92 simulatio uitiosa est – tollit enim iudicium ueri idque adulterat – tum amicitiae repugnat maxime: delet enim ueritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae ualere non potest. nam cum amicitiae uis sit in eo ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus, qui id fieri poterit si ne in uno quidem quoque unus animus erit idemque semper, sed uarius commutabilis multiplex?
93 quid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam deuium quam animus eius qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac uoluntatem sed etiam uultum atque nutum conuertitur?

> Negat quis, nego; ait, aio; postremo imperaui egomet mihi
> omnia assentari,

ut ait idem Terentius, sed ille in Gnathonis persona. quod amici genus
94 adhibere omnino leuitatis est. multi autem Gnathonum similes cum sint loco fortuna fama superiores, horum est assentatio molesta cum ad uanitatem accessit auctoritas.

Secerni autem blandus amicus a uero et internosci tam potest adhibita 95
diligentia quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque ueris. contio quae
ex imperitissimis constat tamen iudicare solet quid intersit inter popu-
larem, id est assentatorem et leuem ciuem, et inter constantem seuerum
grauem. quibus blanditiis C. Papirius nuper influebat in aures contionis, 96
cum ferret legem de tribunis plebis reficiendis! dissuasimus nos, sed nihil
de me: de Scipione dicam libentius. quanta in oratione maiestas, ut facile
ducem populi Romani, non comitem diceres! sed adfuistis, et est in
manibus oratio. itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est. atque
ut ad me redeam, meministis Q. Maximo fratre Scipionis et L. Mancino
consulibus quam popularis lex de sacerdotiis C. Licini Crassi uidebatur:
cooptatio enim collegiorum ad populi beneficium transferebatur, atque
is primus instituit in forum uersus agere cum populo; tamen illius uen-
dibilem orationem religio deorum immortalium, nobis defendentibus,
facile uincebat. atque id actum est praetore me, quinquennio antequam
consul sum factus. ita re magis quam summa auctoritate causa illa defensa
est. [XXVI] quod si in scaena, id est in contione, in qua rebus fictis et 97
adumbratis loci plurimum est, tamen uerum ualet, si modo id patefactum
et illustratum est, quid in amicitia fieri oportet, quae tota ueritate per-
penditur? in qua nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus uideas tuumque osten-
das, nihil fidum, nihil exploratum habeas, ne amare quidem aut amari,
cum id quam uere fiat ignores.

Quamquam ista assentatio, quamuis perniciosa sit, nocere tamen
nemini potest nisi ei qui eam recipit atque ea delectatur. ita fit ut is
assentatoribus patefaciat aures suas maxime qui ipse sibi assentetur et se
maxime ipse delectet. omnino est amans sui uirtus: optime enim se ipsa 98
nouit, quamque amabilis sit intellegit. ego autem non de uirtute nunc
loquor, sed de uirtutis opinione. uirtute enim ipsa non tam multi praediti
esse quam uideri uolunt; hos delectat assentatio, his fictus ad ipsorum uo-
luntatem sermo cum adhibetur, orationem illam uanam testimonium esse
laudum suarum putant. nulla est igitur haec amicitia, cum alter uerum
audire non uult, alter ad mentiendum paratus est. nec parasitorum in
comoediis assentatio faceta nobis uideretur nisi essent milites gloriosi.
"Magnas uero agere gratias Thais mihi?" satis erat respondere "magnas";
"ingentes" inquit. semper auget assentator id quod is cuius ad uoluntatem
dicitur uult esse magnum.

Quam ob rem quamquam blanda ista uanitas apud eos ualet qui 99
ipsi illam allectant et inuitant, tamen etiam grauiores constantioresque
admonendi sunt ut animaduertant ne callida assentatione capiantur.
aperte enim adulantem nemo non uidet nisi qui admodum est excors;
callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet studiose cauendum est. nec enim

facillime agnoscitur, quippe qui etiam aduersando saepe assentetur, et litigare se simulans blandiatur atque ad extremum det manus uincique se patiatur, ut is qui illusus sit plus uidisse uideatur. quid autem turpius quam illudi? quod ut ne accidat magis cauendum est.

> Vt me hodie ante omnes comicos stultos senes
> uersaris atque illuseris lautissime –

100 haec enim etiam in fabulis stultissima persona est, improuidorum et credulorum senum. sed nescioquo pacto ab amicitiis perfectorum hominum, id est sapientium (de hac dico sapientia quae uidetur in hominem cadere posse), ad leues amicitias defluxit oratio. quam ob rem ad illa prima redeamus eaque ipsa concludamus aliquando.

[XXVII] Virtus, uirtus inquam, C. Fanni et tu Q. Muci, et conciliat amicitias et conseruat. in ea est enim conuenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia. quae cum se extulit et ostendit suum lumen et idem aspexit agnouitque in alio, ad id se admouet uicissimque accipit illud quod in altero est. ex quo exardescit siue amor siue amicitia (utrumque enim ductum est ab amando); amare autem nihil est aliud nisi eum ipsum diligere quem ames nulla indigentia, nulla utilitate quaesita, quae tamen ipsa
101 efflorescit ex amicitia etiamsi tu eam minus secutus sis. hac nos adulescentes beneuolentia senes illos – L. Paullum, M. Catonem, C. Galum, P. Nasicam, Ti. Gracchum Scipionis nostri socerum – dileximus. haec etiam magis elucet inter aequales, ut inter me et Scipionem, L. Furium, P. Rupilium, Sp. Mummium. uicissim autem senes in adulescentium caritate acquiescimus, ut in uestra, ut in Q. Tuberonis; equidem etiam admodum adulescentis P. Rutili, A. Vergini familiaritate delector. quoniamque ita ratio comparata est uitae naturaeque nostrae ut alia ex alia aetas oriatur, maxime quidem optandum est ut cum aequalibus possis, quibuscum tamquam e carceribus emissus sis, cum eisdem ad calcem, ut
102 dicitur, peruenire. sed quoniam res humanae fragiles caducaeque sunt, semper aliqui anquirendi sunt quos diligamus et a quibus diligamur. caritate enim beneuolentiaque sublata omnis est e uita sublata iucunditas.

Mihi quidem Scipio, quamquam est subito ereptus, uiuit tamen semperque uiuet. uirtutem enim amaui illius uiri quae exstincta non est, nec mihi soli uersatur ante oculos, qui illam semper in manibus habui, sed etiam posteris erit clara et insignis. nemo umquam animo aut spe maiora suscipiet qui sibi non illius memoriam atque imaginem proponendam
103 putet. equidem ex omnibus rebus quas mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit nihil habeo quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim comparare: in hac mihi de re publica consensus, in hac rerum priuatarum consilium, in eadem requies plena oblectationis fuit. numquam illum ne minima quidem re

offendi, quod quidem senserim; nihil audiui ex eo ipse quod nollem. una domus erat, idem uictus isque communis, neque solum militia sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque communes. nam quid ego de studiis 104
dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid atque discendi, in quibus remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum tempus contriuimus? quarum rerum recordatio et memoria si una cum illo occidisset, desiderium coniunctissimi atque amantissimi uiri ferre nullo modo possem. sed nec illa exstincta sunt alunturque potius et augentur cogitatione et memoria mea. et si illis plane orbatus essem, magnum tamen affert mihi aetas ipsa solacium: diutius enim iam in hoc desiderio esse non possum; omnia autem breuia tolerabilia esse debent, etiamsi magna sunt.

Haec habui de amicitia quae dicerem. uos autem hortor ut ita uirtutem locetis, sine qua amicitia esse non potest, ut ea excepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis.

COMMENTARY

A. PREFACE (1–5)

The preface falls into two parts. In the first (1–3), C. establishes his source for the dialogue he is about to recount: he claims to have heard it in 88 BCE from his mentor Q. Mucius Scaevola Augur, who recounted to a group of friends a conversation on the topic of friendship that he and C. Fannius had with their father-in-law C. Laelius Sapiens in 129. Just as Scaevola had allegedly retained Laelius' words, so too C. claims to report Scaevola's account from memory. In the second part (4–5), the author turns to the work's dedicatee, his friend Atticus, and explains his rationale in setting up the dialogue the way he has, with a venerable speaker from an earlier generation discoursing on a topic with expertise and authority. Thus, just as in C.'s earlier *De senectute* the old man Cato discusses old age, in *Amic.* Laelius – renowned for his friendship with the younger Scipio – talks about friendship. And just as C. had dedicated *De senectute* to Atticus as an old man to an old man, he now writes for the same dedicatee as one friend to another, encouraging him to immerse himself fully in the fiction of the dialogue and hear "Laelius" speak.

The fact that in the first part C. emphasizes the historicity of the dialogue while in the second he openly acknowledges that he has made it up has (together with other perceived inconsistencies in *Amic.*; see esp. 61n. *ut etiam ... turpitudo sequatur*) in the past given rise to theories of different stages of composition (see Neuhausen 1981–92: 110–11 for documentation and brief discussion); we would thus have two different draft prefaces, which C. never got around to reconciling. Few if any scholars today would subscribe to such a view, and at any rate the bipartition, with its surely ironic about-face, makes perfect sense and fits C.'s complex purposes. On the one hand, he gets to assert his authorship, affording his readers a glimpse, as it were, into his literary workshop, while also acknowledging Atticus' role, not only as a dedicatee but as someone who in the past has often urged C. to write about friendship. On the other hand, the elaborate fiction of the dialogue's oral transmission allows C. to insert himself into a multigenerational intellectual genealogy of Roman elite men (Laelius and his sons-in-law; Scaevola and his companions; C. and Atticus), which serves as the conduit for an ethics both informed by Greek philosophy and applicable to Roman reality (see Introduction 3(*a*)).

1 **Q. Mucius ... C. Laelio:** on the participants in the dialogue, see Introduction 3(*a*). **memoriter** "from memory"; found in early drama and C. but rarely later, its use here may be slightly archaizing. It introduces the theme of memory that links different generations (see 3n. *memoriae mandaui* and Introduction 3(*a*)). **iucunde:** C. elsewhere, too, characterizes Scaevola as a charming and amusing speaker (*De or.* 1.35; *Att.* 4.16.3). The connection with *memoriter* foreshadows the pretended double nature of the dialogue: already Scaevola offers both a faithful account and an entertaining performance of his own. **sapientem:** *sapientia* is a leitmotif of the dialogue (see 6n. and Introduction 3(*c*)), and Laelius' status as a wise man and his cognomen *sapiens* are discussed also at 5, 6–7, 9, 15. The origin of the cognomen is unclear. Plutarch (*Ti. Gracch.* 8.4) claims that it derived from Laelius' political sagaciousness in withdrawing a contentious agrarian law (date uncertain). Most of the time, however, particularly in his philosophical works, C. considers Laelius' *sapientia* to be a combination of traditional Roman intelligence in public life with the philosophical wisdom derived from the study of Stoicism. On the meanings of *sapiens*, see further 6n. *sapientem* and, for more detail, Garbarino 1965–6; on Laelius as *sapiens*, see Introduction 3(*c*) and Panico 1980, with documentation and discussion of all Ciceronian passages. **deductus ad Scaeuolam:** *deducere ad* is a normal way to describe entrusting someone with the supervision of one's son's education; cf. *Cael.* 9; Tac. *Dial.* 34.1; *OLD deduco* 10c. Scaevola Augur was a distinguished jurisconsult, but at the time C. became his pupil (presumably in 90), he was about 80 years old and no longer active in the courts. C. gives some description of his own early education at *De or.* 2.2 and *Brut.* 306–7: before he was 16 he was attached to the great orator L. Crassus (who died in 91), after Crassus' death he studied law with Scaevola Augur, and after his death (probably in 87) with Scaevola Pontifex (see below). Atticus also received legal training from Scaevola Augur (*Leg.* 1.13); it is sometimes suggested (although there is no evidence) that that is how C. and Atticus met. **sumpta uirili toga:** the ceremony of receiving the toga of an adult male marked a Roman boy's coming of age; its formal date was the Liberalia on 17 March, but informally it could take place any time after someone's sixteenth birthday (in C.'s case, 3 January 90). **ut** "on condition that" picks up on *ita* and introduces a proviso clause (A&G 528b). **quoad possem et liceret** "to the extent that I was able and it was possible." **itaque multa ... doctior:** the sentence neatly encapsulates the range of what C. learned from Scaevola: the two phrases introduced by *multa* refer respectively to Scaevola's legal instruction and his talent for aphorism, with *prudenter disputata* balancing *breuiter et commode dicta*, and the repetition *prudenter ... prudentia* emphasizing the transfer of wisdom

from the old man to his pupils. **breuiter et commode** "short and to the point"; the two concepts are closely linked (cf. *De or.* 2.340 *commode et breuiter et acute et hilare dicto*). *commode* is slightly colloquial; frequent in C.'s letters and in the technical writers Celsus and Columella, it is relatively rare in more elevated style. **prudentia:** as opposed to *sapientia*, *prudentia* (cf. also *prudenter* in the previous clause) is wisdom acquired from experience rather than from philosophical training; in the case of Scaevola, this is especially his *iuris prudentia* (cf. Acilius in 6). **quo mortuo** "after his death"; the antecedent of the connecting relative is Scaevola. **pontificem Scaeuolam:** Q. Mucius P.f. Scaevola (known as Scaevola Pontifex to distinguish him from his cousin Scaevola Augur) was the most distinguished jurist in a family of legal experts, as well as, according to C., *iuris peritorum eloquentissimus* (*Brut.* 145). He was consul in 95, became pontifex maximus in about 89, and was murdered on the orders of the younger Marius in 82. C. presumably mentions him here both to make a distinction between the two homonymous Scaevolas and because the Pontifex's ideas about *bona fides* were important to C. throughout his life, not least in *Off.*, written at about the same time as *Amic.*; cf. Harries 2006: 17–26. See also Zetzel 2013 and, for his importance as a jurist, Ferrary, Schiavone, and Stolfi 2019. **unum:** often used to emphasize the superlative qualities of the person or thing described. **alias** "some other time." For the ellipsis of a form of *dicere*, cf. 2 *saepe multa*, 7 *te autem*, 13 *idem semper*; the use is colloquial and common in C.'s dialogues. C. never wrote about Scaevola Pontifex in any detail, but at *Off.* 3.70 discusses his views of contract and *bona fides*.

2 **saepe multa:** elliptical; supply *dicere memini*. **hemicyclio:** a semicircular part of a building or portico (cf. Vitr. 5.1.8; Suet. *Gram. et rhet.* 17.4); here it clearly includes seating. **et ego ... familiares:** the common pattern of two parallel elements of a clause (here the two subjects) surrounding the verb (labeled *coniunctio* by *Rhet. Her.* 4.38) is used to create emphasis and/or a pleasing rhythm. **pauci admodum:** *admodum* is conversational in tone; it often modifies words of quantity (or age; cf. *Sen.* 10) and emphasizes the degree: "just a few." **sermonem** "topic of conversation" (*OLD* 4). **tum fere** "just then." *fere* cannot modify *multis*: in expressions of quantity, it is used only to qualify precise numbers. **meministi enim ... uel querela:** *meministi* introduces the indirect question *quanta esset ... querela*, on which depends the temporal or circumstantial clause *cum is ... dissideret*. The syntactical inversion, by which the circumstances are mentioned before the main action, is typical of colloquial style. **Attice:** this belated and casual address to the dedicatee is in keeping with the presentation in 1–3 of the dialogue as being based on historical fact;

once C. turns in 4–5 to his own role as author, Atticus takes center stage. On Atticus, see Introduction 1. **P. Sulpicio ... Q. Pompeio:** P. Sulpicius Rufus as tribune in 88 proposed a set of laws diluting aristocratic power and, most important, transferring command of the incipient war against Mithridates of Pontus from the consul L. Cornelius Sulla to the great (but elderly) general Marius; the consuls (Sulla and Q. Pompeius Rufus) unsurprisingly opposed Sulpicius; in the ensuing fighting Sulla left Rome, to return rapidly with his army. That led to the death of Sulpicius, the abrogation of his laws, the flight of Marius, Sulla's purge of his enemies and first reorganization of Roman government, and then to his departure for the war against Mithridates. The politics of this period are complex and brutal (for a good summary, see Seager 1994: 165–73). Both here and in *De or.*, where Sulpicius appears as a younger acolyte of the great orator L. Crassus, C. emphasizes personal factors rather than the broader political framework; so too *Har. resp.* 43. **utebare multum** "you were much in the company of" (*OLD utor* 9b). Atticus was related to Sulpicius by marriage; according to Cornelius Nepos (*Att.* 2.1–2), it was the bloody sequence of events that started with the death of Sulpicius that led Atticus to leave Rome to live in Athens. **capitali odio** "a hatred that was fatal"; there is no exact parallel for this phrase, which extends C.'s usual use of *capitalis* to indicate a crime or action punishable by the loss of civic status or life. **quocum ... uixerat:** cf. *De or.* 3.11 (also of Sulpicius in 88) *quibuscum priuatus coniunctissime uixerat, hos in tribunatu spoliare instituit omni dignitate. uiuere cum aliquo,* esp. when modified by adverbs expressive of closeness and affection, is a standard way to describe the conduct of friendship; see 15, 77. **admiratio** "astonishment" (not "admiration" in a positive sense).

3 in eam ipsam mentionem: for *in eius ipsius rei mentionem.* Latin idiom frequently substitutes a demonstrative or personal adjective for a genitive (e.g., *hic metus* for *huius rei metus*). **C. Fannio ... Africani:** see Introduction 3(*a*). **sententias** "the main ideas"; cf. *De or.* 3.16, where Cotta is said to have reported *tantum modo locos ac sententias huius disputationis.* **memoriae mandaui:** the fifth reference to memory in the opening paragraph of the work, after *memoriter, memoriae mandabam* (1) and *memini, meministi* (2); on the importance of memory in *Amic.*, see also López Montero 2018. The emphasis on memory is similar to the opening of *De or.* (which also features Scaevola) and stresses both the transmission of knowledge from one generation to the next and the historicity of C.'s report of Laelius' speech. That, however, is balanced in this sentence by *sententias* and *arbitratu meo,* both of which draw attention to C.'s own construction of the scene. **arbitratu meo**

"at my own discretion" or "using my own judgment" (cf., e.g., *Fin.* 1.28, 4.2). **quasi enim ipsos ... saepius interponeretur:** among C.'s dialogues, *Leg.*, *Tusc.*, *Part. or.*, *Sen.*, and *Amic.* "stage" the conversation as in a dramatic script; all others are narratives that recount conversations and introduce speakers with "I said" or "he said." At *Tusc.* 1.8, C. succinctly characterizes the first type vis-à-vis the second as *quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur* "as though the matter were acted out rather than narrated." The same distinction is found among Plato's dialogues (cf. Diog. Laert. 3.50; Hirzel 1895: II 211–16); *Tht.* 143b5–c5 provides a rationale for the dramatic form similar to that given here (avoidance of tedium by leaving off references to the speakers) and may have been a model for C. **induxi:** cf. also 4 *induxi* of Cato in *Sen.* *inducere* is regularly used for bringing a character onstage (see also 4n. *aptior persona ... Laeli persona*); cf. *Cael.* 35; *Tusc.* 2.27, 5.115; *Div.* 1.131, 2.25; *Off.* 3.38; of the characters in C.'s dialogues, *Att.* 13.19.4. References to actual dramatic performance and literature recur throughout *Amic.* (see 24, 89, 93–4, 99–100); see also the description of the *contio* as a *scaena* (97n.). **ut tamquam a praesentibus** points to the greater vividness of C.'s chosen format but also, as it were, makes Atticus/the reader a participant in the evoked gathering of friends. Conversing, or simply spending time in one another's presence, is a typical element of friendship; Laelius later says that friendship can even bring it about that "the absent are present" (23 *absentes adsunt*).

4 **Cum enim ... rogatu tuo:** after an opening paragraph that emphasizes the veracity of C.'s account of the conversation he is reporting, he now explains (*enim*) his own composition of the dialogue, ironically calling its historicity into question. The opening sentence intertwines the two themes of personal gift and public service: *mecum ageres ... omnium cognitione ... nostra familiaritate ... prodessem multis rogatu tuo.* **mecum ageres** "you have urged me" (*OLD ago* 42a). **cum omnium cognitione tum nostra familiaritate:** in a kind of zeugma, the two elements indicate effect ("worthy of everyone's attention") and cause ("worthy of our friendship"). **ut prodessem multis rogatu tuo:** C. presents his philosophical writing as a public service also at *Luc.* 6; *Tusc.* 1.5; *Div.* 2.1, 2.7 (see Volk 2021: 152–4); here Atticus appears as encouraging his friend in this mission, although the remainder of the preface presents the writing of the dialogue rather as a private *beneficium* specifically for the dedicatee. **Catone Maiore ... de senectute:** the companion dialogue of *Amic.*, written earlier in 44 and likewise dedicated to Atticus (see Introduction 1). As with *Laelius de amicitia*, it is unclear whether C. thinks of *de senectute* as part of the title or just a

description of the topic (cf. Introduction 1); cf. *de senectute ... de amicitia* at the beginning of 5. **Catonem:** the famous statesman, orator, and historical and agricultural writer M. Porcius Cato the Elder (aka "Cato the Censor"; 234–149 BCE) is the main speaker of *Sen.*, with Laelius and Scipio playing minor roles. **aptior persona ... Laeli persona:** with *persona* "character, role," C. continues to present his dialogue as drama (see 3n. *induxi*), while gesturing with *aptior* and *idonea* at a commonplace of ancient literary criticism, that a person's speech has to fit his or her character (Gk. *prepon*/Lat. *aptum* "appropriateness, suitability"; see, e.g., Hor. *Ars P.* 99–127). Since Cato was experienced in old age and Laelius was famous as a friend, C.'s choice of speaker in both *De senectute* and *Amic.* is supremely *aptum*. **quae ... loqueretur ... quae ... dissereret:** relative clauses of characteristic: "suitable/appropriate for speaking/discussing." **diutissime senex fuisset:** *fuerit* in the OCT is an error. **maxime memorabilem ... familiaritatem fuisse:** that the friendship between Laelius and Scipio was outstanding and famous is a leitmotif of the dialogue, establishing Laelius' expertise in the subject of his discourse; see 5, 15, 25, 103–4. *memorabilem* continues the theme of memory (see 3n. *memoriae mandaui*). **quae ... dissereret quae disputata ab eo meminisset Scaeuola:** an ironic mixing of fictions, as C. claims to have himself chosen Laelius to utter the very words that Scaevola reports him actually to have uttered. **genus autem ... habere grauitatis:** for *genus sermonum*, cf. *Att.* 4.16.2 *nosti genus dialogorum meorum*. Here C. provides a further reason for having set up the dialogue the way he has: using famous men of the past as speakers lends what is being said more weight and authority; the unspoken point of comparison is presumably dialogues set in the present, with C. himself as an interlocutor. Throughout his oeuvre, C. used both formats; the "men of old" approach links *Amic.* with *De or.*, *Rep.*, and *Sen.* (see Introduction 3(*a*)). C. discusses his careful approach to the construction of historical dialogues at *Att.* 4.16.2–3 and *QFr.* 3.5.; cf. Zetzel 2022: 18–22. **et eorum illustrium** "and illustrious ones at that" (*OLD is* 7): the demonstrative pronoun conveys an amplification or explanation of something previously mentioned (here *hominum ueterum*). **nescioquo pacto** seems slightly humorous, as C. self-deprecatingly disavows understanding of the literary effects he himself employs. **ipse mea legens ... loqui existimem:** the humorous tone continues as C. presents himself as the proof of his own writings' mastery of characterization and emotional impact: the depiction of Cato in *Sen.* is so true to character that C. on rereading occasionally believes he is listening to Cato himself. This claim is not entirely joking: C. in fact used his own writings as emotional

appeals to himself (see *Att.* 6.2.9, 6.3.3, 6.6.2, 7.2.4, 7.3.2, 10.4.4 for such uses of *Rep.*; *Att.* 2.3.4 for *De consulatu suo*).

5 **ad senem senex de senectute ... ad amicum amicissimus ... de amicitia:** the combination of words based on the same root (figura etymologica) is emphatic. For a moment, C. avows not only his authorship (*scripsi*) but also his expertise: like Cato and Laelius, C. knows what he is talking about, and he has written expertly qua old man about old age and qua friend about friendship. After this playful near-identification of author and speakers, the (false) autonomy of the latter is reasserted in the following sentence, which yet again stresses Cato's status as *senior* and Laelius' as *amicitiae gloria excellens.* **tum est Cato locutus ... de amicitia loquetur:** the qualifications of Cato and Laelius – their expertise in the subject and their general understanding – are presented in chiastic order: *senior ... prudentior ~ sapiens ... amicitiae gloria excellens.* Laelius' *sapientia* here contrasts with Cato's mere *prudentia*; in the ensuing dialogue, Cato too is presented as wise (6, 9). **sic enim est habitus:** in his second reference to Laelius' status as *sapiens* (see 1n.), C. foreshadows Laelius' own principle (18–19, 21) of using public reputation rather than philosophical definition as a criterion for a person's qualities (e.g., 19 *hos uiros bonos, ut habiti sunt, sic etiam appellandos putemus*), an attitude shared by Scaevola (1) and Fannius (6–7). The appeal to reputation as a criterion for *sapientia* is applied to the Seven Sages, Lycurgus, the Homeric Odysseus and Nestor, and Pythagoras at *Tusc.* 5.7–8 (the Seven Sages also at *De or.* 3.137 and *Amic.* 59) and to the gymnosophists of India at *Tusc.* 5.77; the right of such people – including Cato and Laelius – to be called *sapientes* is questioned from a Stoic perspective at *Off.* 3.16. **tu uelim a me ... putes:** C. now explicitly invites Atticus into the mimetic world of the dialogue, asking him to suspend disbelief, put the author C. out of his mind, and hear only Laelius "speak" (cf. 4 *Catonem, non me, loqui existimem*). **animum ... auertas:** a play on the much more common *animum aduertere*, which is often used at the beginning of a speech or exposition: here C. asks Atticus *not* to direct his attention to him. **C. Fannius et Q. Mucius:** on Fannius, Scaevola, and the setting of the dialogue, see Introduction 3(*a*). **quam legens te ipse cognosces:** the Delphic instruction (sometimes ascribed to one of the Seven Sages) to know oneself (γνῶθι σαυτόν) is more usually found in Latin with *te ipsum* (the reading of one group of manuscripts here as well) rather than *te ipse* (cf. *Fin.* 5.44; *Leg.* 1.58); on the Delphic oracle, see also 7, 10, 13. How Atticus is to find himself in Laelius' speech is left vague (cf. Vielberg 2017; P. A. Miller 2015: 184). The most straightforward homology would make Atticus Laelius to C.'s Scipio, but C. sometimes thought

of himself as Laelius: he proposed himself as Laelius to Pompey's Scipio in 62 (*Fam.* 5.7.3) and suggested using "Laelius" as a code name for himself in letters to Atticus in 59 (*Att.* 2.19.5, 2.20.5). In this case, C. as writer and Atticus as reader are participants in a friendship in which (since a friend is an *alter ego*; see 80) each can identify with the other and with Laelius. In some sense it is also an address to the reader: friendship is universal, and all readers can recognize themselves in the discussion.

B. PRELIMINARY CONVERSATION (6–15)

The beginning of the dialogue finds Laelius, Scaevola, and Fannius in mid conversation: the two younger men are paying a condolence call to their father-in-law, and Laelius has been reminiscing about the recently deceased Scipio. Fannius, seconded by Scaevola, now directs the conversation toward Laelius himself, asking how he is coping with his friend's demise; many people (thus Fannius) are wondering about this, especially in light of Laelius' reputation for wisdom (6–8). In his extended response (8–15), Laelius briefly deprecates his supposed *sapientia* (9–10) before sharing his thoughts and feelings about Scipio's death (10–15).

Concerning Laelius' wisdom, Fannius maintains that his father-in-law is the only person currently considered *sapiens* by everyone; while such earlier great men as Cato and the jurist Acilius gained a reputation for wisdom through their various fields of expertise (6), Laelius is wise in the philosophical sense and thus comparable to the only Greek *sapiens*, Socrates (7). In particular, Laelius (according to Fannius) displays an apparently Stoic self-sufficiency, considering himself in control of all true goods and above the vicissitudes of fortune. In his response, Laelius does not take up this claim but instead criticizes Fannius' assessment of Cato, who in Laelius' view was truly wise and superior even to Socrates (9–10); as Laelius states at the very end of his speech, he considers his own reputation for wisdom false if flattering, and would at any rate rather be famous for his friendship with Scipio (15).

As for Scipio, Laelius admits that he is moved by his friend's death, but lists some of the arguments with which he is comforting himself. These are mostly standard topoi of consolation literature, adjusted to the particular situation. Thus, nothing bad has befallen Scipio in dying (10); on the contrary, his life was splendid, and his sudden death was painless and means that Scipio was spared the indignities of old age (11–12). In addition, Laelius holds out the possibility of the immortality of the soul, referring to Scipio's own eschatological dream as recounted in C.'s *De re publica* (13–14). Even if such a belief should be false, however, and death is the

end of everything, it is nevertheless not an evil. The only person affected by Scipio's demise is thus Laelius himself, who takes solace in the recollection of their friendship and expresses the hope that the two of them will go down in history as a pair of famous friends (15).

6 Sunt ista "true enough"; the use of a phrase that responds to a previous utterance brings the reader into an ongoing conversation (cf. 2 *Verr.* 4.12; *Rep.* 1.16; *Acad. post.* 1.9); presumably Laelius has just spoken in praise of Scipio (*nec ... melior ... nec clarior*). Cf. ἔστι ταῦτα, one of the standard formulas of assent in Platonic dialogue. Fannius, the older of Laelius' sons-in-law, always speaks before Scaevola (6–8, 16, 25, 32–3) and is also mentioned first in C.'s introduction of the two (5). So too, when Laelius addresses his two sons-in-law together, Fannius is always named first (40, 50, 100). The one exception comes at 8–9, when Laelius first addresses Scaevola in agreement with what he has said and then corrects Fannius concerning his views about Cato. **nec ... melior ... nec clarior:** on this pattern of word order, see 2n. *et ego ... familiares.* **unum:** some older editions punctuate after *unum* rather than before, but the manuscripts generally do the latter, and the clausula *esse coniectos* (cretic + spondee) is preferable. **sapientem:** see 1n. The problem of defining *sapientia* and thus of deciding who is truly *sapiens* runs through *Amic.* (6–10, 13, 15, 18–19, 20, 30, 35, 38, 45, 47–8, 59, 65, 76–7, 88, 100); so too in other dialogues (*De or.* 1.83, 3.56–65; *Rep.* 3.7). This is in part a criticism of those (particularly the Stoics) who define *sapientia* as philosophical expertise and wisdom and restrict moral excellence (and therefore friendship) to those who are *sapientes* in their narrow sense; they are criticized here as nitpickers (7 *qui ... subtilius quaerunt*, 18 *qui haec subtilius disserunt*) who contribute little that is useful (18 *ad communem utilitatem parum*), as nobody has ever achieved *sapientia* according to their definition (cf. *Off.* 3.16, where the likes of Laelius and Cato are explicitly said not to have been wise in this sense). In C.'s account, setting aside the narrow philosophical view, there are two sources of *sapientia*: one is the civic wisdom acquired from natural virtue and experience in public life, including legal expertise (cf. Acilius and Cato in the following sentence; Fabricius, Curius, and Coruncanius in 18); the other is, beginning in the mid second century, the acquisition of philosophical *doctrina* (on C.'s construction of Roman intellectual history, see Zetzel 2022). Some few people, including Laelius, achieve both: 7 *non solum natura et moribus, uerum etiam studio et doctrina esse sapientem*; elsewhere this double wisdom is ascribed not only to Laelius, but to his friends Scipio and Philus (*Rep.* 3.5), and Cato too is credited with a more philosophically inflected *sapientia* elsewhere in the

Ciceronian corpus (see Panico 1980). **et appellant et existimant:** see 5n. *sic enim est habitus.* **M. Catoni:** see 4n. Other than Laelius, Cato is the person most often called *sapiens* by C. throughout his work (see Panico 1980 for documentation and discussion). Unlike with Laelius (cf. 1n. *sapientem*), there is no evidence beyond C. (and Quint. *Inst.* 12.7.4, almost certainly drawing on C.) that *sapiens* was used as a cognomen for Cato. **L. Acilium:** an early jurisconsult and interpreter of the Twelve Tables, paired with Sex. Aelius (cos. 198) at *Leg.* 2.59. **usum:** Acilius' narrow *iuris prudentia* is contrasted with Cato's broad experience. The praise of Cato here is comparable to Scipio's description of him at *Rep.* 2.1, but enumerates only his domestic accomplishments without mentioning his military experience. **multa ... ferebantur:** the two locations for Cato's experience are introduced by *et*; the three types of experience, by *uel.* The latter are parallel in structure (participle + adverb) but vary in sound and form: pairs of 3 + 3, 2 + 3, and 3 + 2 syllables, only the first alliterative (in fact a figura etymologica, as *prudens* is a contraction of the present participle *prouidens*); the first two adverbs rhyme, but not the third. The three activities correspond to Cato's roles as senator, public orator (*acta* represents *agere cum populo*), and jurist. **quasi cognomen ... sapientis:** cf. *Sen.* 5. C. uses *quasi* here because *sapiens* was not really Cato's cognomen (see above). **in senectute:** cf. 4 on Cato as *senex* and his role in *Sen.*

7 **te autem:** elliptical; supply *dicunt.* **alio quodam modo:** cf. the earlier designation of Laelius as *sapiens* vs. Cato as *prudens* (5n. *tum est Cato locutus ... de amicitia loquetur*). **non solum natura ... appellare sapientem:** it was an ancient commonplace that excellence in any field must be based on a combination of natural talent and character (*natura et moribus*) with study and learning (*studio et doctrina*). Inborn but unreflective wisdom is presented as something that even the common crowd recognizes, while only the learned appreciate philosophically informed *sapientia.* C. here uses Fannius to establish Laelius' sophisticated philosophical learning and attitude, something that Laelius himself modestly (and ironically) denies having (9, 15); he instead affects a down-to-earth persona with little time for philosophical hairsplitting (18 and Introduction 3(*c*)). **Septem:** a set of sixth-century BCE Greek thinkers and statesmen were traditionally grouped together as the "Seven Sages" (mentioned also at 59). Plato names them as Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Solon, Cleobulus, Myson, and Chilon (*Prt.* 343a1–5); other lists vary, and only the first four are always included. **qui ... subtilius quaerunt:** philosophers arguing about the true nature of *sapientia.* Dicaearchus (fr. 37 Mirhady) called the Seven Sages intelligent

men and good lawmakers rather than philosophers or men of wisdom, and the Stoics attributed wisdom only to Stoic sages. C. on several occasions shows that the Sages' claim to *sapientia* is questionable but emphasizes their political activities (*De or.* 3.137; *Rep.* 1.12; *Tusc.* 5.7; *Off.* 3.16). **Athenis unum:** Laelius, the only true Roman *sapiens*, is comparable to the one true Greek wise man, Socrates (the two are mentioned together also at *Off.* 1.90). Here as elsewhere (10, 13), Socrates is not named (see Introduction 3(*c*)). **Apollinis oraculo:** in Plato's *Apology*, Socrates famously recounts that when his friend Chaerophon inquired from the oracle at Delphi whether anyone was wiser than Socrates, he was told that there was no one (20e6–21a7); see also 10, 13; *Sen.* 78. For the Delphic injunction "know thyself," see 5n. *quam legens te ipse cognosces.* **ut omnia tua ... inferiores putes:** a very philosophical definition of Laelius' *sapientia*: all schools stress the self-sufficiency of the wise man, who is unaffected by the vicissitudes of fortune. However, Laelius' considering "*all* things that concern [him] to be placed in [his] control" (*omnia tua in te posita esse*) gives his stance a specifically Stoic character; while other schools allow external factors some, if often minor, roles in a person's achieving the highest moral end, the Stoics famously maintain that one's virtuous disposition, the one thing in one's own control, is the only thing that counts (cf. *Tusc.* 5.30 *omniaque sibi in sese esse posita, nec esse quicquam extra suam potestatem,* 42 *qualem sapientem esse uolumus, nisi omnia sibi in se posita censebit?*; both quotations come from an argument in favor of the Stoic position; see also *Amic.* 30 *ut quisque maxime uirtute et sapientia sic munitus est ut nullo egeat suaque omnia in se ipso posita iudicet,* Laelius' very Stoic-sounding description of the self-sufficient person who makes the best kind of friend). **proximis Nonis ... commentandi causa:** at this period, the college of augurs apparently met every month on the Nones to engage in the study and discussion of their art (*OLD commentor*[1] 2; cf. *Div.* 1.90 *magi ... congregantur ... commentandi causa atque inter se colloquendi*), in this case at the estate of one of their members, D. Iunius Brutus (cos. 138). Linderski 1985: 213 suggests that these were not "official meetings which were convened to pass a decree or give a responsum," but "informal seminars and colloquia, discussions concerning various theoretical tenets of the *disciplina auguralis.*" The only other reference to this custom (*Div.* 1.90) implies that by C.'s time it was obsolete. The Nones in question must have fallen between the death of Scipio and the dramatic date of the dialogue. **ut adsolet** "as is the usual practice"; often of ritual or legal procedures (cf. *Phil.* 2.82; *Leg.* 2.21; Livy 5.16.11, 23.31.15). **munus ... obire:** a standard phrase for performing an official function (cf. *Phil.* 9.3; Livy 3.6.9; Plin. *Pan.* 59.3).

8 **id ... quod animum aduerti** "that which I have observed." In this common idiom, *aduertere* takes as its accusative object not only *animum* but also the thing toward which the mind is directed (the sense of direction being conveyed by the prefix *ad*). **ferre moderate:** moderation is a virtue in both ancient popular morality and philosophy; Laelius' moderate response to Scipio's death is a sign of his wisdom (see also 77, of Scipio). C. shows a remarkable propensity toward the connection of *moderate* with *ferre* in his letters in the years just preceding the composition of *Amic.*, especially in those to other defeated ex-Pompeians living under Caesar's rule (*Fam.* 4.14.1, 5.21.4, 6.1.4, 6.21.1): measured forbearance is a desideratum in difficult times. **nec potuisse non commoueri ... humanitatis tuae:** Scaevola correctly describes the feelings of Laelius (cf. 10), who throughout the dialogue represents a view of ethics that is "humane" and, unlike Stoicism, allows for feelings of concern, grief, and pain (*dolorem ... maestitiam*); see further 10, 19, 45–8, 50, 67, 100. **causae ... fuisse** "was the reason." *causae* is apparently a partitive genitive, although the absence of a governing noun or pronoun is unusual (cf. Seyffert and Müller 1876 *ad loc.* and *Att.* 15.7 *puto mehercule id quoque esse causae*). Older editions read *causam*, attested in some late MSS. **Recte tu quidem, Scaeuola, et uere:** Laelius succinctly characterizes Scaevola's explanation as correct and just as succinctly immediately afterwards tells Fannius that his view of Cato is wrong (9 *non recte iudicas*); for this order, cf. 6n. *Sunt ista.* **nec enim ... debui** "for it wouldn't have been right for me"; in Latin, the indicative is often used in the past tense to express obligation, potential, or similar concepts where English idiom might suggest the subjunctive (cf. A&G 437a). Logically speaking, the obligation or possibility is a historical fact; what is contrary-to-fact is merely the execution. **officio ... officii:** the stress on duty reflects Laelius' aristocratic Roman ethos. **semper usurpaui** "I have always performed (an office or duty)" (*OLD usurpo* 3). **incommodo:** Laelius shows restraint and modesty in speaking of his loss as a mere "inconvenience" (also 10, 15). **ullo casu** echos 7 *humanosque casus.* **constanti homini:** both popular and philosophical ethics stressed the importance of consistency of character and action, as seen in *Amic.* at 6, 19, 25, 32, 62, 64–5, 92, 95, 99, 100.

9 **facis amice** "that is kind of you"; lit. "you act in a friendly manner." The phrase is found especially in comedy and Ciceronian dialogues and letters and is presumably colloquial. The adverb points to the fact that the dialogue itself is not only a discussion but also an enactment of friendship (see Introduction 3(*c*)). **non recte iudicas:** see 8n. *Recte tu quidem, Scaeuola, et uere.* **aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo:** Laelius tends toward the view that sages, properly defined, do not exist (see 18 *eam*

sapientiam ... quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus, 21); *magis* is expressive of a skeptical stance that accepts positions as probable but not certain (see 14n. *ueriora*). **mortem fili:** Cato's son from his first marriage (referred to as Licinianus from the name of his mother Licinia) fought at Pydna in 168, married the daughter of L. Aemilius Paullus (on whom see further below), and was elected praetor, probably for 151, but died before taking office (see Astin 1978: 104–5). At the time of Licinianus' death, Cato himself was over 80, and the imagined conversation depicted in *Sen.* takes place less than two years later. The stress on Cato's ability to endure the death of a loved one reflects positively on Laelius' own wisdom, as demonstrated by his way of coping with Scipio's death. C. may also be thinking of the death of his own daughter Tullia in early 45, which hit him very hard. **memineram Paullum ... spectato uiro:** a very elliptical sentence; supply something like *mortem fili aequo animo ferre*. **Paullum ... Galum:** L. Aemilius Paullus had two sons by his first marriage and two sons by his second marriage; the first two were given for adoption and became Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus and P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (whose friendship with Laelius provides the background to *Amic.*), but the two remaining sons both died very young in 167. C. Sulpicius Galus (cos. 166) was famous for his astronomical knowledge (cf. *Rep.* 1.21–3); the loss of young children is otherwise attested only at *Fam.* 4.6.1, where C. uses Cato, Paullus, and Galus as examples in replying to Ser. Sulpicius Rufus' letter of condolence on the death of C.'s daughter Tullia (adding Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator, whose fortitude at his son's death is described also at *Sen.* 12). The same set was also used in C.'s own lost *Consolatio* (see 10n. *medicina ... consolor*); cf. *Tusc.* 3.70, together with the much fuller list of names (beginning with the same four) drawn from the *Consolatio* by Jer. *Ep.* 60.5. For C.'s research into bereft parents while writing the *Consolatio*, see further *Att.* 12.20.2, 12.22.2, 12.24.2. **in ...** in "in the case of" (*OLD* 42). **perfecto** "grown up."

10 **ne istum ... iudicauit:** see 7n. *Apollinis oraculo*; *istum* of Socrates is perhaps somewhat condescending. **facta ... dicta:** Laelius pithily puts Roman action over Greek talk. **ut iam cum utroque uestrum loquar:** after talking to Scaevola (8) and Fannius (9–10) in turn, Laelius now addresses both. **sic habetote** "know this for certain"; the use of the solemn future imperative adds weight to what follows. Cf. *Rep.* 6.13.1 with Zetzel 1995 *ad loc.* **si ... negem ... uiderint ... mentiar** "if I were to deny that I feel longing for Scipio ... the wise can figure out how correctly I would be acting in that case ... but I would certainly be lying." The simple construction of a future-less-vivid condition (*si ... negem ... mentiar*) is interrupted by the parenthetical dismissal of the opinion of

sapientes, i.e., Greek philosophers. *uiderint* is future perfect, used idiomatically to postpone or dismiss a topic for the present: "let the wise see to it, let's leave it to the wise" (*OLD uideo* 18b); *quam ... faciam* is an indirect question dependent on *uiderint*. *sed* logically if not syntactically responds to the anticipated verdict of the *sapientes*: whatever they would say, Laelius would still be lying. Laelius here once more excludes himself from the group of the wise (cf. 9, 15, and Introduction 3(*c*)) and embraces a more humane view of human nature and emotions (see 8n. *nec potuisse non commoueri ... humanitatis tuae*). **desiderio:** strong emotional, nearly erotic language. **moueri ... moueor** picks up Scaevola's *commoueri* (8). **orbatus:** as if bereft of a family member; cf. Cato and his son (9). **qualis ... certe fuit:** after generally pronouncing Scipio the "best" and "most outstanding" (6), Laelius now also declares him to have been an incomparable friend who will never be surpassed. **medicina ... consolor:** Laelius uses the language of philosophical *consolatio*, "medicine" (for the soul) being a common metaphor for philosophy. The consolatory treatise was a genre of philosophical writing (see Kassel 1958, Scourfield 2013), and educated men like C. were familiar with the standard strategies of comfort, which they employed, e.g., in their letters of condolence (see Hutchinson 1998: 49–77, Wilcox 2005 for *consolatio* in C.'s correspondence). Devastated by the death of his daughter Tullia in early 45, C. immersed himself in consolatory literature (*Att.* 12.14.3) and ultimately took the original step of writing a *consolatio* to himself. Laelius too engages in auto-consolation, as did Cato at the death of his son (*Sen.* 84 *me ipse consolabar*; cf. *Amic.* 9). **eo errore ... angi solent:** as the next sentence shows, the main "mistake" that people make in mourning is the belief that the deceased has suffered an evil. **nihil mali accidisse Scipioni puto:** according to *Tusc.* 3.76, a major (Stoic) consolatory strategy is to demonstrate that the perceived evil is not in fact a bad thing at all (*malum illud omnino non esse*). That death specifically is not an evil is a tenet shared by all philosophical schools and a classic argument against the fear of death, developed by C. especially in *Tusc.* 1 and *Sen.* 66–85; since C.'s Laelius attended the conversation in *Sen.* (as he himself says in 11), he may have learned some of his arguments from those of Cato in that dialogue (see Cole 2013: 168–70). **mihi accidit si quid accidit:** Laelius leaves it open whether his own loss of Scipio qualifies as a *malum*. **suis autem incommodis ... se ipsum amantis est** "to be seriously pained by one's own problems (for *incommodis*, see 8n.) is the part of a man who loves not his friend but himself." *amantis* is a genitive of characteristic, used to qualify the nominal infinitive *angi* (A&G 343c); *amicum* and *se ipsum* are both objects of *amantis*. Cf. *Tusc.* 1.111 *nostrum*

enim et nostra causa susceptum dolorem modice ferre debemus, ne nosmet ipsos amare uideamur; *Brut.* 4 *illum* [*sc.* the dead person] *potius quam nosmet ipsos diligere uideamur.*

11 **Cum illo ... actum esse praeclare** "he has been dealt with gloriously, things have turned out splendidly for him" (cf. 15; *OLD ago* 21e). The impersonal construction leaves the identity of the agent (fate, chance, the gods) indeterminate; cf. *Fam.* 4.5.3 (Ser. Sulpicius to C.) *non pessime cum eis esse actum quibus sine dolore licitum est mortem cum uita commutare.* The position of *praeclare* is emphatic. Laelius' first argument for Scipio's not having suffered any *malum* is that his life was perfect and his death painless (11–12). **nisi enim ... esset optare:** the sentence is loosely structured and, despite the introduction with *nisi*, not a proper conditional construction but a kind of free association in keeping with Laelius' conversational style: "unless he had wished for immortality (but of course he didn't) ... what didn't he achieve?" **putabat:** elliptical; supply *optandum esse.* **immortalitem:** immortality, i.e., living forever, is something that it would be absurd for a human being to wish for; by contrast, as Laelius will discuss shortly (13–14), an eternal afterlife is something to be hoped for. **uellet:** imperfect rather than pluperfect subjunctive for a repeated or continued action in the past (A&G 517a). **quod homini fas esset optare** "that it is right for a man to wish for"; relative clause of characteristic indicating a limit or restriction. Echoing the earlier *quod ille minime putabat*, Laelius stresses that Scipio's wishes wisely went no further than the humanly possible. Throughout the dialogue, Laelius advocates an ethics that remains within the realm of human abilities; cf. 8n. *nec potuisse non commoueri ... humanitatis tuae*, 19 *quantum homines possunt*, 100 *de hac dico sapientia quae uidetur in hominem cadere posse.* **qui summam spem ... factus consul est bis:** Polyb. 31.23–30 offers a justly famous account of the ambitions and behavior of the young Scipio; for a modern assessment, see Astin 1967: 26–34. Scipio's first important public action occurred during difficulties in the recruitment of soldiers to fight in Spain in 151: he volunteered to exchange his assigned position in Macedonia for a military tribunate in Spain, both encouraging enlistment and, in the ensuing campaign, earning rewards for great courage in battle. So too as military tribune in 149 in Africa (the alleged occasion for the *Somnium Scipionis* at the end of *Rep.*) he earned a *corona obsidionalis* for his actions in the Third Punic War. The statement that Scipio was never a formal candidate for the consulate is true: he was elected consul for 147 without having held the praetorship and five years younger than the statutory age, against strong opposition from the senate; the mechanism by which his popular

support altered the normal electoral process so completely is not clear, but his popularity and his military reputation were clearly the leading factors. He was elected consul for the second time for 134 in order to take command in the war against Numantia, despite the fact that second consulates were at that time prohibited. **factus consul est:** placing the subject between the past participle and the accompanying form of *esse* is a regular Ciceronian pattern, although more common at the end of clauses; cf. 89 *habenda ratio et diligentia est.* **primum ante tempus ... paene sero:** *ante tempus* refers to the minimal age to stand for the consulship (established by the *lex Villia* of 180 as forty-two), which Scipio had not yet reached in 147. When *tempus* is taken up by *suo tempore, rei publicae paene sero* in the discussion of his second consulship, the meaning shifts to "when the time was right for him, but when it was almost too late for the commonwealth." *suo tempore* is used to indicate the proper time (of one's life, of the seasons) for something to take place (e.g., *Sen.* 85 *extingui homini suo tempore optabile est*); *sibi* emphasizes the contrast with the *res publica.* Prior to Scipio's holding office in 134, the conduct of the war in Spain had been disastrously unsuccessful, and two consuls (Q. Pompeius and C. Hostilius Mancinus) had been forced to make highly disadvantageous treaties. **duabus urbibus euersis:** Carthage in 146, Numantia in 134. **pietate ... liberalitate ... bonitate ... iustitia:** cf. *Fin.* 5.65, where *pietas, bonitas,* and *liberalitas* are among the components of *iustitia.* **pietate in matrem, liberalitate in sorores:** Scipio inherited the property of Aemilia, the widow of the elder Africanus, and immediately gave it to his natural mother Papiria, who had been divorced by Aemilius Paullus and was not well off; after Papiria's death, he transferred the money to his two sisters (Polyb. 31.26.6, 31.28.8–9). **funeris:** a public banquet was given at the funeral by Scipio's nephew Q. Fabius Maximus, who also delivered a funeral oration (written, in fact, by Laelius; fr. 22 Malcovati). **quid igitur ... iuuare potuisset:** the idea that a well-lived life cannot be improved by longer duration is a philosophical commonplace held by both Stoics (e.g., Sen. *Ep.* 77.20 *non quam diu, sed quam bene acta est, refert*) and Epicureans (e.g., Lucr. 3.944–5 (Nature speaking) *nam tibi praeterea quod machiner inueniamque, | quod placeat, nil est; eadem sunt omnia semper*); the same argument appears at *Sen.* 70 and is often used in consolatory contexts. **senectus enim ... erat Scipio:** by dying in the prime of life, Scipio avoided the challenges of old age – even though Laelius hastens to add that growing old is not a hardship (*grauis*). **memini Catonem ... disserere:** another reference to *Sen.* (cf. 4–5), this time not by the author C. but by Laelius, who together with Cato and Scipio took part in the dialogue; together with the mentions of *Rep.* (14, 25), this serves to situate *Amic.* in the fictional world of Ciceronian historical dialogue (see

Introduction 3(*a*)). *memini* continues the theme of memory (1–3), in which the remembered past is the one (re)invented in literary form (cf. Conte 1986: 57–62 on *memini* as a marker of intertextuality). **uiriditatem** "greenness (of plants)," hence "youthful vigor; prime."

12 **uel fortuna uel gloria** "in terms of either fortune or fame"; ablatives of specification. **de genere mortis:** see Introduction 3(*a*). It was unclear, then as now, whether Scipio was murdered or died a natural death. **illum diem clarissimum:** the grand escort home on Scipio's last day, reminiscent of C.'s descriptions of his own return home after unmasking the conspiracy of Catiline in 63, is not otherwise attested, and the last event known on that day was a *contio*, not a meeting of the senate. **sociis et Latinis:** communities in Italy that did not have Roman citizenship either were *socii* (formally independent states linked to Rome by treaty) or had the *ius Latii*, which gave them rights of trade and intermarriage with Rome and granted Roman citizenship to their magistrates. The harm done to the Latins and to Rome's Italian allies by the Gracchan land law (under which only citizens received distributions of *ager publicus*) is emphasized by Laelius at *Rep.* 3.41; the pairing of *socii* and *Latini* among those who look to Scipio for aid appears also in the *Somnium* (*Rep.* 6.12). **ad superos ... peruenisse:** the idea that Scipio may have joined the heavenly gods anticipates the following discussion of the immortality of the soul (13–14); ideas of apotheosis and a blessed afterlife were often conflated (cf. Cole 2013 on C.'s evolving thoughts on the subject). Here, the conceit that Scipio had literally reached such a high rung on the ladder of esteem (*tam alto dignitatis gradu*) that it was easier for him to join the gods above (*superos ... deos*) rather than those below (*inferos*, i.e., the underworld) is a (perhaps mildly humorous) rhetorical flourish, but leads Laelius to the more serious considerations that follow.

13 **Neque enim assentior:** Laelius now moots an even stronger consolatory argument in favor of death not being an evil: the soul is immortal and the deserving dead enjoy a blessed afterlife (13–14). Cf. C.'s discussions of the same topic in *Rep.* 6 (the *Somnium Scipionis*, mentioned in 14); *Tusc.* 1.26–30, 38–55, 71–6; *Sen.* 77–84. **eis qui ... morte deleri:** the Epicureans, who famously hold that "death is nothing to us" (Epicurus, *RS* 2) since both body and soul dissolve into their constituent atoms. **nuper:** the Epicurean doctrine of the mortality of the soul was hardly recent in 129, but perhaps Laelius means that it had been taken up only recently in Rome. Epicurean teachers were expelled from Rome, probably in 154 (Ath. 12, 547a; Ael. *VH* 9.12). **antiquorum auctoritas:** against the newfangled Epicurean theory, Laelius invokes three ancient

authorities for his belief in the immortality of the soul: (i) the Roman *maiores*, whose establishment of funerary rites implies a conviction that the dead continue to have an existence (cf. *Tusc.* 1.27); (ii) early Greek inhabitants of Italy, i.e, the Pythagoreans with their belief in the transmigration of souls; (iii) Socrates, who discourses on the survival of the soul in Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Phaedo*. Cf. *Sen.* 78, where both the Pythagoreans and Socrates are likewise invoked as believers in an immortal soul. **tam religiosa iura** "such scrupulous regulations." *religiosus* applies particularly to regulations governing funerary ritual and care for the dead (*OLD religiosus* 4b; a detailed discussion of such rules is found at *Leg.* 2.46–68) as opposed to *sacer*, which applies to regulations governing relationships with the gods. The legal scholar Aelius Gallus distinguished between *sacrum aedificium, consecratum deo* and *religiosum sepulcrum, ubi mortuus sepultus aut humatus sit* (Festus 348.34–350.2 Lindsay). **eorum qui ... erudiuerunt:** in keeping with his approach throughout (see Introduction 3(*c*)), Laelius does not name the Pythagoreans directly, but the reference is clear; the Romans, including C., were fascinated with Pythagoreanism, which they often viewed as a kind of indigenous Italian philosophy (see Volk 2016). **Magnamque Graeciam:** the Greek cities of Sicily and southern Italy, whose political power and cultural significance have, as Laelius acknowledges, come to an end under Roman rule (*nunc quidem deleta est*); Pythagoras (a native of the island of Samos) settled in Croton, and later Pythagoreans are associated with other southern Italian cities (cf. 88 on Archytas of Tarentum). **eius qui ... est iudicatus:** once again, Socrates is identified only by reference to the Delphic oracle (see 7, 10). **qui non tum hoc ... tum illud ... sed idem semper:** elliptical; supply *dicebat*. **ut in plerisque** "as in most cases" or "on most topics"; C. depicts Socrates as a skeptic who argued different points of view at different times (the "New" or Skeptical Academy, to which C. claimed allegiance (see Introduction 1), considered Socrates a model in this respect). The exception is the immortality of the soul, which Socrates (it is alleged here) always maintained. **reditum in caelum:** the idea of the soul's ultimate return to heaven is found in broad terms in the myth in Pl. *Phdr.* 246a2–249d2 and in terms of astral immortality at *Tim.* 42b3–5 (where Socrates is not the speaker). It is central to the *Somnium Scipionis* (see *reditum* in *Rep.* 6.18, 25), to which Laelius turns immediately after this (cf. *Tusc.* 1.24, 27–9, 42–3, 51). **optimoque et iustissimo cuique expeditissimum** "and the swiftest (return to heaven lies open) to the best and most just" (cf. 14 *optimi cuiusque*; for this use of *quisque* with the superlative, see A&G 313b); in the *Somnium*, these are especially outstanding statesmen (*Rep.* 6.13). The speed of their return to heaven (cf. 14 *facillime*) is mentioned also at *Rep.* 6.29 (*uelocius ... ocius*).

14 quod idem Scipioni ... audisse dicebat: a sprawling sentence, which begins with the main clause *quod idem Scipioni uidebatur* (the connecting relative refers back to the idea of the immortality of the soul), followed up by the relative clause *qui ... triduum disseruit de re publica*. From this depend a clause of comparison (*quasi praesagiret*), a temporal clause (*cum ... adessent ... tuque ... uenisses*), and a relative clause (*cuius ... fuit ...*), which itself introduces a further relative clause (*quae ... dicebat*). Laelius is referring to Scipio's dream, whose telling concludes the conversation recounted in *Rep.*; this is a further instance of C.'s creating a backstory for his characters that consists of their appearing in multiple Ciceronian dialogues (see 11n. *memini Catonem ... disserere*, 25; Introduction 3(*a*)). In the dream, Scipio's grandfather (cf. *ex Africano audisse*) explains to him that souls are immortal and that those who have served the fatherland well enjoy a blessed afterlife in the Milky Way (*Rep.* 6.13–14, 29); if the dead Scipio's soul does live on, this is, as it were, a confirmation of the *Somnium*'s teachings. **Philus et Manilius:** L. Furius Philus (cos. 136) and M'. Manilius (cos. 149) both participate in the conversation of *Rep.* Philus, a very close friend of Scipio and Laelius, delivers (without believing it) a Carneadean attack on justice in *Rep.* 3; Manilius says little in the extant dialogue, but is present both as a legal expert (like Scaevola himself in *De or.*) and as a representative of an older generation. **tuque etiam, Scaeuola:** both Laelius here and Scaevola at 25 refer to the absence of Fannius from the conversation reported in *Rep.*; in fact he was there (*Rep.* 1.18), although in the extant portions of the dialogue he says nothing. Unless it is genuine absent-mindedness on C.'s part, the retroactive elimination of Fannius permits Laelius and Scaevola to describe the discussion that took place then; if all three had been there, there would be no occasion to repeat parts of the earlier dialogue. **quae** "things which"; the plural pronoun does not have a direct antecedent but refers loosely to the content of what Scipio learned in his dream. **per uisum** "in a dream." **Id si ita est, ut** "if it is the case that"; *ut* introduces a noun clause elaborating on *id*. **optimi cuiusque ... facillime:** see 13n. *optimoque et iustissimo cuique expeditissimum*. **euolet tamquam ... uinclisque corporis** combines two phrases from the *Somnium*, *Rep.* 6.14 *e corporum uinclis tamquam e carcere euolauerunt* and 6.15 *retinendus animus est in custodia corporis*. The idea of the body as prison is drawn from Pl. *Phd.* 62b3–5. **ad deos:** see 12n. *ad superos ... peruenisse*. **euentu** "death" (*TLL euentus* 11C). **uereor ne ... amici sit:** *uereor* introduces a fear clause, whose subject is the infinitive *maerere, inuidi* and *amici* are genitives of characteristic (cf. 10n. *suis autem incommodis ... se ipsum amantis est*). **sin autem illa ueriora ... nihil mali:** after considering the possibility of the soul's immortality, Laelius returns to a more skeptical position, concluding that even if the soul dies

with the body, death is not an evil (*ut nihil boni ... sic ... nihil mali*; partitive genitives); the same kind of win-win argument about death not being an evil either way is found already in Pl. *Ap.* 40c4–41d2; C. uses it at *Sest.* 47; *Tusc.* 1.25–6, 1.82, 1.117–18; *Fam.* 5.16.4. **ueriora** points to C.'s probabilistic brand of Academic Skepticism, which – given that the truth is unknowable – seeks to find what is similar to the truth or, here, seems "truer" (the verb to be supplied with the elliptical phrase introduced by *sin* is thus presumably *uidentur* rather than *sunt*). Laelius' move here is typical of C.'s method in his philosophical works of considering possible positions on three levels (see Görler 1974; Gawlick and Görler 1994: 1099–1116): the lowest (death is an evil) is rejected; the highest (the soul is immortal) is desired but cannot be proved; the middle (death is an absolute end and thus not an evil) is the skeptical fallback. **ut ... sit ... nec ... maneat:** a noun clause explaining *illa*. **sensu enim amisso ... laetabitur:** the sentence somewhat abruptly moves from considering the general scenario of what happens when humans after death have no more sensation, with *quasi natus non esset omnino* apparently referring to any dead person, to talking specifically about Scipio, whom the relative clause *quem ... laetabitur* belatedly identifies as the subject of *natus esset*. **quasi natus non esset omnino:** this so-called symmetry argument, viz. that, on a scenario of the soul's mortality, the lack of sensation and consciousness after death is exactly the same as that before birth and hence (since we did not suffer before birth) not an evil, is Epicurean (cf. Lucr. 3.832–42). **haec ciuitas, dum erit, laetabitur:** the conceit that a Roman's fame will last as long as Rome itself is found elsewhere (Hor. *Carm.* 3.30.7–9; Ov. *Am.* 1.15.25–6, cf. *Met.* 15.876–8); the underlying idea may be that of Rome's hoped-for eternity (see Nisbet and Rudd 2004 *ad* Hor. *Carm.* 3.30.8–9) or simply a sense that what happens after the end of this *ciuitas* cannot be imagined and hence does not matter. A more pessimistic assessment of Scipio's future fame (and the longevity of Rome) is given by the elder Africanus in the *Somnium* (*Rep.* 6.24), whose purpose, however, is to direct his grandson's ambitions to his starry afterlife rather than to earthly fame; down-to-earth Laelius is more sanguine about his friend's lasting reputation.

15 **ut supra dixi:** see 11n. *Cum illo ... actum esse praeclare.* Technically, *supra* ("higher up on a page," *OLD supra*[1] 3) is an expression of written discourse, so C. here breaks the illusion of oral communication. **incommodius** "somewhat inconveniently" (see 8n. *incommodo*). **quem fuerat aequius ... prius exire de uita** "for whom it would have been more just to die earlier." The relative pronoun is in the accusative because it is part of the indirect statement dependent on *fuerat aequius*; its antecedent is Laelius (*mecum*). For the indicative of *fuerat*, see 8n. *nec enim ...*

debui. **ut prius introieram:** Laelius was born a year or two before Scipio. **beate uixisse:** the *uita beata* "blessed life," the Lat. equivalent of Gk. *eudaimonia*, is the final aim of all philosophies; Laelius here elevates (his and Scipio's) friendship to the status of the philosophical *summum bonum* (cf. 17n. *ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis*, 84n. *haec est ... esse non possit*). **de publica re et de priuata:** the unusual position of *publica* emphasizes the contrast with *priuata*. **domus fuit et militia communis:** the two men did not share a house. Instead, *domus et militia* should be understood as a nominative form of the common locative phrase *domi et militiae* "at home and abroad; in peace and in war"; like the immediately preceding *publica ... et ... priuata*, the pairing indicates the total pervasiveness of their friendship. **uoluntatum ... consensio** anticipates Laelius' definition of *amicitia* as *omnium diuinarum humanarumque rerum cum beneuolentia et caritate consensio* (20). *consensio* rather than *consensus* is normally quite rare, but C. is fond of it. **sapientiae ... amicitiae:** wisdom and friendship are the two main virtues discussed in the dialogue (see Introduction 3(*c*)); Laelius here explicitly rejects his reputation for the former as false (cf. 9), but hopes that he and Scipio will become famous for the latter. **quam modo Fannius commemorauit:** see 6–7. **memoriam** continues the dialogue's leitmotif of memory (see 1, 2, 3n. *memoriae mandaui*, 11, 23, 38, 104); Laelius' wish is fulfilled, as witnessed by C.'s own statement in the preface, 4 *accepissemus a patribus maxime memorabilem C. Laeli et P. Scipionis familiaritatem fuisse.* **sempiternam:** cf. 32 *uerae amicitiae sempiternae sunt* (there of friendships lasting a lifetime, here of their living on in memory). **uix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum:** it was a commonplace that true friendships are rare and that there had ever existed only a very few pairs of real friends (see Bohnenblust 1905: 37, 41). Most often cited are Orestes and Pylades (see 24n. *cum ... Orestes ... perseueraret*), Achilles and Patroclus, Theseus and Pirithous, and Damon and Phintias; Laelius hopes that he and Scipio will become part of the canon. **sperare uideor:** supply *mihi*: "I seem (to myself) to hope; I flatter myself with the hope"; cf. *De or.* 2.122 *si quid est in me, quod iam sperare uideor.* The combination is found only in C.

C. LAELIUS' FIRST SPEECH (16–24)

Laelius' elevation of his friendship with Scipio provides Fannius and Scaevola with an opening to ask their father-in-law to tell them his opinion on friendship in general (16). Laelius is happy to do so, yet modestly casts doubt on his abilities: Greek philosophers are able to discourse on such subjects, while he himself is able merely to exhort the two younger men to value friendship above all other things (17). Nevertheless, Laelius

launches into a short speech that both serves as a general praise of friendship and enumerates, in quick succession, a number of fundamental points about its nature; it is to these that Laelius will return again and again in the remainder of the dialogue. At the same time, this first speech functions as a protreptic to friendship and creatively adapts arguments that are traditionally used in exhortations to philosophy.

First and foremost, Laelius stresses that friendship can exist only among good people (18 *in bonis*). He immediately qualifies this claim, however, by defining "good" not in the Stoic sense as "perfectly wise," but in the way the term is used by speakers of Latin for men – especially the great men of old – who are considered *boni* by ordinary Roman standards (18–19). Friendship arises naturally from the inborn fellow feeling among human beings; at the same time, it is distinct from other affective relationships such as blood relation by always being accompanied by good will (19 *beneuolentia*) and by being a bond among only two or a very few people (20). Laelius then offers a definition of friendship as *omnium diuinarum humanarumque rerum cum beneuolentia et caritate consensio* (20) and declares that it is more valuable than all other goods with the exception of virtue – but then again, virtue (here, too, understood in the ordinary, not philosophical sense, 21) is by definition closely intertwined with friendship.

Moving on to the advantages of friendship, Laelius begins by considering the various ways in which one can benefit from a friend in both good and bad fortune (22), before engaging in somewhat more metaphysical speculation: he maintains that friendship even bridges the divide between life and death (23) and invokes Empedocles' view of a universe ruled by the forces of Love and Strife (24). He further points out that there is universal consensus on the value of friendship, citing as evidence a performance of a tragedy of Pacuvius, at which the mutual devotion of Orestes and Pylades aroused public acclaim (24). With this, Laelius completes his speech, telling Fannius and Scaevola to consult philosophers if they wish to know more (24).

16 otiosi: *otium* is a necessary context for conversations of this kind; see 17 and, e.g., *De or.* 3.66; *Rep.* 1.14; *Brut.* 10; *Fin.* 1.14. **pergratum mihi feceris:** a polite request in the future perfect (thus also *disputaris*), repeated in very similar language by Scaevola in the next sentence. C. uses the same construction to initiate conversation at *Rep.* 1.34 and *Sen.* 6, as well as in asking for favors in many letters, particularly the letters of recommendation in *Fam.* 13. C. favors *per*-compounds in his dialogues and letters; they belong to an urbane conversational style (cf. Zetzel 1995 on *Rep.* 1.9.1). **quemadmodum soles ... disputaris** gives the impression that Laelius is accustomed to expound on topics suggested by his

audience; Laelius himself, however, ascribes this custom to Greek philosophers (see 17n. *doctorum est ... quamuis subito*). Once more, Fannius presents his father-in-law as a kind of philosopher, while Laelius himself repudiates this role (cf. 7n. *non solum natura ... appellare sapientem*). C. himself in the preface uses *disputare/disputatio* a total of four times to refer to the dialogue and Laelius' role as speaker (1, 3, 4, 5); see also 14 and 25 for the use of the term in describing the conversation in *Rep.* **quid sentias, qualem existimes, quae praecepta des:** in C.'s dialogues, *quid sentias* is the normal way for one interlocutor to invite another to discourse on a given subject (e.g., *Rep.* 1.34 *de re publica quid sentias*; *Leg.* 1.14 *de iure ciuili quid sentias*), and Laelius introduces his first claim about friendship with 18 *hoc primum sentio* and concludes his first speech with 24 *de amicitia quid sentirem. qualem existimes, quae praecepta des* elaborates on *quid sentias*, presumably pointing to topics that most interest Fannius and Scaevola; the series of three indirect questions is thus not a table of contents for the whole dialogue, as some have thought (see Introduction 3(*b*) with n. 47). **tecum agere:** see 4n. *mecum ageres*. **Fannius anteuortit** "Fannius got in first" (*OLD anteuerto* 2a).

17 **si mihi ipse confiderem ... quae est in me facultas?** an instance of the modesty topos, which merges, however, into a criticism of Greek philosophical practice. **doctorum est ... quamuis subito:** the claim to be able to speak extemporaneously about any subject was associated in the first instance with Gorgias and the sophists (cf. *Inv. rhet.* 1.7; *De or.* 1.102–3; *Fin.* 2.1); the practice became an accepted mode of philosophical disquisition and was typically referred to as a *schola*. C. criticizes the format at *Fin.* 2.1–2, but exceptionally uses it himself in *Tusc.* (cf. Gildenhard 2007: 12–14; Volk 2021: 34–5). **doctorum ... eaque Graecorum** "a custom of learned men, and particularly of Greeks"; for the use of the pronoun, see 4n. *et eorum illustrium*. **disputari ... hortari:** though Fannius has claimed that his father-in-law is accustomed to *disputari* (see 16n. *quemadmodum soles ... disputaris*), Laelius here rejects this type of Greek lecturing: what he will say is not an analysis of the subject, but a praise of the importance of friendship in real life coupled with an exhortation to Fannius and Scaevola (cf. 104 *hortor*). **ista profitentur** "teach this subject" (*OLD profiteor* 5b). **ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis:** in the remainder of the dialogue, Laelius repeatedly argues for friendship as a kind of *summum bonum* (see 15, 20, 22, 31, 47, 49, 52, 83, 84, 86, 103, 104, and Introduction 3(*c*)). Already Aristotle considered friends the greatest of the external goods (*Eth. Nic.* 9, 1169b9–10), and Epicurus thought that the possession of friends was the greatest gift of wisdom (*RS* 27; see Bohnenblust 1905: 28–9), but Laelius seems particularly committed to

elevating friendship within a hierarchy of goods. In doing so, he is adapting a typical argument of philosophical protreptic (the genre of C.'s own lost *Hortensius*), namely, that the pursuit of wisdom (Gk. *philo-sophia*) is superior to that of all other goods (see Markovich 2022: 20–1); the question of the relation of friendship to wisdom (and virtue) is a leitmotif of the dialogue (see Introduction 3(*c*)). **nihil est enim tam ... aptum, tam conueniens:** this word order (*enim* in third position after an enclitic second word) is far more common than *nihil enim est*, particularly in C.'s dialogues (in *Amic.* also at 28, 49, 50, 65, 77). Cf. the less common *non est igitur* in 59; *non igitur est* is not attested in classical Latin. The construction *nihil est tam* is a variant of Laelius' favorite *nihil est* + neuter comparative (see 20n. *nihil melius*). **naturae aptum ... secundas uel aduersas:** the reference to nature looks forward to 19–20 (see 19n. *quia sequantur ... bene uiuendi ducem*), that to good and bad fortune to 22. The reference to nature is a typical component also of philosophical protreptic.

18 **Sed hoc primum sentio:** Laelius begins to speak after all, but emphasizes that what follows is just his personal opinion. **primum** "first and foremost" rather than "first in a series"; there is no "second" in Laelius' speech. Cf. 36n. **nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse:** the belief that friendship exists only among the good (Bohnenblust 1905: 27–8) is discussed in Plato's *Lysis* (214d3–6) and Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (2.6.16–20) and maintained by the Stoics (Diog. Laert. 7.124; Sen. *Ep.* 81.12); in keeping with their doctrine, the latter identify the good with the wise (see below). For Aristotle, it is virtue friendship, the best of his three types, that is achieved only by the good (*Eth. Nic.* 8, 1156b7–1157b28); Laelius, too, repeatedly implies that there are also inferior friendships, which involve people who do not qualify as good (see 22, 76, 77, 100; Introduction 3(*c*)), though, unlike Aristotle, he never clearly demarcates the different types. **ad uiuum reseco:** lit. "cut back to the living flesh" (*OLD uiuus* 2a; Otto 1890 *vivus* 4), a proverbial expression taken from medicine and denoting an (exaggerated) thoroughness (in removing diseased tissue); here "use in the technical sense." **illi qui ... nisi sapientem:** that wisdom and virtue go hand in hand is a commonplace of ancient philosophy, but Laelius here specifically refers to the Stoics and their restrictive definition according to which only the putative perfectly wise (and quite possibly non-existent; see below) person can be called good. **qui haec subtilius disserunt:** cf. 7n. *qui ... subtilius quaerunt.* In the earlier passage, Fannius cites "more subtle" thinkers as authorities; here Laelius dismisses them as uselessly pedantic. *subtile* of the Stoics is found also at *De or.* 3.66; *Fin.* 3.3. **communem utilitatem:** cf. *in usu* below. C. once more plays (Roman) practicality and public-mindedness

against (Greek) theorizing; cf. 6n. *sapientem*, 10n. *facta ... dicta*. In *Rep.*, too, Laelius emphasizes the importance of utility over theorizing (1.33); cf. Zetzel 2022: 205–6. **eam sapientiam interpretantur quam** "they understand by wisdom the kind that." **adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus:** see 9n. *aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo*. **in usu uitaque communi** "in common (linguistic) use and everyday life"; cf. 21 *ex consuetudine uitae sermonisque nostri*. For *uita communis*, see also 21, 38; the phrase is elsewhere also used in the more specialized sense of "social existence" (e.g., *Caec.* 70). **quae finguntur aut optantur:** C. uses *fingere* as a derogatory description of the imaginary Platonic world of the *Republic* (*Rep.* 2.3, 2.22; *De or.* 1.224) and the imaginary perfect orator (*De or.* 1.71, 1.118; see Gildenhard 2013: 231–48 and Zetzel 2022: 93, 228). *optare* is often equally unrealistic (e.g., *QFr.* 2.11.4 *ut magis optandum quam sperandum putarem*) but not derogatory. **C. Fabricium, M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium:** C. Fabricius Luscinus (cos. 282, 278, cens. 275), M'. Curius Dentatus (cos. 290, 275, 274, cens. 272), and Ti. Coruncanius (cos. 280) are named here not for their military accomplishments in the war against Pyrrhus but for their moral and civic stature. Fabricius and Coruncanius are mentioned (together with Cato and Scipio) at *De or.* 3.56 as exemplars of the kind of wisdom possessed by the Seven Sages in Greece and the great statesmen of early Rome; more frequently, Curius and Fabricius are paired (sometimes with Camillus as well, as at Hor. *Carm.* 1.12.37–44) as examples of early Roman simplicity and moral incorruptibility; see also 28. Curius stands at the head of a list (the rest of which is unfortunately lost) of moral exemplars at *Rep.* 3.6 (see Zetzel 2017a: 472–3); for other instances, see Otto 1890 *Curius* and *Fabricius*. **sibi habeant** "let them have/keep for themselves," an idiom indicating complete dismissal or lack of interest in something (*TLL habeo* Caput prius 111A1b); see also Powell 1988 on *Sen.* 58. **sapientiae nomen** "the word/definition of 'wisdom'" contrasts with *ut uiri boni fuerint* "that they (actually) were good men"; cf. 10n. *facta ... dicta*. **inuidiosum** in C. typically means "arousing *inuidia*," hence "unpopular, odious" (*OLD inuidiosus* 1); if this is the sense here, the Stoic definition of wisdom is hateful for its arrogance in positing an ideal unattainable by ordinary humans (thus Seyffert and Müller 1876 *ad loc.*). It is also possible to understand the adjective as meaning "displaying *inuidia*" (*OLD* 3): the narrow definition begrudges normal people the chance to become wise. This use becomes common only with Augustan poetry, but cf. *Rhet. Her.* 4.44 *omnes inuidiose eripuit bene uiuendi casus facultates*.

19 agamus igitur pingui, ut aiunt, Minerua "let's be a little slow on the uptake, as they say." As *ut aiunt* indicates, this is a proverbial expression

(Otto 1890 *Minerva* 3; *OLD Minerua* 3a; cf. also Schievenin 2000: 448–9), where Minerva, the goddess of wisdom, serves as a metonym for intelligence; *pinguis* here means "slow-witted, obtuse" (*OLD* 7a). Laelius is obviously being ironic, elevating Roman commonsense and ordinary language over the useless subtlety of the Stoics. **qui ita se gerunt ... bene uiuendi ducem:** a sequence of thoughts loosely connected rather than a tightly knit periodic sentence; the style is presumably an imitation of conversation (see also Introduction 4(*a*)). The opening relative clause contains two parallel verbal phrases introduced by *ita*; that in turn introduces a result clause with three parallel ideas (*ut ... probetur fides ...*; *nec sit ... cupiditas ...*; *sintque magna constantia*) expressed in varying forms: the first and last are positive, the middle one negative; the first two contain lists of qualities (four virtues, three vices; *aequitas* is Lambinus' necessary correction of the transmitted *aequalitas*), while the third mentions the single virtue of *constantia*. The following clause of comparison *ut ei fuerunt*, from which depends the relative clause *modo quos nominaui*, encompasses all three lists: the men Laelius has been talking about exemplify all the characteristics mentioned. At this point, there is a slight anacoluthon: *hos* is not strictly necessary (replacing the unexpressed antecedent of the initial *qui*) and summarizes the entire preceding relative clause; what follows is an instruction to accept the judgment of contemporaries (*ut habiti sunt*) about the goodness of the men described (employing yet a third use of *ut*) and offering in the last clause a somewhat different explanation of the nature of their goodness. **probetur ... habiti sunt:** see 5n. *sic enim est habitus.* **appellandos putemus:** Laelius suggests that he and his sophisticated interlocutors adopt ordinary language use; cf. 1, 6, 7 for instances of "calling" (*appellare*) someone "wise" and 7 for the idea that *uulgus* and *eruditi* may employ language differently. **quia sequantur ... bene uiuendi ducem:** Laelius imports into his definition of *sapientia* based on native Roman morality a more philosophical element. As will become clear, Laelius considers (human) nature the origin of friendship, and in fact all ancient philosophies based their ethical systems on their understanding of nature. Even so, the formulation seems to allude specifically to the Stoic ideal of *secundum naturam uiuere* "living according to nature": Fabricius and the other Roman *uiri boni* – though not qualifying as "good" in the Stoic sense – are following Stoic ethical principles without knowing anything about Greek philosophy. **quantum homines possunt:** this qualification is another dig at the inhumane restrictiveness of Stoic definitions (see 18); the acceptance and even embrace of human limitations is typical of Laelius' *humanitas* throughout the dialogue (cf. 8n. *nec potuisse non commoueri ... humanitatis tuae*). **bene uiuendi:** see 15n. *beate uixisse.* **ita natos esse nos:** *natos* picks up on *natura*

(< *nasci*): we are born, i.e., nature made us this way. **ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam:** that we are by nature social creatures, and that our fellow feeling extends naturally to all other human beings, was a tenet of many philosophical schools, including Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and Antiochus' Old Academy; the idea is fundamental to C. throughout his work and life (see Wood 1988: 78–89, who cites this passage at 82). There is a specifically Roman flavor to *societas*, the legal term for a business partnership; the use of *quaedam* (*OLD quidam*¹ 3) indicates that the metaphor is not exact. **ut quisque ... quam alieni:** though there is *societas* among all human beings, our attachments are stronger the closer we are to a (set of) person(s); the doctrine propounded here by Laelius of the concentric circles of human relationships is described in much more detail at *Off.* 1.50–8. **ciues potiores quam peregrini** seems to be drawn from Xen. *Cyr.* 8.7.14 πολῖταί τοι ἄνθρωποι ἀλλοδαπῶν οἰκειότεροι, but the argument there, that brothers are more reliable than friends, is the exact opposite of Laelius' view here. *potiores* here means "more entitled" (*OLD* 3a). **cum his ... habet firmitatis:** *his* refers to the just-mentioned *propinqui*; we have a natural if weak "friendly" feeling toward our relatives. Here C. uses *amicitia* as simply a derivative of *amicus*, meaning "friendly disposition," possibly on the model of Gk. *philos/philia*, which can designate all sorts of close relationships, including blood relation (see Introduction 2). As Laelius makes clear, however, this is not real "friendship" as discussed in the dialogue. **hoc** "in this," explained by the *quod*-clause that follows, to which it is the antecedent. **beneuolentia** is here established as a criterion for *amicitia* (see Laelius' definition in 20) but not for blood relationship. The connection of good will (Gk. *eunoia*) and friendship is found in many sources (Bohnenblust 1905: 36); see esp. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 9, 1166b30–1167a21 on how good will is a necessary but not sufficient condition for friendship. **amicitiae nomen tollitur** "the name of friendship is taken away," i.e., you can no longer call "friendship" a relationship from which good will has been removed.

20 quanta autem ... inter paucos iungeretur: a somewhat loosely constructed sentence, whose meaning, however, is clear: within the general fellow feeling among humans, friendship is an especially powerful affective relationship that binds together only two or very few individuals. **ita contracta res est et adducta in angustum:** *res* here does not refer to anything specific but means "matters, affairs." A possible translation might be "there is such a reduction and concentration." **caritas ... iungeretur:** where English speaks of intransitive "joining in" a union or an emotion, Latin uses transitive *iungere* with an accusative object (*OLD* 8); thus, *caritatem iungere* means "form an affection." Here the passive

is used: "affection is being formed." Cf. 26 *ad beneuolentiam coniungendam.* **aut inter duos aut inter paucos:** how many friends one can or should have was much debated in antiquity (Bohnenblust 1905: 37–8; Fürst 1996: 184–5), and Plutarch devotes an entire treatise to the issue of *polyphilia* (*De am. mult.*, *Mor.* 7, 93a–97b). C. here agrees with Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 9, 1170b20–1171a20) that true friendship can exist only among very few people. **Est enim amicitia ... consensio:** Laelius offers a definition of friendship as agreement on all things coupled with benevolence and affection. That agreement is fundamental to friendship is a commonplace (Otto 1890 *amicitia* 2 with Häußler 1968: 52 and 130; Bohnenblust 1905: 27; Fürst 1996: 231–4); cf., e.g., Cic. *Planc.* 5; Sall. *Cat.* 20.4; the same thought appears at 15, 65, 103. **enim** connects to the preceding discussion: Laelius offers his definition as an explanation of the fact that friendship is possible only among two or very few people. **nihil aliud nisi:** double negative; an emphatic means of expressing the identity of the two halves of the definition. **omnium diuinarum humanarumque rerum:** the coupling of divine and human to express the totality of all things is traditional. However, *res humanae* and *diuinae* are also the subject of philosophy (*sapientia* is defined as *diuinarum humanarumque rerum scientia* at *Fin.* 2.37; cf. also *Tusc.* 4.57; *Off.* 1.153, 2.5): Laelius seems to imply that in order to agree on things human and divine, one needs to have some understanding of them. **beneuolentia:** see 19n. **consensio:** see 15n. *uoluntatum ... consensio.* **qua quidem ... immortalibus datum:** for the elevation of friendship above all other goods, see 17n. *ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis.* **haud scio an** expresses a modest affirmation and is followed by a negative (*nihil*) rather than *aliquid.* Cf. *Brut.* 126 *nescio an habuisset parem neminem.* **excepta sapientia** continues the dialogue's leitmotif of wisdom and its relationship to friendship. Here *sapientia* is placed just above *amicitia* (cf. 15n. *sapientiae ... amicitiae*, Introduction 3(*c*)); at 104, it is *uirtus* that is the one exception (*ea excepta*) to the primacy of friendship. **nihil melius:** Laelius has a taste for *nihil* + comparative: cf. also 28 *nihil ... amabilius*, 33 *nihil difficilius*, 47 *nihil ... melius ... nihil iucundius*, 49 *nihil ... iucundius*, 50 *nihil ... appetentius*, 77 *nihil ... turpius*, 86 *nihil inanius, nihil ... leuius*, 104 *nihil ... praestabilius.* Cf. Hofmann 1978: 89–90 on the colloquial nature of such over-the-top language and Williams 2012: 227–8 on its use in the context of friendship. **a dis immortalibus datum:** cf. 47. For philosophy as the gods' gift to humans (an idea that goes back to Pl. *Tim.* 47b1–2), see *Leg.* 1.58; *Acad. post.* 1.7; *Tusc.* 1.64. **diuitias alii ... summum bonum ponunt:** a list of putative highest goods. Except for *uoluptates* (Epicureanism) and *uirtus* (Academy, Peripatos, and esp. Stoicism, which considers virtue not just the highest but the only good), these are not associated with

specific schools but are presumably meant to reflect popular opinion; except for virtue, they are external (wealth, power, honor) and bodily (health, pleasure) goods that are not in our control. The enumeration of opinions of various "others" (*alii ... alii ... alii*), to be capped by one's own preference, is a common version of the rhetorical and poetic figure called priamel. **beluarum:** cf. 32 *pecudum ritu.* Since the Epicureans used animal behavior to illustrate the natural desire for pleasure, they were often likened to animals by their opponents (e.g., Cic. *Fin.* 2.109; cf. Hanchey 2022: 45–6). **extremum** "this last item" as opposed to *illa ... superiora* "the former," discussed in the following clause. **illa autem ... in fortunae temeritate:** external and bodily goods are not in our control but subject to Fortune. Whether they can thus be considered "goods" in the philosophical sense was debated, with the Peripatetics and Antiochus in favor and the Stoics opposed (see Cic. *Fin.* 4 and 5). **caduca** "transitory" (*OLD* 8). **posita non tam in consiliis nostris:** see 7n. *ut omnia tua ... inferiores putes.* **qui autem in uirtute ... illi quidem:** the champions of virtue come in for some praise, which is, however, immediately qualified: yes, virtue is the *summum bonum*, but it goes hand in hand with friendship – and Laelius still wants *uirtus* to be understood in the ordinary, not the Stoic sense (cf. 21). **sed haec ipsa uirtus ... ullo pacto potest:** Laelius manages to keep both virtue and friendship in the running for the *summum bonum* (with wisdom a competitor as well: *excepta sapientia*, above) by maintaining that virtue and friendship entail one another, a connection already hinted at with the claim that only good men can be friends (18) and one that will be explained in greater detail in the course of the dialogue. Virtue brings about friendship (see 27–30, 37, 48–9, 102), and real friendship cannot exist without virtue (see 37, 83–4); see 100 *Virtus, uirtus inquam ... et conciliat amicitias et conseruat,* 104 *ita uirtutem locetis, sine qua amicitia esse non potest, ut ea excepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis.* **et gignit et continet** "brings about and sustains" (*OLD contineo* 3), looking forward to the topics of Laelius' second and third speeches, on the origin and maintenance of friendship, respectively (see Introduction 3(*b*) with Table 1).

21 iam uirtutem ... nusquam reperiuntur: Laelius stresses that he is using "virtue" in its ordinary meaning to designate those deemed "good" by public opinion, not according to the restrictive Stoic definition, which encompasses only the (non-existent) wise; this reiterates the argument of 18–19. **ut quidam docti:** the Stoics. **uerborum magnificentia:** that the Stoics revel in the grandeur of their counterintuitive language is a point C. also makes in *Fin.* 3 and 4; see esp. *Fin.* 4.60 (about Zeno, the founder of Stoicism) *uerborum magnificentia est et gloria delectatus.* **uirosque**

bonos eos qui habentur: cf. 5n. *sic enim est habitus.* **Paullos Catones Galos Scipiones Philos:** for Paullus, Galus, and Cato, see 9n. (also 4n. on Cato); for Philus, see 14n.; for Scipio, see 11nn. and Introduction 3(*a*). The plural is generalizing ("men like Paullus ..."). **communis uita:** see 18n. *in usu uitaque communi.* **qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur:** see 9n. *aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo.*

22 inter uiros: an explicit indication of what is otherwise left implicit, namely, that the friendship Laelius envisages is one among men only. **opportunitates** "advantages" (*OLD* 1b). This and the following paragraph describe the many beneficial aspects of friendship, most of which are traditional in discussions of the topic. The question of whether friendship is utilitarian, i.e., sought for the sake of the advantages it offers, or whether it arises selflessly from affection for the other person, was much debated in antiquity (see Introduction 2); as will become clear, Laelius strongly upholds the latter view (see esp. 26–32, 51). **qui potest ... quid dulcius ... qui esset:** a series of three rhetorical questions, each of which has subordinate clauses of different kinds. **qui** "how" (*OLD qui*[8] 1a). **uita uitalis, ut ait Ennius** "a life worth living"; this quotation from Ennius (*Inc.* 8 Goldberg and Manuwald) is found only here. Unlike perhaps in the Ennian original, the adjective is here used predicatively: "how can a life be worth living?" **mutua beneuolentia:** for *beneuolentia,* see 19n. Good will needs to be mutual (*mutua*) to count as friendship; see Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 8, 1155b33–4 "good will that is reciprocated is friendship." **conquiescit** "finds peace of mind, relaxes" (*OLD* 4). **quid dulcius:** in keeping with his colloquial style, Laelius frequently omits the verb (here *est*) for emphasis in exclamations and rhetorical questions (so also 24, 25 (Scaevola speaking), 30, 37, 42, 49, 55, 67). Here and elsewhere, Laelius describes friendship as "sweet" (*dulcis*: 22, 66, 88, 90; *suauis*: 66, 67) or "enjoyable" (*iucundus*: 47, 51, 55, 88), evoking its pleasures without using the philosophically suspect term "pleasure" (*uoluptas*). This strategy would not work in Greek, where the philosophical term for pleasure, *hēdonē*, in fact means "sweetness." **sic loqui ut tecum:** Laelius stresses the trust that exists between friends, possibly alluding with *ut tecum* to the idea that a friend is an *alter ego* (see 80n. *alter idem*). **aduersas uero:** the loyalty of a friend through misfortune was often seen as a touchstone of friendship; see 64. **ceterae res quae expetuntur:** once more, Laelius compares friendship to other putative goods (see 17n. *ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis* and Introduction 3(*c*)), this time in terms of what advantages they offer. **diuitiae ut utare ... fungare corporis:** a carefully structured list. In each of the five elements the desirable attribute + *ut* comes first; the first and last verbs (*utare* and *fungare*)

are deponents, while the second and third (*colare*, rhyming with the previous *utare*, and *laudere*) are genuine passive forms, and the fourth and fifth (*gaudeas* and *careas*) are active and also rhyme. The first three goods are external, progressing from money, through the resources (*opes*) that bring respect and political influence, to the holding of public office (*honores*); the last two are bodily (pleasure and good health), with the last one receiving the longest description. **continet** "contains, includes" (*OLD* 10). **non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt:** not proverbial (*ut aiunt*) in the same way as 19 *pingui ... Mineruae aqua et igni interdicere* was the formal expression of a decree of exile (e.g., *Dom.* 47, 82; *Phil.* 1.23), as the sharing of water and fire was considered a basic condition of human society (cf. *Off.* 1.52). **neque ego nunc de uulgari aut de mediocri ... loquor:** the first indication that there exist also less-than-perfect "friendships" (if they qualify as such), presumably among those who do not qualify as *boni* (see 76, 77, 100, and Introduction 3(*c*)). **et delectat et prodest:** an allusion to the two lesser Aristotelian friendships, which are directed at pleasure and advantage, respectively (see *Eth. Nic.* 8, 1156a6–b32 and Introduction 2). **eorum qui pauci nominantur:** see 15n. *uix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum.*

23 continet: see 22n. **illa ... praestat omnibus, quod ... praelucet** "that advantage (*illa*, nom. sing.) is superior to all other advantages, namely that friendship (implied subject of *praelucet*) lights the way." This way of constructing the sentence makes good sense, even if the change of subjects is somewhat harsh. Alternatively, *illa* might be taken as abl. sing., with friendship the subject throughout: "on account of this advantage, friendship is superior to all other goods, namely that it (friendship) ..." On the latter reading, however, *omnibus* has to refer back to other goods with which friendship can be compared, whereas here the point seems to be that this particular advantage is superior to all the others that friendship offers. **quod bona spe ... cadere patitur:** a peculiar metaphor, in which friendship "lights the way" (*OLD praeluceo* 3a) to the future (*in posterum*) by means of good hope (*bona spe*), thus preventing the souls on their journey from growing weak or falling (*debilitari ... aut cadere*). That friendship gives confidence for the future because we know that we will always be able to rely on help from our friends is an Epicurean tenet (Epicurus, *RS* 28, translated at *Fin.* 1.68), but as becomes clear in what follows, that is not what Laelius has in mind: perhaps influenced by the experience of Scipio's death, he envisages a near-mystical scenario in which friendship transcends physical absence and even death, holding both human society and the universe together through the bonds of affection. **tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui:** a version of the proverbial definition of a

friend as an *alter ego* (see 8on. *alter idem*), which leads to the argument that since one friend is, as it were, a copy or mirror image (*OLD exemplar* 3a) of the other, the qualities of one friend also apply to the other. Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 9, 1170a2–4 on how one perceives one's own qualities in those of a friend. **absentes adsunt ... egentes abundant ... imbecilli ualent ... mortui uiuunt:** a series of oxymorons, whose meanings are not easy to unravel, as Laelius hints with *difficilius dictu* (the last item is comparatively more incredible, but the others are baffling as well). Laelius appears to combine two ideas: (i) as hinted in the preceding clause, what applies to one friend, applies to the other; this is why "the poor are well supplied" (according to a famous saying, often attributed to the Pythagoreans, κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων "friends hold all things in common"; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 8, 1159b31–2; 9, 1168b7–8; Cic. *Off.* 1.51; Otto 1890 *amicus* 1; Bohnenblust 1905: 41) and, possibly, why "the absent are present" (one friend can represent the other) and "the weak are strong" (the stronger friend can act for the weaker); (ii) as made explicit in the following sentence, one friend can keep alive the memory of another who is absent or even dead, guaranteeing his continued existence. The latter is a version of the general topos that the dead live on in the memory of the living (e.g., Simon. *Epigr.* 8.3 Sider οὐδὲ τεθνᾶσι θανόντες; Cic. *Mil.* 97 *ut absentes adessemus, mortui uiueremus*). **tantus eos ... prosequitur amicorum:** this description of how friends keep dead friends "alive" by honoring, remembering, and missing them is obviously an allusion to Laelius' own situation after Scipio's death. His *desiderium* for his dead friend is mentioned at 10 and 104; in the latter passage, it is Laelius' *recordatio, memoria*, and *cogitatio* of the deceased that makes this desire at all bearable. On *memoria*, a leitmotif of *Amic.*, see 3n. *memoriae mandaui*; the dialogue is itself engaged in various acts of commemoration. **illorum ... horum:** *illi* are the dead, whose death becomes blessed through commemoration; *hi* are the living, whose ongoing dedication to the dead is praiseworthy. **quod si ... cultus permanebit:** somewhat abruptly, Laelius moves on to a larger argument about the central role of mutual affection in the universe (*rerum natura*) and human society. **beneuolentiae iunctionem ... amicitiae concordiaeque:** leaving behind the type of friendship between individuals that he has been discussing, Laelius now operates with a looser concept of *amicitia* as natural good will and concord, which allows him to promote it to the force that holds both nature and civilization together. See further 24n. *amicitiam*. **nec domus ... nec urbs ... nec agri quidem cultus:** why households and cities (mentioned again below: *quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma ciuitas est*) cannot exist without trust and agreement is clear (cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 8, 1155a22–3 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία), but the inclusion of agriculture is surprising. Presumably, Laelius

means that agriculturalism (an advanced stage in the development of civilization) requires agreement and collaboration. **id si minus intellegitur ... percipi potest ... iudicari potest:** Laelius self-referentially marks out his own argument: to better show the importance of concord, he conversely demonstrates the destruction wrought by discord. **dissensionibus atque discordiis ... odiis et discidiis:** individual cases of dissent and discord (cf. 26n. *utilitates*); friendship and concord are singular units, while hate and discord are by definition pluralities.

24 **Agrigentinum quidem doctum quendam uirum:** Empedocles (c. 492–432 BCE), Presocratic philosopher from Agrigentum (Sicily). In keeping with Laelius' practice elsewhere (see 7n. *Athenis unum* and Introduction 3(*c*)), he is not named directly but identified via periphrasis. *quendam* may be slightly colloquial and dismissive ("some learned fellow from Agrigentum"), to signal Laelius' pretended distance from Greek learning; so *ferunt*, as though Laelius himself were not quite sure about Empedocles' identity and doctrine. **carminibus Graecis:** Empedocles' didactic poem *On Nature*. **uaticinatum:** Empedocles presented himself as an inspired holy man, and C. may be influenced specifically by Lucretius' description of Empedocles and his followers as prophets (1.737–9 *ex adyto tamquam cordis responsa dedere | sanctius et multo certa ratione magis quam | Pythia quae tripodi a Phoebi lauroque profatur*). **quae in rerum natura ... dissipare discordiam:** according to Empedocles, the universe is made up of the four elements and governed by the contrasting forces of Love (*Philotēs*) and Strife (*Neikos*): the former endeavors to consolidate all matter into a single whole, while the latter works to disperse it into its constituent parts. **amicitiam:** Laelius' identification of Empedocles' *Philotēs* with *amicitia* is tendentious, made possible by the polysemy of the Greek noun, which can mean "friendship, love, affection" (LSJ 1). Empedocles, however, presents his constructive force rather in terms of sexual desire and union, identifying her with Aphrodite (esp. DK B17.24 = LM D73.255). **Atque hoc quidem:** another loose transition, where the referent of *hoc* is left vague. One would logically expect it to be the Empedoclean dualism of Love and Strife, but as the rest of the paragraph shows, it seems to be generally the importance and value of friendship. **omnes mortales:** the so-called argument *e consensu omnium* is often used to clinch the truth of some philosophical position or create common ground for further exploration (see Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.43–4 with Pease 1955–8 *ad loc.*; *Div.* 1.1 with Pease 1920–3 *ad loc.*); see also 86 *una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis de cuius utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt*. As will become clear, Laelius is here invoking especially the unsophisticated opinion of the non-elite. *mortalis* (when not used to emphasize

human mortality) almost always appears in C. in the fixed phrase *omnes mortales*, referring to a universally shared opinion or condition; it is much more common in C.'s earlier works, and probably a mild archaism. **et intellegunt et re probant:** in keeping with his practical attitude (see 10, 18–19), Laelius stresses real-world experience in addition to intellectual understanding. *re probant* is ambiguous, though: at first glance, it might mean that people "demonstrate" (*OLD probo* 7a) "through their action" (*re*) the importance of friendship; however, the following example of the appreciative theater audience instead shows people "approving of" (*OLD probo* 1a) friendship "in reality" (*re*) – with the further twist that this particular "reality" turns out to be a *res ficta*, namely, a play. **si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici** "if at some point some duty of a friend has arisen," i.e., if someone finds himself obliged to do something for his friend. **maximis efferat laudibus:** Laelius' point is not that in such a situation, all people will do their duty by their friends: since, as we have been told, only the good can be real friends (18), and there have been but few true friends in history (15, 22), such widespread virtuous action is presumably unlikely (see *quod facere ipsi non possent* below). However, everybody will applaud those who rise to the occasion in such a situation. On the importance of popular approval, see 5n. *sic enim est habitus.* **qui clamores tota cauea:** supply *fuerunt*; on Laelius' use of ellipsis, cf. 22n. *quid dulcius.* **in hospitis et amici mei M. Pacuui:** Pacuvius (c. 220–130 BCE) was a tragic poet; by stressing the personal connection with Laelius, C. continues his evocation of a "Scipionic Circle" that includes members of the Roman elite as well as philosophers and poets (cf. 69n. *in nostro ... grege*, 89n. *in Andria familiaris meus*, Introduction 3(*a*)). **noua fabula:** probably the *Chryses* (cf. Schierl 2006: 192–239); C. refers to this scene and its reception also at *Fin.* 2.79, 5.63. On such audience reactions of moral approval, see Rawson 1987. For other references to theater in *Amic.*, see 89, 93–4, 99–100; cf. 97; on the theatricality of the dialogue itself, see 3n. *induxi*, 4n. *aptior persona ... Laeli persona.* **cum ... Orestes ... perseueraret:** this circumstantial *cum*-clause with numerous levels of subordination is a sentence fragment, which can be taken logically with both the preceding and the following sentence. For Orestes and Pylades as one of the proverbial few pairs of good friends, see 15n. *uix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum.* In Pacuvius' play, Thoas, the king of the Taurians, after Iphigenia's abduction by Orestes and Pylades pursues and captures the fugitives; when he confronts the two friends, however, he cannot determine which one is Orestes, since each claims to be the wanted man in order to protect his friend. **stantes plaudebant:** a standing ovation is found also at *Att.* 2.19.3; that C. mentions it (rather than simple applause) suggests

that it was uncommon, but much about seating (and therefore standing ovations) before the building of Pompey's theater in 55 BCE is uncertain. **in re ficta ... in uera:** an a fortiori argument: if fiction arouses such an emotional and ethically correct response, reality should do so even more. Note the alliteration *ficta ... facturos fuisse ... facile ... facere ... fieri.* **indicabat ipsa natura uim suam** "nature indicated its own power," i.e., the power of nature became apparent; cf. 19n. *quia sequantur ... bene uiuendi ducem* on the role of nature in ethics in general and friendship in particular. In this case, the spontaneous audience reaction would appear to indicate not only the general appreciation of friendship (cf. *hoc quidem omnes mortales et intellegunt et re probant* above), but an innate ability to tell right from wrong (cf. *recte fieri*). **cum homines ... in altero iudicarent:** the *cum*-clause can be interpreted as either causal or circumstantial. *possent* presumably means that the audience members "would not have been able" to act in this manner (as if *potuissent*), even if they had found themselves in such a situation, not that they "were not able" because they never had a chance to prove themselves in this way. The spectators represent a common crowd that is inferior both to the elevated mythological characters onstage and to the *boni* whose friendships Laelius discusses; even so, their shared human nature enables their moral judgment and their appreciation of friendship. **hactenus mihi uideor ... potuisse dicere:** Laelius abruptly concludes his discussion, striking once more a note of diffident modesty (cf. 17n. *si mihi ipse confiderem ... quae est in me facultas?*): *hactenus, mihi uideor,* and *potuisse* indicate that he has exhausted his limited expertise, with *quid sentirem* harking back to 16 *quid sentias.* So too at the end of the dialogue: 104 *Haec habui de amicitia quae dicerem.* **si qua praeterea ... quaeritote:** for any remaining questions, Laelius once more refers Fannius and Scaevola to the philosophers who are accustomed to discuss such topics (cf. 17).

D. LAELIUS' SECOND SPEECH (25–32)

After Fannius and Scaevola playfully pressure their father-in-law into continuing his discussion (25–6), Laelius' short second speech focuses on the origin of friendship. In his extended first sentence (26), he sets out two competing opinions: friendship either arises out of weakness and need, as we rely on our friends to provide what we ourselves do not possess, or otherwise comes about naturally from a feeling of love inspired by another person's excellence. Laelius himself comes down firmly on the second explanation: just as we spontaneously love our parents and children, we naturally feel affection for those whose moral qualities have become apparent to us (27), and this emotional response even encompasses

people we have never met in person but only heard of, including virtuous enemies (28–9).

While it is true that constant interaction and the exchange of *beneficia* strengthen such spontaneous mutual affection, and that many advantages arise from friendship, it is not the case that people become friends for the purpose of reaping such benefits. Otherwise, the neediest people would make the best friends, whereas in reality it is the self-confident and self-sufficient who excel in friendship (29–31). Laelius thus rejects the utilitarian view of the Epicureans, pointing out that a friendship built on advantage will last no longer than the aimed-for benefit itself (32). By contrast, friendships arising naturally from love seek their reward in the relationship itself and are therefore stable, which is why Laelius offers the rousing conclusion that "true friendships are eternal" (32).

25 **Nos autem ... orationis tuae:** Fannius' brief intervention is very colloquial in style, with two cases of ellipsis (supply something like *quaerimus* with *nos autem a te potius*, and *est* with *sed aliud quoddam filum orationis tuae*) and sentence-initial *quamquam* (cf. 29n.) introducing, as it were, an afterthought. **saepe quaesiui et audiui:** Fannius has clearly been trained in philosophy, but like Laelius, he is interested in a different approach. **filum:** lit. "thread," but regularly used metaphorically for the texture or style of speech; cf., e.g., *De or.* 3.103 *haec formanda filo ipso et genere orationis*; *Orat.* 124 *si tenues causae, tum etiam argumentandi tenue filum.* **si nuper in hortis Scipionis:** like Laelius in 14, Scaevola too appears to have forgotten that Fannius was in fact present and took part in the conversation reported in *Rep.* **patronus iustitiae:** *Rep.* 3 (now highly fragmentary) contained a formal debate, elaborating on the famous pair of speeches on the possibility or necessity of justice in human affairs delivered by the Academic Skeptic Carneades in Rome in 155; in C.'s version, Philus (see 14n. *Philus et Manilius*) was given the unwelcome task of arguing the case of injustice, and Laelius delivered the case for the necessity of justice. On the debate and its reconstruction, see Zetzel 2017b. **accuratam** "carefully prepared"; cf., e.g., *Brut.* 326 *erat oratio cum incitata et uibrans tum etiam accurata et polita.* **iustitiam iustissimo uiro:** for the repetition, cf. 5 *ad senem senex de senectute* and *ad amicum amicissimus ... de amicitia.* Having previously been praised for his wisdom (see esp. 1, 6), Laelius is now also credited with outstanding justice. **qui ... maximam gloriam ceperit:** Scaevola implies that Laelius has already achieved the fame as a friend that he is wishing for (see 15) and that *Amic.* itself will help perpetuate. **seruatam** "maintained, kept up."

26 Vim ... afferre: a standard phrase for physical assault (e.g., 2 *Verr.* 4.148; *Dom.* 89; *Mil.* 9; *Phil.* 2.16), occasionally (as here) used metaphorically (*OLD affero* 9b). In keeping with his affected modesty (see 17n. *si mihi ipse confiderem ... quae est in me facultas?*), Laelius jokingly pretends that he is being "forced" (*cogatis, cogitis*) by Fannius and Scaevola to continue his exposition. **quid enim refert qua me ratione cogatis?** "What difference does it make by what reasoning you coerce me?" Laelius asserts that he is moved less by any particular argument on the parts of Fannius and Scaevola (such as their praise of his justice and expertise in friendship) than by the fact that they are his sons-in-law and that the topic is an important one. **generorum:** on the ideology and depiction of the relationship of fathers-in-law to sons-in-law at Rome, see Gowers 2019, with 9–22 on C. **in re bona** "in a good cause." **Saepissime igitur ... alia causa:** the opening of Laelius' second speech marks a change in style (see Introduction 4(*a*)): instead of his self-deprecating and homely attitudes and relatively simple (if sometimes long) sentences, he now speaks (at least temporarily) in a distinctly Ciceronian style – and acknowledges that, contrary to his previous assertion of non-competence (17, 24), friendship is a topic to which he has in fact given much thought (*Saepissime ... cogitanti*; cf. 33n. *saepissime inter me et Scipionem*). The clause, with the use of *saepe* and the combination of the dative participle of *cogito* with *uideri solet* (on this use of the participle, see Laughton 1964: 37–8) is closely related to some of C.'s own opening sentences, e.g., *De or.* 1.1 (*Cogitanti mihi saepenumero ... illi uideri solent*), *Div.* 2.1 (*Quaerenti mihi multumque et diu cogitanti*), and *Fam.* 7.3.1, a very carefully composed letter to M. Marius in 46 (*Persaepe mihi cogitanti ... solet in mentem uenire*). The sentence is periodic, with two alternative origins for friendship considered (*utrum ... an*); *causa* appears only as the last word. It is marked by pairs (*imbecillitatem atque inopiam; dandis recipiendisque meritis; acciperet ... redderet; antiquior et pulchrior*) instead of the frequent groups of words in asyndeton found in Laelius' previous speech. **utrum propter ... uicissimque redderet:** the question of whether friendship arises from a lack or want (we seek friends who can provide what we do not ourselves possess) or otherwise from spontaneous affection is central to many ancient discussions of friendship and closely related to the issue of whether friendship is selfishly utilitarian or genuinely altruistic (see *Inv. rhet.* 2.167; *Leg.* 1.49; *Nat. D.* 1.122; and Introduction 2). Socrates floats the idea that friendship has its origin in need at Pl. *Lysis* 214e2–218c3 (cf. the similar account of *erōs* at *Symp.* 201d1–212a7), though that dialogue ultimately ends in aporia. C. associates this need theory especially with the Epicureans, who throughout *Amic.* are excoriated for their utilitarian approach to

friendship (see 32, 46, 51–5). However, the Epicureans appear to have viewed friendship as arising not so much from individual needs as from the perception of the shared weakness of the human condition, which leads people to form friendships, among other social bonds, for mutual support (*Fin.* 1.66 *nam cum solitudo et uita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare*; Lucr. 5.1019–20). C. here and elsewhere in *Amic.* does not distinguish the two ideas and generally conflates need and the seeking of advantage (see Powell 1990: 93–4 on the difference). **imbecillitatem atque inopiam:** so also, with slight variation in phrasing, 27 *indigentia*, 29 *imbecillitate*, 29 *inopia atque indigentia*; cf. 51, 100. **dandis recipiendisque meritis:** *merita* are the reciprocal obligations of friends to one another; *beneficia* or *officia* would be the more familiar terms. **quod quisque ... uicissimque redderet:** cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 9, 1169b6–7 τὸν δὲ φίλον ... πορίζειν ἃ δι' αὑτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ. **quisque:** the subject of both *posset* and *acciperet/redderet*; its position within the relative clause is normal. **posset:** *posse* on its own can mean the power or capacity to do something (supply *facere*, as it were). **redderet:** strictly speaking, friends in need do not return the identical favor (which, after all, in this scenario was the very thing they were not able to achieve on their own), but one of equal worth. **proprium amicitiae:** the exchange of benefits is a necessary attribute of friendship, but that does not mean that such benefits are the origin of or motivation for friendship. **antiquior:** both "prior" (both logical and chronological priority are implied by *a natura ... profecta*) and "more important" (*OLD antiquus* 10a). **amor ... ex quo amicitia nominata est:** for the etymology, see also *Fin.* 2.78; Maltby 1991 *amicitia*. **ad beneuolentiam coniungendam:** see 20n. *caritas ... iungeretur*. **utilitates:** the plural, as with many abstract nouns, denotes instances of utility (i.e., advantages, benefits) rather than utility in general. **ab eis:** not an abl. of personal agent with *percipiuntur*, but the antecedent of the relative clause, i.e., the people from whom one can gain benefits under the false pretense of friendship. **percipiuntur:** the metaphor is one of harvesting (*OLD* 1): even false friends reap the benefits of friendship on occasion. **simulatione amicitiae:** Laelius discusses the need for sincerity in friendship in detail in Section H (88b–100a), inveighing against that ultimate fake friend, the flatterer (see also 53 *coluntur ... simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus*, on the false friends who surround tyrants). **temporis causa** "to suit the occasion" (*OLD tempus* 10c); cf. 53 *coluntur ... simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus*. **nihil fictum ... uoluntarium:** the pair of adjectives introduced by *nihil* is balanced by the alliterative pair *uerum et uoluntarium*; *uerum* responds to both *fictum* and *simulatum*, but *uoluntarium* harks back to *temporis causa* in the previous sentence.

27 quapropter a natura ... esset habitura: in two parallel clauses, Laelius offers two different formulations of his alternative explanation for the origin of *amicitia*; in the first, *potius* is used to indicate an exclusive comparison (nature not *indigentia*, on which see 26); in the second, *magis* indicates a matter of degree (emotional attachment more than rational calculation of utility). The idea that friendship arises naturally is central to Laelius' view (see 17, 19–20, 24, 26, 32, 50, 80–1, 83, 88, 103; Introduction 3(*c*)). **applicatione ... animi** "mental attachment" (unique in this sense; see *OLD applicatio* and Seyffert and Müller 1876 *ad loc.*). The process of our seeking out and attaching ourselves to those whom we have begun to love is explained in greater detail in 32. **sensu amandi ... earum sensus ... sensus ... amoris:** as in 32 *sensum diligendi, sensus* here denotes an instinctive natural emotion. **Quod ... quale sit** "what this is like"; the connecting relative refers back to the general idea – the affectionate basis of friendship – of the previous sentence. **in bestiis quibusdam:** animal behavior in general and care for offspring in particular are often adduced in philosophical discussions of human emotions and sociability (Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 8, 1155a16–19, too, uses them to argue for the natural origin of *philia*); Laelius develops the thought further in 81. **ad quoddam tempus:** the limit of animals' care for their young is more precisely defined at *Nat. D.* 2.129 *usque ad eum finem dum possint se ipsa defendere.* **primum ... deinde:** the two pieces of evidence are given in non-parallel syntax, a prepositional phrase modified by two parallel relative clauses (*quae ... parentes, quae ... non potest*) followed by a temporal *cum*-clause containing a conditional clause (*si ... nacti sumus*), from which in turn depends a relative clause (*cuius ... congruamus*). The final causal *quod*-clause does not depend on the conditional clause but is parallel to it, with both following on *deinde cum similis sensus exstitit amoris* (see further below). **inter natos et parentes:** cf. C. on Atticus' love for his young daughter (*Att.* 7.2.4 ~ *Rep.* 3.39). **similis:** i.e., similar to the love parents have for offspring. **si aliquem ... perspicere uideamur:** Laelius combines two explanations of why we naturally love our friends: similarity of character (*cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus*) and perceived virtue (*in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et uirtutis perspicere uideamur*). The former is traditionally viewed as a basis of friendship (see 50n. *similitudo*), while the latter is central to Laelius' vision of friendship between *boni*. Meeting a person of compatible disposition is presented as a *condition* for the development of friendship (*si aliquem nacti sumus cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus*), but the *cause* is our perception of that person's virtue (*quod ... perspicere uideamur*). **quasi lumen:** cf. 100 *ostendit suum lumen*, likewise of *uirtus*. The metaphorical use of *lumen* for admirable qualities is

not uncommon. **probitatis et uirtutis:** the close relationship of *uirtus* and *amicitia* was stated emphatically in 20 (see 20n. *sed haec ipsa uirtus ... ullo pacto potest*), and Laelius continues to use *uirtus* as the main criterion by which to judge a potential friend (varied as *uirtutem et bonitatem* in 29). He also uses *probitas*, which appears five times in fairly close succession (here, 28 *uirtutem et probitatem*, 28 *probitatem* alone of Pyrrhus, 29 *uis probitatis*, 32 *facta significatione probitatis*).

28 **nihil est enim uirtute amabilius:** repeated from *Nat. D.* 1.121 *nihil est enim uirtute amabilius, quam qui adeptus erit ubicumque erit gentium a nobis diligetur* (cf. also *Off.* 1.56), where it is said to be a Stoic opinion; see also *Fam.* 9.14.4 *nihil est enim ... uirtute formosius, nihil pulchrius, nihil amabilius.* On the construction, see 20n. *nihil melius.* **alliciat ad diligendum:** in 50, Laelius mentions the more widespread view that it is similarity that attracts people to one another and makes them friends (*nihil esse quod ad se rem ullam tam illiciat et tam trahat quam ad amicitiam similitudo*); as he explains there, this is not incompatible with his virtue-based model, since it is especially the good who are attracted to the good. **C. Fabrici, M'. Curi:** for Fabricius and Curius as exemplars of virtue, see 18n. **cum caritate aliqua beneuola:** cf. Laelius' definition of friendship as agreement on all things *cum beneuolentia et caritate* (20); cf. also 19n. *beneuolentia.* **memoriam usurpet** "invokes the memory of" (*OLD usurpo* 5c). **Tarquinium Superbum ... Sp. Cassium, Sp. Maelium:** Tarquinius Superbus, the last king of Rome, is the archetypal tyrant; his lack of friends is mentioned at 53. The other two were considered to have aimed at tyranny and were killed accordingly; see 36n. *Vecellinum ... Maelium.* **oderit ... oderit:** the first is perfect subjunctive in form, present in meaning (owing to the verb being defective, with forms built from the perfect stem only); the second is future perfect in form, future in meaning. **Pyrrho et Hannibale:** Pyrrhus the king of Epirus and Hannibal the Carthaginian general were (at the beginning and end of the third century, respectively) the two most significant foreign invaders of Italy with whom Rome had to contend. Pyrrhus was renowned for his nobility and in particular his generosity toward Roman prisoners and Hannibal for his treachery and cruelty; C. compares the two also at *Off.* 1.38. **ab altero:** the prepositional phrase goes with *alienos* "unfavorable toward" (*OLD* 7a). **non nimis** "not very"; Pyrrhus was still, after all, a *hostis* of Rome. The limitation implied by phrases such as *non nimis* or *non admodum* (cf. 49) is sometimes ironic.

29 **quod si ... uideantur:** an a fortiori argument: if we are able to love people we have never met and even our enemies because of their *probitas*,

it is hardly surprising if we have affection for good people with whom we have the opportunity to interact ourselves. **usu** "through habitual interaction" (*OLD* 10). **Quamquam** "to be sure; admittedly"; for its use to begin a sentence, see *OLD* 3; A&G 527d. Laelius uses introductory *quamquam* four times in *Amic.* (29, 33, 54, 97; see also Fannius in 25), in keeping with his conversational style. **confirmatur amor ... consuetudine adiuncta:** Laelius outlines the steps in the formation of true friendship: one starts with *amor* (*illum primum motum animi et amoris*, cf. 26–8), but this must then be solidified (*confirmatur*, cf. 82) by the series of friendly interactions expressed in the three ablatives absolute: good services (*beneficium*), concern for the other (*studium*), and finally familiarity (*consuetudo*; cf. 30, 68). That friendship needs to be actively practiced and does not just consist in one's feeling for the friend is central to Aristotle's theory of friendship (esp. *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1157b1–24; 9, 1171b29–1172a15). **exardescit:** cf. 100n. *lumen ... ad se admouet uicissimque accipit ... exardescit.* **beneuolentiae magnitudo** "greatness of good will = great good will"; cf. 19n. *beneuolentia*, 30 *auxit beneuolentiam consuetudo.* **quam:** the connecting relative technically refers back to *magnitudo* or *beneuolentiae*; however, as the rest of the sentence makes clear, the issue is the origin of friendship in general. **si qui putant:** presumably Plato as well as the Epicureans; see 26n. *utrum propter ... uicissimque redderet.* **ut sit per quem adsequatur quod quisque desideret** "so that there be someone with whose help one can achieve what one desires." The sequence of thought is very abbreviated: if friendship arises out of weakness, this means that we enter friendships with the purpose (*ut*) of finding someone who can provide what we lack. As in 26, *quisque* appears in the relative clause even though it is also the subject of the main verb *adsequatur.* **humilem ... minime generosum ... ex inopia atque indigentia natam:** Laelius playfully personifies *amicitia* (*ut ita dicam* signals his use of figurative speech) to make his point: just as it is absurd to imagine Friendship as born from humble parentage and in poverty (contrast Pl. *Symp.* 203b2–c1, where Eros is the son of Poverty), it makes no sense to believe that friends become friends out of need. As the following sentences make clear, Laelius imagines both Friendship and her followers to be equally noble and well supplied. **quod si ... secus est:** if the need hypothesis were correct, people with the lowest self-esteem would make the best friends – which Laelius says is far from being the case. Here and in what follows, Laelius adds a psychological element to the question of need: it is not so much about really lacking something as about believing that one does (which is something that the truly self-sufficient person would not do). **ut quisque ... esset aptissimus** "the less someone thought he had in himself, the

more suitable he would be for friendship" (for this use of *quisque* with the superlative, see A&G 313b).

30 **ut enim ... maxime excellit:** cf. 29n. *ut quisque ... esset aptissimus.* The paragraph 30–1 is carefully organized: the first and last sentences are general statements about the nature of friendship with parallel structures of comparison: each begins with *ut enim*, followed in the first case by *ita*, in the second by *sic*; *expetendis* near the end of the first sentence is taken up by *expetendam* near the end of the second. Between the two general statements comes a description of the specific relationship between Laelius and Scipio, which exemplifies and confirms Laelius' theory about the origin of friendship. The first sentence is shaped by pairs of words or phrases: *ut ... confidit* and *ut ... munitus est*; the second element contains the pair *uirtute et sapientia*, and the subordinate clause in the second element balances the negative *ut nullo egeat* with the positive *suaque ... iudicet*; the main clause contains the paired *expetendis colendisque.* **nullo egeat ... posita iudicet:** self-sufficiency is a characteristic of the wise person and has been ascribed to Laelius himself by Fannius with the same language (7 *omnia tua in te posita esse*); see 7n. *ut omnia tua ... inferiores putes.* **quid enim? Africanus indigens mei?** the rhetorical question *quid enim* frequently introduces an illustration of a more general argument, and is often followed by another rhetorical question, here made more emphatic by the omission of the verb. **minime hercule ... quidem illius:** both Scipio and Laelius are self-sufficient (though here and in the following sentence, Laelius always places himself second to his friend), and it would thus be absurd to imagine that their friendship was based on need. Laelius somewhat modifies this statement in 51, suggesting that friends sometimes must have need of one another and allowing that occasionally even Scipio depended on Laelius' help. **sed ego admiratione ... me dilexit:** the genesis of Laelius' love for Scipio out of admiration for his *uirtus* follows the scenario laid out in 26–9 (this part of the sentence is elliptical; supply *eum dilexi* from the second part); rather than ascribing virtue to himself, however, Laelius modestly suggests that Scipio's mutual feeling was based "perhaps on a certain opinion ... about [Laelius'] character." For the use of *quidam* to indicate approximation (also in 29 *admirabilis quaedam*), see 19n. *ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam.* **dilexit. auxit:** the juxtaposition of the rhyming verbs and the absence of any connective are emphatic. **beneuolentiam consuetudo:** see 29n. *confirmatur amor ... consuetudine adiuncta.* **sed quamquam ... diligendi profectae:** the advantages (*utilitates*, see 26n.) gained from a friend's services are an inherent element of friendship but arise,

as it were, as a side-effect of natural affection and are not the motivation for establishing friendship (cf. 32, 51 *non igitur utilitatem amicitia sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est*).

31 **benefici liberalesque:** Laelius compares friendship to generosity: both are natural other-directed impulses and not motivated by hopes for gain and advantage. In Greco-Roman society, the voluntary exchange of services played an enormous practical and ideological role (see Introduction 2) and was accordingly a topic of philosophical ethics: in *Off.* 1.42–60, C. treats *liberalitas* as a social virtue on a par with justice, and Seneca devotes his entire treatise *De beneficiis* to the discussion of *beneficia*. *liberalitas* could also be problematic: as Antonius points out at *De or.* 2.105, it is sometimes very difficult to draw a clear line between generosity and bribery. As Gellius shows in an extended discussion of our passage (*NA* 17.5), Laelius is here a priori adopting a high-minded (philosophical but, we may add, also aristocratic) definition of generosity as not aiming at the return of favors bestowed; if this is not granted, the argument loses its force (as shown by the malevolent rhetorician against whom Gellius argues in his chapter). **beneficium faeneramur** "we do not seek to make a profit from doing a service" (cf. *Fin.* 2.117 *nec enim, cum tua causa cui commodes, beneficium illud habendum est, sed faeneratio*; *Nat. D.* 1.122; Sen. *Ben.* 1.1.9, 1.2.3). This phrase is the most striking example of the pervasive use of financial language in this sentence; see also *exigamus* (used of calling in a loan), *spe mercedis, fructus* ("profit"), as well as 26 *id acciperet ... uicissimque redderet* (the terminology of balancing accounts). Friendship cannot be measured in accounts of profit and loss, and the only real profit is disinterested love itself. C. often uses commercial language in disparaging the "calculating" ethics of the Epicureans, especially in the context of friendship; see Hanchey 2013a, 2022: 46–53 and 56n. *ut nostra ... aequaliterque respondeat*, 58n. *ad calculos uocare ... ratio acceptorum et datorum*. **natura:** like friendship (see 17, 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 32, 50, 80, 81, 83, 88), generosity arises from a natural kindly disposition toward our fellow human beings. **omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest:** the love envisaged is presumably the mutual affection between friends (cf. 51 *amici amor ipse delectat*, where, however, the *amor* is specifically that of one's friend rather than oneself; see 51n.). Since *amor* is the basis of *amicitia* (cf. 26n. *amor ... ex quo amicitia nominata est*), friendship turns out to be something that is done for its own sake (*in ipso amore*), being its "own reward" (cf. 80 *pulcherrima illa et maxime naturali ... amicitia, per se et propter se expetita*). What is sought for itself rather than for ulterior motives is typically considered of high philosophical value or even the highest good (e.g., *Fin.*

1.29 *extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod ... tale debet esse ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam*); cf. Introduction 3(*c*) and 17n. *ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis.*

32 **Ab his ... dissentiunt** "People who, like cattle, make pleasure a universal standard strongly disagree with these views"; *his* is neuter plural, referring back to the opinions expressed in the previous paragraph. The use of the demonstrative in an oblique case to stand for an unexpressed noun is relatively rare because of the ambiguity of the form (that is presumably why a few manuscripts here read *dissentimus*, taking *his* as masculine and as the antecedent of the following *qui*). **qui ... referunt:** the Epicureans. For *pecudum ritu*, cf. 20n. *beluarum*; at *Parad. Stoic.* 1.14, C. describes the Epicurean belief in pleasure as the *summum bonum* as *uox pecudum* (cf. also *Acad. post.* 1.6; *Fin.* 2.111). **nihil enim altum ... tamque contemptam:** C. regularly uses metaphors of high and low to describe, respectively, the noblest and the most contemptible views of many aspects of philosophy and rhetoric; thus here *altum, diuinum, suspicere* contrast with *abiecerunt, humilem, contemptam*. On this pattern of imagery, cf. Görler 1974, esp. 63–9, 96–102, and on this passage 28–9, 48–9. Here, the metaphor additionally evokes the ancient topos that only humans have an erect stature, thus being able to "look up" (*suspicere*) to higher things, while animals (and here the animal-like Epicureans) are doomed to face downwards (e.g., *Leg.* 1.26; *Nat. D.* 2.140). **natura gigni ... significatione probitatis:** Laelius sums up the view of the origin of friendship that he has been expounding since 26, stressing once more its foundation in nature (*natura*; cf. 26–7), its emotional component (*sensum diligendi*; cf. 27) and inherent good will (*beneuolentia*; cf. 26, 28, 29, 30), as well as its motivation in the perceived excellence of the other person (*significatione probitatis*; cf. 27–9). **facta significatione probitatis:** *significatio* is an indication by which one can judge another's feelings, opinion, or qualities, ranging from the applause of a crowd through divine omens to (in this case) the actions by which to judge someone's moral worth; cf. 27 *lumen aliquod probitatis et uirtutis*, 48 *significatio uirtutis*, 100 *quae* [*sc. uirtus*] *cum se extulit et ostendit suum lumen*; *Off.* 1.46 *significatio uirtutis.* **quam qui ... honesta certatio:** enlarging on his previous discussion (30–1), Laelius lays out his ideal of the reciprocal practices of friendship once the initial emotional attraction has been strengthened through habitual interaction (*usu*; cf. 29n.). As often, the sentence relies on pairings of words to create emphasis (*applicant ~ admouent*; *usu ~ moribus*; *pares ~ aequales*; *bene merendum ~ reposcendum*). **quam qui appetiuerunt:** *quam* refers back to *probitatis*; on the other person's *probitas* or *uirtus* as the object of one's love, see 27–9. **applicant se:** cf. 27n. *applicatione ... animi.* **ut ... fruantur ...**

sintque ... sit: an extended result clause. **pares ... propensioresque:** friends should be equal, but each of them should be eager to do the other good rather than expect anything in return, according to the ideal of natural disinterested generosity laid out in 31. **utilitates ... capientur:** see 26n. *utilitates*, 30n. *sed quamquam ... diligendi profectae.* **erit ortus ... et uerior:** this concluding sentence harks back to 26, where Laelius opened the question of friendship's origin by likewise pitting *imbecillitas* against *natura* and using comparatives (there: *antiquior et pulchrior*) to refer to the natural foundation of friendship. **nam si utilitas ... dissolueret:** already Aristotle observed that friendship based on utility lasts only as long as the advantage sought (*Eth. Nic.* 8, 1157a14–16). Cf. *Fin.* 2.78 (against the Epicurean view) *manebit ergo amicitia tam diu quam diu sequetur utilitas, et si utilitas amicitiam constituet, tollet eadem.* **conglutinaret:** C. is fond of the metaphor; he uses it of the bond of friendship at *Fam.* 11.27.2 (to Matius); *Att.* 1.17.10, 7.8.1; of ideas or words at *De or.* 1.188 and *Orat.* 78; and of life itself at *Sen.* 72. **natura mutari non potest:** a strong general statement. Laelius presumably means the unchanging character of the virtuous friend; for the importance of consistency in friendship, see 62, 64–5, 100. **uerae amicitiae sempiternae sunt:** proverbial (Otto 1890 *amicitia* 3; Bohnenblust 1905: 36–7); cf. 15n. *sempiternam.* **nisi quid ad haec forte uultis** "unless perchance you wish (to add/reply) something to this"; cf. *Tusc.* 2.42 *nisi quid uis ad haec*; *Fin.* 1.28 *ad haec ... habeo quae uelim.* **qui minor est natu:** Scaevola, although younger than Fannius, had married Laelius' elder daughter, while Fannius had married the younger. The two men invariably speak in sequence in *Amic.* (this is their last interruption): Fannius always speaks first (6–8, 16, 25, and here), and Fannius comes first when C. introduces them (5). So too, when Laelius addresses his two sons-in-law together, Fannius is always named first (40, 50, 100). The one exception comes at 8–9, when Laelius addresses Scaevola in agreement with what he has said (*Recte tu quidem, Scaeuola, et uere*) and then corrects Fannius concerning his views about Cato (*non recte iudicas*).

E–I. LAELIUS' THIRD SPEECH (33–104)

E. HOW FAR SHOULD ONE GO FOR A FRIEND? (33–44)

Laelius' third and final speech is considerably longer than the first two and covers a variety of topics related to the maintenance of a lasting friendship. He begins by reporting at length the thoughts of Scipio – shared in past conversation – on why friendships rarely last a lifetime (33–5). As people grow older, their interests diverge, and they often find themselves

in competition or even conflict. The greatest danger arises when one friend, citing an alleged "right of friendship" (35 *ius ... amicitiae*), asks the other to do something morally wrong and, if the friend does not comply, turns against him.

This leads Laelius to the general question of how far one ought to go for a friend (36). His uncompromising answer is that one is never allowed to use friendship as an excuse for wrongdoing (37) and that the "first law" of friendship ought to be that "we neither ask [our friends] for anything shameful, nor do it if we are asked [by them]" (40; cf. 44). Laelius' main concern is with acts against the commonwealth (40 *contra rem publicam*), which cannot be justified by claims of loyalty to friends. He marshals a number of *exempla* from Roman history, the most notorious being that of Blossius of Cumae, a Stoic philosopher who cited his friendship for Ti. Gracchus as an excuse for his support of the tribune's subversive activities (37).

The question of whether one is allowed to cut some ethical corners in support of a friend was much discussed in philosophical treatments of friendship and general ethics (see Introduction 2). C.'s categorical rejection of the "friendship defense" especially in political contexts appears to be motivated at least in part by the situation at Rome during the dialogue's composition (see Introduction 3(*c*)): after the assassination of Caesar, questions of *amicitia* were paramount in Roman political discourse, as the remaining Caesarians invoked their own loyalty to the dictator and accused the likes of Brutus of having betrayed their friendship with the dead man; conversely, supporters of the liberators claimed that the good of the *res publica* ought to trump *amicitia*. C.'s correspondence with the Caesarian C. Matius (*Fam.* 11.27–8; see the Appendix) is evidence for how pressing the topic was during these turbulent months.

In 61, Laelius briefly returns to the ethical boundaries of friendship, stating now that in emergency situations, one may for the sake of a friend depart ever so slightly from the strictly honorable. This apparent self-contradiction has given rise to theories of different stages in the dialogue's composition (see 61n. *ut etiam ... turpitudo sequatur*) but is better explained as evidence for the inherent tensions in C.'s concept of *amicitia* (cf. Narducci 1985: 9). At any rate, it is clear that the more permissive attitude of the later passage does not extend to the kinds of actions against the commonwealth that are Laelius' main concern in the present section.

33 Audite uero, optimi uiri: cf. the ironically grandiose opening of Antonius' speech at *De or.* 2.28 *audite uero, audite*. Laelius takes up Scaevola's *audiamus*. **saepissime inter me et Scipionem:** here, as below

(59, 60, 62), Laelius reports Scipio's views *de amicitia*, stating that they had many conversations on the topic (*saepissime*, 62 *omnis sermo* [*sc. Scipionis*] *erat de amicitia*; cf. also 26 *saepissime ... mihi de amicitia cogitanti*). We are thus made to understand that *Amic.* contains not only Laelius' thoughts on friendship, as told to C. by Scaevola, but also ideas Scipio had previously conveyed to Laelius (cf. also 76, 90 on reported views of Cato). This contributes to the impression of an overlapping set of ongoing discussions on friendship, which extend from the "Scipionic Circle" to C.'s own time (see Introduction 3(*a*)). **quamquam:** see 29n. **ille ... dicebat:** together with *saepe dicebat* in the following sentence, this introduces Scipio's reported speech, which extends (in indirect discourse in secondary sequence) from here to the end of 35. **nihil difficilius esse:** Laelius ended his previous speech by claiming that true friendships, arising from nature, last forever, but now uses Scipio's reported speech to complicate the issue and emphasize the difficulty of lasting friendship. Laelius' monologue turns quasi dialogic as he "responds" (from 36) to his friend, in a way reminiscent of C.'s *in utramque partem* dialogues in the spirit of Academic Skepticism (*Acad.*, *Fin.*, *Nat. D.*, *Div.*). That Scipio here and later comes across as considerably more down-to-earth and skeptical than Laelius is a reversal of their roles in *Rep.*, where realistic Laelius is the foil to idealistic Scipio; note, though, *Off.* 1.108, where C. reports that Laelius was indeed of a more cheerful disposition than his gloomier friend. **ad extremum uitae diem:** by stressing the difficulty of a friendship's lasting until death, C. once more elevates the relationship of Laelius and Scipio, which managed to do exactly that. **ut non idem ... aetate ingrauescente:** as his first explanation of why friendships do not always last, Scipio mentions disagreements about external matters, both in general (*ut non idem expediret*) and in political matters (*ut de re publica non idem sentiretur*), which could occur at any time. He then offers two internal explanations for the divergence of friends' *mores*, either from circumstances (*aduersis rebus*) or from growing older (*aetate ingrauescente*); the latter leads (in the remainder of 33 and the first part of 34) to a more chronological approach to the kinds of breaches of friendship that occur at particular times of life. **ut non idem expediret** "that their interests differ," lit. "that the same thing is not useful [to both of them]" (*OLD* 8). Like *ut ... sentiretur*, the phrase (a noun clause) depends on *incidere*, the verb of the indirect statement. **exemplum ex similitudine** "demonstration from analogy." What begins as an illustration of the changes of human character using childhood quickly turns into a history of the ages of man (*praetexta toga ... adulescentiam ... longius*) in terms of the challenges to lasting friendship that emerge at various points in one's

life. **praetexta toga:** the *toga praetexta* (with a purple border) was worn by upper-class boys until the age of 16, when they received the white toga of adults (cf. 1n. *sumpta uirili toga*). For childhood friendships and their continuation, see also 74.

34 **sin autem ... non posset:** if a friendship has survived into young adulthood (*ad adulescentiam*), it is endangered by rivalry over a possible wife and other, presumably social or financial, advantages. **perduxissent:** the implied object, which then becomes the implied subject of *dirimi* and *labefactari*, is *amores* from the previous sentence. **uxoriae condicionis:** *condicio* alone can denote a marriage or marriage contract (*OLD* 2); *uxoriae* is simply a clarification. **longius ... prouecti:** the metaphor is of a sea voyage. **honoris contentionem** "rivalry over election to political office," presumably beginning with the quaestorship (minimum age: 30). **in plerisque ... in optimis quibusque:** Scipio now generalizes about the threats to friendship in terms of social class rather than age: the multitude fight about money (*pecuniae cupiditatem*), while the better sort compete for political office and the glory that may come with it (*honoris certamen et gloriae*). **inimicitias:** open and declared enmity was considered a matter of great gravity in Roman society (Brunt 1965: 13; Epstein 1987: 12–29; Kierdorf 1987: 228–33); it is warned against later in the dialogue (60, 77, 78).

35 **magna enim discidia ... etiam gigni sempiterna:** rivalry over external goods leads Scipio to the loftier question of ethical values, to be taken up by Laelius in 36–44 (cf. esp. 36n. *quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat*). According to Scipio, friendship is most endangered by the common perception of a "right of friendship" (*ius ... amicitiae*), according to which friends are supposed to do everything for each other (*omnia se amici causa esse facturos*), including things that are not morally right (*quod rectum non esset*). Those who refuse are acting ethically (*honeste*), but are vilified by their friends, and such friendships not infrequently turn to hatred (*odia*). **aut libidinis ministri aut adiutores ... ad iniuriam:** Scipio apparently envisages missteps or crimes in the private sphere, unlike the actions *contra patriam* discussed by Laelius in 36–44. **quod qui ... obsequi nollent:** *quod* is a connecting relative, whose antecedent is the request to do something dishonorable contained in *cum aliquid ... ad iniuriam*. Since *arguerentur* is subjunctive, not infinitive, it makes the most sense to see it as continuing the syntax of the *cum*-clause: according to Scipio, rifts arise *cum ... postularetur ... [et cum] ... arguerentur*. **quamuis honeste id facerent** "however morally justified they might be in doing so," picked up by *tamen* "nevertheless, even so." Depending on how we wish to construe *tamen*, this

may be an instance of Scipio's editorializing ("nevertheless these men are being accused," *tamen ... arguerentur*) or the cynical statement of those who accuse their friends of "nevertheless deserting the obligations of friendship" (*ius tamen amicitiae deserere*). **ius ... amicitiae** "right of friendship, obligations arising from friendship" (*OLD ius* 9; the phrase returns in 63). There is clearly a contrast between the *discidia ... iusta* at the beginning of the sentence and *ius amicitiae* here: the question is whether the rights of friendship are limited by what is in fact "right." **quibus obsequi nollent** "whose lead they were unwilling to follow"; for the problems of *obsequium* in friendship, cf. 89. **auderent ... omnia se ... esse facturos:** both expressions have negative connotations: those who "have the cheek" to make such demands of their friends indicate that they themselves would be ready "to do anything," i.e., "do the worst" themselves (cf. Catull. 75.4 *omnia si facias*; Gk. πανοῦργος "ready to do anything, wicked"). **odia ... sempiterna:** contrast 32 *amicitiae sempiternae*. **non modo sapientiae sed etiam felicitatis:** genitives of characteristic: to escape all the possible causes of the destruction of friendship requires not only *sapientia* but *felicitas*. It is not clear that Laelius *sapiens* shares Scipio's unphilosophical view that luck as well as wisdom is needed. **diceret:** a closing reminder that we have been listening to Scipio's reported speech. *ut ... diceret* is a result clause that depends on the indirect statement *haec ita ... impendere amicitiis*: logically, the result of the dangers to friendships is the need for both wisdom and luck, but grammatically, it is Scipio's *saying* that it seems to him that there is such a need.

36 Quam ob rem "therefore." Laelius responds directly to Scipio's challenge, formulating his *lex amicitiae* (40, 44) as an answer to the alleged *ius amicitiae* (35) criticized by Scipio. **primum:** cf. 44 *prima lex amicitiae*. Laelius never explicitly follows up with a "second," and it is probably best to understand the meaning of the adverb and adjective as "of first importance; principal" (*OLD primus* 15; cf. 18n.). **si placet:** an inclusive gesture of politeness to Laelius' interlocutors, equivalent to εἰ δοκεῖ in Plato's dialogues. C. uses it in all his dialogues, most frequently (7×) in *Div.*, and only here in *Amic.* **quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat** "how far love in friendship is allowed to go." The question is not how much one should love one's friend (a topic Laelius discusses in 56–61) but how far one may go for a friend. This was a topic of both popular moralizing and systematic philosophy (Fürst 1996: 122–6): according to Aulus Gellius, the question of "whether one should support a friend beyond what is just, and how much, and in which way" was a topic discussed by "many followers of philosophy" (*NA* 1.3.9). The question does not appear in Aristotle; Gellius himself cites C. as well as Theophrastus,

On Friendship (which he believes was C.'s source); see also Cic. *Off.* 2.51 (with explicit reference to Panaetius), 3.19, 3.43–6. Laelius' analysis of the limits of friendship makes use of two grouped sets of examples. In the first group (36–7), three traitors of the early Republic (Coriolanus, Sp. Cassius, and Sp. Maelius) who were not supported by their friends are contrasted with the most recent instance of treasonous behavior, the tribunate of Ti. Gracchus, who did receive support from some of his friends, notably Blossius. In the second group (38–9), two pairs of friends from the early Republic (Aemilius Papus, Fabricius Luscinus, M'. Curius, Ti. Coruncanius) who would never have done anything disloyal or dishonorable are again contrasted with Ti. Gracchus and his dishonorable friends. **amor in amicitia:** on the origin of friendship in affection, see esp. 26–7. **numne:** found elsewhere in C. only in *Nat. D.* 1.88, presumably as a more emphatic equivalent of *num*, expecting a negative answer. Just as the analogous *nonne* is often followed by *non* in anaphora, so *numne* here is followed by *num*. **Coriolanus:** according to legend, Cn. Marcius Coriolanus was exiled from Rome in 491 for his anti-popular sentiments and led the Volsci against Rome in revenge until dissuaded by his female relatives in 488. Coriolanus' friends and clients are mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant. Rom.* 7.21.3), but he is always pictured as going into exile alone. The absence of supporters is emphasized again when C. mentions his suicide at 42. There, as elsewhere in C. (*Brut.* 41–3; *Att.* 9.10.3), he is paired with his near-contemporary (and fellow exile and subsequent enemy of his homeland) Themistocles; Plutarch pairs him with Alcibiades. On the legend and its sources, cf. Ogilvie 1965: 314–16; Cornell 1990: 287–8. **Coriolanus ... cum Coriolano:** the repetition of the name is emphatic, as is the postponement of *arma*. **debuerunt** "would have been obliged"; for the use of the indicative, see 8n. *nec enim ... debui*. **Vecellinum ... Maelium:** the separation of *Vecellinum* from *regnum appetentem* adds emphasis. Sp. Cassius Vecellinus was consul in 502, 493, and 486; according to the historical tradition (see Ogilvie 1965: 337–9), in his third consulate he was accused of seeking royal power through agrarian legislation and condemned the next year. The legend of Sp. Maelius is more confusing in its details and chronology; in Livy's account (4.13–16; see Ogilvie 1965: 550–1) he was killed by the *magister equitum* C. Servilius Ahala in 439 for similar aspirations. C. links the two, together with Manlius Capitolinus, as instances of wrongful political ambition rightfully punished also at *Dom.* 101; *Phil.* 2.87, 2.114; *Rep.* 2.49 (see Baraz 2020: 81–95 on how the three stories belong together). At 28, Tarquinius Superbus substitutes for Manlius; Maelius is linked to Ti. Gracchus also at *Cat.* 1.3; *Mil.* 72. The cognomen Vecellinus (or Vicellinus; corrupt in all sources) without Cassius' nomen

is otherwise found only in various late versions of the Fasti; his full name appears only at Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 5.49.1. **regnum appetentem:** cf. 41 *regnum occupare conatus est* of Ti. Gracchus. The accusation of attempting to seize sole power was leveled not only at Maelius, Cassius, and Manlius, but at Cinna, Sulla, and Caesar as well (cf. *Phil.* 2.114, 5.17), not to mention C. himself (cf. *Sull.* 27); see Baraz 2018, 2020: 101–10 on the use of such accusations in late Republican polemic. C. uses both *appetere* and *occupare conari* (or *uelle*) without distinction; the more common *regnum affectare* is not found before Livy, while Sallust (*Cat.* 5.6; *Iug.* 31.7) uses *regnum parare* for both Ti. Gracchus and Catiline. The accusation had a particular resonance in the case of Ti. Gracchus for two reasons: not only had he attempted to use the bequest of the property of Attalus III of Pergamum to Rome to fund his agrarian program (Badian 1972: 713 describes this as "an act characteristic of the aspiring tyrant"), but the consular Q. Pompeius had also claimed to have seen the Pergamene ambassador Eudemus offering Gracchus a royal diadem and a purple robe (Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 14.1–2). Compare Antony's offer of a royal diadem to Caesar at the Lupercalia in February 44 (*Phil.* 2.85–7; Suet. *Iul.* 79.2), an event that contributed to the conspirators' decision to hasten the dictator's demise.

37 **Ti. ... Gracchum:** the tribunate of Ti. Gracchus and its aftermath are mentioned in *Amic.* only here (37–41), but Tiberius is a significant figure both for C. in general and in the dramatic context of the dialogue. For C., the step from the would-be tyrants of the early Republic to Ti. Gracchus was a very short one – not least because the stories of agrarian agitation on the part of Sp. Cassius and other early figures were probably retroactively invented on the model of the Gracchi – and he generally views Tiberius' tribunate (sometimes with that of his brother Gaius) as the first major betrayal of republican government (cf., e.g., *Cat.* 4.4; *Sest.* 105; *Har. resp.* 41, 43; *Phil.* 8.13–14; *Brut.* 103, 224; *Fin.* 4.65; *Off.* 1.109; see Gaillard 1975 and van der Blom 2010: 103–7). In *Amic.* C. focuses on Tiberius as destroying civic concord and aiming at tyranny and, for obvious reasons, on the loyalty or treason (depending on one's point of view) of his associates. What Laelius says about him is consistent with *Rep.*, the dramatic date of which is only weeks earlier: there Laelius commented on Tiberius' divisiveness (1.31) and mistreatment of the Italians (3.41), while Scipio seems (although Tiberius' name is missing in a lacuna after 2.49) to have linked him to the three early would-be tyrants. Little is said here (although C. mentions it fairly frequently elsewhere) about Tiberius' death at the hands of the mob led by the pontifex maximus Scipio Nasica, and Laelius alludes only briefly to the slaughter of his followers and the subsequent

punishment of the survivors. For the Gracchan context of *Amic.*, see Introduction 3(*a*). It has often been suggested that by highlighting Ti. Gracchus' alleged monarchic ambitions and violent end, C. is alluding to the recently assassinated Julius Caesar, whose seizure of sole power by means of civil war was in C.'s opinion the culmination of the pernicious development of Roman politics that had begun with the Gracchi (cf. Laelius' broad hint at future troubles for the *res publica*, 40–1). C.'s vehement vituperation in what follows of the misguided loyalty of Ti. Gracchus' "friends" would thus appear to be a veiled accusation against those Caesarians who even after the Ides of March kept invoking their *amicitia* for the deceased and accused Brutus and others of having betrayed their own friendship with Caesar. See Introduction 3(*c*). **uexantem:** used frequently by C. of the harm (economic, physical, or moral) caused to Rome or its provinces by various opponents (notably Verres, Catiline, and Clodius). **Q. Tuberone:** Q. Aelius Tubero was the son of Scipio Aemilianus' sister Cornelia and thus a cousin of the Gracchi. This passage is the only evidence that he ever supported Tiberius, and it seems fairly improbable that he did so for very long (but see Briscoe 1974: 131): he is one of the junior participants in *Rep.*, and subsequently he and Gaius Gracchus delivered speeches against one another (*Brut.* 117). Tubero was a Stoic and a pupil of Panaetius; as one of the organizers of Scipio's funeral he was philosophically frugal, as a result of which (according to C.) he failed to be elected praetor (*Mur.* 76). He held the tribunate no later than 130, but despite what is sometimes said, there is no evidence that he did so in 133. **aequalibusque amicis:** the vagueness is significant: we know that many people died with Tiberius, but no names of contemporaries who deserted him. **derelictum:** more emphatic than the simple *relictum*; the prefix is echoed by *deprecatum* in the next clause. **C. Blossius:** Blossius of Cumae, a Stoic who had studied with Antipater of Tarsus in Athens, was a supporter and close associate of Ti. Gracchus; he may have been his teacher and is said both here and by Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 8.5 to have encouraged his agrarian program. The anecdote about Blossius' inquisition is reported here, at Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 20.3–4, and at Val. Max. 4.7.1 with varying details; C.'s account is the most plausible. Various elements in Blossius' biography (Campanian origins; Stoic training; connection to Tiberius; participation in Aristonicus' revolt) have led some scholars to highly speculative conclusions, but extreme caution is in order. The most judicious assessment of his importance for Tiberius is that of Garbarino 1973: II 445–58; see also Dudley 1941; Erskine 1990: 161–7; Vesperini 2012: 175–205. That Laelius here mentions one Stoic who opposed Tiberius (Tubero) and one who supported him (Blossius) may be deliberate. C.'s condemnation of Blossius has not been universally shared: both

Valerius Maximus (4.7.1) and Montaigne (*On Friendship*) present his unwavering loyalty to Tiberius as a positive example of faithful friendship. **hospes familiae uestrae:** Blossius' connection with the Mucii – presumably P. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 133), who also supported Tiberius – is otherwise unknown. **ad me ... deprecatum uenisset:** P. Popillius Laenas and P. Rupilius, the consuls of 132, were charged by the senate with investigating and punishing the adherents of Ti. Gracchus. Roman magistrates and judges generally made use of expert advisers; (*ad*)*esse in consilio alicui* is technical language. For Laelius' similar service to Furius Philus in 136, cf. *Rep.* 3.28 *consul ego quaesiui, cum uos* [*sc. Laelius et Scipio*] *mihi essetis in consilio, de Numantino foedere.* C. and Val. Max. 4.7.1 (based on C.) have Blossius visit Laelius privately; in Plutarch (*Ti. Gracch.* 20.4) the interrogation is by Scipio Nasica in a formal hearing. Plutarch's account is clearly wrong, as Nasica had no part in the *quaestio* and left Rome immediately after the murder of Tiberius. On the cruel and unusual forms of capital punishment employed by Laenas and Rupilius, see Beness 2000. Laenas was prosecuted for his actions by C. Gracchus and exiled in 123. After his conversation with Laelius, Blossius wisely left Rome before being summoned before the *quaestio.* **deprecatum** "to seek forgiveness"; supine. **hanc ... causam:** the hyperbaton is emphatic, as is that of *tanti ... fecisset* in the following clause. **tanti:** genitive of value. **uellet ... uellet ... uoluisset ... uoluisset:** the first *uellet,* in Blossius' reported statement, is the tense one would expect in a subordinate clause expressing contemporaneous action in secondary sequence; Laelius' *uellet* uses an imperfect subjunctive instead of the appropriate pluperfect (past contrary-to-fact: Tiberius was dead); he may simply be echoing Blossius' words, or the imperfect may be meant to make the possibility of such treason more present. Blossius' *uoluisset* puts that possibility firmly back into the counterfactual past. **in Capitolium:** the Capitol was the symbolic heart of Rome and could be used metonymically for the Roman state itself (e.g., Hor. *Carm.* 1.37.6–8, 3.30.8–9; Verg. *Aen.* 9.448–9). Not only was Ti. Gracchus killed there, but he is also reported to have used "destroying the Capitol or burning the shipyards" as examples of what a bad tribune might do (Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 15.3); by alluding to this, Laelius' question clearly implies that Tiberius was a bad tribune even by his own definition (so Badian 1972: 708). It is perhaps not an accident that Lucan (1.356–86) ascribes to a soldier named Laelius similar willingness to destroy Rome for Caesar. **id quidem:** *quidem* emphasizes *id* (*OLD quidem* 1c): "that is something he would never have wanted." **uidetis quam nefaria uox!** the ellipsis of the verb (*sit* if construed as an indirect question) emphasizes the exclamation. *nefarius* is normally used of people or actions; it is applied to *uox,* perhaps emphasizing the performative quality of the

utterance, only here and at *Tusc.* 5.56 (of Marius ordering Catulus' murder) in C. and elsewhere only in M'. Lepidus' otherwise very Sallustian speech for Clutorius Priscus at Tac. *Ann.* 3.50.1. While *nefas* is frequent in all periods, nearly two thirds of the attestations of *nefarius* are found in C. **non enim ... ducem praebuit:** that Blossius supported Ti. Gracchus even beyond what he said he would do is illustrated by two pairs of contrasts, *non ... paruit ... sed praefuit* and *nec ... comitem ... sed ducem*; the two are connected by the paronomasia *praefuit ... praebuit*. Strangely, Laelius later uses very similar language in praising Scipio's success at addressing the people: 96n. *ducem ... non comitem*. Blossius' role in urging Tiberius on, particularly at the end, is emphasized by Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 8.4–5, 20.4. **amentia:** summarizes *temeritati* and *furoris* of the previous sentence; not only Tiberius, but Blossius must have been mad. *temeritas* is a character defect, frequently paired with *audacia* or *libido*; *furor* is defined by C. as *mentis ad omnia caecitas* (*Tusc.* 3.11). **quaestione noua:** not a formal judicial commission (which had to be authorized by legislation, not merely senatorial action), but an ad hoc inquiry established by the senate and conducted by the consuls Laenas and Rupilius, which had the power to punish as well as investigate; the uncertain legality of such proceedings (punishment without trial) apparently did not trouble either Laelius or C. **in Asiam ... persoluit:** the fate of Blossius is described in a crisp tricolon with asyndeton: Blossius joined the revolt of Aristonicus of Pergamum (the illegitimate son of Attalus III, who thought that he should have inherited the kingdom, which Attalus had left to Rome) against the new Roman province of Asia; Aristonicus was defeated in 130; and Blossius committed suicide rather than be captured by the Romans. Some fairly imaginative connections have been made between Blossius' support for Tiberius and his support for Aristonicus; see Martino 2004 and La Greca 2016. Laelius' description of his suicide as *poenas ... persoluit* is righteous rather than literally true. **rei publicae:** dative with *poenas ... persoluit*. **nulla est ... causa peccaueris:** the position of *nulla* is emphatic; in 40, such an *excusatio* is merely termed *turpis ... et minime accipienda* (see also 43 *excusatione amicitiae*). *excusatio* "defense" is often used in legal contexts: cf. *Rhet. Her.* 2.49 *dicimus uoluntario facinori nullam esse excusationem*. C. may here be thinking of men like Matius, who after the Ides of March used their friendship with Caesar as justification for their lack of sympathy with, or even resistance to, the liberators' cause. See Introduction 3(*c*) and the Appendix. **nam cum ... a uirtute defeceris:** the immoral actions of a so-called friend destroy belief in that person's *uirtus*. As Laelius has stated before, 20 *uirtus amicitiam et gignit et continet* (see 20n. *sed haec ipsa uirtus ... ullo pacto potest*): the origin of friendship is the perception of the friend's moral excellence, and without virtue real friendship cannot

exist. If one's impression of one's friend's virtue turns out to be false, then, the friendship by definition comes to an end. **conciliatrix** "motivator"; cf. 83 *uirtutum amicitia adiutrix*. The use of personified abstractions is typical of C.'s philosophical and rhetorical works, rare in speeches and letters (Fantham 1972: 146–7); he seems particularly fond of feminine nouns in *-trix*, of which twelve are found only in C., while of ten more there is only one other example in classical Latin. **uirtutis opinio** "a favorable opinion of [a would-be friend's] virtue" (*OLD opinio* 5); cf. Laelius' self-deprecating claim that Scipio might "perhaps" (*fortasse*) have had "a certain good opinion" (*opinione ... nonnulla*) of Laelius' character (30n. *sed ego admiratione ... me dilexit*). C. elsewhere makes a strong distinction between *uirtus* and *opinio uirtutis* (cf. *Top.* 78), as does Laelius below (98). **defeceris:** The second person is generalizing, equivalent to English "one." The metaphor is one of "revolting" or "defecting" (*OLD* 10), and thus (for Laelius) appropriate to Ti. Gracchus: as he revolted against the commonwealth, so the unworthy friend defects from virtue.

38 **Quod si ... res uiti:** a double future-less-vivid condition: *si ... statuerimus* is the principal protasis, *habeat* the apodosis, which is modified by the further condition *si simus. rectum statuerimus* "if we define it as right" is followed by two carefully balanced infinitive phrases (*concedere, impetrare*) used as nouns explaining *rectum. rectum* is C.'s regular translation (cf. *Fin.* 3.45, 4.15) of the Stoic κατόρθωμα (a perfectly virtuous action), and he may make Laelius use it here precisely to contrast with the strict Stoic virtue he rejects in this sentence. **perfecta ... sapientia si simus:** among the perfectly wise and virtuous, ethical dilemmas of the type discussed would not arise. Laelius stresses once more (cf. 18) that he is not concerned with Stoic sages but with ordinary Romans; he proceeds to point out that even without the benefit of wisdom as philosophically defined, many of the outstanding Romans of old spontaneously adhered to the very code of ethical behavior that he is developing. **nihil habeat res uiti** "there would be nothing wrong with it, there would be no problem." *uiti* is a partitive genitive; the *uitium* envisaged may be either the moral flaws that among sages would not exist or the faulty reasoning that would be absent from a scenario that involves only the wise. **qui ante oculos sunt** "who really exist," unlike perfect (and entirely hypothetical) *sapientes*. The following three clauses (*quos uidemus ... de quibus ... accepimus ... quos nouit*) explain further what Laelius means. **de quibus memoria accepimus** "about whom we have learned through memory" (cf. 39 *a patribus accepimus*). *accipio* + *de* used absolutely in this sense is common; it is accompanied by the instrumental *memoria* only here and in Cato fr. 206

Malcovati *atque ego a maioribus memoria sic accepi.* C. may be archaizing. For the theme of *memoria* in the dialogue, see 3n. *memoriae mandaui.* **uita communis:** at 18, in defining the kind of *sapientia* (Roman, not Stoic) he is talking about, Laelius says that we should look to *quae sunt in usu uitaque communi* "in common (linguistic) use and everyday life" (see also 21) and instances Fabricius, Curius, and Coruncanius as examples, as he does in what follows (39n. *Papum Aemilium ... Ti. Coruncanium*). **ex hoc numero:** the position is emphatic: it is familiar, Roman examples that are significant. **exempla:** Laelius here self-consciously employs the discourse of exemplarity (the use of historical figures as role models), which is fundamental to Roman thought and self-definition. **qui ad sapientiam proxime accedunt:** perfect (Stoic) wisdom is unattainable but can be approximated, as exemplified by the following list of historical Roman figures.

39 **uidemus:** figurative (*OLD* 14b; cf. 38n. *qui ante oculos sunt*), made more precise by *a patribus accepimus* and *memoriae proditum est* later in the sentence (cf. 38 *memoria accepimus*). **Papum Aemilium ... Ti. Coruncanium:** Q. Aemilius Papus and C. Fabricius Luscinus served together as consuls in 282 and 278 and as censors in 275; M'. Curius Dentatus was consul in 290, 275, and 274 and censor in 272; Ti. Coruncanius was the first plebeian pontifex maximus and was consul in 280. All were active in the war against Pyrrhus: it was Fabricius who led an embassy to Pyrrhus after the battle of Heraclea, and Curius who defeated him in the final battle of Malventum. The grouping here is slightly unusual: Fabricius, Curius, and Coruncanius are linked at 18, as previously at *Nat. D.* 2.165 and *Sen.* 15; C. elsewhere uses them individually and in various pairings as illustrations of early Roman *sapientia.* Aemilius Papus is not mentioned elsewhere by C.; Aemilius and Fabricius are linked in other sources (Val. Max. 4.4.3; Gell. *NA* 3.8.6, 17.21.39), but not specifically as friends. *Sen.* 43 pairs Curius with Decius Mus rather than Coruncanius. The inversion of cognomen and nomen seen in *Papum Aemilium* is uncommon in Republican Latin; it is found more often in C.'s letters than in his other works, and is thus perhaps a colloquialism (cf. Shackleton Bailey 1965–70 on *Att.* 2.24.3). As with 36 *Vecellinum*, Laelius here uses the cognomen Luscinus to refer to Fabricius; elsewhere (except for twice using the plural *Luscinos*) C. always calls him *Fabricius* without the cognomen. Authors other than C. never use *Luscinus* without the nomen. **igitur** rarely is the first word in a Ciceronian sentence (some 20 examples of more than 2,000 uses). It is particularly common in this position in historical and technical writing; in C. nearly half the examples are from letters. Here it is both emphatic and

an element of the slightly archaic flavor of Laelius' language. **contra fidem ... rem publicam:** the same limitation on what a friend will do is found at *Off.* 3.43 *at neque contra rem publicam neque contra ius iurandum ac fidem amici causa uir bonus faciet.* Here it is expressed more strongly as a tricolon crescendo with anaphora, culminating in the most serious crime, against the *res publica* (cf. 40 *contra rem publicam*). **nam hoc quidem ... rogare:** *hoc* is the object of *dicere*, and the appositive accusative-*cum*-infinitive *impetraturum non fuisse* explains what this *hoc* consists in: thus literally "For in the case of such men (*nam ... quidem in talibus uiris*), what is the point (*quid attinet*) in saying the following (*hoc ... dicere*), namely, that [one friend] wouldn't have received (*impetraturum non fuisse*) if he had asked (*si contendisset*)?" The following causal *cum*-clause contains two elements, the first specific, about the character of these particular men (in the perfect), the second generalizing, about the nature of such requests (in the present). **et facere rogatum et rogare:** throughout this passage, the reciprocal nature of friendship is emphasized, e.g., 38 *concedere ... uel impetrare*, 40 *neque rogemus ... nec faciamus rogati.* **C. Carbo, C. Cato:** C. Papirius Carbo was a member of Tiberius' agrarian commission and as tribune himself in 130 passed a law extending the secret ballot and unsuccessfully proposed legislation to permit reelection to the tribunate. It was during the debate on this law that Carbo asked Scipio's opinion about the death of Tiberius; Scipio famously responded, *iure caesum uideri* (reported *De or.* 2.106; *Mil.* 8). After the dramatic date of *Amic.*, Carbo as consul in 120 switched sides and defended Opimius for the murder of C. Gracchus, but was himself prosecuted by L. Crassus (for either *maiestas* or *repetundae*) in the next year and committed suicide rather than be convicted. C. Porcius Cato was a grandson of Cato the Elder and a nephew of Scipio. His later career was unfortunate: as consul in 114 he was defeated by the Scordisci in Macedonia and subsequently condemned for provincial extortion; after serving as a legate in the Jugurthine War in 110, he was exiled by the Mamilian Commission in 109. On his support for Tiberius, see Astin 1967: 86–7 and Briscoe 1974: 130. Laelius' list of Tiberius' friends tendentiously emphasizes those who were (at least in C.'s hindsight) disreputable, and he ignores Tiberius' solid base of respectable senatorial support. **minime tum quidem:** supply *acer* from the following *acerrimus.* Gaius was a member of the Gracchan land commission in 133 and supported Carbo's legislation (see above) in 130. He certainly opposed Scipio's attempt in 129 to weaken the Gracchan land commission, and was (one of many) suspected of having murdered Scipio. See further 41n. **nunc idem acerrimus** "the same (who is) now the most aggressive" or "now he (is the one to be) the most aggressive."

40 **Haec igitur lex ... faciamus rogati:** what follows (40–3) is a warning against improper behavior; the corresponding positive instructions begin at 44, the opening of which rephrases this sentence. Laelius lays down the "law" that one is never to act unethically if asked to do so by one's friend, nor to ask the friend in turn to commit unethical deeds for oneself. Friendship thus remains strictly bounded by virtue (cf. 37 *difficile est amicitiam manere si a uirtute defeceris*). **sanciatur** "be enacted, ratified," a legal term (*OLD* 1a). **rogemus ... rogati:** cf. 39n. *et facere rogatum et rogare.* **turpes ... turpis** "shameful; morally bad"; as with *honestum* ("honorable; morally good"), Ciceronian Latin terminology expresses ethical value in terms of public (dis)approval. In the positive rephrasing of Laelius' "law" at 44, *honesta* are what we should ask from our friends and do for them. **excusatio:** cf. 37n. *nulla est ... causa peccaueris*, 43 *excusatione amicitiae.* **cum in ceteris ... tum si ... fateatur:** the disparity in length and syntax between the two options correlated by *cum* (a short prepositional phrase) ... *tum* (an extended conditional clause) shows that actions *contra rem publicam* remain Laelius' main concern (cf. 39n. *contra fidem ... rem publicam*). Among those who admit to having acted against the commonwealth for the sake of a friend, Laelius may once more be thinking of Blossius (cf. 37), while C. the author might also be hinting at the behavior of friends of Caesar after his assassination (see 37n. *nulla est ... causa peccaueris*, Introduction 3(*c*)). **fecisse** "to have acted," used intransitively. **etenim eo loco ... rei publicae:** speaking in vague terms, Laelius states that the current situation of the *res publica* is such as to necessitate concern about future developments, a thought he develops through 43. From C.'s position of hindsight, the troubling future anticipated by Laelius is C.'s, and his readers', past and present. **deflexit iam ... consuetudo maiorum:** in 41, Laelius illustrates the ways in which ancestral custom has gone off the track: the "tyranny" of Ti. Gracchus; its aftermath and its effects on his supporter Carbo and his opponent Scipio Nasica; and the expectation of what C. Gracchus will do when he becomes tribune. The gradual decay of the constitution (41 *serpit in dies res*) is illustrated specifically by the changes in ballot laws – which look forward to even worse situations of popular control. **de spatio curriculoque:** both *spatium* and *curriculum* are terms for a racetrack. Often used metaphorically for the course of one's life or career, they are not often combined nor anywhere else used in connection with *consuetudo maiorum* – which, one imagines, should be static rather than in motion.

41 **regnum occupare:** see 36n. *regnum appetentem.* **paucos menses:** Laelius presumably means that Tiberius was in effective control of affairs in Rome (an exaggeration) between his removal of his colleague Octavius

from office (probably early in 133) and his attempt to be reelected as tribune, leading to his death (likely in the summer or early fall). The exact chronology is unknown. **P. Nasica:** P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio (cos. 138) was pontifex maximus in 133, and when the consul P. Scaevola refused to take violent action against Ti. Gracchus, Nasica led the mob that killed Tiberius. The senate in 132 appointed him to the embassy sent to Asia to organize the new province; he died there in 132. There is no evidence that the Gracchans did anything to Nasica other than hate him. **nam Carbonem ... sustinuimus:** on Carbo, see 39n. *sustinuimus* can mean either "we kept in check" or "we put up with," and the two qualifications in the sentence suggest that both meanings are in play here: *quoquo modo potuimus* implies resistance to Carbo, while *propter recentem poenam Ti. Gracchi* would suggest moderation of any such resistance because of unwillingness further to enrage Tiberius' supporters. **C. Gracchi:** Tiberius' younger brother Gaius did not become tribune until 123 (reelected for 122), when he put through a wide-reaching program of reform legislation, including the transfer of juries in *quaestiones* from the senate to the *equites* – in all probability the measure about which Laelius here expresses foreboding. Like his brother, he was killed by a mob, led by the consul L. Opimius in 121. That was some years after the dramatic date of *Amic.*, and Laelius is therefore ominous rather than precise here. **serpit:** the metaphor is used to describe gradual change (so Laelius himself at *Rep.* 2.33 *neque enim serpit, sed uolat in optimum statum ... res publica*) which may or may not be perceived (e.g., *Verr.* 2.3.177 *serpit illud insitum in natura malum*); the serpentine image is continued in *labitur*, picked up by *labes* in the next sentence. **in dies** "from day to day"; Müller's tentative emendation for the transmitted *deinde.* The latter cannot be right, as it would imply a sequence of events subsequent to C. Gracchus' tribunate, which had not yet taken place. Powell's *diem e die* is far less idiomatic. **res** "matters, conditions," presumably the general pattern of decline adumbrated at the end of 40. **tabella** "voting tablet, ballot" (*OLD* 4), here metonymically: "voting procedure; ballot legislation." **labes** "collapse, ruin" (*OLD* 1, 2; cf. *labitur* in the previous sentence). **Gabinia lege ... Cassia:** the *lex Gabinia* of 139 provided for the use of written ballots in elections; the *lex Cassia* of 137 extended that to trials before the people. Laelius does not mention the third ballot law of the period, the *lex Papiria* of 131 or 130, which extended the use of the ballot to votes on legislation; he also does not mention the fact that Scipio had supported passage of the *lex Cassia.* There is a fuller discussion of ballot laws at *Leg.* 3.33–9, where Quintus Cicero (as a speaker in the dialogue) opposes written ballots even more vigorously than does Laelius here. **populum a senatu ...**

res maximas agi: Laelius fears the increased power of a *populus* acting against the will of the senate, no doubt under the direction of subversive tribunes like the Gracchi. **discent:** see 42n. *praecipiendum.*

42 **Quorsum haec?** "Why (am I talking about) this?" Laelius returns to the topic of friendship, proceeding to show how his political concerns connect to the "law" he has laid down (40). **sine sociis nemo quidquam tale conatur:** deleterious actions against the commonwealth are not committed by single actors: they need accomplices, whom (Laelius implies) they will attempt to recruit from among their friends. **praecipiendum:** Laelius assumes a didactic stance: as he just mentioned (41), people must learn (*discent*) how to resist evil machinations; they therefore need to understand that they no longer have obligations toward any "friends" who engage in nefarious activities. This lesson is no doubt one that C. himself wished to impart through *Amic.* (see Introduction 3(*c*)). **bonis:** in a context dealing with proper behavior in public life (such as this), *boni* are supporters of the established order; Kaster 2006: 424 uses "patriotic" as a suitable English equivalent. Earlier in *Amic.*, Laelius insisted that friendship can only exist among *boni* (18), meaning people who are morally good. Here, as often, both meanings are present. **ut ... ne existiment ita se alligatos ut ... non discedant** "that they ought not to consider themselves bound in such a way ... that they should not leave." As Laelius has stated before, the widespread idea of a *ius amicitiae* (cf. 35n.) enjoining loyalty in all situations is simply wrong. The use of *ut ne* instead of *ne* in purpose clauses and noun clauses is somewhat archaic and formal (K–S II 209; H–S 643–4); it is a feature of Laelius' speech throughout the dialogue (43, 60, 65, 78, 99). **si in eiusmodi ... casu aliquo inciderint:** to counter the possible objection that *boni* would hardly be friends with enemies of the state to begin with, Laelius imagines a scenario where they have "unawares" (*ignari*) "happened upon" (*inciderint*) such a friendship by mere "chance" (*casu aliquo*). **in magna aliqua re peccantibus:** Laelius no doubt envisages the kinds of actions against the state he has been talking about; the qualification might go some way toward mitigating the apparent contradiction between the discussion in 36–44 with that in 61, where minor ethical infractions for the sake of friendship are condoned (see 61nn.). **improbis autem poena statuenda est:** *improbis* contrasts with *bonis* above: those who cannot be taught need to be punished. C. generally describes political dissent in moral terms – note here *impietatis duces* and 43 *improborum consensio* – but it is difficult to establish a legal punishment for a moral failing. No such punishment yet exists (hence the passive periphrastic *statuenda est* and the future perfects *secuti erunt* and *fuerint*), and the *senatus consultum ultimum*

used in the case of the Gracchi was, as C. knew from his own experience, an inadequate legal justification for violent action against political opponents. **qui secuti erunt ... qui ... fuerint ... duces:** cf. Blossius in 37, who from being a *comes* of Ti. Gracchus' actions turned into a *dux* himself. In Laelius' opinion, followers need to be punished as harshly as leaders, in order to root out the misplaced loyalty that people think they owe their "friends." Laelius himself took part in the senatorial commission investigating Tiberius' supporters (see 37), and had Tiberius been convicted of anything, it is conceivable that his supporters might also have been prosecuted. **Themistocle ... Coriolanus:** C. here (as at *Brut.* 41–3; *Att.* 9.10.3) pairs Themistocles, the Athenian leader most responsible for the defeat of Persia at Salamis in 480, with Cn. Marcius Coriolanus (see 36n.). Each was exiled, each joined with the enemy to attack his country, and (according to this passage) each committed suicide as a result. **propterque inuidiam ... ferre debuit:** Themistocles was ostracized in the late 470s. The reason he incurred ill will (*inuidia*) is unclear; it may simply have been political opposition. In the 460s he made his way to Asia Minor, was made governor of Magnesia by Artaxerxes the king of Persia, and was condemned to death in absentia by the Athenians. The actual cause of his death is uncertain. **ingratae patriae ... ferre debuit:** even if one's *patria* is ungrateful to its saviors, the obligation to remain loyal to it is paramount. C. makes a strong argument for our absolute obligation to the *patria* in the preface to *Rep.* (esp. 1.4–8); among examples of ingratitude there he includes Themistocles, but not Coriolanus. For the indicative of *debuit*, see 8n. *nec enim ... debui.* **uiginti annis ante:** traditionally in 489–488. **inuentus est nemo:** the fact that Themistocles' and Coriolanus' erstwhile friends abandoned them (as they should have) contributed, so Laelius implies, to the failure of their attacks. The placement of *nemo* at the end of the clause is emphatic.

43 **quare talis ... inferentem sequi:** Laelius sums up his argument: consorting with bad men cannot be justified by invoking friendship but must be harshly punished, in order to get across the message that loyalty to a friend does not condone actions against the state. **improborum consensio:** *consensio* is at the heart of Laelius' definition of friendship (20), but a *consensio* of *improbi* (cf. 42 *improbis*) does not qualify as friendship, which only exists among *boni* (18). **excusatione:** cf. 37, 40. **supplicio omni uindicanda est:** cf. 42 *poena statuenda est. omni* "the utmost, worst" (cf. 35n. *auderent ... omnia se ... esse facturos*). **ut ne:** cf. 42n. *ut ... ne existiment ita se alligatos ut ... non discedant.* **uel** "even," used to introduce an extreme possibility (*OLD* 5a). **bellum patriae inferentem:** Laelius' language here clearly anticipates events of C.'s lifetime rather

than his own, the actions of Sulla and above all of Caesar; this kind of prophecy based on authorial hindsight (cf. *haud scio an aliquando futurum sit* in the following sentence) is also found in Caesar's speech about the precedent created by the punishment of the Catilinarian conspirators in Sallust (*Cat.* 51.25–36), written not long after *Amic.* **ut res ire coepit:** for *res*, see 41n.; for *coepit*, cf. 41 *cum semel coepit.* **mihi autem ... qualis hodie sit:** Laelius' concern about the future of the *res publica* characterizes him as a provident and responsible statesman, but also, as it were, retrospectively justifies C.'s inclusion of material not strictly relevant to Laelius' own situation.

44 **Haec igitur ... adhibitae pareatur:** Laelius concludes the discussion started in 36 of how far one may go for a friend by rephrasing in positive terms the *lex* laid down in 40 (it is now called the *prima lex*, harking back to 36 *primum*): the prohibition of the earlier *lex* (to avoid anything *turpis*) is replaced by exhortation toward what is *honestum*. The statement of the "law" is followed by a number of corollary instructions as to the proper conduct of friendship, esp. the exhortation to give and accept criticism, a topic treated in more detail at 88–100. For the style of this passage, see Introduction 4(*a*). **sanciatur:** see 40n. **honesta:** see 40n. *turpes ... turpis.* **ne exspectemus ... cunctatio absit:** Laelius hastens to stress that we should do *honesta* not only when asked by our friends. **consilium uero dare ... ad monendum:** both mutual advice and mutual criticism are needed if the friendship is to maintain its commitment to doing *honesta.* **uero** "moreover, indeed" (*OLD* 6). Most earlier editors print *uerum* rather than *uero*, which is found in only one of the major manuscripts. However, there is no point in stating the truthfulness of the *consilium* (of course, we are supposed to give only good advice), and Powell thus rightly chooses *uero*, which introduces a new argument about freely dispensed advice and frank criticism. **libere** "openly, frankly" (*OLD* 3a). Laelius returns to the importance of frank speech in friendship at 88–100.

F. HOW MUCH SHOULD ONE LOVE A FRIEND? (45–61)

In this second part of his third speech, Laelius considers the affection involved in friendship. He begins by arguing against two positions ascribed to unnamed Greek "wise" men: first, that one should eschew close bonds of friendship in order to avoid the mental disturbances that might arise from concern for one's friend (45), and second, that friendship arises not

from love but from a seeking of advantages, especially on the part of the weak and needy (46).

While the first view cannot be ascribed to any philosophical school and may instead represent a form of popular wisdom, it leads Laelius to an impassioned argument against the Stoic ideal of freedom from emotions (*securitas*): he argues that it is proper for human beings – and, in fact, especially for the virtuous – to feel delight at good and distress at bad things (47–8). He adds a number of observations on the pleasures that arise from mutual affection (49), including the point that while we are especially attracted by similarity of character, the virtuous will extend their love to all mankind (50).

The second view is that of the Epicureans and is once more criticized by Laelius on the grounds that it is not the indigent and helpless who make the best friends (51; cf. 29–31). He further maintains that, without friendship, even a life fully supplied with all pleasures and provisions would not be worth living (52). Thus, tyrants despite their power can never count on their friends (52–4), and good fortune generally blinds people's judgment (54). It is thus important to put effort into establishing friendships, which should be considered life's most precious possessions (55).

Laelius then attempts to define the limits of love in friendship (56 *fines et quasi termini diligendi*), arguing against four positions. It is wrong to stipulate that we should (i) love our friends as we love ourselves: in fact, we do things for our friends that we would not do for our own sake (57). It is also wrong to demand that we should (ii) love our friends as much as they love us, which would reduce friendship to mechanical reciprocity (58). Likewise, we should not just (iii) love our friends as much as they love themselves, which would be inappropriate for friends with low self-esteem (59). The worst view is that we should (iv) love our friends as though we might one day hate them, a precept that Laelius regards as flying in the face of the very idea of friendship (59–60).

According to Laelius' own, positive definition, once a friendship is properly established, there is no limit to how much one should love a friend (61). Surprisingly, he states that in moments of crisis such devotion might lead one even to depart from the straight and narrow (*declinandum de uia sit*) and aid one's friend's "less-than-just intentions" (*minus iustae ... uoluntates*). How this injunction is supposed to fit with Laelius' earlier strict "law" (40, 44) that one is allowed to do only *honesta* for one's friend is one of the problems of the interpretation of *Amic.* (see Fürst 1996: 165–70).

45 **Nam:** the logical connection to what precedes is somewhat weak. Presumably, after having just described a fully committed friendship,

Laelius is reminded of the absurdity of views that advocate looser and less emotional ties. **quos audio sapientes habitos:** as elsewhere in *Amic.* (18–19, 21, 47, 48), Laelius – himself considered *sapiens* by his peers (see 1n. *sapientem*) – attacks the alleged *sapientia* of Greek philosophers, in this case for their lack of realism (cf. *mirabilia*) and the empty virtuosity of their reasoning (cf. *argutiis*), thus continuing the dialogue's running theme of inquiry into the true meaning of *sapientia* (see 6n. *sapientem*, Introduction 3(*c*)); see further 47 *O praeclaram sapientiam!* Laelius disclaims direct knowledge of Greek philosophy (*audio ... habitos*; also *opinor* immediately following) and, in keeping with his practice throughout the dialogue, does not name the thinkers he has in mind (see Introduction 3(*c*)). **argutiis** "verbal trickery, sophistry" (*OLD* 2). **partim fugiendas esse ... unum ... pro pluribus:** the first view attacked by Laelius is that one should avoid excessively close (*nimias*) friendships in order not to have to experience distress on behalf of one's friends. This proposition is developed over a series of indirect statements, focusing first on aspects of intense friendships to be avoided (*sollicitum, molestum*) before laying out the advantages of weak friendship (convenience and *securitas*). The sentiments described do not represent a philosophical position, but appear to be drawn in part from a speech of the Nurse in Euripides' *Hippolytus* (253–66), who reflects on her own close bond to her mistress Phaedra (the mention of σοφοί at the end of the speech (266) may have inspired C.'s attribution of the Nurse's observations to *sapientes*). The idea that emotional attachment can cause distress when one worries about the beloved person as about oneself appears elsewhere in ancient literature (Antiph. DK B49 = LM D57 (about marriage); Ter. *Ad.* 35–9 (about parenthood)) and may be a commonplace of popular moralizing. In what follows (47–8), however, Laelius uses his disapproval of such a wish for an absence of worry as the occasion for an attack specifically on the Stoic ideal of freedom from emotions. **partim:** the adverb is used in place of a noun: "in part [they say]," i.e., "a part [of them say]." *partim* is picked up by 46 *alios*, a combination found a few times in C.'s dialogues (e.g., *De or.* 3.106–7; *Rep.* 4.3; *Div.* 1.93) but never in the speeches or letters. **fugiendas esse nimias amicitias:** cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 253–4, where the Nurse recommends μετρίας ... φιλίας "measured friendships," i.e., ones that avoid the kind of excess C. expresses with *nimias* and *nimis* later in the sentence. Note that, at the end of the speech, the Nurse espouses the maxim μηδὲν ἄγαν "nothing in excess," whose Latin equivalent is *nil nimis*. **unum ... pro pluribus:** repeated at the end of the sentence; the meaning is not "one [worried] for many," but "one [worried] for more [than him- or herself]," i.e., worried for both self and friend(s). **sibi suarum cuique rerum:** *suarum* is separated from *rerum* because idiomatic

word order always places forms of *suus* immediately before those of *quisque.* **quam laxissimas ... uel remittas:** cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 256–7, where the Nurse recommends that "affections should be easy to loosen, by casting them off or drawing them close." **habenas habere:** etymological word-play, since *habena* was believed to derive from *habere* (Maltby 1991 s.v.). C. elsewhere uses the metaphor of the reins only for government and law; cf. *De or.* 1.226; *Rep.* 1.9 (thus also of Aeolus at Verg. *Aen.* 1.63). **caput enim esse ad beate uiuendum securitatem:** with this phrase, Laelius elevates the ideas he has been citing to philosophical doctrine by claiming that those who advocate less close friendships view "freedom from anxiety" (*se-curitas* < *cura*) as the key to the philosophical *uita beata* (see 15n. *beate uixisse*). C. is the first attested Latin writer to use the noun *securitas,* which he employs throughout his philosophical work to describe the ideal of freedom from mental disturbance as conceived by different schools, including Democritean εὐθυμία (*Fin.* 5.23), Epicurean ἀταραξία (*Nat. D.* 1.53), and what appears to be Stoic ἀπάθεια (*Tusc.* 5.42; *Off.* 1.69–72); in the first three of these passages, *securitas* is likewise declared to be the basis of the *uita beata.* The introduction of the concept of *securitas* here slyly sets up Laelius' attack on the Stoic theory of the emotions in 47–8 – despite the fact that the idea of *securitas* elaborated in the present passage (viz. lack of worry about another person) is not as such Stoic. **animus si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus:** cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 258–9, where the Nurse speaks of "one soul suffering birth pangs (ὠδίνειν) on behalf of two." The figurative use of *parturio* for being oppressed by care or worry is not found again in Latin until late antiquity. For *unus pro pluribus,* see above.

46 **alios autem dicere ... putentur beati:** the second view is (C.'s version of) the Epicurean position, viz. that friendships are purely instrumental as people seek friends who can provide advantages that they themselves lack. Cf. 26n. *utrum propter ... uicissimque redderet.* **alios:** see 45n. *partim.* **dicere aiunt:** Laelius continues to claim that his philosophical knowledge is based on hearsay; cf. 45n. *quos audio sapientes habitos.* **inhumanius:** throughout the dialogue, Laelius advocates a "humane" view of ethics, i.e., one appropriate to human nature; see 8n. *nec potuisse non commoueri ... humanitatis tuae.* While, in what follows (47–8), the Stoics are criticized for lacking *humanitas* (cf. 48n. *humanitatem*), L. here makes it clear that the Epicureans are even more inhumane. **quem locum breuiter paulo ante perstrinxi** "a topic I briefly touched on before," namely in 26–32. **non beneuolentiae neque caritatis:** contrast Laelius' own definition of friendship as 20 *omnium diuinarum humanarumque rerum cum beneuolentia et caritate consensio.* **minimum ... minimumque ...**

maxime: C. uses superlatives where in English it is more idiomatic to employ comparatives: "the less one has ..., the more one seeks." **haberet:** C. sometimes uses the imperfect subjunctive in indirect discourse in primary sequence, where the present subjunctive would normally be expected (see *quaerant* and *putentur* later in the sequence). **ex eo fieri ... putentur beati:** in 29–30, Laelius himself presented the observation that, according to the need theory of friendship, the least confident would make the best friends as a *reductio ad absurdum* meant to demolish that view (see 29n. *quod si ... secus est*). Here, he ascribes the belief that the weak and needy are the most eager for friendship to the holders of the need theory themselves. **mulierculae:** *Amic.*, like all other ancient philosophical discussions of friendship, near-exclusively views friendship as a relationship among men; the suggestion that women might be more suited to friendship is meant to be obviously absurd. The diminutive *mulierculae* is derogatory and often either patronizing or sarcastic; cf. Sulpicius Rufus' letter of consolation to C. on the death of C.'s daughter Tullia, which Sulpicius describes as *in unius mulierculae animula ... iactura* (*Fam.* 4.5.4). C. may further be alluding to the polemical trope of depicting the Epicureans (who controversially admitted women among their ranks) and their philosophy as effeminate; see Gordon 2012. **calamitosi** "afflicted by disaster, unfortunate" (*OLD* 2a). **qui putentur beati:** unlike maleness or wealth, good fortune is largely a matter of opinion, and people who are judged *beati* do not necessarily live the *uita beata* promoted by philosophy.

47 **O praeclaram sapientiam!** spoken by the man called *sapiens* himself; cf. 45 *quos audio sapientes habitos*. C. frequently uses *praeclarus* ironically. In what follows, Laelius first replies to the argument that friendship causes too much mental anguish (47–8), then more briefly to the utilitarian need theory of friendship (51). **solem ... e mundo:** cf. *Att.* 9.10.3 *sol ... excidisse e mundo uidetur*, of C.'s distress on hearing about Pompey's departure from Italy in 49. The expression may be proverbial; see Otto 1890 *sol* 7. **qua nihil a dis immortalibus melius habemus:** for friendship as the gods' gift to mankind, see 20; for its being the "best" or highest good, see 17n. *ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis*. **qua nihil ... melius ... nihil iucundius:** see 20n. *nihil melius*. **quae est enim ista securitas?** while the ideal of "absence of anxiety" described in 45 does not seem particularly philosophical and C. elsewhere uses *securitas* in the discussion of a variety of schools (see 45n. *caput enim esse ad beate uiuendum securitatem*), Laelius' arguments now appear to be directed specifically against the Stoics, who hold that the wise are characterized by *apatheia*, freedom from all emotional affects. By contrast, Laelius maintains that

the virtuous by definition experience joy at good things and distress at bad ones, emotions that are necessary to enable their virtuous actions. Cf. *Luc.* 135, where C. as dialogue speaker likewise expresses incredulity at the Stoic view. **specie quidem blanda** "of enticing appearance indeed." Owing to the Stoics' grand terminology (cf. 21n. *uerborum magnificentia*), their ideas appeal at first sight, but on closer examination turn out to be faulty; cf. *Fin.* 4.61 *nominibus uterentur eis, quae prima specie admirationem, re explicata risum mouerent.* **reapse** = *re ipsa*, contrasting with *specie.* It is a mild archaism (cf. Sen. *Ep.* 108.32) used by C. some eight times, never in speeches. **multis locis** "in many respects." **est consentaneum** "is consistent, fitting" (*OLD* 2), often combined with a dative or other indication for whom or under what circumstances something is appropriate, but here used absolutely. The following sentences make clear that the doctrine with which the omission of the actions described would not be consistent is that of the Stoic propagation of virtue. **ullam honestam rem ... susceptam deponere:** it is not fitting to shirk an honorable action – either by avoiding it in the first place or by giving it up before completion – in order to avoid worry. *suscipere ... susceptam*, the infinitive followed by the past participle of the same verb ("participial resumption") is a mild archaism and not common in C.; see Laughton 1964: 17–19. **quod si ... aspernetur atque oderit:** boldly contradicting the Stoic ideal of *securitas*, Laelius states that virtue by definition is characterized by a kind of *cura*, i.e., the distaste and anguish a virtuous person feels at what is morally bad. In what follows, he exemplifies this with particular virtues and vices. **quod si curam fugimus, uirtus fugienda est:** this sentence makes it clear that Laelius is here arguing specifically against the Stoics, according to whom virtue, the only good, is to be pursued, while emotions like anxiety are to be shunned. In Laelius' view, this stance is self-contradictory. **curam:** the use of *cura* is emphatic: it appears twice in this sentence and toward the end of 48 (but elsewhere only three times in *Amic.*). **necesse est** picks up 45 *ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus* and looks forward to 48 *amor exoriatur necesse est.* Those wishing to avoid the necessity of emotional involvement are wrong: virtue by necessity involves emotion (as expressed here) and also by necessity causes the love that is the basis of friendship (48). **cum aliqua cura** "with some anxiety," as opposed to *sine cura* > *securitas.* **bonitas malitiam ... flagitiosis modestos:** Laelius uses two sets of contrasting good and bad qualities, the first with abstractions (following from *uirtus* in the previous clause) and the second with individuals. *bonitas malitiam* is comparable to *rebus iniustis iustos, temperantia libidinem* to *flagitiosis modestos*, and *ignauiam fortitudo* to *imbellibus fortes.* The small variations in order and morphology within overall parallelism are typical of C.: in the list of abstractions, two

pairs are nominative + accusative, the third accusative + nominative, and each of the three nominative abstracts has a different ending; the second list uses a different grammatical structure from the first, but each pair is in the same order (dative + accusative), while the order of the last two elements is reversed from the first list. The adjective *imbellis* first occurs here in Latin, although it is probably not C's. coinage. The lists clearly represent three of the four standard virtues, justice, courage, and self-control; the emotions they entail are summarized in the next sentence by *laetari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis.* **uideas:** potential subjunctive: "you might see; one can see." **flagitiosis** "outrageous." **animi bene constituti** "a well-constituted mind," i.e., a wise and virtuous disposition.

48 **si cadit in sapientem animi dolor:** for *cadere in* "happen to, affect; be a quality/characteristic of" (*OLD cado* 16a, 22a), cf. 100 *in hominem cadere.* The interlocutor's statement at *Tusc.* 3.7 (cf. 3.12), *uidetur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo,* is the starting point for a discussion of the wise person's immunity (or lack thereof) to mental distress; in that dialogue, C. as speaker agrees with the Stoics that the sage will not suffer from any *aegritudo* of the mind. By contrast, Laelius here takes a distinctly anti-Stoic position (perhaps comparable to that ascribed to the Academic Crantor at *Tusc.* 3.12), rejecting *apatheia* and even claiming that not to experience *dolor* would be inhumane. **humanitatem:** see 8n. *nec potuisse non commoueri ... humanitatis tuae,* 46 *inhumanius.* At *Tusc.* 3.12, the interlocutor's view that the wise experience distress is described as *humanum id quidem.* **funditus tollamus:** more emphatic than simple *tollunt* in 47. **aliquas ... molestias:** cf. 45 *alienis nimis implicari molestum esse. molestia* can mean simply "distress," but more often shades into "annoyance, nuisance." Laelius insidiously paints the Stoics as simply not wanting to be bothered. **quid enim interest ... generis eiusdem:** Laelius has moved from *dolor* to *molestias* to *motu animi*: the last does not mean "disturbance of mind," but simply "mental activity" – which is what distinguishes humans from inanimate objects even more than it does from other animals. The trope of the difference between humans and trees or rocks with no feeling is found as early as Hom. *Od.* 19.163; cf. also *Luc.* 101 *non enim est* [*sc. sapiens*] *e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus*; *Tusc.* 3.12 *non enim silice nati sumus* (in the context of discussing whether the sage experiences distress; see above). **inter pecudem et hominem:** previously, Laelius criticized the Epicureans for not distinguishing between humans and animals (see 20n. *beluarum,* 32 *pecudum ritu*); now he implies that the Stoics do not even allow for a difference between humans and inanimate objects. **uirtutem duram et quasi ferream:** the adjectives

continue the imagery of *truncum aut saxum*, but Laelius moves from the literal insensibility of rocks to the equivalent harshness of the Stoic idea of *uirtus*. **tenera atque tractabilis:** again similar to the language of *Tusc.* 3.12 *sed est naturale in animis tenerum quiddam atque molle*. Here *tenera* is opposed to *duram*, the quality of rock; *tractabilis* "malleable" is opposed to the inflexibility of iron. **et bonis ... incommodis contrahatur** "it expands, as it were, because of a friend's good fortune and contracts because of his difficulties." C. uses Stoic technical terminology to combat Stoic doctrine: "expansion" and "contraction" are the irrational movements of the mind in the grip of joy and distress (cf. *Tusc.* 4.66 *eodem enim uitio est effusio animi in laetitia quo in dolore contractio*, *Tusc.* 1.90, 4.14; Andronicus, *On Passions* 1 = LS 65B; Gal. *On Hippocrates' and Plato's Doctrines* 4.2.5 = LS 65D). That Laelius here ascribes such experiences not to the individual's mind but to personified virtue itself is especially insidious: according to the Stoics, virtue by definition entails the absence of such perturbances. **angor** "mental distress" (*OLD* 2), but lit. "choking, suffocation" (*OLD* 1), harking back to *contrahatur*. **ut tollat e uita:** cf. 47 *e uita tollunt*, 48 *funditus tollamus e uita*. **non plus quam ut uirtutes ... repudientur:** as so often, friendship and (the) virtue(s) are aligned; cf. 20n. *sed haec ipsa uirtus ... ullo pacto potest*; Introduction 3(*c*). **non plus quam** "not any more than"; normally used only for quantities (e.g., *Off.* 3.61 *non plus quam semel*); C. alone uses it to introduce more abstract comparisons (cf., e.g., 2 *Verr.* 2.21; *Sen.* 27; *Off.* 3.118). **Cum autem contrahat ... necesse est:** the main clause is *necesse est* at the end of the sentence, from which depends the noun clause *amor exoriatur*. Before we get there, we encounter the circumstances and conditions needed for this arousal of love: *cum ... contrahat ... si ... eluceat ... id cum contigit*. **contrahat amicitiam** "begins, enters into a friendship," with subjunctive in a circumstantial *cum*-clause. The subject is unexpressed, but is clearly the possessor of the *similis animus* later in the sentence. *contrahere* here has economic overtones ("make a contract"), but also playfully picks up *contrahatur* from four lines earlier. **ut supra dixi:** cf. 27–9. Laelius reiterates his view that friendship arises from spontaneous love for a virtuous person. On *supra*, see 15n. *ut supra dixi*. **significatio uirtutis:** see 32n. *facta significatione probitatis*. **applicet et adiungat:** cf. 27n. *applicatione ... animi*, 32 *applicant se et propius admouent*, 81 *appetant ad quas se applicent*. **amor:** cf. 26n. *amor ... ex quo amicitia nominata est*. **necesse est:** cf. 47n.

49 **quid enim tam absurdum:** no longer arguing specifically against Stoic views, Laelius is still responding to the first group of opponents identified in 45, those who counsel against entering into close relationships. Having

shown that friendship sometimes entails distress but is not therefore to be avoided (47–8), he now in turn points out the desirability and enjoyment of friendship, which it would be foolish to eschew. **inanibus rebus:** the first subset of "empty things" in which people foolishly delight consists in non-material goods (political offices and glory), the second in tangible possessions and attributes, with the last item (*cultuque corporis*) pointedly contrasted to the virtuous *animus* that immediately follows it. **ut ita dicam, redamare:** *redamare* is qualified because it is presumably C.'s own coinage, a translation of Gk. *antiphilein*. This is the only attested occurrence of the word until late antiquity. **admodum delectari** "greatly to be delighted," contrasting with the simple *delectari* at the beginning of the sentence. **nihil est ... iucundius:** using his favorite *nihil -ius* construction (see 20n. *nihil melius*), Laelius once more places friendship at the top of a hierarchy of goods (see 17n. *ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis*), this time using the criterion of enjoyment. **remuneratione ... officiorumque:** explaining (with repetition of the prefix) the content of *redamare*.

50 **illiciat et ... trahat:** although *illicere* often has the suggestion of luring someone or attracting the unwary, here it is synonymous with the more neutral *allicere* (cf. 28 *alliciat ad diligendum*). The image of attraction evokes language often used of the magnet, *qui ferrum ad se alliciat et attrahat* (*Div.* 1.86). **similitudo:** the idea that like is attracted to like and that friendship thus rests on similarity was a topos of both popular and philosophical reflections on friendship (Bohnenblust 1905: 42; Fürst 1996: 236–42). Laelius mentions the idea also at 23, 27, 49, 74, and 82. **ut bonos boni ... atque natura** "that good men have affection for other good men and adopt them as if linked by kinship and nature": Laelius reiterates his belief that friendship exists only among the good (see 18n. *nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse*), but now presents this bond as brought about by a natural force (*natura* appears three times in 50) comparable to that of kinship (*propinquitate*) and an ineluctable attraction similar to that of the magnet (see above). The strength of the language used in this section is notable: *illiciat, rapacius, quasi necessariam*. On the natural origin of friendship, see 27n. *quapropter a natura ... esset habitura*. That all the wise/good are naturally friends is Stoic doctrine; see *Nat. D.* 1.121 *censent* [*sc. Stoici*] *autem sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos*. **nihil ... appetentius ... nec rapacius:** see 20n. *nihil melius*. **hoc ... constet** "let this be agreed upon." *hoc* is explained by the indirect statement *bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam beneuolentiam* (supply *esse*). **beneuolentiam:** see 19n. **qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus** "which is the origin of friendship established by nature." The antecedent of the relative clause is

either *necessariam beneuolentiam* or the fact expressed in the entire indirect statement; the relative pronoun agrees in gender with *fons*, the predicate noun in the relative clause itself (A&G 306). **ad multitudines ... populos uniuersos ... caritate uulgi:** at 19–20, Laelius had separated friendship out from the natural fellow feeling among humans; here he in turn broadens friendship into a more general philanthropy, maintaining that *uirtus* entails benevolence directed by the *boni* toward large numbers of people (*multitudines*), including foreigners (*populos uniuersos*) and social inferiors (*uulgi*); on this see also Schievenin 2000: 460–3. *tueri* and *optime consulere*, however, connote a more paternalistic, unequal form of benevolence than the equality that obtains in friendship. **non enim est ... neque superba:** another dig at the Stoics, whose virtue had previously been called *dura* and *ferrea* (48) and who had been accused of removing *humanitas* from the sage (48; for the theme of *humanitas*, see 8n. *nec potuisse non commoueri ... humanitatis tuae*). As a matter of fact, the Stoics themselves maintained that there was a natural affinity among all human beings but, technically, granted "citizenship" in their *cosmopolis* "cosmic city, universal community" only to the properly wise (and the gods); by contrast, Laelius extends universal *bonitas* to everybody. **immanis** "savage, brutal" (*OLD* 1b); cf. 87 *immanitate*.

51 **qui utilitatum causa fingunt amicitias** "who peddle the fiction (*fingunt* "make it up") that friendships exist for the sake of advantages" (supply *esse*). Laelius turns to criticizing the second group of mistaken Greek thinkers (described in 46), i.e., the Epicureans. As elsewhere in the dialogue (see 26n. *utrum propter ... uicissimque redderet*), he conflates the view that friendship is sought for the sake of advantage with the need theory, according to which friendship arises from lack and weakness, apparently ascribing both positions to the Epicureans. **utilitatum:** see 26n. **amabilissimum ... delectat ... iucundum:** see 49 *delectari ... delectari ... iucundius*. Like the Stoics, the Epicureans with their dreary theory miss out on the most enjoyable aspects of friendships – a special failing, given that their doctrine aims at the pursuit of pleasure. **nodum amicitiae:** although a knot would seem an obvious metaphor for friendship (as *uinculum* is), this is apparently its only appearance in Latin literature; a more sinister but similar usage appears in Claudian, *In Rufinum* 2.320–1 *funesta tacere | nexus amicitiae*. **amici amor** "the love that comes from a friend" (subjective genitive). As explained further in the following sentence, the tangible benefit we receive from our friend (*utilitas parta per amicum ... quod ab amico est profectum*) is secondary to the friend's affection, which the bestowal of the benefit demonstrates. **cum studio** "accompanied by devotion" (cf. 29 *studio perspecto*). Benefits received from a friend are enjoyable if they are

motivated by true affection rather than offered as a quid pro quo. **tantumque abest ut amicitiae propter indigentiam colantur** "friendships are so far removed from being cultivated on account of want." **propter indigentiam** looks back to 46; for the idea, see 26n. *utrum propter ... uicissimque redderet.* **ut ei qui ... et beneficentissimi:** a result clause, picking up on *tantum.* Laelius repeats his argument of 29–31, viz. that rather than the needy, it is the well supplied and independent who excel in friendship and show themselves generous and beneficent. **in qua plurimum est praesidi** "in which there is the greatest protection," i.e, against all challenges and vicissitudes of life. Laelius hastens to clarify that more than material provisions (*opibus et copiis*), it is virtue that puts people in a position of strength and qualifies them for friendship. **atqui haud ... deesse amicis** "But I'm not sure whether (*atqui haud sciam an*) it is even desirable (*ne opus sit quidem*) for friends never to lack anything (*nihil umquam deesse amicis*)." A slight correction of what Laelius has just said: it is in fact conducive to friendship if friends can contribute something to one another's benefit. For *opus est* meaning "it is useful, desirable" rather than "necessary," cf., e.g., *De or.* 2.43 *etiam si opus est, minus est tamen necessarium*; *Off.* 3.49; *Fam.* 1.9.25. *atqui* is a necessary emendation of the MSS' *atque.* **haud sciam an** indicates greater uncertainty on the part of the speaker than *haud scio an* (see 20n.). The subjunctive is far less common (indicative in C. some 45×, subjunctive 7×, including 4× in *De or.*, all in Antonius' voice); other than once in Livy, it appears only in C., Apuleius, and Fronto. **ubi enim studia nostra uiguissent** "For where would our mutual devotion have flourished ...?," i.e., "What opportunity would there have been for our mutual devotion to flourish ...?" **numquam ... Scipio eguisset?** Laelius modifies his earlier statement (30) that he and Scipio had no real need of one another. *studia* (cf. *studio* in the previous sentence) refers to the mutual devotion of the two men; in the balanced pairs of negatives *consilio* clearly applies to *domi*, while *opera nostra* applies to *militiae.* Laelius modestly describes his usefulness to Scipio on occasion; he does not even need to say how useful Scipio was to him. **non igitur ... secuta est:** similar constructions are used in both Greek and Latin philosophical texts to clarify which of two entities follows on the other (cf. Arist. *Mag. mor.* 2, 1209b36–8; Plut. *Quomodo adulator* 5, 51b). Note *Off.* 3.19 *honestas utilitatem secuta est* (on the assassination of Caesar).

52 deliciis diffluentes: a caricature of the Epicureans, with *diffluentes* (more or less equivalent to *dissoluti* "completely undone"; cf. *De or.* 3.131; *Off.* 1.106) echoed by *circumfluere* just below. **audiendi ... disputabunt:** the terminology is that used for formal philosophical presentations (cf. 17nn.): Laelius tells his sons-in-law that they need not listen to Epicurean

lectures on friendship. **nec usu nec ratione:** experience and reasoning are a traditional pair. The Epicureans were in fact well known for their theory and practice of friendship, but Laelius dismisses them as not having any knowledge of the topic. **nam quis est ... abundantia uiuere:** to demonstrate that, contrary to Epicurean doctrine, friendship is not about the gaining of benefits but about affection, Laelius imagines a person supplied with all worldly goods, who would nevertheless not wish to live if deprived of human affection (see also 55, 87–8). The same thought experiment is found in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 9, 1155a5–6, 1169b16–19 and used by C. also at *Fin.* 3.65 and *Off.* 1.153, 3.25 in the context of man's innate sociability. **ut** "on condition that," introducing a proviso clause (A&G 528b). **tyrannorum uita:** Laelius moves into a lengthy digression (marked as such at the end by 55 *sed haec hactenus*) on the unsuitability for friendship of the fortunate and powerful, beginning with the figure of the tyrant, who is well supplied with external goods but can have no affection for anyone and cannot expect it from others. C. evokes the tyrant as a prime example of vice and unhappiness in numerous contexts in his philosophical works (Sirago 1956; Luciani 2009). In many of these cases, including here, there can be little doubt that C. is thinking of Caesar, whom he considered a tyrant and who may have been an Epicurean (Volk 2021: 163–6, 2022); cf. 89n. *tyranno.* If Caesar, qua tyrant, by definition had no real friends, any accusations of friendship betrayed against his assassins are moot (see 33–44nn., Introduction 3(*c*), and C.'s correspondence with Matius in the Appendix). The list of the elements of the tyrant's loneliness falls into two parts, a tricolon with anaphora of *nulla* (in which the third element is by far the longest) and a pair of contrasting descriptions introduced by *omnia* and *nullus.* **nimirum in qua ... esse fiducia** "unsurprisingly [since it is a life] in which there can be no trust ..." At the beginning of a clause, *nimirum* introduces an explanation of the previous sentence. **nulla fides:** Laelius emphasizes the absence of trust and good faith in the world of the tyrant: 52 *fides, fiducia*; 53 *fidos, infidos*; 54 *fideles.* The idea that *fides* is a central requirement of *amicitia* is taken up again in 65. **caritas ... beneuolentiae:** two of the constitutive elements of Laelius' definition of friendship in 20.

53 **quis enim ... metui putet:** a variation on the archetypal attitude of the tyrant as famously expressed by Atreus in a tragedy of the Roman poet Accius: *oderint dum metuant* (fr. 47 Dangel; quoted by C. at *Off.* 1.97 and alluded to against Antony at *Phil.* 1.33–4). C. here expands it to include the converse, that the tyrant too is not capable of affection for his subjects because they fear him. Cf. also Arist. *Rh.* 2.4, 1381b33 "no one loves whom he fears." Cf. *Off.* 2.23–6 on how the fear inspired by tyrants ends

up working against them, with explicit mention of Caesar at 2.23. **coluntur ... ad tempus** "they are courted as friends (*OLD colo* 7a) by pretense, but only (*dumtaxat*) temporarily." For *ad tempus*, cf. *Off.* 1.27 *breuis ... et ad tempus*. Why such fake friendship is temporary is explained by what follows: tyrants fall. **ut fit plerumque:** as Scipio had explained in *Rep.* 1, all simple forms of government, including tyranny, are by definition unstable. **tum intellegitur ... inopes amicorum:** that one learns only in a crisis who one's true friends are is a commonplace (see further 64, as well as Fürst 1996: 210–16), but C. may also be thinking of the "tyrant" Caesar, who was killed by men he thought were his friends (Volk 2021: 160–80). **quod Tarquinium dixisse ferunt:** the connecting relative *quod* refers back to *tum intellegitur ... inopes amicorum* and itself anticipates the content of what Tarquinius said, *tum se ... referre posset*. L. Tarquinius Superbus, the last king of Rome (mentioned also at 28), was expelled in 509 BCE. That he said any such thing is otherwise unattested. **tum se intellexisse:** takes up *tum intellegitur* in the previous sentence. Tarquinius' statement demonstrates the truth of what Laelius has just said. **gratiam referre** "return the favor" (*OLD gratia* 4e), referring to the just recompense for both faithfulness and unfaithfulness that Tarquinius was no longer able to offer.

54 **quamquam:** see 29n. **illa superbia et importunitate:** these attributes of Tarquinius were well known (thus *illa*): they appear together at *Rep.* 1.62. *superbia* is the quality that gave him his cognomen, and *importunitas* (recklessness or heedlessness) is what led to his downfall. **atque ut huius ... amicitias fideles:** for "true" friendship, see 23, 26, 32, 58, 59, 64, 80, 91, 95. While it was Tarquinius' *mores* that disqualified him as a friend, Laelius goes on to state that excessive power and good fortune themselves preclude true friendship; again, C. may be thinking of Caesar, a far more amiable character than Tarquinius but no less tyrannical. **non enim ... complexa est:** the blindness of Fortuna is proverbial (Otto 1890 *fortuna* 1); for the idea that she also blinds her favorites, cf. Men. fr. 74 Kassel–Austin; Antiphanes fr. 259 Kassel–Austin on the blinding effect of wealth. **itaque efferuntur ... fieri potest:** note the soundplay in this sententious statement: *efferuntur fere fastidio ... insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri*. **nec quidquam ... intolerabilius:** a variation of Laelius' favorite *nihil -ius* construction (see 20n. *nihil melius*). **insipiente fortunato** "a stupid man of good fortune." The phrase is Aristotelian: ἀνοήτου εὐδαίμονος (*Rh.* 2, 1391a13). For a substantivized adjective (here *fortunato*) to be itself modified by an adjective or participle (here *insipiente*) is relatively uncommon. **sperni ab eis ... indulgeri nouis:** the substitution of new (and presumably not genuine) friendships for old ones is the result

of the change in character caused by the acquisition of power and wealth. The question of old versus new friendships returns in 67–8.

55 **quid autem stultius ... supellectilem:** from the friendlessness of the powerful, Laelius turns to people's general undervaluation of friends, the best "furnishings" (*supellectilem*) of life. In its assimilation of friends to material possessions, the passage owes much to Xen. *Mem.* 2.4, where Socrates declares friends the best of all *ktēmata* (see further 62nn.). Syntactically, the question with the comparative "What is more stupid ...?" leads to a comparison with *quam* plus the two infinitives *parare ... non parare* "than to acquire ... and not to acquire." **copiis facultatibus opibus:** C. groups these three terms for financial resources only here and in *Off.* 1.9, 2.1, 2.9, 3.22; pairs of any two of the three are found fairly often in his earlier writings. In the singular, *copia* and *facultas* often denote aspects of oratorical talent; in the plural, they have this more concrete meaning. **possint:** the subject is the implied subject of the infinitives *parare ... non parare*, i.e., people in general, especially the well-off. A fitting English translation might be "one is able." **parare** appears five times in this and the following sentence; Laelius emphasizes acquisitions for cash (*pecunia*), drawing attention to the most expensive ones. **famulos:** in keeping with Roman attitudes, slaves are viewed as commodities on a level with material objects. **uestem:** all valuable textiles, not just clothing. **supellectilem** is a logical continuation (marked as metaphorical by *ut ita dicam*) of the kinds of expensive possessions listed above. **etenim cetera ... causa laborent:** that one never knows who will ultimately enjoy the material goods one has amassed is a commonplace of ancient invectives against greed. Often, the envisaged beneficiary is one's ungrateful heir (for a collection of passages, see Nisbet and Hubbard 1978 on Hor. *Carm.* 2.14.25), but as the next sentence shows, here Laelius envisages a more violent form of dispossession. **eius enim est ... uicit uiribus:** *eius* at the beginning of the sentence is emphatic: "to *him* belongs ..."; it is the antecedent of the relative clause introduced by *qui*. The threat of property loss through violence applies in particular to the kind of powerful individuals discussed in 52–4; C. may be thinking especially of dispossessions after the Civil War. The alliterative *uicit uiribus* may be a tag from earlier poetry, but if so, it is unidentifiable. **istorum quidque** "whatever (there is) of such things" (referring back to *cetera*) is a derogatory description of the physical trappings of wealth itemized above. **amicitiarum ... possessio:** Laelius continues the metaphor of friendship as a form of property. *certa possessio* or *incerta possessio* are used to describe the (un)disturbed possession of property in (dis)orderly political circumstances; e.g., *QRosc.* 33 *tum enim propter rei publicae calamitates omnium possessiones erant incertae,*

nunc deum immortalium benignitate omnium fortunae sunt certae. The combination of *stabilis* and *certus* is used elsewhere to describe philosophical beliefs (*Nat. D.* 2.2 *stabilem certamque sententiam*; cf. *Fin.* 1.55), marriage (*Phil.* 2.44), a permanent home (*Marcell.* 29; Livy 1.1.10), or a reliable water source (Vitr. 8.1.2; Plin. *NH* 31.48). **ut etiamsi ... esse iucunda:** Laelius sums up by returning to his starting point in 52: possessions are worthless without friendship. The result clause introduced by *ut* does not follow logically from what has just been said (it is not *because* gifts of fortune are fleeting but friendship is stable that a life well supplied but without friends would not be pleasant) but loosely picks up the earlier idea that friendship is the most valuable possession (as a result of which, life without it would not be pleasant); cf. 52n. *nam quis est ... abundantia uiuere.* **dona fortunae:** though the metaphor of the gifts of fortune is common, it here hints at a more philosophical point: material goods are not in the individual's control; it is implied that friendship (with its basis in virtue) is. **inculta et deserta:** the metaphor is agricultural, but C. applies it to the unpalatable rigor of Stoicism at *Cael.* 42, while at *Off.* 3.5 he says that no area of philosophy should be *inculta ac deserta.* The trope works well for friendship since *colere* is used for "cultivating" friends, and one can be "deserted" by one's friends. **sed haec hactenus** indicates the end of a digression and a change of topic.

56 **Constituendi autem ... termini diligendi** "It is necessary to establish what boundaries and, as it were, boundary markers of affection there are to be in friendship." A passive periphrastic in the main clause leads to an indirect question, but instead of the impersonal construction *constituendum est qui sint fines et termini*, the gerundive is made to agree with the subjects of the indirect question (see K–S II 581–2); cf. 63 *quidam ... perspiciuntur quam sint leues.* There is good manuscript authority for both *deligendi* (printed by Powell) and *diligendi* (printed by many earlier editors) as the last word of the sentence. *deligendi* would be parallel to *constituendi* and create a tidy chiastic structure for the sentence, but there is no classical parallel for either *fines* or *termini* being construed with *deligere*, while both are regularly governed by *constituere.* It is thus better to read *diligendi* as a gerund dependent on *fines et ... termini*, "the boundaries and ... boundary markers of affection." **tres ... sententias:** Laelius considers, and rejects, three opinions on how to limit love for one's friend, all of which involve measuring it against another quantity. The three are described in the remainder of this chapter and refuted sequentially in 57–9. A fourth, and rather different, limitation on friendship is rejected in 59–60. **ferri:** *sententiam ferre* normally refers to casting a vote, usually in a trial, rather than giving an opinion in the senate (*sententiam*

dicere). **unam ut ... alteram ut ... tertiam ut:** the indirect statement continues, with *unam ... alteram ... tertiam* clarifying *tres ... sententias.* The *ut*-clauses are noun clauses (*sententia* retains the verbal force of *sentire* and can thus introduce a clause; cf. English "the opinion that"), each of which is marked by repetition and correlation: *erga amicum ~ erga nosmet ipsos; beneuolentia ~ beneuolentiae; quanti ... facit, tanti fiat.* **eodem modo ... nosmet ipsos:** that we should love our friends as much as we love ourselves would seem to be a widespread view among philosophers and non-philosophers alike. It is implied in Aristotle's derivation of friendship from self-love (since a friend is "another self"; *Eth. Nic.* 9.4 and 8), and is said to be Epicurean doctrine and described in very similar language by C. at *Fin.* 1.68 *eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum quo in se ipsum* (cf. *Fin.* 2.83). **ut nostra ... aequaliterque respondeat:** apparently not a philosophical opinion but perhaps a popular view of *amicitia* as simply the equitable exchange of *beneficia.* The financial language used extensively in the rebuttal of this view in 58, however, suggests that C. may be ascribing this quid pro quo attitude also to the Epicureans, whose ethics he throughout his works often depicts as "calculating"; see Hanchey 2013a and 31n. *beneficium faeneramur,* 58n. *ad calculos uocare ... ratio acceptorum et datorum.* **quanti ... facit, tanti fiat:** *fieri* is used here as the passive of *facere* "esteem, value" (*OLD* 18c); *quanti* and *tanti* are genitives of value. Who would have held this view is unclear; perhaps it is meant to represent a popular opinion.

57 **prorsus** modifies the preceding *nulli*: "I agree with none at all." **nec enim ... sit animatus:** Laelius rejects the idea that we should love our friends as we love ourselves, arguing in the following sentences that we do things for our friends that we could not honorably do for ourselves. By contrast, at *Tusc.* 3.72–3, C. states plainly that it is neither possible nor desirable to love anyone, including a friend, more than oneself; see esp. 73 *ne optandum quidem est in amicitia ut me ille plus quam se, ego illum plus quam me* [*sc. amem*]*; perturbatio uitae, si ita sit, atque officiorum omnium consequatur.* The context there is different – C. is inveighing against the societal expectation that one should be overly distraught at a beloved person's death – but the contrast between the two passages is still striking. **ut** introduces another noun clause (see 56n. *unam ut ... alteram ut ... tertiam ut*). **animatus** "disposed" (*OLD* 2). **quam multa ... fiunt honestissime:** while the list of the three varieties of reciprocal friendship in 56 was constructed in parallel order, the description of one's services to a friend makes use of chiasmus (*nostra causa ... faceremus ~ facimus causa amicorum; acerbius ... inuehi ~ insectarique uehementius*), followed again by parallel order (*in nostris rebus ... honeste, in amicorum ... honestissime*).

For the idea that for a friend one may do things that otherwise would not be considered morally acceptable, see further 61nn. A somewhat similar argument is found in Pl. *Symp.* 182e1–183c2, where the speaker Pausanias, praising the Athenian custom of pederasty, states that in courting a boy, the lover may engage in behavior normally regarded as shameful. **precari ... supplicare ... inuehi insectarique:** C. is probably thinking primarily of a scenario where one friend defends the other in court, a service Roman *amici* were supposed to render one another, and a situation where normal ethical norms were partly suspended since orators were fully expected to twist the truth to fit their cases. Cf. *Clu.* 139 *sed errat uehementer, si quis in orationibus nostris quas in iudiciis habuimus auctoritates nostras consignatas se habere arbitratur. omnes enim illae causarum ac temporum sunt, non hominum ipsorum aut patronorum.* Cf. 61nn. **honeste ... honestissime:** if doing certain normally non-honorable things for a friend counts as "most honorable," someone who acts this way does not violate Laelius' "law" (40, 44) that we must not do anything for our friends that is not *honestum.* Even so, this discussion introduces a certain amount of ethical confusion, on which see further 61n. *ut etiam ... turpitudo sequatur.* **commodis** "advantages." Friends give up their own advantages to have their friends enjoy advantages. Technically (unless we want to think that these *commoda* are tangible entities, such as money), the benefited friend does not enjoy the exact same advantage the benefiting friend has given up (e.g., by spending his free time defending his friend in court), but the meaning is clear enough.

58 **paribus** takes up 56 *pariter aequaliterque.* **exigue et exiliter:** while *exigue* is generally used for grudging or miserly behavior, as here, *exiliter* is elsewhere used by C. only to describe a dry and overly precise style of language, as of the Stoic Chrysippus at *De or.* 1.50. The combination portrays someone ungenerous in dispensing either cash or words. **ad calculos uocare ... ratio acceptorum et datorum:** Laelius uses the language of accounting: the *calculi* are the markers of an abacus, and the *ratio* "account" is that of financial ledgers recording income and expenses; *expensorum* would be more normal usage than *datorum.* In financial transactions, accounts must be balanced (*par*; cf. *ne plus reddat quam acceperit* and *ne plus aequo quid ... congeratur* in the following two sentences), while true friendship is far removed from such a quid pro quo attitude. The commercial language is an indication that C. associates this second view with the Epicureans; cf. 31n. *beneficium faeneramur* and 56n. *ut nostra ... aequaliterque respondeat.* Note, though, C.'s own positive use of accounting imagery at *Off.* 1.59 *haec igitur et talia circumspicienda sunt in omni officio ... ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum esse possimus, et addendo deducendoque uidere*

quae reliqui summa fiat, ex quo quantum cuique debeatur intellegas. **diuitior mihi ... in amicitiam congeratur:** images of wealth and generosity (*diuitior, affluentior*) replace close accounting; with *excidat* and *defluat* the true friend is shown not to pay close attention to the calculation of exact quantities. Here the image may be of measuring out substances such as grain; cf. also *congeratur*. For generosity rather than commercial exchange as a model for friendship, see also 31.

59 **ut quanti ... ab amicis:** repeated verbatim from the end of 56, with the one exception that *facit* in the earlier passage, emphasizing the factuality of someone's self-evaluation ("the value that each person actually places on himself"), is replaced by a generalizing *faciat* ("whatever value each person may place on himself"). **animus abiectior ... fractior:** low self-esteem affects either one's internal state of mind (cf. *Parad. Stoic.* 5.35, where slavery is defined as *oboedientia fracti animi et abiecti et arbitrio carentis suo*) or one's social and economic aspirations; the two aspects are taken up in the second half of the sentence (*animus abiectior ~ iacentem animum; spes ... fractior ~ spem ... meliorem*). Laelius shows himself concerned with problems arising from a friend's lack of self-confidence also at 29, 72. **non est igitur amici:** *igitur* appears later than its normal second position because of the enclitic *est*; *amici* is genitive of characteristic. **Alius igitur ... constituendus est:** Laelius announces his own *finis* (*finis ... constituendus* is repeated from 56) but gets sidetracked by an unexpected fourth opinion to be rebutted. **Scipio:** as at 33–5, Scipio's view of friendship (as reported by Laelius) emphasizes its difficulties and problems. Here his ideas are reported initially in indirect speech (*to reuocantis esse sententiam*), but the opinions given in direct speech until the end of 60 still represent Scipio's views. **solitus sit** once more gives the impression that Laelius and Scipio were accustomed to discuss the topic of friendship (see 33n. *saepissime inter me et Scipionem*). **edixero** (printed by Powell) is better attested than the alternative *dixero* (printed by earlier editors) and is a more unusual usage, as C. elsewhere uses *edico* only in connection with the formal utterances of magistrates (notably the praetor's annual *edictum*). It provides a note of formality and underlines the importance of what follows. **inimiciorem amicitiae:** the wordplay brings out the paradox inherent in a view of friendship that actually undermines friendship; cf. 60 *ad tollendam amicitiam ualet.* **ita amare oportere ut si aliquando esset osurus** "one ought to love in such a way as if one were someday going to hate." The subject of *esset osurus* is the implied subject of the infinitive *amare* (cf. 55n. *possint*). The maxim is proverbial and found in many sources (Otto 1890 *amicus* 5; Fürst 1996: 20–3), but was often ascribed to Bias of Priene (see below). Its meaning is cryptic and

was variously interpreted in antiquity: e.g., Aristotle views it as expressive of a lack of trust typical of the elderly (*Rh.* 2, 1389b13–24), Diogenes Laertius takes it as a logical inference from the fact that most men are bad (1.87), and Gellius understands it as counseling moderation in both love and hate (*NA* 1.3.30). For Scipio's own interpretation, see below. **nec uero se ... esse sententiam:** the indirect statement ascribed to Scipio continues; after the negative *negabat* introducing the previous sentence, we now have to supply a positive verb of speaking such as *dicebat.* **nec ... se adduci posse ut ... crederet** "he couldn't be brought to believe." The reflexive *se* refers to Scipio, whose statement is being reported. **quemadmodum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum:** the maxim is often cited anonymously, but ascribed to Bias by Arist. *Rh.* 2, 1389b23–4; Val. Max. 7.3.ext. 3; Diog. Laert. 1.87. Gell. *NA* 1.3.30 attributes it to Chilon. Both *quemadmodum putaretur* and Scipio's own skepticism point to an awareness that authorship is debated and any ascription is doubtful. **sapiens ... unus e Septem:** in 7, Fannius claimed that certain philosophers did not regard the Seven Sages as *sapientes.* The clause continues the dialogue's leitmotif of wisdom and who truly possesses it; see 1n. *sapientem,* 6n. *sapientem,* and Introduction 3(*c*). **impuri ... ambitiosi ... reuocantis:** while the *sententia* under discussion might be viewed as simply counseling anticipatory caution in light of human unreliability, Scipio interprets it as the proactive attitude of someone who uses his friends for his own purposes with the intention of discarding them later. This kind of person is morally depraved (*impuri*), ambitious (*ambitiosi*), and power-hungry (*ad suam potentiam reuocantis* "referring everything to his own power"), i.e., a corrupt Roman politician of the type both Laelius and C. warn against. *potentia* is used for personal power or influence, as opposed to official authority (*potestas*). **quonam enim ... dolere inuidere:** the sentences are carefully balanced: *esse poterit ~ esse posse, necesse erit cupere et optare ~ necesse erit angi dolere inuidere.* Scipio imagines the absurd scenario of one "friend" eagerly awaiting the other's missteps, so that he can finally have a motivation for hating him. **quin etiam** "and furthermore" (*OLD quin* A3a) introduces a sentence that adds further emphasis to the point made in the previous one. **ansas** "handles," the same idiom as in English, made additionally vivid by its combination with *ad reprehendendum* lit. "for grasping." The rather colloquial metaphor (qualified by *tamquam*) drawn from jug-handles is not common in literary Latin; it is found in Plaut. *Persa* 671 and two other Ciceronian passages; note particularly *Planc.* 84 *locus habet reprehensionis ansam aliquam.*

60 praeceptum ... praecipiendum: Laelius here as elsewhere uses repetition, antithesis, and assonance to shape his sentences: *amicitiam ~ amicitiis;*

quando ~ aliquando; amare ~ odisse, ferendum ~ cogitandum; and even *diligentiam ~ deligendo. praecipere* (here as in 75 below) governs a noun clause; for Laelius' didactic stance, cf. 42n. *praecipiendum*, 65. **ad tollendam amicitiam:** cf. 59n. *inimiciorem amicitiae.* **in amicitiis comparandis:** *comparo* (*OLD* 6) is a regular metaphor for the acquisition of friends (cf. *parare* in 54, 55, 62), assimilating friendship once more to concrete goods (cf. 55n. *quid autem stultius ... supellectilem*). The necessity of applying care to the establishment (and dissolution) of friendship is discussed at length in the following section (62–88), where Scipio is cited once more for the need to apply *diligentia* in choosing one's friends. **ut ne** introduces a noun clause; cf. 42n. *ut ... ne existiment ita se alligatos ut ... non discedant.* **quando amare ... aliquando odisse** "to love at one point (*quando* rather than *aliquando* after *ne*) ... to hate at another." **quin etiam:** see 59n. **felices:** cf. 35n. *non modo sapientiae sed etiam felicitatis.* Once more, the pessimistic Scipio views a successful friendship as in part a matter of luck. **inimicitiarum tempus** "an occasion for enmity." *inimicitiae* denotes an openly declared hostile relationship (see 34n. *inimicitias*), which – as Laelius himself discusses further in 76–8 – should never be the outcome of a broken friendship. **cogitandum:** *cogitare* here means "anticipate, envisage, plan for" (*OLD* 7). Even someone whose friend turns out to be less than perfect should not follow the maxim ascribed to Bias by anticipating that the friendship will turn into enmity.

61 His igitur finibus ... summa turpitudo sequatur: Laelius returns to the task he set himself in 56 of defining limits to the commitment of friends, having in the interval refuted other approaches. The structure of the sentence is convoluted: "therefore I think one must employ the following limitations (*His ... arbitror*, the main clause), namely that (*ut* introduces a noun clause), when the characters of the friends are spotless (*cum ... sint*, circumstantial *cum*-clause), then there should be a sharing of all things, plans, and wishes without exception (*tum ... communitas*, the continuation of the noun clause introduced by *ut*) – with the result that (*ut* introduces a result clause, which depends on *sit ... communitas* as a kind of afterthought), even if by some chance it happens (*etiam si ... acciderit*, conditional clause) that one must assist one's friends' less-than-just intentions (*ut ... sint*, noun clause), in cases where it is a matter of their life or reputation (*in quibus ... fama*, relative clause), one must veer from the path (*declinandum de uia sit*, the continuation of the result clause), as long no major disgrace follows (*modo ne ... sequatur*, proviso clause)." The hesitancy of the syntax reflects the uncertainty of the advice given (cf. below on *ut etiam ... turpitudo sequatur*). Thus, the noun clause (*ut ... declinandum de uia sit*) is hedged about with ungainly qualifications: *etiam si ... acciderit*,

itself with a dependent *ut*-clause containing a further relative clause (*in quibus ... fama*), separates *ut* from its verb (*sit*), and the latter in turn is followed by a further qualification (*modo ... sequatur*). **igitur:** Laelius segues seamlessly from Scipio's observations to his own view, which he presents, as it were, as a result of and response to his friend's points, thus giving once more the impression of an ongoing conversation (cf. 33n. *saepissime inter me et Scipionem*, 36n. *Quam ob rem*). **emendati mores** "spotless character"; *emendatus* is used as an adjective (*OLD*) and does not imply that the friend's character needed to be "cleaned up." The scenario envisaged is one of a true friendship, unlike the flawed one considered by Scipio in the previous sentence. **omnium rerum ... communitas:** in a pointed paradox, Laelius' *fines* of friendship turn out, at least at first glance, to envisage no limitations to affection and its manifestations whatsoever, but instead a "sharing" of everything "without exception." For the importance of shared beliefs and opinions in true friendship, cf. 15 *uoluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio*, 20 *omnium diuinarum humanarumque rerum cum beneuolentia et caritate consensio*. The inclusion of *rerum* (clearly here a broader category than material possessions) may allude to the Pythagorean maxim κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων "friends hold all things in common" (cf. 23n. *absentes adsunt ... egentes abundant ... imbecilli ualent ... mortui uiuunt*). *communitas* (rarely attested other than in C.) can refer either to the sharing of possessions in a narrow sense or more broadly to the sociability essential to human society (thus, *communitas* is paired with *societas* at, e.g., *Fin.* 4.4 *ad societatem communitatemque generis humani*). **ut etiam ... turpitudo sequatur:** Laelius suggests that on occasions where a friend's life or reputation is threatened, we may have to depart from what is strictly moral in order to assist the friend's "less-than-just" intentions. This blunt statement raises two problems: first, it is exceedingly vague (and not much clarified in what follows) and, second, it seems to contradict Laelius' "law" of *honestas* in friendship (36–44). The first point was made already by Aulus Gellius (*NA* 1.3), who tells us that the question of whether one might ever act *contra ius contraue morem* (9) for the sake of a friend was one much discussed in ancient treatments of friendship (10; Konstan 1994–5, Fürst 1996: 122–6). He contrasts C.'s brief and enigmatic account with the far more detailed discussion of Theophrastus in his work on friendship, which was apparently one of C.'s sources; even so, Gellius complains, neither author makes it clear under which exact circumstances a deviation from strict morality would be allowed. As for the second point, the injunction to do what is "less than just" for the sake of a friend sits ill with Laelius' emphatically stated rule of never asking for and never doing anything that is not *honestum* (40, 44); this contradiction in the past led some scholars to consider 36–44 a later addition by C., which

the author failed to reconcile with the present paragraph (cf. Fürst 1996: 165–70, with a *historia quaestionis*). If one does not wish to go down that path, one has to accept that C. is somewhat inconsistent. The two discussions, however, envisage rather different scenarios: in 36–44, Laelius' concern is actions against the *res publica*, which can never be justified by citing friendship; in this passage, the reference to *caput* and *fama* shows that what is at issue is the specific question of representing a friend in court. Legal aid was a typical service expected of friends (cf. 57n. *precari ... supplicare ... inuehi insectarique*), and Roman public morality in general and C. in particular considered it acceptable to defend even a guilty man. See *Off.* 2.51 *nec tamen ... est habendum religioni nocentem aliquando, modo ne nefarium impiumque, defendere. uult hoc multitudo, patitur consuetudo, fert etiam humanitas.* **minus iustae amicorum uoluntates adiuuandae sint:** the obligation to assist such wishes arises from the friends' just-mentioned *uoluntatum ... communitas.* This begs the question, however, why a friend with *emendati mores* would have *minus iustae uoluntates* in the first place. **caput** "one's life as forfeit for various offences" (*OLD* 5a). In Rome, "capital" cases concerned theoretically a person's life, even if the actual punishment was typically exile; what was lost was not one's "head" but one's civic status. **declinandum de uia** "deviate from the path," i.e., of virtue. Cf. *Cael.* 38 *responderet Caelius se nulla cupiditate inductum de uia decessisse.* **modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur** "as long as excessive disgrace does not follow," i.e, "as long as it does not lead to excessive disgrace." The disgrace would attach to the one who helps a friend in a matter that is wholly shameful or disreputable. Cf. *Off.* 2.51, cited above, on how one is allowed to defend a guilty man, with the proviso *modo ne nefarium impiumque.* In implicitly accepting a small amount of *turpitudo*, C. may be influenced by the carefully calculating approach to the same issue shown by Theophrastus, who, according to Gell. *NA* 1.3.21–6, suggested weighing the pros and cons of helping a friend and putting up with *parua ... et tenuis uel turpitudo uel infamia* for the sake of attaining *magna utilitas* (23). **est enim quatenus amicitiae dari uenia possit** "for there is a point up to which allowances can be made for friendship," with *quatenus* introducing a relative clause of characteristic. The "allowances" are granted either by the person who gives himself leeway to depart from the straight and narrow for the sake of his friend, or by the public, which is willing to forgive some dodgy dealings if they are motivated by friendship. Whether the stress is on the fact that there *is* room for leeway (*dari uenia possit*), or on the fact that this is possible only *up to a point* (*quatenus*), is likewise open to interpretation. **nec uero neglegenda ... repudianda est:** the two sentences touch on the topic of reputation and public opinion (cf. *fama* and *turpitudo* in the previous sentence), but Laelius' point is anything but clear. He

first states that *fama* matters and that a favorable reputation depends on the *beneuolentia* of one's fellow citizens; this, in turn, is useful (*nec mediocre telum* "a not inconsiderable weapon") for "achieving things" (*ad res gerendas*); finally, Laelius cautions that such good will is won not through flattery but ultimately through one's *uirtus*. The situation envisaged appears to be that of a public figure (like Laelius, C., and their audiences) who needs to secure popular favor, a necessity much discussed in *Off.*, whose second book is dedicated to advice on how to "win over people's minds and put them to use for oneself" (2.17 *conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere*). It is hard to see what this has to do with the question of how much one should love one's friend. Gellius, for one, ends his verbatim quotation of *Amic.* 61 after *uenia dari possit* (*NA* 1.3.13), and if *nec uero neglegenda ... repudianda est* were absent from the text, it would not be missed. We might charitably view the two sentences as Laelius' associative musing motivated by the judicial scenario implied earlier in the passage (cf. Seyffert and Müller 1876 *ad loc.*): as discussed in *Off.* 2.49–51, forensic oratory is an excellent way of gaining a reputation, especially if one speaks for the defense, even of a guilty man (*Off.* 2.51 *uult hoc multitudo*). Laelius would be saying that defending a friend is a welcome means of winning public favor, only to call himself back and stress that one must never curry favor with the populace, and must win affection only through *uirtus*. **nec uero neglegenda est fama:** the *fama* at issue here is not, apparently that of the friend whose *caput ... aut fama* may need to be defended, but that of the friend who assists him and in doing so may win public approval. Cultivating one's public persona is not otherwise a topic in *Amic.*, but is of central importance in *Off.* (see above). **nec mediocre telum:** an oddly aggressive image (a *telum* is a weapon of attack, a spear or other missile), which casts Roman public life (*res gerendas*) as a kind of battleground. **beneuolentiam ciuium ... repudianda est:** vocabulary and ideas that elsewhere in *Amic.* are applied to friendship are here used to describe public esteem: *beneuolentia* and *caritas*, crucial elements in the definition of friendship (20), now refer to the good will and affection of the populace (and are used in the same way in *Off.* 2); flattery, opposed to friendship in 88–100 below, is here considered ill-suited for winning popular acclaim; and *uirtus*, viewed throughout *Amic.* as the motivation for friendship, is here said to inspire popular affection (similarly throughout *Off.* 2; see below). Of course, Laelius had declared friendship to be just one subcategory of general human fellow feeling and sociability (19–20), and in *Off.*, too, the establishment of friendships is briefly mentioned as one element of the general task of making oneself popular (2.30–1). Even so, the discussion of strategies for becoming well liked by a large swath of

the population (perfectly appropriate in *Off.* 2, a book dedicated to the concept of the *utile* or advantageous) seems quite out of place in Laelius' high-minded exploration of affection among a virtuous few. **uirtus ... minime repudianda est:** for the argument that friendship arises from one person's love for another person's virtue, see 26–9; here, the idea is that virtue inspires the admiration and good will of *all* people (cf. *beneuolentiam ciuium ... caritas*), a central thought throughout *Off.* 2 (e.g., 32 *etenim illud ipsum quod honestum decorumque dicimus quia per se nobis placet animosque omnium natura et specie sua commouet maximeque quasi perlucet ex eis quas commemoraui uirtutibus, idcirco illos in quibus eas uirtutes esse remur a natura ipsa diligere cogimur*). That "virtue should by no means be rejected" as a means of winning affection sounds jaded and utilitarian, an attitude in keeping with the sentiment of the preceding sentence, but not with the rest of the dialogue. It might be preferable to understand Laelius as meaning that "virtue must by no means be abandoned" and referring back to his original point about veering from the straight path without incurring disgrace (= without abandoning virtue?); however, after the intervening sentence, this would be a very abrupt shift and make the passage even less coherent.

G. HOW SHOULD ONE ESTABLISH (AND END) FRIENDSHIPS? (62–88a)

In this third part of his third speech, Laelius considers a number of issues related to the establishment and conduct of friendship. He begins by impressing on his listeners both the difficulty and the importance of choosing one's friends wisely (62–6). A true friend is faithful and consistent, but unfortunately such qualities become apparent only in the course of the friendship itself, so to some extent, one enters a friendship blindly. If one is unlucky, one may end up with a friend who puts money or political advantage over friendship, or deserts one during misfortune.

While one should not pass up an opportunity to make new friends, old ones are preferable (67–8). A major issue in a stratified society like Rome is inequality among friends (69–73): here, the superior in position, talent, or fortune needs to use tact to bridge the divide and attempt to lift his friend to his own level, while the inferior needs to overcome any resentment. True friendships are formed between mature adults who have left the interests of their early youth behind (74), and indulgence to one's friends should remain within the bounds of the realistic and appropriate (73, 75–6). If one's friend should turn out to be vicious after all, the friendship will need to be dissolved (76–8). In this case, Laelius strongly

counsels against turning to open hostility (*inimicitiae*) and instead suggests letting the friendship fizzle out by ceasing contact.

The consideration of such threats to friendship leads Laelius once more to stress the origin of true friendship in affection for a person's inherent qualities (79–82; cf. 26–32). He now adds to this the Aristotelian concept of friendship as a form of self-love (*Eth. Nic.* 9.4, 9.8): a real friend is "another self" (80 *alter idem*), with whose soul one wishes to merge one's own (81). This means that in order to find a good friend, one first needs to be a good person oneself (82).

If virtue is thus at the root of friendship, friendship itself also motivates people to virtue (83 *uirtutum amicitia adiutrix*) and brings about that ultimate philosophical goal, the *uita beata* (84). Laelius therefore repeats once more that one must choose one's friends carefully (85), pointing out that all people, as well as all philosophical schools, are agreed on the value of friendship (86). A life without the company of other people is simply not worth living (87–8), and friendship is the most enjoyable form of human sociability.

62 redeo ad Scipionem: after laying out his view of the limits of friendship, Laelius resumes reporting what Scipio had said, picking up his point about choosing one's friends well (60). **cuius omnis sermo erat de amicitia:** cf. 5 (of Laelius' own discourse in *Amic.*) *cuius tota disputatio est de amicitia*, 33n. *saepissime inter me et Scipionem.* **querebatur** introduces a factual *quod*-clause: "he complained that." The following two sentences report Scipio's opinion in indirect statement. **quod omnibus ... idonei iudicarent:** Scipio's reported words follow very closely the discussion of friendship in Xen. *Mem.* 2.4 (cf. 55n. *quid autem stultius ... supellectilem*), esp. 2.4.4 on people's ignorance of the number of their friends and 2.4.2 on their carelessness in acquiring them. Such quotation is in keeping with Scipio's personality: C. describes him as an avid reader of Xenophon at *Tusc.* 2.62; *QFr.* 1.1.23. **capras et oues ... signa quaedam et notas:** Xenophon mentions livestock (*Mem.* 2.4.2 βοσκήματα) among the possessions to which people regularly pay more attention than to their friends; to judge such animals, one looks to obvious *notae* "marks" and *signa* "signs" (presumably including brands by the breeder or previous owner, meant to guarantee quality), while the absence of clear signs of a person's character is often lamented (e.g., Eur. *Hipp.* 925–7; *Med.* 516–19; cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2.6 for how one might identify a potential friend). The problem thus becomes one of epistemology: *nota* and (less frequently) *signum* are among C.'s regular equivalents for Gk. σημεῖον, used in Stoicism as a firm indication of the truth or falsehood of an impression (e.g., *Luc.* 58 *sublata ueri et falsi*

nota, 111 *percipiendi signum nullum habemus*; *Nat D.* 1.12 *certa iudicandi et adsentiendi nota* with Pease 1955–8 *ad loc.*). *quasi* "as it were, so to speak" is doubly distancing: humans not only do not have visible marks like sheep, but do not even display other quasi-signs of their disposition. The livestock comparison returns in 79. **eligendis:** C. uses *eligere* for the selection of friends three times in 62–5; elsewhere (60, 85) he uses *deligere*. Together with *diligere* "to love" (*passim*) and *diligenter/diligentia* "careful(ness)" (60, 62, 89, 95), they form a semantic field that promotes a view of friendship as a careful "sifting" (*legere*) of potential candidates for friendship in order to isolate the one truly worthy of love (*di-ligere*). **quibus ... iudicarent:** relative clause of purpose. **Sunt igitur:** Laelius "responds" once again to Scipio (see 36n. *Quam ob rem*, 61n. *igitur*), drawing a strong conclusion from his friend's reported words. **firmi et stabiles et constantes:** the three words mean more or less the same, with the repetition stressing the reliability of the ideal friend. Constancy was a general philosophical ideal (see 8n. *constanti homini*); its necessity for friendship is explored in the following paragraphs (63–5). **cuius generis est magna penuria:** in this part of the dialogue, Laelius shows himself unusually pessimistic: there is a "great dearth" of faithful friends, who are "very hard to find" (64 *difficillime reperiuntur*) and belong to an "extremely rare and nearly divine race of men" (64 *ex maxime raro genere hominum ... et paene diuino*); cf. 79 *rarum genus* and Bohnenblust 1905: 37 on the topos of the rarity of true friends. **expertum; experiendum ... experiendi potestatem:** "having experienced; experiencing ... potential for experience." The argument is syllogistic and reveals a paradox: only through experience can one make a proper judgment about a potential friend; but that experience can only be found in friendship itself; and therefore one has to enter the friendship without having made a judgment. In other words, we can never satisfactorily decide in advance whether or not someone will be the right kind of friend (for the theme, see Bohnenblust 1905: 32–4; Fürst 1996: 125–6). Because of this problem, Laelius recommends caution in initiating a friendship (63): test a potential friend in one aspect of life (such as attitudes to money) before committing yourself. **expertum:** accusative subject of the infinitive *iudicare*. **praecurrit amicitia iudicium:** if judgment rests on experience, but experience happens only within friendship, friendship forestalls (*OLD praecurro* 3b) the judgment that should have preceded it. The swift movement inherent in *praecurrit* points to the emotional origin of friendship, the spontaneous strong affection at the encounter with a compatible person (see 26–31; cf. 63 *impetum beneuolentiae*); the idea of a race in which one competitor "outruns" the other is taken up in 63 *sustinere ... currum ... equis temptatis*. **tollitque experiendi**

potestatem: friendship does not preclude the "potential for experience" as such (as just stated, *experiendum ... est in ipsa amicitia*), but the opportunity to experience and hence judge *before* a friendship springs up.

63 est igitur ... moribus amicorum "it is therefore the task of a prudent man to rein in (*OLD sustineo* 8) the onward movement of good will in order to (*quo* here is a slightly archaic equivalent for *ut*, introducing a purpose clause) make use of friendship in such a way (*utamur ... sic amicitia*) as (we use) horses that we have tested (*quasi equis temptatis*), by making a trial of our friends' character in some respect" (for a somewhat different construction of the same text, see Powell 1990: 170). Laelius begins by imagining an archetypal prudent man, but continues with a first-person plural (*utamur*); both serve to make a general statement of what "one" should do. *equis temptatis* and *amicitia* are both (ablative) objects of *utamur*, *periclitatis moribus* is an ablative absolute (*periclitatis*, the participle of a deponent verb, is here used passively). **currum ... equis temptatis:** the comparison between testing someone's character and test-driving a team of horses goes back to Thgn. 1.125–6 "you can never know the mind of a man or a woman unless you test them like a team of horses (ὥσπερ ὑποζυγίου)," cited by Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 7, 1237b15–16 in the context of making trial of a friend's character. **quidam saepe ... in magna:** a typically Ciceronian blend of anaphora (*quidam ... quidam*), governing the large structure of the sentence, and chiastic order (*in parua pecunia perspiciuntur* (with alliteration) ~ *cognoscuntur in magna*). **in parua pecunia** "in (a case of/an affair involving) little money." Laelius' examination of the causes of non-friendly behavior progresses from trivial (small amounts of money) to more serious (a lot of money), to the real stresses on friendship caused by the desire for success and power (63–4) or by *calamitates* (64). **perspiciuntur quam sint leues** "they are recognized (for) how unreliable (*OLD leuis* 15a) they are," i.e., "it becomes apparent how unreliable they are." For the construction, cf. 56n. *Constituendi autem ... termini diligendi.* **mouere** "change someone's position or attitude" (*OLD* 14). **sin uero ... non anteponant:** people who place friendship over profit are uncommon, but people who place friendship over power are even rarer. **honores ... opes:** the list of things valued over friendship moves from high (*honores*) to low (*opes*) as the desire for power and money becomes ever clearer, reaching its nadir in *potentia* a sentence later. **cum ex altera parte ... ius amicitiae:** Laelius imagines a situation where people are literally given a choice between *haec* (the worldly goods and powers just enumerated) and friendship, with the options, as it were, displayed before them *ex altera parte ... ex altera.* **ius amicitiae** emphasizes the semi-contractual nature of friendship seen as *societas*

(cf. 19n. *ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam*), creating a clear contrast between power on the one hand and justice on the other. At 35, those who expect their friends to do everything for them, no matter the moral implications, invoke a misunderstood *ius amicitiae*, a situation that Laelius seeks to clarify by introducing his own *lex amicitiae* (40, 44). **imbecilla enim est natura ad contemnendam potentiam** "for (human) nature is weak when it comes to despising power," a *sententia* with a proverbial ring. For *imbecillitas* in general as an inadequate basis for friendship, cf. 26n. *utrum propter ... uicissimque redderet*, 29, 32; for *potentia*, cf. 59n. *impuri ... ambitiosi ... reuocantis. ad contemnendam potentiam* is a version of the typical construction *ad* + accusative noun + gerundive to express purpose (A&G 503). Dependent on a word expressing difficulty (here *imbecilla*), *ad* means "toward the attainment of, concerning" (*OLD* 43b). **quam etiamsi ... neglecta amicitia** "and if (*etiamsi*) they have achieved it (*quam* is a connecting relative referring back to *potentiam*), even (*etiamsi*) at the cost of friendship (*neglecta amicitia*), they think this will become forgotten (*OLD obscuro* 6b) since friendship was neglected not without a good reason." Those who betray friendship for the sake of power are counting on people to share their values and consider the neglect of friendship a small price to pay for a big gain. **neglecta amicitia ... neglecta amicitia:** repetition for emphasis. **obscuratum iri:** future passive infinitive, consisting of accusative supine + *iri* (A&G 509); its subject is an understood *id* referring to the neglect of friendship.

64 **in eis qui ... uersantur:** so too Scipio's opinion, as reported in 34: those who are ambitious and active in political life – the readers of *Amic.* themselves – are the worst candidates for friendship. In 44 BCE, when C. was writing, that will have seemed all too evident; it is what makes the relationship between Scipio and Laelius so unusual. **quid?** the rhetorical question draws attention to what follows (cf. 30n. *quid enim? Africanus indigens mei?*). **haec ut omittam** "to pass over this; apart from this"; *haec* refers back to what was mentioned in the previous sentence. **calamitatum societates** "shared experiences of misfortune" (*OLD societas* 4b). For *societas*, cf. 19n. *ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam.* **ad quas ... qui descendant** "it is not easy to find (*inuentu* is ablative supine) people who (*qui* introduces a relative clause of characteristic) stoop (*OLD descendo* 8a) to those (i.e., associations with the unfortunate; *quas* is a connecting relative referring to *societates*)." **quamquam ... tamen:** the two words correlate: "even though (misfortune brings out true friends), nevertheless (most people are not cut out to be true friends)." **amicus certus in re incerta cernitur:** this verse (166 Manuwald) is known only from this passage; it presumably derives from a tragedy and has plausibly been seen as

a version of Eur. *Hec.* 1226–7. Its etymological play with *certus, incerta, cernitur* (all from *cernere* "see, discern") is striking. The idea (if not the wording) is proverbial (Otto 1890 *amicus* 6; Fürst 1996: 210–16). **haec duo** "these two things," i.e., the two scenarios described by *aut si ... aut.* **leuitatis et infirmitatis:** genitives of the charge with *conuincunt.* The weakness and unreliability of the false friend contrast with *grauem constantem stabilem* in the following sentence; cf. 63 *perspiciuntur quam sint leues.* **aut si ... in malis deserunt:** people disdain their fortunate friends and desert their unfortunate ones. **utraque in re:** in both good and bad fortune. **grauem constantem stabilem:** cf. 62n. *firmi et stabiles et constantes,* 65 *Firmamentum ... stabilitatis constantiaeque.* **maxime raro:** C. uses this form of the superlative of *rarus* three times (used otherwise only once by Quintilian) and the far more common *rarissimus* only once. Cf. 62n. *cuius generis est magna penuria,* 79 *rarum genus.* **paene diuino:** for C.'s tendency to use *diuinus* or *paene diuinus* of human beings and their attributes, see Cole 2013, esp. 34–48 on his treatment of Pompey.

65 **Firmamentum ... stabilitatis constantiaeque:** with *firmamentum* "foundation" Laelius brings to life the metaphors inherent in *stabilitas* and *constantia,* presenting friendship as a stable building with sound structural support. **eius** is the antecedent of *quam* and, grammatically speaking, modifies *constantiaeque;* logically, it refers to the entire hendiadys *stabilitatis constantiaeque.* Its placement is emphatic. **fides** "trust, good faith" is traditionally seen as an indispensable part of friendship (Bohnenblust 1905: 43), as well as of contracts such as *societas,* and binds together society at large; that is why *fides* and tyranny are incompatible (cf. 52–4). It is here seen as the key to the constancy required of friends (cf. 62–4). Laelius emphasizes this point by verbal repetition throughout the section: *fides, infidum, fidelitatem, fidum, fidus* (placing *fides* at the end of the first clause is also emphatic); *stabilitatis, stabile, stabilis; constantiaeque, constantiam.* **simplicem ... communem ... consentientem:** each of these three qualities of the desirable friend is taken up in the rest of this section. Thus *simplicem* "simple, artless, ingenuous" (*OLD* 8a) is contrasted with *multiplex ingenium et tortuosum,* and *consentientem* "sympathetic, agreeing" (*OLD* 2a; cf. 20n. *Est enim amicitia ... consensio*), further defined by *id est qui rebus eisdem moueatur* (see below), is contrasted with *qui non eisdem rebus mouetur naturaque consentit. communem* "courteous, sociable" (*OLD* 8) is not so explicitly picked up, but the affability it implies is opposed to the suspiciousness and malice of someone who *criminibus aut inferendis delectetur aut credat oblatis.* **qui rebus eisdem moueatur:** since *consentiens* can describe either internal consistency or agreement with something external, this clause means either that someone has consistent reactions to the same

things or that he consistently has the same reactions to the same things as his friend; the same is true for *eisdem rebus mouetur naturaque consentit* in the following sentence. **multiplex ingenium et tortuosum:** *multiplex* itself can be a favorable description (as when Plato is described as *uarius et multiplex et copiosus, Acad. post.* 1.17), but, as here, often refers to shifty, devious, and untrustworthy people, including Catiline (*Cael.* 14; cf. also *torquere* of Catiline's mind in *Cael.* 13); for C.'s attitudes to multiplicity, see Fitzgerald 2016: 19. Laelius himself later asserts the impossibility of friendship with someone who is not of one mind, but is 92 *uarius commutabilis multiplex.* **addendum eodem** "to this should be added"; *eodem* "to the same place" is the adverb derived from *idem.* **ut ne:** see 42n. *ut ... ne existiment ita se alligatos ut ... non discedant.* **ne criminibus ... credat oblatis:** a good friend neither himself makes accusations against his friend nor believes those made by others when they are brought to his attention (*oblatis*). Laelius enlarges on this a few sentences later: one needs to defend one's friend against any charges brought by others and must not oneself be suspicious or quick to take offense (*non solum ab aliquo allatas criminationes repellere sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum, semper aliquid existimantem ab amico esse uiolatum*). The language is legal and reflects the feeling that acting for the defense in a trial is respectable, while a taste for prosecution is not. **quae pertinent omnia ad eam quam iamdudum tracto constantiam** "all of which have to do with that constancy that I have been discussing for a while." **quod initio dixi ... non posse:** see 18n. *nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse.* **quem eundem sapientem licet dicere:** as in 18–19, the mention of "good" people leads to the question whether these are the same as the "wise." Earlier, Laelius polemicized against restrictive Stoic views of virtue and wisdom, but here he simply follows the philosophical commonplace that the good and the wise person are the same. **haec duo:** the three features required of a friend are reduced to two (with a different third characteristic to be added in the following sentence): one is *simplicitas*, transparency of character (expressed as a purpose clause); the second is the kind of affability (see *communem* above) that rejects litigiousness and suspicion (expressed as two infinitives). **fronte occultare** "conceal behind a (deceptive) exterior" (*OLD frons* 4a).

66 accedat huc suauitas quaedam oportet "to this must be added a certain sweetness"; the construction is *oportet (ut) accedat.* As with 65 *addendum eodem*, Laelius tacks on an amplification of what he has just said: the counterpart of not being litigious or suspicious is being pleasant, easygoing, and cheerful. For Laelius' stress on the sweetness of friendship, see 22n. *quid dulcius.* In this latter part of the dialogue in particular, metaphors

of taste abound; see, e.g., 67 for the *suauitas* of vintage wines and old friendships. **condimentum:** C. is fond of the metaphor of seasoning (*condire*), e.g., *QFr.* 1.1.21 *condimentis humanitatis.* Here it continues the image offered by *suauitas.* **tristitia autem ... procliuior:** the difficulty, clearly, is that someone who is relentlessly serious and stern might be just a little oppressive, and friendship ought to be a source of pleasure and comfort as well as of moral support and uprightness. Hence the need for *condimentum*; hence, more specifically, the idea that friendship should be amiable as well as edifying. The language C. uses here corresponds to his descriptions of the public faces of various statesmen, who ideally combine *tristitia* and *seueritas* with *comitas* and *facilitas*, e.g., *Sen.* 10 (of Q. Fabius Maximus) *erat enim in illo uiro comitate condita grauitas*; *Brut.* 148, where C. compares the balance of *comitas* and *seueritas* in Scaevola Pontifex and L. Crassus; *De or.* 2.236, on the need to moderate *tristitia* and *seueritas* with humor. Of particular note is the contrast between the affability of the elder Cato with the relentless sternness of the younger at *Mur.* 66 *sed si illius comitatem et facilitatem tuae grauitati seueritatique asperseris, non ista quidem erunt meliora quae nunc sunt optima, sed certe condita iucundius.* Here too the contrast between *grauitas* and *seueritas* on one side and *comitas* and *facilitas* on the other is combined with the metaphor of seasoning in *condita* (as also in *Sen.* 10). **tristitia:** not "sadness" but "sternness, austerity" (*OLD* 3). **remissior ... liberior ... dulcior ... procliuior:** the string of comparatives is expressive both of the concept of an "added" condiment and of the idea that friendship itself offers "more" to society than such traditionally sanctioned attitudes as *tristitia* and *seueritas.* **comitatem facilitatemque:** the qualities of being good-natured and easygoing, exhibited (we are no doubt meant to understand) by Laelius himself. Scipio, too, was characterized by 11 *moribus facillimis*; the need for *comitas* reappears in 89.

67 **Exsistit ... hoc loco** "at this point there arises." *exsisto* is used to refer to the appearance of a preexisting or familiar problem. **quaestio** "question, issue" (*OLD* 6a), in this case a philosophical point of contention (Gk. *zētēma*) that one might ask a philosopher to discuss (see 17). The comparison of new to old friends was indeed a commonplace of both popular and philosophical reflections on friendship, with general consensus on the superiority of old friends (Otto 1890 *amicus* 12; Fürst 1996: 27–8). **subdifficilis:** found only here; given what follows, it should be taken to mean "mildly problematic" – in fact, not problematic at all. C. is fond of adjectives compounded with *sub-* (some twenty-five of them, most found only in C. and only once), most frequently in dialogues or letters (only 4× in speeches); they tend to be self-deprecating or ironic.

amici noui ... solemus: the sentence combines chiastic order (*noui ... ueteribus ~ uetulis teneros*), in which the words themselves are varied, with the parallel position, with repetition, of *anteponendi ~ anteponere*. For a similar pattern, cf. 63n. *quidam saepe ... in magna.* **indigna homine dubitatio:** as often in *Amic.*, Laelius uses human nature as a criterion in judging behavior, displaying his attitude of *humanitas* (cf. 8n. *nec potuisse non commoueri ... humanitatis tuae*). **satietates:** C. uses the plurals *satietates* and 68 *nouitates* only here; on the meaning of the plural, see 26n. *utilitates.* **ueterrima quaeque ... esse ... suauissima:** "all oldest things ... must be sweetest," i.e., "in the case of all things, what is oldest is necessarily sweetest" (for this use of *quisque* with the superlative, see A&G 313bc); cf. Plaut. *Truc.* 173 *ueterrumus homini optumust amicus.* Laelius continues the taste metaphor, applying the standard comparison of human character to wine (e.g., *Sen.* 65) specifically to friendship (the same simile is found in the Bible, at *Ben Sira* 9.10). **uetustatem ferunt** "endure the passage of time" (*OLD* 19a), i.e., "age well." Not all wines improve with age, and the same is presumably true of friendships. **quod dicitur, multos modios ... edendos esse:** a well-known proverb (flagged as such by *quod dicitur*) often quoted in ancient discussions of friendship (e.g., Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 7, 1238a2–3; *Eth. Nic.* 8, 1156b26–8; Otto 1890 *amicitia* 4; Bohnenblust 1905: 41; Fürst 1996: 28). Within the same sentence, Laelius has moved on from the metaphorical enjoyment of wine to the actual sharing of meals between friends. **amicitiae munus:** friendship is seen as a long-running (and reciprocal) obligation; it is not clear how or when it would be considered completed.

68 **nouitates:** for the plural, see 26n. *utilitates.* Translate "novelty" or "new possibilities." **ut tamquam ... fructus appareat:** a noun clause, spelling out what the hope (*spem*) consists in. **in herbis non fallacibus:** *in herba* (or *herbis*) describes the early stage of plants and is proverbial for the uncertainty of success; cf. Cato fr. 217 Malcovati *nunc ita aiunt, in segetibus, in herbis bona frumenta esse. nolite ibi nimiam spem habere* and Otto 1890 *herba* 1. A *fallax herba* is one that looks good at the outset, but deceives the farmer. **illae quidem:** in drawing a contrast between two alternatives, C. generally uses a pronoun (here *illae*) followed by *quidem* to emphasize the first, balancing the second with *tamen*; cf. K–S I 623–4. **uetustatis et consuetudinis:** *uetus* and its cognates are repeated six times in 67–8; *consuetudo* and *consuesco* appear three times. C. links *uetustas* and *consuetudo* as central to friendship in several letters (*Fam.* 5.15.2, 6.5.4, 11.16.2), and at *Fin.* 1.69 Torquatus emphasizes the importance of *consuetudo* in maintaining friendship. *uetustas* is the passage of time, *consuetudo* the familiarity and habits that come with it. **in ipso equo ... intractato**

et nouo: at 67 (cross-referenced with *cuius modo feci mentionem*), Laelius claimed that we prefer young horses to old ones. Here he corrects himself, saying that all things being equal (*si nulla res impediat*), we prefer old horses to which we are accustomed to new ones we have not previously used (*intractato*). **nemo est quin ... libentius utatur** "there is no one who would not rather use." **montuosis etiam:** the Romans did not share the modern appreciation of untouched nature; as seen in *Leg.* 2.1–4, places for which people expressed affection were landscaped rather than wild. That, over time, one might even come to enjoy wild places is thus a testament to the power of habit. *montuosus* is not infrequently coupled with *asper* (e.g., *Planc.* 22; *Part. or.* 36; also Caes. *BCiv.* 1.66.4, 3.42.5) and designates rough, wild, and inhospitable terrain.

69 **maximum est** "it is a matter of the greatest importance," as opposed to the *quaestio subdifficilis* just discussed (see 67n.). How to navigate differences in social standing and ability within friendship was a pressing question in the stratified societies of antiquity and was treated at length by Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 8.15–16; *Eth. Eud.* 7.3); Laelius' discussion extends through 73. **parem esse inferiori** "to be equal to the inferior," a literal impossibility, expressing the difficulty of the task (cf. *maximum*). The meaning is "to be equitable to the inferior friend," i.e., to treat him as an equal (cf. Sen. *Ben.* 2.15.1 *summa amicitiae sit amicum sibi aequare*). *parem* is accusative agreeing with the understood subject of the infinitive (presumably *amicum*, to be inferred from *in amicitia*). Tellingly, Laelius is speaking from the perspective of the superior friend who has to adjust his behavior for the benefit of the inferior one; cf. Schievenin 2000: 456–8. **excellentiae quaedam** "particular areas of excellence"; for the plural, see 26n. *utilitates*. The types of excellence are specified in 70 *praestantiam uirtutis ingeni fortunae*. **qualis erat Scipionis:** supply *excellentia*. Scipio is Laelius' prime example of an outstanding person who behaves appropriately to his inferior friends. **in nostro ... grege:** the use of *grex* for an (informal) group of friends is colloquial (cf. *Att.* 6.1.10; Ter. *Eun.* 1084); hence Laelius' qualifying *ut ita dicam*. The phrase provides no basis for the reconstruction of a "Scipionic Circle," although it has sometimes been used for that purpose (see Introduction 3(*a*)). **Philo ... Rupilio ... Mummio:** for L. Furius Philus, see 14n.; he plays an important role in *Rep.*, where Sp. Mummius has a much smaller part. For P. Rupilius, see 37n. *ad me ... deprecatum uenisset*. On Rupilius and his brother, see further 73. **inferioris ordinis** "of lesser standing." Laelius here considers two groups of *amici*. The first (Philus, Rupilius, Mummius) consists of men of high social standing who were Scipio's social equals but did

not reach his level of *excellentia*; the other includes unnamed people who were also Scipio's *amici* but not in his social class. **Maximum fratrem:** Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus was the eldest son of L. Aemilius Paullus and thus Scipio's natural older brother, although he was consul two years later than Scipio; Scipio's deferential treatment of his brother is reminiscent of his similar treatment of Laelius as his elder, as described at *Rep.* 1.18. **sibi** refers to Scipio, the subject of the sentence. **suosque omnes:** the broader group of his friends and relations. For Scipio's generosity to family, see 11. **per se posse esse ampliores:** *per se* in this context can either mean "as far as he [Scipio] was concerned," looking back to the previous discussion of his treatment of *inferiores*, or "through his [Scipio's] efforts," looking ahead to the following discussion of how one ought to be generous to one's less fortunate or less capable connections. The structure of the sentence makes the first interpretation somewhat more likely. *posse* has been questioned as unnecessary or weak, but cf. *Brut.* 204 *animaduertendum est, posse esse summos qui inter se sint dissimiles*; *Att.* 14.12.2 *quem nego posse esse bonum ciuem*; Powell's emendation of *per se posse* to *per se ipsos* ("that they should be grander in their own right") misses the point: it is Scipio's help and encouragement, not their own (weaker) capacities, that permit his friends and family to rise.

70 **quod faciendum imitandumque est ... ut si ... ut si ... ut in fabulis ... esse duxerunt:** a loosely structured period: the main clause *quod faciendum imitandumque est omnibus* is followed by two noun clauses, each introduced by *ut* "namely that" (cf. 14n. *Id si ita est, ut*) and further modified by, respectively, one and two conditional clauses introduced by *si*; the third *ut*-clause, by contrast, is a clause of comparison (in the indicative, not subjunctive), with *ut* meaning "just as." **omnibus:** Scipio is held up as an *exemplum* for all to imitate. **praestantiam uirtutis ingeni fortunae:** repeated with slight variation (and elimination of *fortuna*) at the end of the paragraph. **impertiant ea ... communicentque:** whereas the previous paragraph simply recommended tact in interacting with less fortunate friends, Laelius now advises taking active steps to improve their position by sharing one's own advantages (loosely referred to by *ea*). On "sharing" as a crucial characteristic of friendship, see 61n. *omnium rerum ... communitas.* **suis ... proximis ... parentibus ... propinquos:** all these terms can refer to members of one's family; all but *parentes* can also refer to close friends and associates. Laelius uses familial relationship as a model for friendship; as explained in 19–20, natural affection, of which friendship is a special case, starts from the family and extends outward to the whole world. Perhaps Laelius' choice of examples here is also owed to the

fact that the duty of supporting one's family members was more generally accepted at Rome than the imperative of sharing resources with one's friends. **imbecilliore ... fortuna:** cf. the lack of self-esteem or money mentioned in 59. **eisque honori sint et dignitati:** double dative: "be a source of honor and standing for them." **in fabulis:** myths and legends. The foundling of noble or divine birth brought up by humble folk until finally recognized is a widespread folk-tale motif. For Romans, the obvious example would be Romulus and Remus, but one might think also of Cyrus the Great: the real Scipio was very fond of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (cf. *QFr.* 1.1.23; 62n. *quod omnibus ... idonei iudicarent*). **in ueris patribus certisque:** a somewhat odd a fortiori argument: if people remain fond of their foster parents after learning of their true birth, then such affection is even more to be expected toward genuine parents; the combination of *ueris* and *certis* is emphatic. **proximum quemque** "each closest person," that is, "all to whom one is close" (for this use of *quisque* with the superlative, see A&G 313b). On "closeness" as a cause of affection, see 19.

71 **Vt igitur ... dignitate superari:** the necessary flip side of the superior friend's treating his inferior as an equal is the inferior's not begrudging his friend's superior talent and fortune. The two halves of this carefully balanced sentence are connected by *ut ... sic*; the long phrase *in ... necessitudine* in the first half is balanced by *aut ingenio ... dignitate*; and *superiores ... cum inferioribus* is echoed by *inferiores ... superari*. One friend may be superior to the other for many reasons: intelligence, money, and social esteem are all possibilities; what is not possible is moral superiority, as friendship can only last between moral individuals. **amicitiae coniunctionisque necessitudine:** the combination of *necessitudo* and *coniunctio* (or *coniunctus*) is frequent in declarations of close friendship or attachment; both words connote close connections, including but not restricted to family relationship, and are here used as elaborations of 70 *proximum quemque*. **ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate:** another variation on 70 *uirtutis ingeni fortunae* and *ingeni et uirtutis*. **quorum:** connecting relative, whose antecedent is *inferiores*. **aut queruntur ... queant dicere:** Laelius paints a psychological portrait of those with an inferiority complex: they complain a lot (*queruntur semper aliquid*) and petulantly keep bringing up the (few) services they have been able to render their friends, expecting gratitude and a quid pro quo. **si habere ... queant dicere** "if they think (*si ... putant*) that they have (*habere se*) something that they can claim (*quod ... queant dicere*) has been done (by them) dutifully, in a spirit of friendship, and with some effort on their part." **officia exprobrantium ... qui contulit:** that the recipient of a gift or favor should remember it while the giver should not is at the heart of the ancient ideology of gift

exchange (e.g., Sen. *Ben.* 2.10.4 *haec enim beneficii inter duos lex est: alter statim obliuisci debet dati, alter accepti numquam*). The *inferior* with the inferiority complex does not have the expected social graces, making himself a nuisance (cf. *odiosum sane genus hominum*) by harping on (*exprobrantium* "bring up as a reproach," *OLD*) his alleged good services. C.'s wording may owe something to Ter. *An.* 43–4 *nam istaec commemoratio | quasi exprobratiost immemoris benefici.* **meminisse debet ... qui contulit:** as at the beginning of the section, there is careful rhetorical balance: *meminisse ~ commemorare, collata ~ contulit.*

72 **superiores ... submittere ... inferiores extollere:** the same balanced structure as in 71 (*ut ... sic*), but here *superiores* is the subject of both halves. The frequently annoying behavior on the part of less fortunate friends is even more of a reason for the more fortunate to try to raise them from their position. **sunt enim ... se arbitrantur:** with great psychological insight worthy of his *humanitas*, Laelius explains how friendship becomes difficult when one party is paranoid about being despised by the other – and how this is usually caused by the low self-esteem of the inferior, who himself believes that he is worthy of contempt (*qui etiam contemnendos se arbitrantur*). **qui hac opinione ... leuandi sunt:** the superior friend must act as a therapist, freeing his friend from his inferiority complex both through persuasion (*uerbis*) and by materially bettering his position (*opere*).

73 **tantum autem ... adiuues sustinere:** Laelius now qualifies his injunction to support our less fortunate friends: there are practical limits to what we can do for our friends, just as there are limits to what they can reasonably accept. For the idea that *beneficia* must be appropriate to both giver and receiver, see *Off.* 1.42–4 (esp. 42 *uidendum est enim, primum ne obsit benignitas et eis ipsis quibus benigne uidebitur fieri et ceteris, deinde ne maior benignitas sit quam facultates*); Sen. *Ben.* 2.15–17. **sustinere:** supply *possit* from *possis* above. As often, Laelius makes his point by repetition: *quantum ille ... sustinere* is taken up later in the paragraph by *quid ille possit sustinere*; *efficere possis* by *potuit ... efficere.* Forms of *possum* appear six times within three short sentences. **perducere:** for this use (advancing someone else's career to the highest possible position), cf. Caes. *BGall.* 7.39.1 *ad summam dignitatem perduxerat.* **ut Scipio ... non potuit:** P. Rupilius (37n. *ad me ... deprecatum uenisset*, 69n.) was consul in 132; his younger brother Lucius subsequently failed to be elected, some time between 132 and 129. Laelius' statement that Scipio "made" Publius consul is obviously an overstatement; he clearly supported him, but could not even have taken part in the election campaign as he was still in Spain. Laelius

omits the sequel (reported by C. from the historian C. Fannius (*FRHist* 12 F5) at *Tusc.* 4.40; cf. also Plin. *HN* 7.122), that on hearing the news of his brother's failure to be elected, Publius died (*ob eam causam a uita recesserit*). That event must have been fairly recent at the dramatic date of *Amic.* **quod si etiam ... possit sustinere:** Laelius does not offer an example of a benefaction that the recipient would not be able to "bear," but cf. Sen. *Ben.* 2.16.1–2 for the story of Alexander the Great giving someone a whole city, much to the recipient's distress.

74 **Omnino amicitiae ... praeditos dilexerunt:** the question of the appropriateness of services to friends leads Laelius to consider which categories of people have a claim to our friendship and hence our *beneficia.* Modifying his earlier claim that old friends are best (67–8), he now states that true friendships are only those begun already in adulthood (cf. 33). The sentence structure is non-parallel and elliptical: obligation is first expressed with the passive periphrastic *iudicandae sunt,* while in the second part of the sentence, something like *oportet* must be supplied with *eos habere necessarios.* **corroboratis ... ingeniis et aetatibus:** in other words, once one has reached the mental maturity of an adult. Cf., e.g., *Cael.* 11 *cum iam sese corroborauisset ac uir inter uiros esset.* **iudicandae:** on the importance of judgment in forming friendships, see 62, 84. **uenandi aut pilae:** typical adolescent pastimes; it may not be a coincidence that hunting was an important activity for Scipio himself in his youth (Polyb. 31.29.3–10). **dilexerunt:** the subject ("they") is the implied subject of the indirect statement *habere.* **isto enim modo ... plurimum beneuolentiae postulabunt:** if childhood friends had a claim on our friendship by virtue of length of association (*iure uetustatis*), then by the same token (*isto ... modo*) the servants who looked after us when we were children would have even more of a right. The future *postulabunt* expresses a counterfactual: it is what will happen if, and only if, we accept the posited *ius uetustatis.* **nutrices et paedagogi:** slaves who look after children: nurses take care of infants, *paedagogi* walk older children to school. They deserve affection and support, but not *amicitia,* as they are too distant in status (and age). **alio quodam modo aestimandi:** *aestimandi* is Mommsen's emendation of the MSS' *est* (old servants should not be neglected, but valued differently from other friends); Powell instead indicates a lacuna after *est.* **aliter ... non possunt:** youthful relationships that are the product of immature affection cannot last: the next sentence generalizes about the varieties of instability that bar true friendship. **dispares ... disparia ... dissimilitudo dissociat:** the anaphora reflects Laelius' taste for creating emphasis by repeating words and syllables; compare Cato's aphorism at 76 *dissuendae ... discindendae.* So too *studia* here looks back to *studiosi* and

studio at the beginning of the paragraph and is echoed by *studiorum* at the end. Note also the careful balance of *boni improbis, improbi bonis* in the next clause. **dissimilitudo:** just as similarity in character brings about friendship (cf. 50n. *similitudo*), dissimilarity dissolves it. **nec ob aliam causam ... nisi** "for no other reason ... than that." **boni improbis:** invoking the greatest possible dissimilarity in character, Laelius refers back to, and further justifies, his definition of true friendship (18): since one can be friends only with those like oneself, the good can be friends only with the good and never with the wicked. **distantia:** the abstract noun is found only here in C., and elsewhere in Republican Latin only in Lucretius; it is more commonly used of physical separation of objects in technical writers (e.g., Vitruvius and Columella). Its placement as the last word in the sentence is iconic, expressive of the "greatest possible distance."

75 **Recte etiam ... utilitates amicorum:** Laelius continues his discussion of the appropriateness of services rendered to friends, but switches the perspective from the would-be granter of *beneficia* to the would-be recipient: we should not ask our friends to do things for us that are against their interests. **praecipi:** as elsewhere (16, 42, 60), Laelius assumes a didactic tone; *praecipi* is an impersonal passive followed by a noun clause. **intemperata ... beneuolentia:** *beneuolentia* is a defining element of friendship (19n.), but it too has limits (here C. may be following the Aristotelian idea that virtues occupy a mean between extremes). This clause elaborates (thus *etiam*) on what was said about *beneuolentia* toward former nurses and *paedagogi* in the previous paragraph, but now the roles are changed: excessive *beneuolentia* is no longer what is unfairly demanded of a friend (as in 74 *plurimum beneuolentiae postulabunt*), but is instead the characteristic of friends who, motivated by their affection, make unfair demands. **utilitates:** see 26n. **ut ad fabulas redeam:** cf. 70n. *in fabulis*. **Neoptolemus ... Lycomedem:** Neoptolemus (also called Pyrrhus), the son of Achilles and Deidameia, the daughter of king Lycomedes of Skyros, was raised by his maternal grandfather (Hom. *Il.* 19.326) and brought to Troy after his father's death (*Od.* 11.508–9); it had been prophesied that his participation was necessary for the defeat of Troy, and he was instrumental in sacking the city (cf. *Troiam ... capere potuisset*). **multis cum lacrimis:** Lycomedes' emotional reluctance to part with his grandson featured in Sophocles' *Skyrioi* as well as in Accius' *Neoptolemus* (frr. 181–94 Dangel). **magnae res:** presumably matters of public importance. In conflicts between personal and public responsibilities, for C. the latter always take precedence; cf. Laelius' condemnation of Blossius' elevation of friendship over civic duty (37). Anyone placing

personal desire over public duty is *infirmus* and *mollis* – and hence not a suitable friend. **desiderium non facile ferat ... infirmus est mollisque natura:** the inability to control one's desire is described as a lack of moral fiber, with "weakness" and "softness" conjuring up connotations of unmanliness. **parum iustus:** in that justice (at least in an Aristotelian view) requires the proper distribution of goods and rights, it is unjust to overemphasize private desires over public needs; a person who does so lacks justice and hence *uirtus* (cf. *Off.* 1.20 on the centrality of justice in *uirtus*) – and is therefore not a reliable friend.

76 quid postules ... a te impetrari: cf. 40, 44. Friendship being a reciprocal relationship, both the granting and the demanding of services must be equally subject to careful analysis and kept within the proper limits. **Est etiam quaedam calamitas in amicitiis dimittendis nonnumquam necessaria** "There also sometimes arises a certain inevitable misfortune of having to end friendships." The question of when and how a friendship ought to be terminated was an established topic of popular and philosophical discourse (see esp. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 9.3 and generally Fürst 1996 on ancient treatments of conflict within friendship), and Laelius discusses the topic through 78. He considers two scenarios: serious misbehavior by one friend (76) and divergence of interests and opinions, especially in political matters (77). Friendships in which this sort of thing happens by definition do not qualify as the true and hence eternal (32) friendship between good and wise men that Laelius has been talking about; even so, such flawed relationships should ideally be gently relaxed over time, with abrupt breakups reserved only for egregious cases. **iam enim ... oratio nostra delabitur:** Laelius' discourse has been about the best sort of friendship, which can only exist among good men (18), who are also (in the non-technical sense) *sapientes*. Here he turns to explore the more common (*uulgaris*) conception of friendship, the kind that exists among people who are not necessarily wise or entirely virtuous (cf. 22, 77, 100). **iam** "starting now"; however, one could argue that Laelius has been considering less-than-perfect friendships already in previous paragraphs. Throughout *Amic.*, the dividing line between "true" and "common" friendships remains blurred (see Introduction 3(*c*)). **delabitur** expresses a movement from a higher to a lower level or topic; cf. *Part. or.* 12 *a maioribus ad minora delabimur.* **erumpunt ... redundet:** the imagery is of water: the bad behavior of a friend bursting out (*erumpunt*) as if from a broken dam or overflowing river and spreading in a flood (*redundet*, a word of which C. is fond). **uitia amicorum ... in ipsos amicos ... ad amicos:** there is a change of referent from one party in a friendship to the other: the vices of bad friends (*uitia amicorum*) are directed against their

friends (*in ipsos amicos*) or otherwise affect them (*ad amicos*). **infamia** is not being used in the technical legal sense of formal disgrace following conviction for certain offenses, but the presence of quasi-legal language in this and the following sentence (*infamia, iniuria, alienatio*) complements the moral language (*uitia, rectum, honestum*) in stressing the seriousness of the problem. **tales igitur ... facienda sit:** even if a friend has been found vicious, one should ideally simply reduce contact (*remissione usus*) and thus "wash out" (*eluendae*) the friendship like a stain (cf. 2*Verr.* 5.121 *maculas furtorum ... eluere*) and "tease (it) apart rather than tear (it) apart" (*dissuendae magis quam discindendae*) – unless an outrageous misdeed makes an immediate breakup a moral imperative. Laelius credits this advice to Cato; it is ascribed to "wise men" at *Off.* 1.120 *amicitias quae minus delectent et minus probentur magis decere censent sapientes sensim diluere quam repente praecidere.* **dissuendae** "unstitch, unravel," a metaphor from sewing. **ut Catonem dicere audiui:** although this could mean simply "I heard that Cato said," Laelius is clearly claiming that he himself heard Cato proffer this bit of advice (for the construction, cf. also 88 *nostros senes commemorare audiui*; *TLL audio* 112a), contributing further to the sense of overlapping past and present conversations on friendship beyond the boundaries of *Amic.* itself (see 33n. *saepissime inter me et Scipionem* and Introduction 3(*a*)); another Catonian saying is reported in 90. C. may have invented the aphorism or found it in an actual Catonian work (it has made it into editions of Cato's writings as *Dicta* 52 Cugusi and Sblendorio Cugusi); the alliterative aphorism *dissuendae ... discindendae* sounds Catonian (see Cugusi and Sblendorio Cugusi 2001: II 490 n. 52), but may be C.'s homage to a writer he admired. **alienatio:** the technical term for transferring ownership of property.

77 **sin autem ... dissensio intercesserit:** the second reason for an end to friendship is the disagreement of friends in terms of character (*morum*), interests (*studiorum*), or politics (*in rei publicae partibus*). Scipio (as reported by Laelius) had already given these causes for the failure of youthful friendships to last (33–4); here, as there, it is political differences that receive the greatest emphasis. **in rei publicae partibus** "in taking a political position" (*OLD pars* 16a "party"). **loquor ... de communibus amicitiis:** see 76n. *iam enim ... oratio nostra delabitur.* **cauendum erit ... susceptae uideantur:** as before (76), Laelius advises dissolving the friendship in a non-confrontational way to avoid the creation of *inimicitiae* (see 34n., 60n., 78). The careful balance between *amicitiae depositae* and *inimicitiae susceptae* emphasizes the danger that the end of a friendship may create. **nihil enim est ... familiariter uixeris:** the sentence has a proverbial ring; for the phrasing with the comparative, see 20n.

nihil melius. Laelius' language for (political) disagreement has become ever starker (*dissensio* to *inimicitiae* to *bellum gerere*), before returning in the following sentence to the calmer emotions desirable in such a situation. **ab amicitia ... se remouerat:** in 142, Q. Pompeius (a protégé of Scipio's) promised to support Laelius' candidacy for the consulate of 141, but suddenly reversed his position, campaigned for himself, and was elected consul while Laelius was defeated (and became consul the next year). Scipio ended their *amicitia* on Laelius' account (*meo nomine*). The more violent (and in fact fatal) breach of friendship that provides the occasion for Scaevola's report of the conversation of *Amic.* in 88 (see 2n. *P. Sulpicio ... Q. Pompeio*) involved the son or grandson of this same Pompeius. On the breach between Scipio and Q. Pompeius, see Astin 1967: 121–3, 311–12. **propter dissensionem ... Metello:** it is not certain when Scipio and Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus (cos. 143) first fell out with each other, but C. in *Rep.* 1.31 has Laelius refer to Metellus as a leader of the *obtrectatores et inuidi Scipionis* in 129. See Astin 1967: 312–15. **a collega nostro:** like Scipio, Laelius, and Laelius' sons-in-law, Metellus Macedonicus was a member of the college of augurs. **grauiter ... non acerba:** in Laelius' view, Scipio is always the exemplar of proper behavior; and C. may in fact have believed in Scipio's restraint and courtesy. But Scipio's quarrels, particularly those mentioned here with Pompeius and Metellus, do not seem to have lacked anger and bitterness, and there is good evidence that he was as high-handed toward his colleagues as he was high-minded in Laelius' and C.'s view. See Astin 1967: 18–19, 88–90. **offensione animi non acerba** "without displaying bitter resentment" (*OLD offensio* 6b).

78 **Quam ob rem ... neue non dignos:** Laelius summarizes the previous argument and extends it: divisions between friends should be avoided; if unavoidable, they should be allowed to happen gradually, because from sudden ruptures come *inimicitiae*, and even those should be borne as forbearingly as possible. Because of these threats, it is of paramount importance not to enter friendships lightly. The paragraph is an example of Laelius' exhortative style (see Introduction 4(*a*)), containing four passive periphrastic constructions (*danda opera est, cauendum, ferendae sunt, tribuendus*), most of them extended by *ne-* and *ut*-clauses containing further instructions. **exstinctae ... oppressae:** for the opposition of these two verbs (*exstinguere* "burn out" for a gradual and natural end, *opprimere* for a violent and sudden one), cf. *Sen.* 71, where *opprimere* is used for the deaths of young men, *exstinguere* for those of the old. The range of metaphors for the termination (gradual or sudden) of a friendship in 76–8 is notable, involving flood, fabric, fire, warfare, and crushing.

iurgia maledicta contumeliae: in ascending length and seriousness: *iurgia* are quarrels, *maledicta* verbal assaults, and *contumeliae* can involve genuine violence. Each of them can be an element of *iniuria* "outrage" (see below), an offense that may be subject to legal action. Lists of three elements in asyndeton are far more common in Latin than coordinated tricola (and than asyndeton of two elements); they are emphatic (and often, as here, with words of increasing seriousness) and have a mildly archaic flavor, but became such a trite rhetorical mannerism after C. as to be criticized by the elder Seneca (*Controv.* 2.4.12) as something *quae basilicani* (i.e., lawyers) *sectantur.* Cf. 88 *uelit anquirat desideret,* 91 *adulationem blanditiam assentationem,* 95 *constantem seuerum grauem* and comm. on *Fam.* 11.27.2 below; see further K–S II 152–3; H–S 830; Adams 2021: 14–16, 192–210. **quae tamen ... patiatur iniuriam:** if possible, we should tolerate even the displayed enmity of a former friend, so as not to put ourselves at fault (*in culpa*) in any way, leaving all the blame to the offending party (*ut is in culpa sit* is either a result clause or a noun clause explaining what *hic honos* consists in). Laelius may be concerned with appearances (by taking the moral high road and not repaying insults, the offended party shows himself in the best light), but there is also the ethical imperative of not committing *iniuria,* possibly influenced by the Socratic position that it is better to suffer than to commit injustice (Pl. *Grg.* 469b8–c2). **una cautio ... una prouisio:** while *cautio* is fairly common (particularly as a legal term for documents intended to protect various forms of property rights), the abstract *prouisio* is found in classical Latin only in C. The two mean roughly the same thing, precautions taken to avoid a foreseeable problem (cf. *Rosc. Am.* 117 *cauti prouidique*), here expressed by the preceding objective genitives; like many abstract words of this form, they indicate a future possibility. The repetition of *una* is emphatic: "the one and only" way to avoid such problems. **ut ne nimis ... non dignos:** cf. 62–6. **ut ne:** see 42n. *ut ... ne existiment ita se alligatos ut ... non discedant.*

79 **quibus in ipsis est causa cur diligantur** "those who have within themselves the reason for being cherished." *quibus* is dative of possession. As Laelius emphasized earlier (esp. 27–30), *amicitia* begins when we are attracted to the inherent qualities (*uirtus* above all) of a potential friend. **rarum genus:** like 67 *indigna homine dubitatio* and 71 *odiosum sane genus hominum,* the phrase is at once a summary of the preceding sentence and a judgment that is almost an exclamation. In each of these cases (as in 30 *quid enim? Africanus indigens mei?* or *Fam.* 11.27.3 *hoc ipsum quanti*) a form of *sum* is omitted, as frequently in exclamations or rhetorical questions; *sum* is also often omitted in proverbial expressions such as the two immediately following. Cf. K–S I 10–11; H–S 419–22.

omnia praeclara rara: proverbial (Otto 1890 *rarus* 1); cf. also *Fin.* 2.81 *optimum quidque rarissimum est.* **nec quidquam difficilius:** a variation of Laelius' favorite *nihil-ius* construction (see 20n. *nihil melius*). **omni ex parte ... perfectum:** *omni ex parte* "in every aspect, from every direction" needs to be qualified by *in suo genere*: absolute perfection is sought only within the context of particular types of object or person. Zeuxis famously needed multiple models for his picture of Helen, *quod nihil simplici in genere omnibus ex partibus perfectum natura expoliuit* (*Inv. rhet.* 2.3); the Academic Antiochus and the great orators Crassus and Antonius are called *in suo genere perfectus* (*Leg.* 1.54; *De or.* 3.16). **neque:** here equivalent to *et non*, with parallel *et* introducing the next clause. **fructuosum ... fructum:** the repetition emphasizes the profit motive of most people. **pecudes:** for the comparison of friends to livestock, cf. 62.

80 **pulcherrima:** cf. 55 *optimam et pulcherrimam uitae ... supellectilem.* **naturali:** the idea that friendship arises from nature is central to Laelius' exposition; see 27n. *quapropter a natura ... esset habitura.* **per se et propter se:** *per se* (repeated in the next sentence) refers to the idea that friendship is natural, and hence to be sought on its own account; *propter se* presumably refers to its actual importance in one's life. The combination of these phrases is emphatic (cf. *Fin.* 5.44, where the *summum bonum* is to be sought as a whole *propter se* because its individual elements have been shown to be desirable *per se*; *expeto* is again the verb used). So too the placement of *haec uis amicitiae* before its clause, and the combination of *qualis et quanta.* **nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt:** double dative. People fail to be "an example for themselves" by not realizing that the love they naturally feel for themselves is of the same kind as that felt for a friend. **ipse enim ... carus est:** that humans, just like other animals (cf. 81), naturally love themselves was a belief shared by Stoics (cf. *Fin.* 3.16) and Antiocheans (cf. *Fin.* 5.24). This self-love is both a model for friendship and, as it were, a first step to the natural love we feel for other people (see 81 *primum ... deinde*). Laelius appears to combine this idea of spontaneous affection for both self and others with the more idiosyncratic Aristotelian argument that friendship arises from self-love because what we observe and love in our friend is a version of ourselves (*Eth. Nic.* 9.4 and 8). **mercedem:** cf. 79 *fructum*: friendship is its own reward and needs no other profit. The idea of seeking a reward from oneself exposes the absurdity of instrumental friendship. **quod ... idem:** *idem* here is neuter, agreeing with *quod*; in *alter idem* below, it is masculine. **alter idem:** cf. 23n. *tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui*, 56n. *eodem modo ... nosmet ipsos.* The idea of the friend as "another self" is central to Aristotle (ἄλλος αὐτός, *Eth. Nic.*

9, 1166a32; ἕτερος αὐτός, 1169b6–7, 1170b6–7) and becomes proverbial (Bohnenblust 1905: 39–40).

81 quod si hoc apparet in bestiis ... quanto id magis in homine fit: animal behavior is used as an a fortiori argument to explain human nature; cf. 27n. *in bestiis quibusdam.* **uolucribus ... feris:** the five epithets attached to *bestiis* fall into two categories: the first three describe their habitats (air, water, land), the other two their character (tame or wild). For the opposition between *ferus* and *cicur*, cf. Varro, *Ling.* 7.91 *quod enim a fero discretum, id dicitur cicur.* **primum ut se ipsae diligant:** a noun clause. What is described here is part of the Stoic process of *oikeiōsis*, through which all creatures begin with inborn self-love and then expand that affection in ever-increasing circles; humans, ideally, reach a sense of community with the entire cosmos. Here the process extends only to all creatures' desire for others similar to themselves (*eiusdem generis animantes*), which is seen as analogical to human love (*quadam similitudine amoris humani*). **animante ... animantes:** *animans* (here feminine, but found in all three genders) is applicable to any creature with an *anima*, i.e., all living creatures. **se applicent:** cf. 27n. *applicatione ... animi.* **anquirit:** the majority of instances of *anquiro* are found in C. and used for intensive and deliberate searching (including criminal investigations). Laelius uses it four times (cf. 87, 88, 102), while its less intensive near-equivalent *requiro* is found only once, earlier in this sentence. **cuius animum ... unum e duobus:** cf. 92 *ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus.* That friends share "one soul" is cited as proverbial already by Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 9, 1168b7; cf. Otto 1890 *animus* 1; Bohnenblust 1905: 40).

82 peruerse ... impudenter: the first adverb indicates bad judgment; the second is deliberately bad behavior. *ne dicam* "not to say" is used to introduce a worse or more unpalatable alternative (e.g., *Nat. D.* 1.59 *in tam leues ne dicam in tam ineptas sententias*). It constitutes a form of *praeteritio*: Laelius really means the worse alternative but is claiming not to. **habere talem ... ab eis desiderant:** most people, Laelius maintains, are looking for friends who have qualities that they themselves do not possess, in order to enjoy their services without reciprocating – an attitude that flies in the face of the disinterested friendship based on equal moral worth that Laelius has been promoting. The sentence is carefully balanced: in the first half (*habere ... possunt*) the subordinate clause follows, and in the second half (*quaeque ... desiderant*) it precedes the main clause. *amic-* and *ipsi* are repeated in the two halves, while *habere ... uolunt* is balanced by *desiderant* and *talem ... quales* by *quaeque ... haec.* **par est autem:** *autem*

here seems to be strongly adversative: "but in fact it is fair." **ipsum esse uirum bonum ... quaerere:** the infinitive phrase (with accusative subject) is the subject of *est*, and *par* is formally predicative: "that one should be a good man oneself ... and look for ... is fair." *ipsum* is the person seeking to establish a friendship; *alterum* is the looked-for friend. *primum ... tum* is both chronological and logical: one must first be a good person and then think about finding a friend, and one must logically be a good person in order to be able to establish a friendship, given that true friendship can only take place between good people (cf. 18). **in talibus:** *sc. amicis* or *uiris* "among such men." **quam iamdudum tractamus stabilitas:** *stabilitas* of friendship has indeed been a major theme of Laelius' discourse; cf. 23, 52, 55, 62, 64–5, 74. **cum homines ... ab altero postulabit:** Laelius names five conditions for a stable friendship: (i) the friendship must be based on mutual good will (i.e., affection rather than the seeking of advantage); the friends must (ii) control their desires and (iii) practice the virtues; and they (iv) must do everything for each other but (v) never ask for anything that is not honorable. Condition (i) is implicit in the subject *homines beneuolentia coniuncti*, after which *primum ... deinde* introduces the friends' qualities, which are expressed (ii) negatively (control over desires) and (iii) positively (pleasure in justice), while *omniaque ... neque quidquam* describes (in the singular) first (iv) positively and then (v) negatively the reciprocal obligations of friendship, using the careful balance of *alter pro altero suscipiet* and *alter ab altero postulabit*. **beneuolentia:** see 19n. **cupiditatibus eis ... seruiunt imperabunt:** the ability to control one's desires was generally considered a necessary element of virtue. At Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.1, Socrates names it as the first quality we should look for in a friend. *seruiunt* and *imperabunt* are pointedly placed next to each other. **nisi honestum et rectum:** a restatement of Laelius' "law" (40, 44). **inter se** "one another" (A&G 145c, 301f). **uerebuntur ... uerecundiam:** true friends have a sense of reverence or shame in regard to each other, which prevents them from acting unethically and thus contributes to making friendship productive of virtue rather than vice, as Laelius discusses in what follows (cf. Lossmann 1962: 65–111). The connection between *uereor* and *uerecundia* elsewhere seems to be made explicitly only in a tragic fragment quoted by C. at *Inv. rhet.* 1.83 (also *Rhet. Her.* 2.42). *uerecundia*, the proper sense of respect and humility before others, is both personal and political; cf. *Rep.* 5.6; *Leg.* 1.50; and the distinction made at *Off.* 1.99 *iustitiae partes sunt non uiolare homines, uerecundiae non offendere.* See further Kaster 2005: 13–27, 61–5.

83 **Itaque in eis ... in amicitia licentiam:** for Laelius' criticism of the idea that friendship legitimizes, as it were, partnership in crime, see 35–44,

esp. 37 *nulla est igitur excusatio peccati si amici causa peccaueris.* **uirtutum amicitia adiutrix:** for C.'s taste for this kind of personified abstraction, see 37n. *conciliatrix*, 89 *assentatio uitiorum adiutrix*, and – in a description of the Epicurean view of friendship – *Fin.* 1.67 *amicitiae ... fautrices ... effectrices ... uoluptatum.* For the close relationship between *uirtus* and *amicitia*, see 20, 27–30, 37, 48–9, 100, 102, 104. At *Tusc.* 5.5, it is philosophy that is called *uirtutis indagatrix expultrixque uitiorum.* **a natura data est:** in 20, friendship was said to be *a dis immortalibus datum.* For the natural origin of friendship, see 27n. *quapropter a natura ... esset habitura.* **quoniam solitaria ... cum altera peruenirent:** as Laelius says below, 88 *natura solitarium nihil amat.* The idea that *uirtus* cannot be complete (*ad ea quae summa sunt peruenire*) without participation in a community is Aristotelian, not only in the general sense that humans are creatures that live in a polis (*Pol.* 1, 1253a3 πολιτικὸν ζῷον), but specifically because some forms of virtue (e.g., *beneuolentia*) require another person as recipient; cf. 19n. *ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam.* Here, Laelius seems to suggest additionally that friends will inspire each other to exercise their virtues, and support each other in the pursuit of their virtuous goals. **coniuncta et consociata:** the pairing of words that are closely related in meaning (hendiadys) is a regular Ciceronian pattern (here surrounded by *peruenire ... peruenirent*, a kind of repetition that seems to characterize Laelius more than C.); for this pairing, cf. *Fin.* 3.66 (on a similar theme) *inter nos natura ad ciuilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus.* Here (as at *Fin.* 3.66–7) *consociatus* is followed by *societas* (further emphasized by being repeated in 84), just as *comes* is followed by *comitatus.* **cum altera** "together with another (virtue)"; personified virtue (which cannot be "lonely" and needs a partner) stands metonymically for the person who possesses virtue (and needs a friend). **quae si quos inter ... comitatus** "if this kind of partnership (*quae* is a connecting relative, referring back to *societas*) exists ... among any people (*quos* instead of *aliquos* after *si*), their (*eorum* refers back to *quos*) association is to be considered ..." **quos inter:** the placement of the preposition after the word it governs (anastrophe) generally occurs only with disyllabic prepositions and is common with pronouns. It here iconically stresses the close "inter"connection of friends. **aut est aut fuit aut futura est:** this combination of past, present, and future is solemn (and Homeric in origin: *Il.* 1.70). **ad summum naturae bonum:** as *uirtutum adiutrix*, friendship leads to the highest moral good. Throughout *Amic.*, friendship is associated or even identified with the *summum bonum*; cf. 17n. *ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis* and Laelius' further discussion in 84. **comitatus:** a group of companions, most frequently used for the retinue of a (great) man, but also the abstract concept of companionship (*OLD* 3).

84 **haec est ... esse non possit:** friendship, defined as the *societas* of two virtuous people, guarantees all other goods and hence the *uita beata*. This is one of the strongest statements in *Amic.* of Laelius' idea that friendship is the *summum bonum* (cf. *optimum maximumque* in the following sentence and see further 17n. *ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis*). The problem (addressed differently at different points in the dialogue) of how *amicitia* relates to another strong contender for the *summum bonum*, namely virtue, is here solved not only by making true friendship once more dependent on virtue (see the following sentence), but also by the claim in 83 that virtue itself needs *societas* to be effective. **inquam:** emphatic; cf. 100 *Virtus, uirtus inquam.* **quae putant ... atque iucunditas:** other putative (highest) goods, which according to Laelius are included in friendship. These are a somewhat odd mix of philosophical and non-philosophical ideals: *honestas* "honorableness; the morally good" would seem to be the Stoic *summum bonum*, but also a Roman social value (see 40n. *turpes ... turpis*); *gloria* is an aristocratic ideal not much approved of by philosophers; and *tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas* points to Epicurean *ataraxia* and pleasure (though C. avoids the more technical *uoluptas*, a word that for him has only negative connotations). *tranquillitas* and *iucunditas* are clearly a pair: the two concepts go together (see *Rep.* 1.1; Val. Max. 7.2.1), and C. rarely if ever puts a conjunction only before the last element of a series (cf. Adams 2021: 195–7). **beata uita:** see 15n. *beate uixisse.* **quod cum optimum maximumque sit:** the connecting relative refers back to the concept expressed in the entire previous sentence: virtuous friendship that leads to all other goods and the *uita beata*. This is now pronounced the "best and greatest," i.e., the *summum bonum*. **errasse** harks back to 83 *error*; both refer to the intellectual and ethical mistake of divorcing friendship from virtue. **cum eos grauis aliquis casus experiri cogit:** the test of friendship is some serious misfortune; cf. 64. *experiri* is used absolutely.

85 **quocirca:** a somewhat formal inferential particle (cf. 14, 23), always introducing a sentence that concludes an argument; C. uses it almost exclusively in philosophical works and twice in the solemn final paragraphs of speeches (*Dom.* 144; *Deiot.* 43). **dicendum est enim saepius:** Laelius refers back to his previous discussions (62, 78) of the importance of choosing friends wisely. **cum iudicaris ... iudicare:** a much-cited maxim by Theophrastus (Fürst 1996: 125–6), given by Plut. *De frat. amor.* 8, 482b as οὐ φιλοῦντα δεῖ κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ κρίναντα φιλεῖν. **neglegentia plectimur** "we suffer on account of our carelessness"; *plectimur* lit. "we are beaten" is used only in the passive and generally, as here, in the metaphorical sense. **praeposteris ... consiliis:** *praeposterus* in its literal

sense: "in the wrong order." We use *consilium* only after our emotions are engaged, but it should be the other way around. **acta agimus:** proverbial, as Laelius says (Otto 1890 *agere* 2), and thus colloquial; it is found in comedy and is used by C. twice in letters to Atticus (9.6.7, 9.18.3). It is in origin a legal phrase for an attempt to revisit a case that has already been decided. **nam implicati ... dirumpimus:** thoughtlessly entered friendships create a mutual (*ultro et citro*) entanglement (*implicati*) through daily interactions (*usu diurno*) and the creation of obligations (*officiis*), which in the case of a crisis needs to be broken (*dirumpimus*). The *offensio* here is presumably the same as the *uitia* mentioned in 76, rounding off this section of Laelius' argument.

86 Quo ... magis "all the more," presumably because of the harm that lack of attention to friendship can cause. **incuria:** serious neglect, often causing damage: C.'s only other use of the word describes the harm Piso caused his soldiers: *Prov. cons.* 5 *incuria fame morbo uastitate consumpti.* **una est enim ... uno ore consentiunt:** at 24, Laelius used the argument *e consensu omnium* to argue that all people, including the non-elite, cherish friendship (see 24n. *omnes mortales*); here, his discussion of different types of people, their values, and lifestyles appears to allude to different philosophical schools and the different ways of life identified by philosophers. Once more, friendship emerges as a kind of *summum bonum* (see 17n. *ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis*), one that everyone can agree on (*de amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt*, below). **utilitate:** elsewhere, Laelius inveighs against viewing *amicitia* as primarily a matter of *utilitas/utilitates* (26, 27, 30, 32, 51, 100). Here, he slyly formulates this first sentence of his argument in such a way that even the most hard-nosed businessman or most utilitarian Epicurean could agree (everybody believes in the "usefulness" of *amicitia*), only then to broaden the discussion and view friendship among a wide range of goods or things that people judge to be valuable or "admirable" (*admirabilia*, below). **quamquam a multis ... pro nihilo putent:** logically, everything from *quamquam* through *putent* should constitute one concessive clause ("although there is great disagreement about all other putative goods ..."), followed by the main clause *de amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt* ("everybody agrees on the value of friendship"). However, the concessive section is so long that its clauses take on lives of their own (most notably, the exclamation *quam multi ita contemnunt ut ... existiment!*); it thus makes more sense to view this as a case of anacoluthon, a series of juxtaposed sentences with no strict hypotactical structure. Laelius contrasts the values held by many people (*a multis ... multi ... multi ... permulti*), but no means by all, with the universal agreement on friendship

(*omnes uno ore* in the previous, *omnes ad unum* in this sentence). The goods considered are *uirtus* (a traditional Roman value, but also the *summum bonum* of the Stoics and prized by all philosophies), wealth (popularly deemed desirable, but also an external good according to Aristotle and the Antiocheans), and honors/public office (ditto). Cf. 20n. *diuitias alii ... summum bonum ponunt.* **uirtus ipsa contemnitur:** Laelius presumably is attacking the Epicureans, unfairly: they do not reject *uirtus*, but view it as merely instrumental in the pursuit of pleasure. **uenditatio ... atque ostentatio:** *uenditatio* (hawking something for sale) is very rare, and is explained by *ostentatio* (ostentatious display, parading). While C. obviously does not despise virtue, he often criticizes the pretentious and self-righteous way in which the Stoics promote their *summum bonum*; cf. 21n. *uerborum magnificentia.* **multi diuitias ... cultusque delectat:** disdain for riches is shared by many philosophical schools, but Laelius may once more be thinking of the Epicureans and their promotion of a simple lifestyle. **honores uero ... leuius existiment:** excessive ambition, too, is considered problematic by many philosophical schools, but it is again the Epicureans who are most opposed to the public service that leads to *honores.* **ad unum** "as one, to a man." Laelius uses numbers to emphasize his case: not just the repeated *multi*, but *una ... omnes uno ore ... omnes ad unum.* A less extended example of this is found at 78 *omnino omnium ... . una ... una.* C. employs contrasting quantities (particularly "one" and "all") with great frequency for rhetorical effect, particularly in speeches. **ei qui:** the introductory phrase is used four times, introducing parallel relative clauses describing four possible kinds of life, in descending order of acceptability: public affairs, philosophical study, concentration on one's private affairs, and, last and most disreputable, the life of pleasure. The distinction between different *bioi* or ways of life was a standard philosophical topic, and the first two and the last items on Laelius' list are the categories articulated by Aristotle at the outset of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1095b17–19): public life (*bios politikos*), a life of study (*bios theorētikos*), and a life devoted to pleasure (*bios apolaustikos*), which he considers suitable only for beasts. The third kind of life in Laelius' list, *qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi*, is comparable to the life of moneymaking (*bios chrēmatistikos*) rejected by Aristotle as something undertaken only under compulsion (1096a5–7); C. redescribes this in distinctly Roman terms, using the striking oxymoron of *negotium ... otiosi*: *suum negotium gerere* is to mind one's own business (both literally and figuratively; cf. *Off.* 1.29), in contrast to *rem publicam gerere*, the normal phrase for taking part in public life, while *otiosi* refers to enjoying the *otium* that stands apart from the life of politics. The description is not to be taken as pejorative: it applies,

above all, to Atticus, the addressee of *Amic.*, and other businessmen of the equestrian order (cf. *Att.* 1.17.5, where C. states that Atticus has chosen a life of *honestum otium*). **sine amicitia ... liberaliter uiuere:** the indirect statement with a dependent conditional clause is in apposition to *idem*, explaining what the "same thing" is that all people agree on. **liberaliter** "like a gentleman," i.e., a free man, with the opportunity to make one of the life choices just mentioned.

87 **serpit ... amicitia:** *serpere* is more often used for the stealthy advance of something evil (cf. 41n.), but it sometimes, as here, is used for the gradual spread of something good, e.g., at *Fin.* 5.65, where it describes the gradual expansion of affection from the family to the entire world. The idea is similar to Epicurus' maxim that "Friendship dances around the world announcing to all of us that we must wake up to blessedness" (*Sent. Vat.* 52, trans. Inwood and Gerson). **aetatis degendae rationem:** the choice of lives described in 86. **Quin etiam:** see 59n. **Timonem nescioquem:** Timon is the archetypal misanthrope and a frequent subject of comic treatment in fifth- and fourth-century Athens; he gave up human company and affection through disappointment with his friends. C. refers to him also at *Tusc.* 4.25, 27 for his *odium generis humani*. *nescioquem* could be scornful or otherwise indicate Laelius' pretended ignorance of things Greek; it is striking that he uses forms of *nescioquis* four times in 87–9 and only once elsewhere (100). **pati non possit ut non** "he would not be able to bear not to, he would not be able to do without." **anquirat:** see 81n. **euomat uirus:** even a true misanthrope needs an audience before which to spit out his "poisonous" hostility. The image is vivid and colloquial, used in comedy as well as by C. in speaking of hateful people; cf. *Mil.* 78; *Phil.* 5.20; Ter. *Hec.* 515; *Ad.* 312, 510. Borgo 2002 additionally draws attention to a parallel in Enn. *Ann.* 274–5 Skutsch, the description of the faithful friend to whom the general Servilius *malaque et bona dictu | euomeret*. **hoc maxime iudicaretur** "this would be concluded most easily; one could best reach this judgment" (*OLD iudico* 10). **ut aliquis nos deus:** the image of the potential intervention of a god to change one's life is familiar, e.g., Pl. *Alc.* 1, 105a εἴ τίς σοι εἴποι θεῶν (also *Symp.* 192d); *Tusc.* 2.67 *deus qui dixerit*; *Sen.* 83 *si qui deus*; Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.15 *si quis deus*. **ex hac hominum ... potestatem eriperet:** for the thought experiment, see 52n. *nam quis est ... abundantia uiuere*. **ferreus ... ferre ... auferret:** the paronomasia is deliberate, possibly reflecting a folk etymology. **uoluptatum:** like *utilitas* (86n.), a term elsewhere in *Amic.* associated with Epicureanism but here used more loosely to refer to popular perceptions; cf. *Fin.* 3.65; *Off.* 3.25 in a similar context.

88a quod a Tarentino Archyta ... commemorare audiui "what I have heard our old men recollect was accustomed to be said, I believe, by Archytas of Tarentum." **Tarentino Archyta:** Archytas was a fourth-century Pythagorean. He is the only philosopher named in *Amic.* (see Introduction 3(*c*)), possibly because Pythagoreanism was often regarded as a kind of native Italian philosophy on account of the presence of Pythagoras and numerous followers in southern Italy (in the case of Archytas, Tarentum); see Volk 2016. The alleged source of the story in the oral tradition of Roman old men (see below) likewise brings Archytas into a Roman orbit, setting him apart from the Greek philosophers Laelius never deigns to name. The anecdote reported here (= A7a Huffman) is not otherwise known; for detailed commentary, see Huffman 2005: 293–7. **ut opinor:** having, extraordinarily, named Archytas, Laelius backtracks, claiming not to be entirely sure that the Pythagorean is in fact the source of the saying he is about to report. **dici ... commemorare audiui ... auditum:** a similar fictional oral tradition is given for another anecdote about Archytas at *Sen.* 39–41; there Cato claims to have been told by Nearchus of Tarentum that he had heard *a maioribus natu* about Archytas' discourse on the evils of pleasure (= A9a Huffman). Given the similarity of the two anecdotes, it is likely that we are to think that the first group of *senes* mentioned here is in fact Cato (the *senex* with whom Laelius and Scipio had the conversation reported in *Sen.*); once more, C. shows his protagonist enmeshed in a multigenerational (and, in this case, even bilingual and bicultural) conversation (see Introduction 3(*a*) and (*c*) and 76n. *ut Catonem dicere audiui*). **si quis ... cui narraret habuisset:** Archytas' saying is reported in indirect speech, with *insuauem illam admirationem ei fore* the main clause and apodosis to the preceding conditional *si quis ... perspexisset.* Archytas' thought experiment shows that even the contemplative life, whose pinnacle is traditionally the study of the heavens, holds no attraction if insights cannot be shared with another person. References to a metaphorical ascent to heaven (*in caelum ascendisset*) and to the beauty of the starred sky (*pulchritudinem siderum*) are traditional in descriptions of the contemplation of nature (*naturamque mundi*). However, such a vision of the sublimity of the cosmos is also part of the *Somnium Scipionis* (esp. *Rep.* 6.16). Powell 1988: 182 points out how close "Archytas"' attack on *uoluptas* in *Sen.* 39–41 is to a fragment of C.'s *Hortensius* (84A1 Straume-Zimmermann); so too "Archytas" here is alluding to *Rep.* The connection here is more pointed, as "Archytas" is emphasizing how little we would enjoy such a vision without someone to whom to describe it – as Scipio had in fact described it to Laelius and his other companions shortly before the dramatic date of *Amic.* **insuauem ... iucundissima:** on the sweetness of friendship, see 22n. *quid dulcius.* **natura**

solitarium nihil amat: cf. 83 *solitaria non potest uirtus ad ea quae summa sunt peruenire.* Humans are social animals, and both *uirtus* and the pleasures of life require companionship. **tamquam adminiculum:** *adminicula* are props used to support vines; the word's metaphorical use is indicated by *tamquam.* **quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est:** lit. "which is the sweeter the dearer (the support)," i.e., the most pleasant support in life is that found in a close friend. The antecedent of *quod* is either *adminiculum* or, loosely, the idea expressed in the preceding clause; for this use of *quisque* with the superlative, see A&G 313b.

H. HOW SINCERE SHOULD ONE BE WITH A FRIEND? (88b–100a)

The last major section of Laelius' third speech concerns a topic found in many ancient discussions of friendship: the need for frank speech among friends and, conversely, the danger posed by flattery. It is vital for friends to be able openly to criticize one another and to accept such criticism graciously and gratefully (88b–90). Since, however, even justified admonitions have a tendency to cause resentment, criticism must be proffered tactfully, and the criticized party needs to realize that they stand to profit from having their faults pointed out.

The opposite of the truthful friend is the flatterer, a stock figure whose *modus operandi* Laelius illustrates with quotations from Roman comedy (93, 98, 99; cf. 89, 100). Since true friendship is based on trust, the falsehoods peddled by flatterers are especially pernicious, and it is thus of paramount importance to be able to identify a flatterer (91–5). To show that it is possible to tell true from false friends, Laelius turns to the political arena, pointing to a couple of incidents when the Roman people (guided by such speakers as Scipio and himself) rejected *popularis* initiatives when they realized that certain self-declared friends of the people were not in fact acting in their best interests (95–7).

In the end, those who fall for flatterers have only themselves to blame (97–100): we are all too convinced of our own good qualities and thus at risk of being tricked and ending up as subjects of ridicule, similar to the bamboozled old men of comedy. At this point, however, Laelius realizes that he is no longer speaking about the friendship of wise people and calls on himself to move his speech to conclusion.

88b eadem natura declaret: personified nature was mentioned in the previous sentence for her rejection of solitude; now Laelius states more generally that nature always makes her needs and wants perfectly clear (*eadem* harks back to the earlier mention: Laelius is still talking about "the

same nature"). Although the views of nature here are merely reported, the bluntness of the declaration is reminiscent of the famous speech of Natura at Lucr. 3.933–49. Nature has been an important presence throughout *Amic.*, particularly because friendship is described as natural (esp. 26–7); here it is apparently not merely human nature that is meant, but the broader foundation of the world itself. **uelit anquirat desideret:** cf. 78n. *iurgia maledicta contumeliae.* This is the third of four appearances of *anquirere* (see 81n.); all other times (81, 87, 102) it refers to the human desire for friendship. **obsurdescimus ... nec ... audimus:** the idea that humans have become too familiar with natural phenomena to appreciate or even perceive them occurs in contexts of natural philosophy (see esp. *Nat. D.* 2.96 with Pease 1955–8 *ad loc.*), including at *Rep.* 6.19, about our deafness to the music of the spheres (C. uses *obsurdesco* only there and in this passage, extending the allusion to the *Somnium* from the previous paragraph). Here the image is more concrete: what we do not (want to) hear are the admonishments of personified nature, who is imagined as speaking to us directly (like a mother?). Her just "admonitions" (*monemur*) hint at the admonitions that, as Laelius shows in what follows, are necessary between friends (88 *monendi*, 90 *monentur*, 91 *monere et moneri*). **nescioquo modo** "somehow" both here and at the beginning of 89 indicates a degree of irony; cf. also 100 *nescioquo pacto.* **est enim uarius ... offensionumque dantur:** the logical connection to the previous sentence, expressed by *enim*, is somewhat obscure. Apparently Laelius means to say that what makes people neglect nature's injunction to form and maintain friendships is the fact that actual friendships turn out to be so complex and difficult. Cf. Scipio's pessimistic assessment of the pitfalls of friendship at 33–5. **uarius et multiplex:** C. likes this combination (cf. *Flac.* 6; *Cael.* 14; *Acad. post.* 1.17; *Orat.* 12). Earlier, Laelius criticized a *multiplex ingenium* as something untrustworthy (65), and similarly at 92 he emphasizes the difficulty of friendship with an *animus* that is *uarius commutabilis multiplex.* Here it is not a friend's character that is *multiplex*, but the interaction (*OLD usus* 10) among friends, which can lead to misunderstandings and offenses. **quas tum euitare ... sapientis est:** *sapientis* is genitive of characteristic, qualifying the nominative infinitives *euitare ... eleuare ... ferre.* At 35, Laelius reported Scipio's observation that wisdom may not be sufficient to solve all the problems that can arise in friendship. By contrast, Laelius here offers three ways for the *sapiens* to deal with discord among friends: avoiding it entirely (i.e., making sure either that there are no suspicions or that they are prevented from turning into *offensiones*); eliminating or minimizing it (*eleuare* can also mean "to allay (suspicions)"); or simply living with it, *ferre.* **una illa ... offensio** "the

one (critical) offense" that could destroy a friendship. Laelius does not name the offense, but the following sentence makes clear that it is insincerity, the failure to offer and accept frank criticism. On *utilitas* and *fides*, see below. **nam** introduces an explanation, which – in keeping with Laelius' conversational style – is somewhat elliptical: all that is said is that there is need for critical give and take in friendship; the reader needs to infer that the absence of such criticism is the great *offensio* that must be avoided. **et monendi ... cum beneuole fiunt:** the need for mutual frank criticism (Gk. *parrhēsia*) and its gracious acceptance is a major topic in ancient discussions of friendship (see Bohnenblust 1905: 35–6; Fürst 1996: 109–12, 203–5; Konstan 1996, 1997: 103–5; and, for its Roman context, Habinek 1990). Without such openness, the friendship – as Laelius pointed out in the previous sentence – lacks its crucial *fides* "trust" (see 65n.) and loses any *utilitas* it might have had.

89 nescioquo modo: see 88n. **in Andria familiaris meus:** the poet Terence; the verse quoted is *An.* 68. *familiaris* is used here rather than *amicus*, in all likelihood because of the social distance between Laelius and Terence (Konstan 1997: 135). Like the earlier mention of a tragedy by Laelius' *hospes* and *amicus* Pacuvius (24n.), this and the following references to Terence encouraged the modern belief in a "Scipionic Circle," which included contemporary poets (cf. Introduction 3(*a*)). Suet. *Vita Terenti* 2–4 provides ample evidence for the ancient belief that Laelius or Scipio (or both) were actually responsible for writing Terence's comedies, and Terence himself in the prologue to his last play (*Ad.* 15–21) alludes proudly to the rumor that *homines nobiles* had assisted him in his writing. But as even Suetonius recognizes, Scipio was probably only 19 when *Andria* was performed (25 for *Adelphoe*), and that does not fit with Terence's reference to the services to Rome *in bello in otio in negotio* of the unnamed *homines* at *Ad.* 20. See also Hanchey 2013b. **obsequium ... parit:** the line became proverbial (Otto 1890 *veritas* 3). In context, the freedman Sosia is picking up on his interlocutor Simo's favorable use of *obsequi* (*An.* 64) as "to be easygoing or compliant," but by contrasting it with *ueritas* gives *obsequium* the negative meaning of "flattery" or "slavishness." See Goldberg 2022 *ad loc.* **molesta ueritas ... ferri sinit:** in correcting Terence's aphorism, Laelius reverses the order, dealing first with *ueritas*, then with *obsequium*, showing that while the former can be annoying, the latter is in fact much worse. The first clause of each half of the sentence has no verb; supply *est*. **uenenum amicitiae:** cf. the similar *pestis* (*Amic.* 34, 91); both terms are combined at Catull. 77.5–6. **praecipitem ... ferri** "to be carried headlong," i.e., to behave without constraint.

maxima ... culpa ... obsequio impellitur: the person flattering is bad enough; the person who gets into trouble (*fraus* refers to dishonest or dishonorable conduct in general, not just deceit) because he believes the flattery is even worse. **habenda ratio et diligentia est:** in what follows, Laelius provides a brief guide to frank criticism in friendship, stressing that it must be proffered tactfully (89 *monitio acerbitate ... obiurgatio contumelia careat*, 89 *comitas adsit*, 91 *non aspere*) and accepted gracefully (91 *patienter ... non repugnanter*). Most importantly, exchanges must be guided by truth (90 *ueritati*, 90 *uerum*) and aimed at preventing moral fault (89 *uitiorum*, 90 *peccasse*, 90 *delicto*); the openness of such discourse is characteristic of free men (89 *libero*, 91 *libere*). More extended ancient discussions of the art of frank criticism (with some of the same advice) can be found in Philodemus, *On Frank Criticism* (see Glad 1996; Konstan et al. 1998) and Plutarch, *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 26–37. **monitio ... obiurgatio:** *monitio* is found only here in C., who (like most authors) generally uses *admonitio*; the choice may reflect the repeated use of *monere* in this passage (88 (2×), 90, 91 (2×)), while *admonere* appears only once (99). At *De or.* 2.339, in a discussion of the ways in which an orator can deal with a hostile crowd, *obiurgatio* is said to be used by speakers with *auctoritas*, while *admonitio* is defined as *quasi lenior obiurgatio*. The same relationship (in reverse order) applies here: *monitio* might be prone to *acerbitas*, but the *contumelia* associated with *obiurgatio* is something rather stronger (see 78n. *iurgia maledicta contumeliae*). **Terentiano uerbo:** C. means that he is using the word Terence employed in the verse just quoted, not that the word *obsequium* was first used by Terence, as Quintilian seems to have thought (8.3.35). **comitas** "mildness; a light touch"; the opposite of *seueritas* (cf. *Brut.* 148; *Orat.* 34). **assentatio uitiorum adiutrix:** contrast *uirtutum amicitia adiutrix* (83n.). Laelius now abandons Terence's ambiguous *obsequium* in favor of straightforward *assentatio* "flattery," which is grouped with other forms of fawning in 91 (*adulatio, blanditia*). The sentence is composed of a set of antitheses, each phrased slightly differently: *comitas adsit ~ assentatio ... amoueatur, non modo amico ~ sed ne libero quidem; aliter ... cum tyranno ~ aliter cum amico.* **libero:** cf. 91 *libere*. The intercourse of free men is characterized by *libertas* "free speech" (*OLD* 7), the Lat. equivalent of Gk. *parrhēsia*. That this is not just a social but also a political ideal is made clear by the reference to the tyrant immediately following. **tyranno:** the tyrant is the person who can have no friends; see 52–4 with 52n. *tyrannorum uita*. Once more, C. is thinking of Caesar, who both suppressed political free speech and cut himself off from the frank criticism that true friends would have been able to offer (see 52n. *tyrannorum uita*, 53, 54).

90 aures clausae ... audire nequeat: earlier, Laelius spoke of deafness to nature (88n. *obsurdescimus ... nec ... audimus*); now, he refers to the refusal to hear the truth from friends. **salus desperanda:** somewhat hyperbolic: *salutem desperare* is usually used for those who have given up hope of survival, frequently in military contexts. **scitum** "clever," of an aphorism, as here (and likewise of a saying of Cato at *Div.* 2.51); of a plan, e.g., Plaut. *Trin.* 764 *scitum ... consilium*; or of a person, e.g., Ter. *Eun.* 254 *scitum ... hominem.* **Catonis:** the second quotation of an alleged remark by Cato (cf. 76n. *ut Catonem dicere audiui*), though this time Laelius makes no claim to having heard it himself. The saying (*Dicta* 53 Cugusi and Sblendorio Cugusi) may be genuine (it is mentioned, without attribution, by August. *apud* Jer. *Ep.* 110.4, who may however be drawing on C.), but owes much to the proverbial wisdom that one can learn even from enemies (Otto 1890 *hostis* 2). **ut multa** "as (are) many (of his sayings)." **melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri** "harsh enemies do a better service to some people" (*OLD mereo* 6a). **acerbos ... dulces:** the two words are opposites, primarily used of flavors; cf. *Fam.* 3.8.8, where C. quotes a verse (from an unknown comedy) using the same opposition. **qui dulces uideantur:** Laelius has been stressing the sweetness of friendship (see 22n. *quid dulcius*), but false friends only appear to be sweet. **illos ... hos** "the former ... the latter." **atque illud absurdum ... correctione gaudere:** this is presumably Laelius' elaboration on Cato's dictum, but it is clearly written in the same style: the terse antitheses of *quam debent capere ... qua debent uacare, non capiunt, eam capiunt; delicto dolere, correctione gaudere*; the asyndeton between the clauses of the second half of the sentence; the repetitions of *capere, debere*, and *molestiam ... moleste.* **molestiam ... moleste:** cf. 89 *molesta ... molestius.* People have the wrong idea of what constitutes *molestia*: they are annoyed at being criticized, rather than at their own shortcomings. **pecasse enim ... moleste ferunt** "they are not distressed at having done wrong, they are annoyed at being criticized." The indirect statement *pecasse enim se* depends on *anguntur*, just as *obiurgari* (supply *se*) depends on *moleste ferunt.* **quod contra oportebat** "which ought (to happen) in the opposite way." The phrase is elliptical; supply *fieri*; for the present meaning of the imperfect *oportebat*, see A&G 522 Note 1. The things that ought to happen are the indirect statements *delicto dolere, correctione gaudere* (the subject is not expressed; supply *eos*), placed in apposition to *quod contra oportebat.*

91 Vt igitur ... assentationem: the sequence of balances and contrasts continues from the previous paragraph: the reciprocal relationship of giving and receiving advice or criticism (*monere et moneri*) is elaborated in the

balanced infinitive phrases introduced by *alterum*. In each phrase the two adverbs are of the same form: *libere* ... *aspere* and *patienter* ... *repugnanter*, and in each phrase the infinitive is placed between the two adverbs. This set of balances is embedded in the larger parallelism of *ut* ... *sic*, contrasting the positive value of fair and appropriate criticism with the negative value of flattery and fawning. **libere:** see 89n. *libero*. **sic habendum est ... assentationem:** the danger of flattery (the opposite of the frank criticism necessary in friendship) is a major topic in ancient discussions of friendship (Bohnenblust 1905: 31–2; Fürst 1996: 216–22; Konstan 1996, 1997: 98–103), with Plutarch and Maximus of Tyre devoting whole treatises to the question of how to distinguish flatterers from friends. As becomes clear (but is never made explicit) in Laelius' subsequent discussion with its examples drawn from comedy, the potential for flattery arises in relationships between unequals, with the poorer and less powerful "friend" attempting to exploit the vanity of the better-situated partner. In the upper-class setting of both the dialogue and its presumed readership, the fear of such deceit may reflect a real anxiety. **nullam ... pestem esse maiorem quam:** a variation on Laelius' favorite trope of *nihil est* + neuter comparative; see 20n. *nihil melius*. **adulationem blanditiam assentationem:** three different forms of uncritical or false admiration. At *Nat. D.* 2.158, C. includes dogs' *adulatio* of their masters among their good qualities, but here it is clearly not desirable. *assentatio* is derived from *assentor*, the intensive form of *assentior*; both the verb and its derivatives are almost always pejorative. **quamuis ... multis nominibus** "with as many names as you like." **ad uoluptatem ... ad ueritatem:** the alliterative alternatives are expressed in chiastic order, expressing the contrast by the juxtaposition of *omnia* and *nihil* surrounded by the parallel prepositional phrases. The pleasure is that of the person being flattered.

92 cum autem ... repugnat maxime: the first part of the sentence gives a general judgment about *simulatio*, with *uitiosa* picking up *uitium* from the previous sentence; the second half introduces the specific application of this judgment to friendship. *simulatio* is the creation of a false appearance, which is not only ethically wrong but also causes epistemological problems (see next note). **tollit ... adulterat:** because *simulatio* by definition means that one is pretending something that is not true, it removes (*tollit*) our ability to distinguish truth from falsehood. *id* refers back to *ueri* (not *iudicium*): simulation creates a fake or counterfeit "truth." **amicitiae repugnat maxime:** on the danger that *simulatio* poses to friendship, see also 26, 53, 65, 95, 99. **delet enim ueritatem** picks up *ueritatem* from the previous sentence, while making a transition from the general idea of falsity to its specific effect on friendship. **sine qua nomen amicitiae**

ualere non potest "without which the name of friendship can have no meaning"; cf. 19n. *amicitiae nomen tollitur.* **ut unus ... ex pluribus:** noun clause. For friendship as the merging of two souls, see 81n. *cuius animum ... unum e duobus.* **qui id fieri poterit ... uarius commutabilis multiplex:** Laelius somewhat fancifully maintains that the desired "becoming one" of the friends' souls cannot take place if one partner's character is itself not a consistent single entity but characterized by the multiplicity that comes with insincerity. **qui** "how"; interrogative adverb (*OLD qui*[2] 1a), originally an old ablative/instrumental. **quoque:** abl. of *quisque*, agreeing with *uno.* **unus ... idemque:** constancy and consistency over time is a mark of the good person, the kind of friend one wants (cf. 8n. *constanti homini*, 62–5). **uarius ... multiplex:** see 65n. *multiplex ingenium et tortuosum*, 88n. *uarius et multiplex.*

93 flexibile ... deuium: while *flexibile* continues the language of changeability (which is here, but not necessarily, pejorative) from the previous section, *deuium* lit. "off the main road" is definitely critical, designating a deviation from the straight and narrow. **ad alterius ... conuertitur:** for *ad*, see *OLD* 34a "in accordance with, in obedience to"; for *conuerto*, see *OLD* 8a "change." The flatterer follows not only someone's stated wishes (*sensum ac uoluntatem*) but even changes of expression (*uultum atque nutum*). **Negat quis ... in Gnathonis persona:** the quotation is from Ter. *Eun.* 252–3, where Gnatho lays out the duties of a successful parasite, the comic stock figure of the hanger-on or moocher, who lives off the generosity of the person he flatters; the missing second portion of line 253 draws the conclusion that this approach is the most profitable way of life. Laelius' identification of the quotation as *in Gnathonis persona* "in the persona/role (lit. "mask") of Gnatho" both identifies the speaker and ensures that his audience does not believe this to be Terence's opinion – perhaps because Terence has previously been called 89 *familiaris meus.* **idem Terentius, sed ille** might be translated "the same Terence, but this time." **quod amici genus adhibere omnino leuitatis est** "to have a friend of this kind is in every respect a sign of frivolity"; both the flatterer (cf. 91 *leuium hominum atque fallacium*, 95 *leuem ciuem*) and his victim are characterized as "lightweights," lacking seriousness and consistency. For the genitive of characteristic, cf. 88n. *quas tum euitare ... sapientis est.*

94 multi autem ... accessit auctoritas: Gnatho the parasite is of low status and therefore not to be trusted in any case, but there are many flatterers who are of good birth, wealth, and/or reputation (*loco fortuna fama*), and these are more troublesome because more credible. The combination of

auctoritas and *uanitas* (which is more often paired with *leuitas* or opposed to *ueritas*) is not otherwise attested; *uanitas* (as also at 99) is not the credulity or "vanity" of the victim, but the insincerity of the flatterer.

95 **Secerni autem ... atque ueris:** Laelius moves on to the question of how to distinguish flatterers from friends, a standard topic (cf. Q. Cic. *Comment. pet.* 39 *perpetua illa de hoc genere disputatio, quibus rebus beneuolus et simulator diiudicari possit*; 91n. *sic habendum est ... assentationem*). He maintains that this is possible since *diligentia* can always tell the counterfeit and false from the genuine and true. **blandus ... a uero ... fucata et simulata a sinceris atque ueris:** Laelius uses *uerus* both in the linguistic sense ("truthful" as opposed to *blandus* "flattering") and in the sense of "genuine" (*sinceris atque ueris* as opposed to *fucata et simulata* lit. "dyed and fake"). For *fucata* and *simulata*, cf. *Pis.* fr. xvii Nisbet, describing the deceptively stern appearance of Piso: *simulata ista, ficta, fucata sunt omnia. sincerus* and *uerus* are paired at *Off.* 1.13, 2.18; it may not be a coincidence that they are also found together in the text Laelius has just quoted, Ter. *Eun.* 175–7 (followed by Catull. 109.3–4). **internosci tam potest ... quam:** supply *internosci possunt* from the *tam*-clause for the *quam*-clause. C. uses *internoscere* in *Luc.* for the problem of distinguishing *uerum* from *falsum* or *ueri simile*; applying this Academic language here elevates the task of distinguishing friends from flatterers to an epistemological one. **contio ... constantem seuerum grauem:** unexpectedly, Laelius uses the Roman people as an illustration for his claim that it is always possible to tell a false friend from a true one: even at a *contio* (an ad hoc gathering of the people summoned by a magistrate for the purpose of informing them of events, policies, and legal initiatives), ordinary citizens are able to tell which politicians have their true interests at heart and which are only flatterers. In this and the following paragraph (where he uses two recent incidents, involving Scipio and himself, as examples), Laelius creates an extremely conservative contrast between the *populares*, who attempt to trick the people, and the serious aristocrats, whose wisdom (at least at times) prevails. The *popularis* is *assentator et leuis* (95; cf. 91n. *adulationem blanditiam assentationem*, 93n. *quod amici genus adhibere omnino leuitatis est*); he uses 96 *blanditiae*, and his speech is 96 *uendibilis*; the man who really has the people's interests at heart is 95 *constans seuerus grauis*, and his speech has 96 *maiestas*. Speaking at a *contio* resembles a theatrical performance (cf. 97n. *in scaena, id est in contione*), and it is the responsibility of honorable speakers to represent the dignity of conservative government and to trust that the people, even though they are described as 95 *imperitissimi*, will recognize the false and flattering performance of the *populares*. Elsewhere, C. speaks of himself as taking on a *persona* imposed by

the people (*Leg. agr.* 2.49; *Phil.* 6.2). On this passage and on the *contio* as deception and theater, see esp. Morstein-Marx 2004: 244–6. **inter ... et inter:** the preposition is occasionally repeated, as here, usually when it refers to two closely related categories (here, citizens of different types); cf., e.g., *Tusc.* 4.32 *inter acutos autem et inter hebetes interest*; *Fat.* 19; Hor. *Serm.* 1.7.11–12 *inter Hectora ... atque inter Achillem.*

96 influebat in aures: *influo* with a personal subject is unusual (the only other classical instance is *Off.* 2.31); *irrepere* is more common in this usage. The normal object of such verbs is *animum/animos*; Laelius is perhaps suggesting that the smooth words of Papirius got no further than his audience's ears, not into their minds. **C. Papirius ... reficiendis:** C. Papirius Carbo, a strong supporter of Ti. Gracchus (cf. 39n., 41n.), as tribune probably in 130 (for the date, cf. Sumner 1973: 58–9) proposed a law making it explicitly legal for a tribune to be reelected; the bill – opposed by Laelius and Scipio – failed. For earlier (and more successful) ballot laws, see 41n. *Gabinia lege ... Cassia.* **dissuasimus nos ... dicam libentius:** both here and in connection with Crassus' bill described just below, Laelius is characteristically self-deprecatory. Laelius is joined with Scipio as representatives of the right political values, which are appreciated even by the ignorant mob, just as their friendship is based on the right personal values. Laelius emphasizes the *maiestas* of Scipio's speech against Carbo's bill; he neglects to mention that Scipio was interrupted by Carbo's demand that he say what he thought about Tiberius Gracchus' death. Scipio's famous response (see Introduction 3(*a*)), that if Tiberius was acting against the *res publica* then his murder was justified (*iure caesum*), marked a decisive stage in Scipio's loss of popular favor. **ducem ... non comitem:** so too of Blossius (37n. *non enim ... ducem praebuit*); here Laelius' point is that Scipio did not simply follow popular sentiment, but shaped it. **et est in manibus oratio:** no verbatim quotations of this speech survive, but C. reports at *Brut.* 82 that speeches of both Laelius and Scipio were still extant. **lex popularis suffragiis populi:** the contrast between what appears to be popular and what the people in fact approve is pointed, and continues Laelius' previous argument that even a *contio* audience can tell a flatterer from an honest man. **Q. Maximo ... C. Licini Crassi uidebatur:** in 145, when Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus (Scipio's natural brother; see 69n.) and L. Hostilius Mancinus were consuls and Laelius was praetor, the tribune C. Licinius Crassus proposed a bill to have membership in the priestly colleges be conferred by popular election rather than cooptation; Laelius opposed it, and the bill failed. C. admired Laelius' speech, mentioning it also at *Brut.* 83; *Nat. D.* 3.5 *in illa oratione nobili*, 3.43 *in illa aureola oratiuncula.* **in forum uersus:** up to

this time, speakers in a *contio* faced the comitium, a much smaller area between the speaker's tribune and the senate house; Crassus instead turned to face the forum, which held a great many more people (see Morstein-Marx 2004: 42–7, with a convenient map). Plut. *C. Gracch.* 5.3 wrongly attributes the change to C. Gracchus, but cf. Varro, *Rust.* 1.2.9. **agere cum populo:** the technical phrase for summoning and addressing a *contio*; the right to do so was limited to magistrates. **uendibilem** "marketable, palatable"; ironic since, for all his efforts, Crassus was not able to "sell" his views to the people. C. elsewhere (*Brut.* 174, 264) describes orators as not being *uendibilis*, able to convince an audience. **religio deorum ... facile uincebat:** Laelius claims that it was the people's correct religious sentiment that made the bill fail, putting himself in a mere supporting role in the ablative absolute *nobis defendentibus*. **consul sum factus:** Laelius was consul in 140. **re magis quam summa auctoritate:** as praetor, Laelius was not at all unimportant, but he downplays his own role in order to show that the people recognized the correct response to the bill on their own.

97 in scaena, id est in contione: the theatricality of public life was a familiar and even proverbial conceit: at *Ad Brut.* 1.9.2, C. tells Brutus *tibi nunc populo et scaenae, ut dicitur, seruiendum est* (cf. Otto 1890 *scaena* 1), and at *De or.* 2.338, he refers to the *contio* in particular as *maxima quasi oratoris scaena*. Here, however, the broad image of the "public stage" is conflated with the more precise idea of the theatrical *contio* as a place where fictions and imaginary actions (*rebus fictis et adumbratis*) are presented to a passive audience. Laelius' point is that in both the theater and the *contio* the people are able to distinguish truth from falsehood, so long as it is presented clearly, and that therefore a fortiori an intelligent and virtuous person should be able to distinguish flattery from true friendship. **patefactum et illustratum** "exposed to the light of day"; for the combination, cf. *Cat.* 1.32, 3.3, 3.21; *De or.* 1.177. The phrase is taken up in the next sentence by *apertum*. **quae tota ueritate perpenditur:** truth is, as here, both the means of assessing the nature of a friendship and an essential element of friendship itself, as Laelius has emphasized throughout; here he continues the discussion of flattery as fake friendship from 89–95; cf. also 24 and 26 for the contrast between *uerum* and *fictum*. **ut dicitur, apertum pectus:** one of the many proverbial expressions of which Laelius is fond, introduced as such (cf. 101 *ut dicitur*, 19 *ut aiunt*). For *apertum pectus* meaning candor and honesty, see Otto 1890 *pectus* 2 and esp. Plin. *Ep.* 6.12.3. **nihil exploratum habeas** "you have nothing known for certain." **ne amare quidem aut amari** "not even loving and being loved," in apposition to *nihil*. **cum id quam**

uere fiat ignores "if you don't know how truthfully this (*id* refers back to *amare ... aut amari*) is happening," i.e., whether the mutual love is real or fake. **Quamquam ista ... ipse delectet:** flatterers would not be successful if it were not for their willing victims, who by thinking too highly of themselves become receptive to those who tell them what they want to hear. As often, Laelius makes his point by repetition: *assentatio ~ assentatoribus ~ assentetur, delectatur ~ delectet.* For *assentatoribus patefaciat aures*, cf. *Off.* 1.91 *cauendum est ne assentatoribus patefaciamus aures.* **Quamquam:** see 29n.

98 **omnino est amans ... intellegit:** after having stated that people become victims of flattery because they are already too pleased with themselves, Laelius concedes that the truly virtuous, being fully aware of their own qualities, also love themselves – though, presumably, their high-minded self-love does not render them susceptible to flattery. In fact, as Laelius explained earlier (80), it is a correct form of self-love that ultimately leads to friendship, as we love in the other the virtue that we ourselves possess. On *uirtus* as the motivation for *amor*, cf. 20, 27–30, 37, 48–9, 100, 102, 104. **optime enim se ipsa nouit:** for the Delphic instruction to know oneself, see 5n. *quam legens te ipse cognosces.* **non de uirtute ... de uirtutis opinione:** Laelius clarifies that he is not now talking about true virtue, but just about the (false) belief that someone is virtuous. *opinione* at first sight seems to refer to people's inflated views of their own qualities; as the next sentence shows, however, this *opinio* is also the impression they want to make on other people. Compare and contrast 30 *opinione fortasse nonnulla quam de meis moribus habebat*, the good (and presumably correct) opinion Scipio had of Laelius' qualities. **uirtute ... praediti esse quam uideri uolunt:** the trope "being rather than seeming good" is first attested at Aesch. *Sept.* 592; its most familiar and aphoristic appearance is Sall. *Cat.* 54.6 on Cato, *esse quam uideri bonus malebat.* Sallust in turn probably derived it from C.'s lost *Cato*, where it is said that "everything [about Cato] seemed greater in reality than in reputation" (Macrob. *Sat.* 6.2.33; cf. Volk 2021: 136 n. 88). At *Off.* 2.43, C. cites Socrates for the idea that one means of gaining glory is actually to be what one wishes to be believed to be, *si quis id ageret, ut qualis haberi uellet, talis esset* (cf. also 2.44 *quales simus, tales esse uideamur*); he is drawing on Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.39, where Socrates advocates this approach as a means of gaining friends, and C. is almost certainly alluding to that passage here. **hos ... his:** the emphatic pronouns serve to conclude Laelius' point: it is *these* people, the ones who want to appear virtuous, who enjoy being flattered. **nulla est igitur haec amicitia ... paratus est:** the opposition of *uerum* and *mentiendum* sharpens the language of truth and fiction that has been running

through Laelius' discussion. Mutual veracity as the basis of friendship on the level of thought and speech matches the earlier stress on mutual *honestum* as its basis on the level of action (40, 44); if this criterion is not met, the relationship cannot qualify as an actual friendship. **uerum audire non uult:** cf. 90n. *aures clausae ... audire nequeat.* **nec parasitorum ... milites gloriosi:** Laelius returns to Roman comedy to underline his point that flatterers and their victims enable each other: the parasite (cf. 93n. *Negat quis ... in Gnathonis persona*) and the braggart soldier are comic stock types, who act as foils for one another; the parasite would not be funny if the soldier were not so full of himself. **"Magnas uero ... ingentes" inquit:** the quotation is from Ter. *Eun.* 391–2, where the parasite Gnatho (see 93) comically inflates a courtesan's message to the soldier. Donat. *ad loc.* aptly comments *continet ... assentationem parasiticam et stultitiam gloriosi militis* and observes the comic exaggeration from *magnas* to *ingentes.* **cuius ad uoluntatem dicitur:** cf. *ad ipsorum uoluntatem sermo ... adhibetur* just above. Laelius, as often, makes his point clear by repetition.

99 **Quam ob rem ... assentatione capiantur:** Laelius concludes his discussion of flattery with a warning against the most devious type of flatterer, who is a danger even to the more circumspect. This is the person who does not openly assent and praise, but manages to manipulate his victims by more covert means, including even contradicting them. **blanda ista uanitas:** as in 94, *uanitas* refers to the insincerity of the flatterer, as made additionally clear by *blanda.* **allectant et inuitant** "entice and invite"; the same pairing in reverse order at *Sen.* 57. **animaduertant ne ... capiantur** "pay attention in order not to be taken in" (*OLD animaduerto* 2c). **excors** "mindless," reflecting a belief that the heart is the seat of intelligence. **quippe qui etiam aduersando saepe assentetur** "given that he also often flatters by disagreeing"; *quippe qui* introduces an explanation of someone's actions, usually followed (as here) by the subjunctive. **et litigare ... uidisse uideatur:** the most devious flatterer works by arguing at length against his victim, before giving him the satisfaction of finally declaring himself "convinced." Two clauses with essentially the same meaning describe the flatterer's pretended opposition, two similarly describe his pretended surrender, followed by the final result of successful deception. For *plus uidere* "to have greater understanding," see *OLD uideo* 14d. The sentence ends with the Ciceronian *esse uideatur* clausula (see Introduction 4(*b*)). **quid autem turpius quam:** a variation of Laelius' favored *nihil* + comparative construction (see 20n. *nihil melius*). **ut ne:** see 42n. *ut ... ne existiment ita se alligatos ut ... non discedant.* **Vt me**

hodie ... lautissime: a quotation from an unidentified comedy of Caecilius Statius (*incert.* fr. 9a Slater); the author can be identified because at *Sen.* 36, Cato quotes *comicos stultos senes* as a phrase of Caecilius. The speaker is presumably an old man, speaking to someone, possibly a clever slave, and admitting to having been utterly bamboozled. As the quotation implies, and Laelius mentions in the following sentence, the comic stock figure of the *senex* typically ends up deceived and cheated. **illuseris:** cf. *illudi* in the previous sentence, where C. (or Laelius) presumably used it to match the coming quotation.

100a in fabulis stultissima persona: the old men of comedy are stereotypically stupid; at *Sen.* 36 Caecilius' phrase is glossed as *credulos obliuiosos dissolutos.* **sed nescioquo pacto ... defluxit:** Laelius "realizes" that he is no longer talking about the true friendships that exist among the good and wise (cf. 18n. *nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse*) but about the lesser type of friendship whose existence he has from time to time acknowledged (see 22n. *neque ego nunc de uulgari aut de mediocri ... loquor*; Introduction 3(*c*)): the good and wise obviously will not practice or fall victim to flattery. **nescioquo pacto:** ironic; cf. 88n. *nescioquo modo.* **perfectorum hominum, id est sapientium:** as he moves his speech to its conclusion, Laelius in a kind of ring-composition returns to the topic that has been at issue since the start of the conversation, i.e., wisdom and its relationship to both virtue and friendship (see 6n. *sapientem*; Introduction 3(*c*)). The *homines perfecti* are presumably the good men capable of true friendship according to Laelius' definition (*perfectus* means "perfect" in the sense of "developed or completed to have all the desired qualities" (*OLD* 3a), and true friendship is described as 22 *uera et perfecta*); Laelius now defines such people as *sapientes* (cf. 65 *boni uiri, quem eundem sapientem licet dicere*). **de hac dico sapientia ... cadere posse:** immediately, Laelius clarifies that by *sapientia* he means a quality that human beings are actually able to attain. Throughout *Amic.*, he has consistently rejected philosophical definitions of *sapientia*, particularly the Stoic belief in the *sapiens* as the perfect (and non-existent) sage, in favor of the wisdom of Roman exemplars of non-philosophical excellence (cf. 18–19, 38). For Laelius' espousal of what is humanly possible or "humane," see 8n. *nec potuisse non commoueri ... humanitatis tuae.* **defluxit:** Laelius' speech has "flowed away" from him, with the prefix *de-* expressing a downward movement to the inferior topic of *leues amicitiae* (*OLD defluo* 5d); cf. 76n. *delabitur.* **quam ob rem ... concludamus aliquando:** with two hortatory subjunctives, Laelius calls himself back to his original topic and toward the conclusion of his speech, signaling the transition to his *peroratio.*

I. CONCLUSION (100b–104)

Laelius' *peroratio* is bookended by two direct addresses to his sons-in-law (100, 104). He first concisely summarizes his view of friendship: it arises from the natural affection of one virtuous person for another and is entered without any consideration for utility or advantage (100). Laelius then reviews his own friendships over the course of his life, stressing that while relationships with one's age-mates are the most important, friendship also has the ability to bridge the generations (101–2). He finally returns to Scipio, who lives on in his memory and whose friendship was the best thing that ever happened to Laelius (102–4). The speech concludes with an exhortation to Fannius and Scaevola to value both virtue and friendship, according the latter a close second place after the former (104).

100b Virtus, uirtus ... et conseruat: Laelius recapitulates his view of the central role virtue plays in friendship (cf. 18, 20, 27–30, 37, 40, 48–9, 83–4, 102, 104). As he moves to his conclusion, his style becomes more elevated: note the repetition of *uirtus*, emphasized by *inquam* (cf. 84n.); the formal praenomen + nomen address; the pairing *conciliat* ~ *conseruat*; and the tricolon with anaphora of *in ea* in the next sentence and the metaphor of *lumen* and *exardescit* in what follows. **conuenientia rerum ... constantia:** *uirtus* (the referent of *in ea*) is the guarantor of consistency and stability, the qualities looked for in a friend (62–5, 92). For *conuenientia*, cf. Sen. *Ep.* 74.30 *uirtus ... conuenientia constat: omnia opera eius cum ipsa concordant et congruunt.* C. uses *conuenientia* and *constantia* together at *Nat. D.* 2.54 as elements in the consistent and harmonious operation of the universe. **quae cum se extulit ... in altero est:** Laelius recapitulates his theory of the origin of friendship (27–9), which arises when two virtuous people recognize and become attracted to each other's qualities. **lumen ... ad id se admouet uicissimque accipit ... exardescit:** the "light" of *uirtus* is like a lamp or torch that kindles the fire of friendship. Laelius returns to the vivid language with which he earlier described the "flaring up" of friendship: 27 *quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et uirtutis*, 29 *exardescit beneuolentiae magnitudo.* **siue amor ... ductum est ab amando:** the reading *dictum* is better attested than *ductum* ("derived"; *OLD duco* 27a), but the latter is regularly used by C. for etymologies (e.g., *Phil.* 8.3, *De or.* 2.17; *Tusc.* 3.14; *Nat. D.* 2.68); cf. 26n. *amor... ex quo amicitia nominata est.* **amare autem ... nulla utilitate quaesita:** by Laelius' definition, only affection for a person him- or herself, without any ulterior motives, qualifies as true love. Cf. 26–7, where Laelius declared (arguing esp. against the Epicureans; see 26n. *utrum propter ... uicissimque redderet*) that neither

indigentia ("need") nor *utilitas* ("advantage") is the source of friendship. For *indigentia*, see also 29–30, 51; for *utilitas*, 30, 32, 51. **quae tamen ... secutus sis:** *quae* and *eam* refer to *utilitas*. As earlier (30, 51), Laelius acknowledges that friendship brings many advantages, but maintains that these are, as it were, a pleasant by-product, rather than the reason for entering a friendship in the first place (cf. *etiamsi tu eam minus secutus sis*).

101 beneuolentia: see 19n.; good will is one of the components of Laelius' definition of friendship (20) and recurs throughout *Amic.* **adulescentes ... senes ... aequales:** the potential of friendship to bridge the generations is a central element of the setting of this dialogue, as it is of C.'s other three dialogues set in the relatively distant past (*De or.*, *Rep.*, *Sen.*): the transmission of cultural knowledge and experience from Rome's past down to C.'s own time is a sign of social and moral stability and continuity (see Introduction 3(*a*)). The people mentioned here (including the speakers of *Amic.* itself) comprise all but one of the participants in *Rep.*, and all those named are described as friends or associates of the speakers in *Rep.* and *Amic.* **L. Paullum ... Ti. Gracchum:** for M. Porcius Cato, see 4n.; for L. Aemilius Paullus (Scipio's natural father) and C. Sulpicius Galus, see 9n., where they are grouped with Cato as men who endured the death of a child with fortitude. For P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, see 37n. *ad me ... deprecatum uenisset*, 41n.; in 133 he led the mob which killed Ti. Gracchus, and it is thus suitable that he is named together with the more admirable Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, father of the tribune and of Scipio's wife Sempronia. All five men were significantly older than Scipio and Laelius. **haec:** *beneuolentia*, and thus, metonymically, friendship itself. **elucet** continues the light and fire metaphor from 100. **L. Furium, P. Rupilium, Sp. Mummium:** for all three men (roughly contemporary with Laelius and Scipio), see 69n. **acquiescimus** "I (lit. we) take comfort in." **Q. Tuberonis ... A. Vergini:** on Tubero, see 37n. A. Verginius is said by Pomponius (*Dig.* 1.2.2.40, calling him Paulus Verginius) to have been, along with Tubero and Rutilius, a jurist in the generation after P. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 133), although Schulz 1946: 47 doubts that he was a jurisconsult and suggests that Pomponius' comment is based on this passage of *Amic.* Verginius is otherwise unknown. **admodum adulescentis** "just grown up"; Rutilius (cos. 105) was some years younger than Tubero, Scaevola, and Fannius. **ita ratio comparata est uitae naturaeque nostrae** "the organization of life and human nature is so arranged" (*OLD comparo*[1] 7a). **maxime quidem ... peruenire:** the best kind of friendship is with one's age-mates and should ideally last one's whole life. Cf. 67–8 on the preference for old friendships over new ones; 33–5 on the challenges to lasting friendships.

e carceribus ... ad calcem: the *carceres* are the starting gate in a horse or chariot race, and the *calx* is the finish line. The image of life as a race is common and perhaps proverbial (cf. Otto 1890 *calx* 3). Note esp. Cato at *Sen.* 83, not wishing to repeat his life: *nec uero uelim quasi decurso spatio ad carceres a calce reuocari.*

102 quoniam res humanae fragiles caducaeque sunt: unlike Scipio, who (as reported in 33–5) saw the greatest threat to long-lasting friendships in disagreements among friends, Laelius points to the proverbial fragility and transitory nature of human life itself (for *caducae*, see 20n.). Since one may be predeceased by one's friends (as happened to Laelius with Scipio), it is wise to seek new ones, including among the younger generation. **anquirendi:** see 81n. **caritate enim beneuolentiaque:** two constitutive elements of friendship in Laelius' definition (20). **omnis est e uita sublata iucunditas:** for *iucunditas*, see 84n. *quae putant ... atque iucunditas*; for the pleasure of friendship, see 22n. *quid dulcius.* At *Fin.* 1.67 the Epicurean Triarius states, *nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem uitae tenere possumus*; cf. also 47 *solem enim e mundo tollere uidentur qui amicitiam e uita tollunt.* **Mihi quidem Scipio:** in his conclusion, Laelius returns to the topic that started the discussion, the sudden death of Scipio. **uiuit ... semperque uiuet:** cf. 23n. *absentes adsunt ... egentes abundant ... imbecilli ualent ... mortui uiuunt.* Earlier, Scipio's eternal life was explained in terms of the immortality of the soul, as described in the *Somnium Scipionis* (13–15); in what follows here, the stress is on the enduring memory of Scipio's qualities. **uirtutem enim amaui illius uiri:** Laelius confirms that his friendship with Scipio was of the true type according to his own definition, i.e., motivated solely by love for the friend's *uirtus* (cf. 20, 27–30, 37, 48–9, 100, 104). **quae exstincta non est ... clara et insignis:** the memory of Scipio's virtue will live on, not only for Laelius but also among future generations. Given the close association of *uirtus* and *amicitia*, Laelius seems to be confirming his earlier hope that his friendship with Scipio will be remembered (15). **in manibus habui** "it [Scipio's *uirtus*] was always present to me"; a different use from 96 *in manibus.* **nemo umquam ... proponendam putet:** beyond his personal memories, Laelius now promotes Scipio as an *exemplum* to follow for anyone with higher ambitions. **animo aut spe ... suscipiet** "will conceive or hope for." **imaginem:** no doubt an allusion to the *imagines* "ancestor portraits" (*OLD* 2a) kept by Roman families to remember the deceased and promote them as role models for their descendants.

103 equidem ex omnibus ... possim comparare: a personal variation of Laelius' repeated positioning of friendship at the top of a hierarchy of all

goods (see 17n. *ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis*): Laelius' own greatest good has been his friendship with Scipio. **fortuna aut natura** "(outer) fortune or (inner) disposition." **in hac ... in hac ... in eadem:** the three major aspects of life: public affairs, private concerns, and *otium*. For the emphatic anaphora, cf. 100 *in ea ... in ea ... in ea.* **consensus:** cf. 20n. *Est enim amicitia ... consensio.* **numquam illum ... ipse quod nollem:** that Scipio and Laelius never offended each other shows that they were skilled in the frank criticism among friends that Laelius has advocated (88–90) – or that they were both so virtuous that no criticism was ever necessary. **quod quidem senserim** "at least as far as I could tell." The subjunctive is used to express a limitation (a variety of potential subjunctive, A&G 447); *quod* refers back to the whole preceding clause. **una domus ... peregrinationes rusticationesque communes:** see 15n. *domus fuit et militia communis.* For the shared *rusticationes* of Laelius and Scipio, see *De or.* 2.22. What specific travels are meant by *peregrinationes* is unclear; Laelius presumably did not take part in Scipio's embassy to the eastern Mediterranean in 140, as he was consul in that year.

104 quid ego ... contriuimus: adding intellectual pursuits to the activities enumerated in the previous sentence, Laelius attributes to himself and Scipio all the ways of life (except that of *uoluptas*) described in 86. For the studies of Laelius and Scipio, cf. *Rep.* 3.5. **recordatio et memoria:** for *recordatio*, cf. 15. The motif of memory (cf. 102) is an essential part of Laelius' understanding of his relationship to Scipio: Scipio lives on in his memory – which ensures his own ability to withstand the loss – and Laelius hopes (and C. ensures) that the memory of their friendship will last. The stress on the power of memory at the end of *Amic.* creates an effect of ring-composition with the beginning, which was dominated by the motif of remembering past generations (see 3n. *memoriae mandaui*). **desiderium:** see 1on. **illa** refers back to the times Laelius and Scipio spent together. **alunturque ... et augentur:** both Laelius and C. are aware of – and indeed encourage – the power of memory to improve on reality. **et si ... orbatus essem ... affert:** the sentence begins as a contrary-to-fact condition, but ends as a present condition in the indicative. **aetas ipsa:** Laelius' own age; as the next clause explains, he does not expect to live much longer. **omnia autem ... magna sunt:** Laelius appropriates a well-known Epicurean maxim (*Sent. Vat.* 4, trans. Inwood and Gerson): "Every pain is easy to despise. For [pains] which produce great distress are short in duration; and those which last for a long time in the flesh cause only mild distress." **Haec habui de amicitia quae dicerem:** cf. *Sen.* 85 *haec habui de senectute quae dicerem.* In concluding, C.

draws attention to the similarity between *Sen.* and *Amic.*, as he had in the preface. **uos autem hortor:** having emphatically addressed his sons-in-law at the beginning of his *peroratio* (100), Laelius concludes the dialogue with a final exhortation to them. **ut ita uirtutem ... praestabilius putetis** "that you give virtue, without which friendship cannot exist, a value such that, excepting it alone, you think nothing more outstanding than friendship." *ut ... locetis* is a noun clause, from which depends the result clause *ut ... putetis*; for *locare* meaning to place on a scale of values, cf. *Acad. post.* 1.37 *inter recte factum atque peccatum ... media locabat quaedam*; *OLD loco* 3b. This last sentence of *Amic.* stresses once more that *amicitia* is based on *uirtus* (cf. 20, 27–30, 37, 48–9, 100, 102) and continues the dialogue's reflection on the relative placement of both friendship and virtue in a hierarchy of goods (cf. 17n. *ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis*). Here, *uirtus* comes out at the very top, with *amicitia* a close second; the relative clause *sine qua ... non potest* shows that the reason for placing *uirtus* first is that friendship is impossible without it. **ea excepta:** cf. 20n. *excepta sapientia.* In 20, it was only wisdom that was said to surpass friendship among the gifts of the gods. **nihil ... praestabilius:** Laelius' favorite trope (see 20n. *nihil melius*) is fittingly used in the last sentence of the dialogue.

APPENDIX

CICERO AND MATIUS

INTRODUCTION

There was good reason for the subject of friendship – and, particularly, the strains placed on friendship by conflicting loyalties to one's friends and to the public good – to be of interest in the period after the Ides of March (see *Amic.* Introduction 1 and 3(*c*)). While *Amic.* is very much concerned with this contemporary context, its dramatic setting precludes overt discussion of the events and issues of 44; by contrast, the justly famous pair of letters between Cicero and C. Matius (*Fam.* 11.27–8) offers a valuable perspective on the concrete problems treated in more abstract terms in Cicero's dialogue.[1]

The letter from Cicero to Matius and Matius' reply are undated, but they were clearly written later than July 44 and before the end of the year; the chronology of Cicero's movements shows that the visit of C. Trebatius (a jurist whose friendship with Matius began in 53 with Cicero's encouragement) to Cicero at Tusculum that provided the occasion for the correspondence (27.1) may have taken place either at the end of August or in the middle of October, and the earlier date is much more likely.[2] Cicero had left Rome on 7 April and only returned to the city on 31 August; that he paused at his villa at Tusculum on his way back and that his younger friend Trebatius should have come out to meet him and pay his respects are both plausible occurrences, and that Cicero should be given news of what had happened during his absence, including Trebatius' report that Matius was unhappy with Cicero, makes more sense than that such a conversation would have taken place six weeks later, when Cicero, Trebatius, and probably Matius had all been in Rome and capable of talking directly to one another. If that is so, then the letters were almost certainly written before *Amic.*, by at least a few weeks, and the exchange with Matius may itself be one reason for the emphasis in *Amic.* on the question of loyalty.

Cicero was moved to write to Matius, as he tells us in 27.1, because Trebatius had told him that Matius was unhappy: *detulit ad me querelam tuam.* What emerges from the letters is that Matius had heard that Cicero was saying unpleasant things about Matius' actions after the Ides of March. At the time of this exchange of letters, the two men had known each

[1] The two letters have been much discussed; among the more important contributions are those of Dahlmann 1938, Heuss 1956, Combès 1958, Kytzler 1960a and 1960b, Gilboa 1974, Griffin 1997a, Hall 2005 and 2009. For a commentary, see Bellincioni 1970a.

[2] For detailed discussion of the chronology, see Gilboa 1974; for the various datings proposed, see also Marinone and Malaspina 2004: 248, 251.

other for a very long time: although Matius first appears in Cicero's correspondence in 53, they had been friends since before Cicero began his political career in the mid 70s. Matius had helped Cicero in his dealings with Caesar in the 50s; together with Trebatius, Matius had visited Cicero at Formiae in 49 while Cicero was trying to decide what action to take (follow Pompey to the east or remain in Italy with Caesar). So too, when Cicero returned to Brundisium in 48 after Pharsalus, it was Matius who came to visit and support him.[3] As both this correspondence and other letters make clear, Cicero valued Matius for his learning and the pleasure of his company: in writing to Trebatius (*Fam.* 7.15.2) he describes him as *suauissimi doctissimique hominis*, and the letter to Matius himself speaks of his *litterae*, his advice to Cicero to write philosophy, and his *humanitas*.

On the other hand, although Cicero and Matius clearly enjoyed each other's company – and Cicero stayed at Matius' house when leaving Rome in April 44 – Cicero's list of the occasions on which Matius had helped him shows, as does Matius' own letter, that Matius was in fact far closer to Caesar than to Cicero himself (it seems very likely that he was even the recipient of Caesar's famously telegraphic message *ueni uidi uici* after the battle of Zela in 47[4]). Like Cicero's friend and confidant Atticus, Matius was a wealthy *eques* who chose to have no political career, and the role he played in Caesar's life seems similar to that which Atticus played in Cicero's: a man of wisdom, charm, and wealth without political ambition, able to give advice and, when appropriate, support. During Caesar's lifetime, Matius' proximity to Caesar did not disturb his friendship with Cicero; indeed, Cicero was grateful for it. After the Ides of March, however, Matius' position became less tolerable to Cicero: Matius continued to honor Caesar's memory, assisted Caesar's supporters, and above all continued to believe that the assassination of Caesar was murder, not justifiable tyrannicide. The letters between Cicero and Matius show that neither of them can ignore that crucial question: Cicero says that he believes that Caesar was a *rex* (27.8), implying that he had to be eliminated, and Matius replies that nobody has yet shown that it was in the public interest for Caesar to be killed (28.2). And, quite clearly, how one understood the role of Caesar and his death had a direct bearing on one's actions in the following months. Cicero was firmly on the side of the assassins, whom he called liberators; Matius was not.

After Matius complained to Trebatius (and Trebatius reported to Cicero) about how Cicero was criticizing him, Cicero in the extant letter

[3] For details, see the commentary.

[4] See Cichorius 1922: 245–50. The message clearly also went to the senate.

denied having done so; but in fact Cicero's own correspondence demonstrates that Matius was right. Although Cicero spent two nights with Matius in early April, he was not happy that Matius not only expected imminent disaster for Rome because of the assassination, but was actually cheered by the prospect (*Att.* 14.1.1); in his letter to Cicero, Matius also hints that he wants revenge for the death of his friend (*Fam.* 11.28.4). Nor did Cicero like Matius' helping Caesar's heir, the young Octavian, pay for the *Ludi Veneris Genetricis* in July – and again, he said so to Atticus (*Att.* 15.2.3).

Whether because of his genuine liking for Matius or as a matter of prudence – or even, although less likely, because he hoped to win Matius over to his point of view – Cicero, on hearing from Trebatius, chose to write to Matius with the intention of reviving their friendship. C.'s letter (*Fam.* 11.27) falls into three parts: after an explanation of why he is writing (1), he devotes the bulk of the letter to an account of their past friendship (2–6), and only then goes on to discuss their differences of opinion and his defense of, and lasting good will toward, Matius (7–8). The elaborate courtesy in Cicero's expressions of gratitude is meant as an indication that Cicero's respect and affection for his friend are still strong, despite the sharper language and implicit criticisms in the final long paragraph, in which he makes it very clear that, although he has himself defended Matius to his friends, he believes that there is an equally strong case to be made against his support of the Caesarians: *libertatem patriae uitae amici anteponendam* (8).

Although Cicero does not say in so many words that Matius' reaction to Caesar's death was against the interests of the *patria*, Matius clearly recognized that as the main point of his letter, and his response (*Fam.* 11.28) consists almost entirely of a self-defense against Cicero's implicit criticism of his political stance. After an introduction in which he professes his continued friendship and his recognition that Cicero has defended his actions (1), Matius proceeds to offer his own response, and while Cicero claims to have made excuses for specific actions of Matius, Matius himself takes a much wider view. Beginning with the summary statement that he is aware of people's criticisms (2), he examines five different accusations and responds to each (2–7), before concluding with a renewed statement of his integrity and the consistency of his behavior, and repeating his satisfaction that his friendship with Cicero still survives (8). His basic argument is stated at the outset: while Cicero thinks that Caesar was a tyrant, Matius believes that his death was not in the public interest; what follows from that, and is emphasized throughout his response, is that while Matius opposed the Civil War, both he and Caesar were in fact working for the good of all, while the people (as ever, unnamed) who are criticizing him (and Caesar) are aiming at self-interested profit (2, 7) and, although

claiming to be liberators, are in fact more tyrannical than Caesar himself (3, 7). Matius hopes that they will suffer for it: "I want Caesar's death to be painful for everyone" (4). He on the one hand emphasizes his personal devotion to Caesar, despite disagreeing with some of Caesar's actions (2, 6), and on the other claims that he has always been on the side of the *boni*, the solid and conservative backbone of Roman society (4, 5) – with the strong implication that the liberators (and Cicero) are the ones who have betrayed those values.

In reading these letters it is easy to take sides, seeing Cicero as either hypocritical and dishonest or tactful and generous, and viewing Matius as either an upright and loyal friend or an incorrigible supporter of tyranny – and, inevitably, differing interpretations through the ages have often been colored by how readers themselves have felt about the assassination of Julius Caesar.[5] It is important, however, to recognize that both letters are carefully composed rhetorical communications, addressed both to the recipient and to the larger readership which both men will have expected their letters to reach. Each of them explains the beliefs that animate his current position and actions; each of them is attempting to maintain the fragile bonds of personal relationship at a time of great uncertainty and stress.

The text printed here is based on that of Shackleton Bailey 1977, although we have at times changed the punctuation and paragraphing. The few passages in which we have altered the text itself are discussed in the commentary.

[5] For a history of interpretations up to 1970, see Bellincioni 1970a: 35–41; more recent discussions are found in Griffin 1997a and Hall 2009: 60–6.

MARCI TVLLI CICERONIS EPISTVLAE AD FAMILIARES 11.27–8

AD FAMILIARES 11.27

M. Cicero Matio S.

Nondum satis constitui molestiaene plus an uoluptatis attulerit mihi 1
Trebatius noster, homo cum plenus offici tum utriusque nostrum amantissimus. nam cum in Tusculanum uesperi uenissem, postridie ille ad me, nondum satis firmo corpore cum esset, mane uenit. quem cum obiurgarem quod parum ualetudini parceret, tum ille nihil sibi longius fuisse quam ut me uideret. "Num quidnam" inquam "noui?" detulit ad me querelam tuam. de qua prius quam respondeo pauca proponam.

Quantum memoria repetere praeterita possum, nemo est mihi te ami- 2
cus antiquior. sed uetustas habet aliquid commune cum multis, amor non habet. dilexi te quo die cognoui, meque a te diligi iudicaui. tuus deinde discessus isque diuturnus, ambitio nostra et uitae dissimilitudo non est passa uoluntates nostras consuetudine conglutinari; tuum tamen erga me animum agnoui multis annis ante bellum ciuile, cum Caesar esset in Gallia. quod enim uehementer mihi utile esse putabas nec inutile ipsi Caesari perfecisti, ut ille me diligeret coleret haberet in suis. multa praetereo quae temporibus illis inter nos familiarissime dicta scripta communicata sunt; grauiora enim consecuta sunt.

Et initio belli ciuilis cum Brundisium uersus ires ad Caesarem, uenisti 3
ad me in Formianum. primum hoc ipsum quanti, praesertim temporibus illis! deinde oblitum me putas consili sermonis humanitatis tuae? quibus rebus interesse memini Trebatium. nec uero sum oblitus litterarum tuarum quas ad me misisti cum Caesari obuiam uenisses in agro, ut arbitror, Trebulano. secutum illud tempus est, cum me ad Pompeium pro- 4
ficisci siue pudor meus coegit siue officium siue fortuna. quod officium tuum, quod studium uel in absentem me uel in praesentes meos defuit? quem porro omnes mei et mihi et sibi te amiciorem iudicauerunt? ueni Brundisium. oblitumne me putas qua celeritate, ut primum audieris, ad me Tarento aduolaris, quae tua fuerit adsessio oratio confirmatio animi mei fracti communium miseriarum metu? tandem aliquando Romae esse 5
coepimus. quid defuit nostrae familiaritati? in maximis rebus, quonam modo gererem me aduersus Caesarem, usus tuo consilio sum, in reliquis officio. cui tu tribuisti excepto Caesare praeter me ut domum uentitares horasque multas saepe suauissimo sermone consumeres, tum cum etiam, si meministi, ut haec φιλοσοφούμενα scriberem tu me impulisti? post

Caesaris reditum quid tibi maiori curae fuit quam ut essem ego illi quam familiarissimus? quod effeceras.

6 Quorsum igitur haec oratio longior quam putaram? quia sum admiratus te, qui haec nosse deberes, quicquam a me commissum quod esset alienum nostra amicitia credidisse. nam praeter haec quae commemoraui, quae testata sunt et illustria, habeo multa occultiora, quae uix uerbis exsequi possum. omnia me tua delectant, sed maxime maxima, cum fides in amicitia, consilium grauitas constantia tum lepos humanitas litterae.

7 Quapropter (redeo nunc ad querelam) ego te suffragium tulisse in illa lege primum non credidi; deinde, si credidissem, numquam id sine aliqua iusta causa existimarem te fecisse. dignitas tua facit ut animaduertatur quicquid facias, maleuolentia autem hominum ut nonnulla durius quam a te facta sunt proferantur; ea tu si non audis, quid dicam nescio. equidem, si quando audio, tam defendo quam me scio a te contra iniquos meos solere defendi. defensio autem est duplex: alia sunt quae liquido negare soleam, ut de isto ipso suffragio, alia quae defendam a te pie

8 fieri et humane, ut de curatione ludorum. sed te, hominem doctissimum, non fugit, si Caesar rex fuerit (quod mihi quidem uidetur), in utramque partem de tuo officio disputari posse, uel in eam qua ego soleo uti, laudandam esse fidem et humanitatem tuam, qui amicum etiam mortuum diligas, uel in eam qua nonnulli utuntur, libertatem patriae uitae amici anteponendam. ex his sermonibus utinam essent delatae ad te disputationes meae! illa uero duo quae maxima sunt laudum tuarum, quis aut libentius quam ego commemorat aut saepius, te et non suscipiendi belli ciuilis grauissimum auctorem fuisse et moderandae uictoriae? in quo qui mihi non adsentiretur inueni neminem.

Quare habeo gratiam Trebatio, familiari nostro, qui mihi dedit causam harum litterarum. quibus nisi credideris, me omnis offici et humanitatis expertem iudicaris, quo nec mihi grauius quicquam potest esse nec a te alienius.

AD FAMILIARES 11.28

Matius Ciceroni S.

1 Magnam uoluptatem ex tuis litteris cepi, quod quam speraram atque optaram habere te de me opinionem cognoui. de qua etsi non dubitabam, tamen, quia maximi aestimabam ut incorrupta maneret, laborabam. conscius autem mihi eram nihil a me commissum esse quod boni cuiusquam offenderet animum. eo minus credebam plurimis atque optimis artibus ornato tibi temere quicquam persuaderi potuisse, praesertim in quem mea propensa et perpetua fuisset atque esset beneuolentia. quod

quoniam ut uolui scio esse, respondebo criminibus quibus tu pro me, ut par erat tua singulari bonitate et amicitia nostra, saepe restitisti.

Nota enim mihi sunt quae in me post Caesaris mortem contulerint. 2
uitio mihi dant quod mortem hominis necessari grauiter fero atque eum quem dilexi perisse indignor; aiunt enim patriam amicitiae praeponendam esse, proinde ac si iam uicerint obitum eius rei publicae fuisse utilem. sed non agam astute: fateor me ad istum gradum sapientiae non peruenisse. neque enim Caesarem in dissensione ciuili sum secutus, sed amicum, quamquam re offendebar, tamen non deserui, neque bellum umquam ciuile aut etiam causam dissensionis probaui, quam etiam nascentem exstingui summe studui. itaque in uictoria hominis necessari neque honoris neque pecuniae dulcedine sum captus, quibus praemiis reliqui, minus apud eum quam ego cum possent, immoderate sunt abusi. atque etiam res familiaris mea lege Caesaris deminuta est, cuius beneficio plerique qui Caesaris morte laetantur remanserunt in ciuitate. ciuibus uictis ut parceretur aeque ac pro mea salute laboraui. possum igitur 3
qui omnes uoluerim incolumes eum a quo id impetratum est perisse non indignari? cum praesertim idem homines illi et inuidiae et exitio fuerint.

"Plecteris ergo" inquiunt "quoniam factum nostrum improbare audes." o superbiam inauditam! alios in facinore gloriari, aliis ne dolere quidem impunite licere! at haec etiam seruis semper libera fuerunt, <ut> timerent gauderent dolerent suo potius quam alterius arbitrio; quae nunc, ut quidem isti dictitant, "libertatis auctores" metu nobis extorquere conantur. sed nihil agunt: nullius umquam periculi terroribus ab officio aut ab 4
humanitate desciscam; numquam enim honestam mortem fugiendam, saepe etiam appetendam putaui. sed quid mihi suscensent si id opto ut paeniteat eos sui facti? cupio enim Caesaris mortem omnibus esse acerbam.

At debeo pro ciuili parte rem publicam uelle saluam. id quidem me cupere, nisi et ante acta uita et reliqua mea spes tacente me probat, dicendo uincere non postulo. quare maiorem in modum te rogo ut rem 5
potiorem oratione ducas mihique, si sentis expedire recte fieri, credas nullam communionem cum improbis esse posse. an quod adulescens praestiti, cum etiam errare cum excusatione possem, id nunc aetate praecipitata commutem ac me ipse retexam? non faciam neque quod displiceat committam, praeterquam quod hominis mihi coniunctissimi ac uiri amplissimi doleo grauem casum. quod si aliter essem animatus, numquam quod facerem negarem, ne et in peccando improbus et in dissimulando timidus ac uanus existimarer.

At ludos quos Caesaris uictoriae Caesar adulescens fecit curaui. at id 6
ad priuatum officium, non ad statum rei publicae pertinet; quod tamen munus et hominis amicissimi memoriae atque honoribus praestare etiam

mortui debui et optimae spei adulescenti ac dignissimo Caesare petenti negare non potui.

7 Veni etiam consulis Antoni domum saepe salutandi causa; ad quem qui me parum patriae amantem esse existimant rogandi quidem aliquid aut auferendi causa frequentes uentitare reperies. sed quae haec est arrogantia, quod Caesar numquam interpellauit quin quibus uellem atque etiam quos ipse non diligebat tamen eis uterer, eos qui mihi amicum eripuerunt carpendo me efficere conari ne quos uelim diligam!

8 Sed non uereor ne aut meae uitae modestia parum ualitura sit in posterum contra falsos rumores aut ne etiam ii qui me non amant propter meam in Caesarem constantiam non malint mei quam sui similes amicos habere. mihi quidem si optata contingent, quod reliquum est uitae in otio Rhodi degam; sin casus aliquis interpellarit, ita ero Romae ut recte fieri semper cupiam.

Trebatio nostro magnas ago gratias quod tuum erga me animum simplicem atque amicum aperuit et quod eum quem semper libenter dilexi quo magis iure colere atque obseruare deberem fecit. bene uale et me dilige.

COMMENTARY

AD FAMILIARES 11.27

1 **molestiaene ... uoluptatis:** the two words are often opposites (e.g., *Part. or.* 9, 35; *Fin.* 1.32–3; *Tusc.* 5.103; *Off.* 3.25) and appear in the similar opening of *Fam.* 13.1 to Memmius. **Trebatius:** C. Trebatius Testa, an eminent jurist and close friend of C. (*Fam.* 7.6–22 are addressed to him, and C.'s *Topica*, written in 44, was dedicated to him), came to know Matius when they were both with Caesar in Gaul in 53 (see *Fam.* 7.15.2); they visited C. and wrote a joint letter to him in 49 (*Att.* 9.12.1, 9.15a) while he was trying to decide whether to follow Pompey. **offici ... amantissimus:** the conflicting pressures of obligation and affection are central to these letters (for *officium*, cf. 27.4, 27.5, 27.8, 28.4, 28.6), and C. introduces both in the first sentence. The problem of incompatible obligations (to friends or to the *res publica*) plays a crucial role in *Amic.* (esp. 33–44, 61) as well as in *Off.*, C.'s two major philosophical works of late 44, when this letter was also written. **nam cum ... mane uenit:** if this letter was written in late August of 44 (see Introduction), then C. is arriving from the south, on his way back to Rome; Trebatius apparently rushed out the next morning from Rome, a few hours' travel from Tusculum, on hearing news of C.'s return from his abortive trip to Greece. The speed of Trebatius' arrival, despite his bad health (about which nothing is known otherwise), stresses the urgency of his visit. The first *cum*-clause is temporal, the second concessive. **nihil sibi longius fuisse:** lit. "nothing was further away for him." The idiom indicates impatience or urgency about something one feels will never happen; an English approximation might be "he thought the day would never come." For this usage, cf. *Phil.* 5.1 *nihil umquam longius his Kalendis Ianuariis mihi uisum est*; also 2 *Verr.* 4.39; *Rab. Post.* 35. **Num quidnam ... noui:** a formulaic greeting (cf. *Planc.* 65; *De or.* 2.13; *Brut.* 10); it seems to be used especially in expectation (and apprehension) of bad news, and is parodied by Messala at Sen. *Suas.* 3.6. **querelam:** so also 7 below. *querelae* are complaints (as opposed to formal legal charges) or expressions of unhappiness. Matius has clearly heard that C. has been criticizing his behavior (as indeed he does in letters to Atticus: *Att.* 14.1.1, 14.3.1, 14.4.1, 15.2.3), and is unhappy about it. **de qua ... pauca proponam:** C. makes explicit the structure of his letter: exposition of the background (2–6) precedes discussion of Matius' actions (7–8). For *propono* as the setting out of preliminaries, cf. *De or.* 2.177 *proponi oportet quid adferas et quare ita sit ostendere. pauca* here

introduces a rather lengthy exposition; it suggests that C. could have said much more on the subject of his relationship to Matius.

2 C. groups (in chronological order) the various stages in his friendship with Matius into two sets: (i) their earlier relationship, including their initial meeting and Matius' time with Caesar in Gaul (2); (ii) a set of specific moments during and after the Civil War (outbreak of the war; help to C.'s family during the war; help when C. was stranded at Brundisium; advice and help under Caesar's dictatorship, 3–5). In each of these four moments a brief statement of the occasion (3 *initio belli ciuilis*, 4 *secutum illud tempus est*, 4 *ueni Brundisium*, 5 *tandem aliquando Romae esse coepimus*) is followed by rhetorical questions demonstrating C.'s awareness of his debt to Matius at those times. **memoria repetere:** a normal usage for recollection of the (distant) past; cf., e.g., *Deiot.* 20; *De or.* 1.1, 1.4; *Rep.* 1.13; and note *Inv. rhet.* 2.160 *memoria est per quam animus repetit illa quae fuerunt.* **antiquior** "of longer standing"; C. begins by drawing attention to the length and intensity of the friendship (without specifying how or when they met). According to Laelius, old friendships are best (*Amic.* 67–8). **amor:** *amor* indicates a relationship of *amicitia* (cf. *Amic.* 26, 36, 48); likewise *dilexi/diligi* in the following sentence. On the semantics of such terms in C.'s letters, see Williams 2012: 218–38. **dilexi ... diligi iudicaui:** cf. *Fam.* 11.29.2 to the Caesarian C. Oppius in July of 44: *equidem et ante hoc tempus te dilexi et semper me a te diligi sensi*; this letter follows the Matius correspondence in *Fam.* 11, and this juxtaposition (by whoever organized the collection) may well be deliberate (cf. Kytzler 1960b: 57–9, and see on 4 and 5 below for other similarities). For the sudden arousal of *amor/amicitia* at the encounter with a like-minded person, see *Amic.* 27. **tuus deinde discessus isque diuturnus:** Matius seems, like Atticus, to have spent some years away from Rome, presumably in Greece; at 28.8 he suggests that he might retire (again?) to Rhodes. **ambitio nostra:** C.'s political activity, particularly his campaigning for (and holding) public office in the 70s and 60s. **uitae dissimilitudo ... consuetudine conglutinari:** for *conglutinare* of friendship, see *Amic.* 32n. Here the repeated *con-* additionally emphasizes the idea of closeness. C. and Matius had the needed initial *amor* but lacked some of the *similitudo* traditionally viewed as a constituent element of friendship (see *Amic.* 50n.): their divergent lives meant that the *consuetudo* of friendship did not fully develop (see *Amic.* 29n. *confirmatur amor ... consuetudine adiuncta*). **erga me animum:** *erga* always denotes a positive attitude toward someone. **cum Caesar esset in Gallia:** the earliest indication of Matius' presence in Gaul with Caesar is *Fam.* 7.15.2 (June 53). **uehementer mihi ... ipsi Caesari:** the advantages provided by friendship are a constant theme in

Amic.: although friendship is frequently useful, it is the moral harmony of two people that is its paramount value. It is possible that here C. is ascribing to Matius (*putabas*) the thought that friendship between C. and Caesar would be more useful to C. (*uehementer ... utile*) than to Caesar (*nec inutile*); if so, C. is being mildly ironic at both his own and Matius' expense. **ut ille ... in suis:** for the combination of *diligo* and *colo* in describing friendship, cf. *Amic.* 82; for *in suis* (*sc. amicis*), cf. *Att.* 10.8a.1 (Antony to C.) *Caesarem maxime in suis M. Ciceronem reponere.* C. and Caesar were indeed on very friendly terms in the mid 50s, exchanging amicable letters (the only one to survive is *Fam.* 7.5 of April 54, at the beginning of which C. even calls Caesar his *alter ego* (*te me esse alterum*; cf. *Amic.* 80n. *alter idem*); other indications of correspondence and friendship are found at *QFr.* 2.14.1 (*Caesaris tantum in me amorem*); *Att.* 4.16.7, 4.18.5, 4.19.2); in addition to Matius, C.'s brother Quintus, who also served on Caesar's staff in Gaul, helped bring about this rapprochement. **deligeret coleret haberet in suis:** for emphasis, C. uses triple asyndeton here, 2 *dicta scripta communicata*, 3 *consili sermonis humanitatis*, and 4 *adsessio oratio confirmatio*; see *Amic.* 78n. *iurgia maledicta contumeliae.* **multa praetereo ... consecuta sunt:** C.'s *praeteritio* may exaggerate the extent of communication between himself and Matius before the Civil War; he also contrasts the mere verbal exchanges of that period with the more important (*grauiora*) services rendered by Matius after 49.

3 **Et initio belli ciuilis:** C. left Rome on 18 January 49 and spent most of the next two months (until 29 March) at his villa at Formiae. For a detailed chronology of his movements in this period, see Shackleton Bailey 1965–70: IV 428–37; Marinone and Malaspina 2004: 168–9. Shackleton Bailey 1977 unnecessarily deletes *et* because it lacks a correlative, but this happens elsewhere in C., e.g., *Fam.* 4.4.3. **cum Brundisium uersus ires ad Caesarem:** Matius and Trebatius were traveling to meet Caesar in Brundisium but learned en route that he had already left for Rome (see *Att.* 9.15a); they instead met him in the area of Trebula (see *cum Caesari obuiam uenisses in agro ... Trebulano* below) on 26 March. Caesar visited C. himself at Formiae on 28 March and asked for his support, which C. refused (see *Att.* 9.18.1). **uenisti ad me in Formianum:** Matius and Trebatius (see *quibus rebus interesse memini Trebatium* below) visited C. on 19–21 March to encourage him to stay in Italy and not to join Pompey (*Att.* 9.11.2, 9.12.1). **hoc ipsum quanti:** *sc. erat.* For the omission of *sum* in exclamations, see *Amic.* 79n. *rarum genus. quanti* is genitive of value. **oblitum me putas:** presumably part of Matius' *querela* was that C. was ungrateful and had forgotten Matius' services to him; *oblitus* (three times in 3–4) emphasizes that C. had not forgotten. **consili sermonis**

humanitatis: elements of friendship. C. emphasizes the importance to him both of Matius' advice on particular matters and of conversation with him (cf. 5 *suauissimo sermone*); both are parts of his *humanitas*, which C. also emphasizes (cf. 6 *lepos humanitas litterae*). **litterarum tuarum:** often believed (see, e.g., Shackleton Bailey 1977 *ad loc.*) to be a joint letter from Matius and Trebatius received on 25 March (*Att.* 9.15a), this must instead be the letter from Matius of a day or two later mentioned by C. at *Att.* 19.17.1 (see Bellincioni 1970a *ad loc.*). The former was written before Matius had seen Caesar and reported the latter's expected movements; by contrast, the letter mentioned here dates from after Matius had met Caesar (*cum Caesari obuiam uenisses*) and apparently contained useful advice for C.'s own meeting with Caesar on 28 March (*Att.* 9.17.1 *ex eius* (*sc. Trebati*) *nuntio Matique litteris meditabor quo modo cum illo* (*sc. Caesare*) *loquar*). **in agro ... Trebulano:** modern Treglia, about 60 km east of Formiae, where C. was at the time.

4 **illud tempus:** C. finally made up his mind to join Pompey and set sail from Caieta on 7 June. **siue pudor ... siue fortuna:** C. uses *pudor* and *officium* as reasons for leaving Italy to join Pompey elsewhere (see Brunt 1986): cf. *Fam.* 6.6.6 (to Caecina, October (?) 46) *itaque uel officio uel fama bonorum uel pudore uictus ... sum profectus.* Here he adds *fortuna*, perhaps (with *coegit*) to make it seem as if it was not his own choice. **quod officium tuum ... amiciorem iudicauerunt:** Matius has been a model friend in both living up to the obligations of friendship (*officium*) and going beyond the strict definition of those obligations (*studium*), to the extent that he was a better friend to C. and family than anyone else. C. says much the same to Oppius, *Fam.* 11.29.2 *et me absentem et meos praesentes a te cultos et defensos esse memini. studium* and *officium* are frequently paired in descriptions of friendship; cf., e.g., *Mur.* 7; *Fam.* 1.6.2, 5.5.1, 12.24.1. **quod officium ... defuit:** the repetition of *quod* and the balanced phrasing of *in absentem me* and *in praesentes meos* emphasize C.'s highly rhetorical gratitude, as do the rhetorical questions. **ueni Brundisium:** after Pharsalus (9 August 48), C. returned to Italy and reached Brundisium in the middle of October, where he remained unhappily until late September 47, when Caesar permitted him to return to Rome. **oblitumne me putas:** a leitmotif of C.'s narrative; see 3n. **adsessio oratio confirmatio:** Matius' virtuous actions are specified in a tricolon: Matius not only sat with C. (*adsessio* is found only here, and C. is fond of abstract nouns of this form; cf. *Amic.* 15n. *uoluntatum ... consensio*), but talked to him; and not only talked, but offered moral support. **communium miseriarum metu:** C. often uses *communes miseriae* to refer to the Civil War and its aftermath: *Brut.* 251; *Fam.* 2.16.5, 4.3.1, 4.15.1, 6.4.2, 7.3.1.

5 **tandem aliquando Romae:** C. returned to Rome before the end of 47; he had not been in the city since April 51, when he left to govern Cilicia. **quid defuit nostrae familiaritati?** cf. 4 *quod officium tuum, quod studium uel in absentem me uel in praesentes meos defuit?* Matius was a model friend, as was Oppius (*Fam.* 11.29.2 *quam familiariter mecum uixeris*). **in maximis rebus ... in reliquis officio:** helping C. manage his relationship with Caesar was clearly the most important assistance Matius could give, and it stands apart from the attentions and services (*officium*) one friend might offer another in normal life, which C. itemizes in the following sentences. **domum uentitares:** *Comment. pet.* 16 includes *qui domum uentitet* as an identifying characteristic of a friend. Here it is the frequency of visits (second only to those to Caesar himself) and their length (*horasque multas*) that is most significant. **suauissimo sermone:** cf. *Amic.* 66, where *suauitas sermonum* is one of the condiments of friendship. **ut haec φιλοσοφούμενα scriberem ... impulisti:** a reference to the philosophical corpus C. wrote from 46 to 44 (see *Amic.* Introduction 1). Matius' encouragement to take up philosophy is mentioned in passing as part of their long conversations; Matius himself in his reply disavows philosophical *sapientia* (28.2). At *Tusc.* 5.121 C. ascribes the inspiration to Brutus: *a quo ... impulsi sumus ad philosophiae scriptiones.* **post Caesaris reditum:** Caesar was away from Rome in Spain (the last campaign of the Civil War) from late 46 until his triumph in October 45; that is presumably the return C. means here. **illi quam familiarissimus:** what Matius did to foster friendship between C. and Caesar is unknown. *quam familiarissimus* presumably means "on as friendly a footing as possible" under the circumstances rather than in absolute terms: in 46/45, C. and Caesar were hardly the best friends imaginable, though when Caesar came to dine with C. at Puteoli on 19 December 45, the occasion seems to have been amicable (cf. *Att.* 13.52).

6 **Quorsum ... quam putaram:** C. draws attention to the letter's structure and argument. *longior* looks back to *pauca* (1); the contradiction is meant to suggest that what is in fact a very carefully composed document was written off the cuff. **sum admiratus ... credidisse:** C.'s show of astonishment (not "admiration"; see *Amic.* 2n. *admiratio*) is contrived (and emphasized by the unusual word order of *sum admiratus*): he is shocked to learn that Matius would have believed anything of the sort. In fact, C.'s exasperation with Matius is expressed clearly in his letters to Atticus (see 1n. *querelam*). **occultiora:** while the friendly behavior described in 2–5 was public knowledge, C. wants Matius to know that C. is well aware of other more private services. **sed maxime maxima:** Shackleton Bailey rightly punctuates after *maxima* rather than (as earlier editors) after *maxime. maxima*

is neuter plural agreeing with *omnia ... tua* ("everything about you gives me pleasure, and the most important things the most pleasure"), not feminine singular agreeing with *fides.* **fides in amicitia ... humanitas litterae:** Matius' virtues as a friend are divided into moral and intellectual categories: on the one hand his trustworthiness, good advice, seriousness, and constancy; on the other hand his wit and learning. It is perhaps no accident that, in a very carefully written letter, *litterae* is the final virtue in the list: Matius will appreciate C.'s manner as well as the substance of what he writes. For the importance of trust in friendship, see *Amic.* 65; for constancy, see *Amic.* 62n. *firmi et stabiles et constantes*; for *consilium* and *humanitas*, see above 3n. *consili sermonis humanitatis. humanitas* is also a major characteristic of Laelius in *Amic.* (*Amic.* 8n. *nec potuisse non commoueri ... humanitatis tuae*); see further 8 *fidem et humanitatem tuam ... humanitatis expertem.* Matius himself in the conclusion of his letter (28.8n. *meam in Caesarem constantiam*) presents his loyalty to Caesar in terms of *constantia* as an essential characteristic of true friendship.

7 **redeo nunc ad querelam:** C. marks the stages of his argument very clearly; for *querela*, see 1 *querelam tuam.* **suffragium tulisse in illa lege:** although the vote of one individual would not be that significant (or in fact generally known), Matius' vote (as an *eques* and a close friend of Caesar) might have received attention or (as is suggested here) been the subject of rumor. What the law in question was is uncertain, although *illa* suggests that it was important (at least to C.). It should probably be identified as Antony's legislation, passed early in June, to change the assignment of provinces, giving himself a five-year command in Gaul while depriving various of Caesar's assassins of their provincial commands and armies. **primum non credidi ... te fecisse:** in discussing Matius' *suffragium*, C. first denies that it happened, then claims that if it did, Matius had good reason for it. These are two of the three basic forms of legal defense (*status* or *constitutiones*) that C. himself defines as based on the three questions *aut sitne aut quid sit aut quale sit quaeritur* (*Orat.* 45); they are fully discussed by Quint. *Inst.* 3.6. C. also uses the legal phrase *iusta causa*, normally used to identify sufficient grounds for an action such as adoption or manumission, to argue that Matius' vote had some adequate explanation. Matius himself denies that he has ever done anything *quod boni cuiusquam offenderet animum* (28.1) – which, like C.'s *iusta causa*, is a question of definition. Both men thus manage to avoid direct confrontation over the matter itself, vaguely maintaining that whatever Matius did, it must have been honorable. **dignitas tua:** Matius does not have the standing that would come from a political career, but (presumably because of his close connection to Caesar) he is a public figure. In stressing

his *dignitas*, C. both flatters Matius and implies that he is naive if he does not realize that people will gossip about him. **facit ... facias ... facta sunt:** C. spells out his point very clearly: Matius' actions are public, and thus liable to be misinterpreted. **maleuolentia autem hominum:** C. deflects responsibility from both himself and Matius by blaming the stereotypical malevolence of people – that is, other people. **durius ... proferantur** "are made public in a more negative light; are distorted when taken out of context" (*OLD profero* 7); cf. *Phil.* 2.7 *quam multa ioca solent esse in epistulis, quae prolata si sint, inepta uideantur.* Once again, C. glosses over what exactly it was Matius did. **ea tu si non audis:** *ea* refers to the malicious rumors rather than to the *nonnulla* that are the subject of those rumors. C. seems to think it impossible for Matius not to have heard them. But if Matius has not, C. has: *si quando audio* below. **quid dicam nescio:** probably not unlike English "I'm speechless," expressing frustration or amazement with the interlocutor. If Matius does not understand the basic workings of public discourse, C. cannot help him. Cf. 28.4n. *tacente me ... dicendo.* **equidem:** C. regularly uses *equidem* as an emphatic first-person pronoun, as if it were a contraction of *ego quidem.* **defendo ... defendi. defensio ... defendam:** C. makes explicit his forensic approach to explaining his own and Matius' actions; and again, he uses two of the standard *constitutiones*, but with significant differences. Before, he offered two defenses for Matius' *suffragium*; now, he offers different defenses for two different actions. The first defense is absolute denial: Matius did not vote for the law in question. The second is to say that he did something undesirable (this time, acting as a *procurator* for the games celebrated by Octavian, on which see the next note), but for honorable reasons (*pie ... et humane*). **de curatione ludorum:** Octavian celebrated the *ludi* in honor of Venus Genetrix (established by Caesar in 46) together with funeral games for Caesar himself at the end of July; Matius and other friends of Caesar assisted, and C. did not approve (see *Att.* 15.2.3). For the occasion and purpose of these *ludi* (during which a comet, later associated with Caesar's apotheosis, was observed), see Ramsey and Licht 1997: 1–57.

8 **hominem doctissimum:** C. had in 53 described Matius to Trebatius as *suauissimus* and *doctissimus* (*Fam.* 7.15.2); here, addressed to Matius himself, it is flattery with a twist: as someone who is philosophically educated (see on *in utramque partem* below), Matius should realize that his support for Caesar might be considered unethical – and that C. himself thought so. For Matius' pointed response, that he has "not reached this stage of wisdom," see 28.2n. *sed non agam astute ... non peruenisse.* **si Caesar rex fuerit:** as C. had made clear in his discussion of monarchy and tyranny at

Rep. 2.47–52, while Greeks might distinguish between (good) monarchy and (bad) tyranny, in Latin *rex* is used for both and is therefore always pejorative. Cf. Volk 2021: 163–4. **quod mihi quidem uidetur:** C. first called Caesar *rex* in August 45 (*Att.* 13.37.2; cf. also *Fam.* 6.19.2), but had thought of him as a potential tyrant as early as 49. He is most explicit at *Off.* 3.83 (written later than this correspondence) *rex populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium.* Here C. puts into a parenthesis what is in fact the heart of his criticism of Matius: that since Caesar was a tyrant, friendship with him was wrong and indeed impossible; cf. *Amic.* 52–5, 89 and Volk 2021: 164–5, 173–7. **in utramque partem ... disputari:** being able to argue both sides of a question was an essential part of rhetorical training, but was above all characteristic of philosophical argumentation as practiced in Academic Skepticism. **de tuo officio:** on *officium* as a central issue in C.'s letter, see 1n. *offici ... amantissimus.* **qua ego soleo uti:** C. repeatedly assures Matius that C. is and has always been on Matius' side. In fact, of course, the question as to how far to support a friend applies not only to C.'s relationship to Matius, but also to Matius' relationship to Caesar and the Caesarians: C. reminds Matius of his support, while at the same time making it clear that there are limits to that support. **fidem et humanitatem tuam:** see 3n. *consili sermonis humanitatis*, 6n. *fides in amicitia ... humanitas litterae. fides* is an essential component of friendship, but impossible in relationships with tyrants or *praepotentes*; cf. *Amic.* 52–4. **qui** refers back to the "you" implicit in *tuam.* **nonnulli:** here and elsewhere, Matius' detractors remain unnamed, perhaps because C. himself (to judge from his correspondence with Atticus) was one of them. In 28.3, Matius complains especially of the criticism he is suffering from Caesar's assassins. **libertatem patriae uitae amici anteponendam:** C. uses *libertas populi* much more often than *libertas patriae* (which can mean freedom from foreign domination, as at *Nat. D.* 3.49, rather than political liberty), but cf., e.g., *Phil.* 11.27 of Brutus and Cassius as liberators (as the assassins of Caesar called themselves; see 28.3n. *ut quidem isti dictitant, "libertatis auctores"*). The argument has shifted from criticism of minor actions on Matius' part to the general question of how to deal with a friend who has turned into an enemy of the *patria.* In the opinion of Matius' detractors, as well as of C. in *Amic.* 33–44 and elsewhere, one's *officium* is always to the common good, and friendship (which under the circumstances may not even qualify as friendship any more) needs to be disregarded. In his response, Matius picks up on the reproach (28.2 *patriam amicitiae praeponendam esse*) and answers it. As the letters demonstrate, the issue was of more than academic interest at the time: many of Caesar's assassins had been his *amici* and were accordingly vilified for their betrayal of

friendship; they, in turn, used the argument laid out here, viz. that they had put the *res publica* above their personal relationships (see *Phil.* 2.27, 5.6; *Fam.* 11.3.4, 12.14.7; *Off.* 3.19; and Volk 2021: 160–80). **uitae amici:** while Matius loves Caesar even when dead (*amicum etiam mortuum diligas*, above), in the opinion of his detractors, one needs to sacrifice even living friends to the *patria*. **ex his sermonibus ... disputationes meae:** C. expresses regret that among the rumors that have reached Matius, there apparently has been no mention of C.'s frequent *disputationes* in his friend's defense during conversations (*sermones*) about Matius' behavior; once more, C. emphasizes that he is on Matius' side – while also implying that there have been numerous occasions on which Matius needed to be defended. **illa uero ... aut saepius:** leaving behind Matius' problematic behavior since the Ides of March, C. alights on the safe topic of his earlier actions, which C. can claim to have praised eagerly (*libentius*) and frequently (*saepius*) and which are approved by everyone (*in quo qui mihi non adsentiretur inueni neminem* below). **et non suscipiendi belli ciuilis ... et moderandae uictoriae:** C. praises Matius for his views in 49 and under Caesar's dictatorship, viz. that he opposed the Civil War and tried to help returning Pompeians, just as in his own Caesarian speeches he emphasizes the moderation of Caesar's victory (cf. *Marcell.* 9–10; *Lig.* 15, 18–19; *Deiot.* 33–4). These are the things that Matius himself mentions in his reply (28.2); his opposition to the Civil War is confirmed by *Att.* 9.11.2 (March 49), where C. describes Matius as an *auctor oti* who does not approve of current developments. **inueni neminem:** C. is trying to calm Matius' fears, and the placement of *neminem* is emphatic. **quare ... familiari nostro:** ring-composition, as C. returns to the message given by Trebatius described in the first sentence of the letter, with the difference that while at the outset he was not certain whether the message brought *molestia* or *uoluptas*, now he is purely grateful: what might have turned into a quarrel has turned out to be an occasion for reaffirming C.'s and Matius' friendship. **quibus nisi credideris ... nec a te alienius:** C. returns to the leitmotifs of *officium* and *humanitas*. While he has earlier praised Matius' possession of these virtues (esp. 3n. *consili sermonis humanitatis*, 4n. *quod officium tuum ... amiciorem iudicauerunt*), he now claims that the letter is an unfailing demonstration of his own *officium* and *humanitas*; in effect, he is daring Matius to have a bad opinion of him. For the future perfect (*credideris ... iudicaris*) in future-more-vivid conditions, see A&G 516c. **nec mihi grauius ... nec a te alienius:** if Matius were to distrust C.'s letter, this would be not only upsetting (*grauius*) for C., but also out of character (*alienius*) for Matius, who is thus gently blackmailed into accepting the letter in good faith.

AD FAMILIARES 11.28

1 uoluptatem: Matius begins by giving a positive response to C.'s hesitation at 27.1 as to whether Trebatius' visit had brought more *molestia* or *uoluptas*. **quam speraram ... opinionem:** the hyperbaton of *quam ... opinionem* is striking, and draws attention to the two groups of words it surrounds: *speraram atque optaram*, emphasizing Matius' state of mind and concern, and *habere te de me*, drawing writer and addressee close together. **quia ... laborabam** "I was worried (*laborabam*; cf. *OLD* 7) because I thought it of the greatest importance for it (your opinion of me) to remain undamaged." The comma belongs after *maneret* (so Shackleton Bailey), not after *aestimabam*. **boni cuiusquam** "any right-minded person"; *bonus* is used, as often, with the double meaning of morally respectable and politically responsible (i.e., conservative; see *Amic.* 42n.); Matius uses its opposite, 5 *improbus*, to indicate the sort of people he has never supported. Who these "good" or "wicked" people are supposed to be remains open. As becomes clear as the letter progresses, Matius feels that Caesar was no less *bonus* than his assassins. **eo minus credebam ... beneuolentia:** Matius' language is very pointed. *plurimis atque optimis artibus* both continues the moral aspect of *boni* in the previous sentence and draws attention to C.'s learning and culture, while *temere* presumably refers to his Skepticism, which would not allow him to make any rash judgment (cf. Griffin 1997a: 98). Matius then emphasizes not their mutual good will (for *beneuolentia* as a regular part of the language of friendship, see *Amic.* 19n.), but his own continuous and eager generosity to C. This move is not quite in keeping with the social code attending the exchange of *beneficia*: while it is appropriate for C. to show himself grateful for Matius' services, Matius' reminding C. of them makes him look like the person whose idea of friendship is *ut nostra in amicos beneuolentia illorum erga nos beneuolentiae pariter aequaliterque respondeat* (*Amic.* 56, where this view is rejected; see further *Amic.* 58). **respondebo criminibus:** C. had used *defendere* (27.7), and Matius continues the legal terminology. Even though Matius declares himself satisfied by C.'s letter and his defense of Matius to his detractors, he nevertheless responds to the charges; the implication is that he still suspects that C. agrees with them. **par erat:** there is no clear parallel for *par* (meaning "fitting") with the ablative rather than the dative, and it may be better to understand *tua singulari bonitate et amicitia nostra* as an ablative absolute: "given your kindness and our friendship."

2 Nota enim mihi sunt: a response to C.'s suggestion (27.7) that Matius may not be quite aware of what people are saying about him: he knows full well. **quae in me ... contulerint** "the attacks they have directed

at me" (*OLD confero* 3). The verb is subjunctive, as if Matius had written *notum est* (followed by an indirect question) rather than *nota sunt* (which should be followed by a simple relative clause in the indicative). The subject of *contulerint* is omitted; Matius leaves his accusers ominously anonymous, though he later refers to 3 *ut quidem isti dictitant, "libertatis auctores."* **uitio mihi dant** "they reckon it as a fault of mine" (*OLD uitium* 1b), a double dative construction. **quod mortem ... perisse indignor:** Matius here and throughout his letter depicts his continued loyalty as a matter of friendship, not politics. Mourning a dead friend is both a natural human reaction and a socially sanctioned practice, and by criticizing Matius for doing so, his opponents are unreasonable and inhumane. It is only in the next sentence that it turns out (*aiunt enim*) that the objection has something to do with the particular identity of the deceased. **patriam amicitiae praeponendam esse** is a more generic variation of C.'s pointed *libertatem patriae uitae amici anteponendam* (see 27.8n.), leaving off the reference to *libertas* (the battle cry of the "liberators"; see 3n. *ut quidem isti dictitant, "libertatis auctores"*). Matius confirms C.'s observation that this is the kind of accusation that is being leveled against him. **proinde ac si iam uicerint** "as if they had already proved"; Matius uses *uincere* in the same way in 4 below. Just as C. had put the basis of his disagreement with Matius, his belief that Caesar was a tyrant, into a parenthesis (27.8), so too Matius places his reply in a subordinate clause, making it very clear that he does not believe that Caesar's murder was "useful" for the *res publica*. Contrast C.'s argument in *Off.* 3.19 that the killing of a friend who is a tyrant is both *utile* and *honestum*. **sed non agam astute ... non peruenisse:** C. had spoken of Matius' *litterae* and of his encouraging C. to write philosophy (27.5–6), calling him 27.8 *hominem doctissimum*; Matius' comment is a sarcastic response, implying that the "wisdom" of lofty statements about preferring *patria* to *amicitia* is no more than cleverness and cunning (*non agam astute*). He presents himself as a simple man of straightforward sentiments, unlike "wise" people who, as it emerges in the following sentences, are at least as interested in profit as in wisdom or true friendship. *istum gradum sapientiae* has sometimes been taken as an allusion to *Amic.* (cf. Griffin 1997a: 100 n. 48), but the chronology makes that unlikely. **neque enim Caesarem ... summe studui:** here and in the rest of the section, Matius' rhetoric of blunt simplicity, using simple indicative statements of fact, matches his claim not to be clever. The unusual word order of *sum secutus* (perhaps responding to 27.6 *sum admiratus* and repeated later in this section by *sum captus* and *sunt abusi*) draws attention to Matius' indignation. The sentence is divided into two balanced parts (*neque ... neque*), the first outlining Matius' actions at the outset of the Civil War, the second describing

his feelings at the time. The important contrast in the first half is between *neque ... sum secutus* and *amicum ... non deserui*: it was not a matter of simply following a leader, but of remaining loyal to a friend – even though Matius was vexed by the circumstances (*re offendebar*). The second half elaborates: Matius thought there was no good reason for the Civil War and wanted to stop it at the outset. **itaque in uictoria ... sunt abusi:** Matius stresses that he did not profit financially from Caesar's victory and even took a loss; he contrasts this with the profiteering of other Caesarians. **hominis necessari:** repeated from the opening of the paragraph, emphasizing the personal nature of Matius' connection to Caesar; cf. also 5 *hominis mihi coniunctissimi*. **minus ... cum possent** "though ... they had less influence." **lege Caesaris:** just which law of Caesar is meant is unclear; several different laws (including the *lex de pecuniis mutuis* of 49 and the *lex de modo credendi possidendique intra Italiam* of 46) were intended to relieve difficult conditions of credit and debt during and after the Civil War; they assisted debtors and tended to cause lenders to lose money (by limiting interest rates, deducting interest from the principal of loans, or linking the size of loans to the amount of Italian land owned by the creditor). Matius was evidently a wealthy man and a creditor. **cuius beneficio plerique ... remanserunt in ciuitate:** Matius claims that many of those rejoicing in Caesar's death had benefited from his debt relief measures, as bankruptcy led to *infamia* and thus to the loss of some rights of citizens. For *ciuitas* "citizenship," cf. *Caecin.* 98; *Balb.* 31. **ciuibus uictis ... laboraui:** Matius ends the account of his actions during Caesar's dictatorship by reminding C. that he had worked on behalf of defeated Pompeians, not least C. himself.

3 **possum igitur ... non indignari?** with this rhetorical question, Matius returns from the narrative of his role under Caesar's rule to his present embattled situation. Given his own and Caesar's merits (Matius wanted people to be unharmed, and Caesar granted his requests), Matius is outraged at being blamed for mourning the deceased. **et inuidiae et exitio fuerint** "caused both his being hated and his being killed"; datives of purpose. It is not quite clear what Matius means by saying that his assassins caused *inuidia* "ill will, hostility" against Caesar. The implication is either that Caesar's generosity to such former enemies as Brutus and Cassius caused his own long-standing supporters to be angry and envious, or that Caesar's enemies manufactured situations that made him appear in a bad light, thus justifying the assassination (cf. Cass. Dio 44.7.3–4, who reports that many senators deliberately proposed outrageous honors for Caesar in order to expose him to "envy and hatred"). **Plecteris** "you will be punished"; the imaginary interlocutors are making a threat (cf.

impunite below, 4 *periculi terroribus*, 4 *mortem*). **o superbiam inauditam! ... impunite licere!** a pair of highly rhetorical exclamations (exclamatory accusative, then exclamatory infinitives). Once more, Matius depicts his opponents as cruel and overbearing: they show arrogance, revel in their crime, and do not allow people to mourn. For *superbia* as an unacceptable claim to worth or power, see Baraz 2020: 55–74. **facinore:** Matius' interlocutors refer to *factum nostrum*, but he speaks of *facinus*, thus making clear what he thinks of the assassination. **at haec etiam seruis ... extorquere conantur:** a powerfully rhetorical a fortiori argument: if slaves are allowed to express their own emotions at will (*suo potius quam alterius arbitrio*), then that should be all the more true for free men. The contrast between *libera* (for slaves' emotions) and the so-called *libertatis auctores*, who are trying to dictate their fellow citizens' emotions and make them lower than slaves, is pointed. As hinted with *superbia*, the liberators are depicted as setting up a reign of terror (*metu*). **<ut> timerent:** *ut* is a necessary supplement; Shackleton Bailey 1977 prints <*ut sperarent*> in order to balance *timerent* (just as *gauderent* and *dolerent* are a pair), but this seems unnecessary. **ut quidem isti dictitant, "libertatis auctores":** this is the only evidence that the assassins of Caesar called themselves *libertatis auctores*, but *libertas* was clearly their slogan. C. himself refers to them as *liberatores*; see further Cogitore 2011: 191–3; Leber 2018; Volk 2021: 166 n. 194. Both *isti* and *dictitant* ("keep on saying, like to say") are pejorative. **extorquere** "wrench away," with a hint at torture (*OLD* 3b), implying once more that the Roman population has been reduced to slaves.

4 **nihil agunt** "they achieve nothing, are getting nowhere" (*OLD ago* 19a). **nullius ... periculi terroribus:** the variant *nullis* is well attested and printed by Shackleton Bailey 1977, but the genitive seems more emphatic; cf., e.g., Sen. *Dial.* 12.13.2 *nullius rei timor.* **ab officio aut ab humanitate:** Matius adapts C.'s phrase 27.8 *me omnis offici et humanitatis expertem iudicaris.* The terms are leitmotifs of C.'s letter, where they are ascribed to both Matius and C. himself (27.1n. *offici ... amantissimus*, 3n. *consili sermonis humanitatis*, 4n. *quod officium tuum ... amiciorem iudicauerunt*, 5, 6, 8). **honestam mortem ... appetendam putaui:** the manuscripts vary between *appetendam* and *oppetendam*; *mortem oppetere* "to die" is a frequent idiom (in poetry often without *mortem*), but Matius' point here is the opposition between *appetere* and *fugere* (cf., e.g., *Acad. post.* 1.23; *Fin.* 5.28). His stated willingness to die a noble death in the pursuit of *officium* and *humanitas* stresses Matius' moral excellence, but also continues the depiction of his opponents as threatening and potentially violent. **sed quid mihi ... mortem omnibus esse acerbam:** Matius bluntly emphasizes

the anger (and desire for revenge of some kind) caused by his personal grief for the loss of Caesar, and by the criticism of that grief on the part of the men who caused it. What it would mean for his opponents to "regret their deeds" and experience the death of Caesar as "bitter" is kept vague, but the language is ominously aggressive. While *quid mihi suscensent ...?* is presented as a rhetorical question (as though there were no reason for people to be angry at him), Matius' own words show that the unhappiness of the liberators and their supporters (including C.) with his attitude is in fact not without motivation. **At debeo ... rem publicam uelle saluam:** *sc. esse.* Here, as in 6 below, Matius puts the imagined objections of others into his own voice: once again, his opponents ask him to put the public good first (see 2n. *patriam amicitiae praeponendam esse*); Matius' reply in the following sentence is that he has always done so. At issue, of course, is the difference of opinion between Matius and the liberators as to what the well-being of the *res publica* would consist in. **pro ciuili parte** "in my capacity as a citizen," a variation on the more familiar *pro uirili parte.* **tacente me ... dicendo:** Matius refuses to argue for the public-mindedness of his lifelong conduct, which he says speaks for itself. His refusal to say more is reminiscent of C.'s own 27.7n. *quid dicam nescio.* **uincere** "prove"; see 2n. *proinde ac si iam uicerint.*

5 **maiorem in modum** "strongly," a phrase used by C. most commonly in letters of recommendation; cf. *Fam.* 13.7.5, 13.34.1, 13.49.1. **rem potiorem oratione** "facts rather than words"; Matius is probably reemphasizing what he said in the previous sentence, that his own history speaks more strongly on his behalf than any words he might use; it is less likely that *oratione* refers to things said against him. **si sentis expedire recte fieri:** a vague and perhaps sarcastic parenthetical remark. *mihi* must be taken with both *expedire* ("if you feel that it is to my advantage that things come out right") and with *communionem cum improbis esse* ("for me to have anything to do with *improbi*"). **cum improbis:** carefully ambiguous. In Ciceronian usage, the *improbi* would be the opponents of the *boni*, that is, people who oppose the conservative and stable order of Roman society, including presumably Caesar and Antony. Given Matius' views, though, his ideas of who qualifies as "wicked" might be rather different. C. and Matius can agree on the importance of ethical behavior (one has to be *bonus* rather than *improbus*), while leaving open the referents of these terms. Cf. 28.1n. *boni cuiusquam.* **an quod adulescens ... ac me ipse retexam:** Matius again stresses the consistency of his behavior over a lifetime; displaying the virtue of constancy (for which C. had also praised him: see 27.6n. *fides in amicitia ... humanitas litterae*; cf. *Amic.* 8n. *constanti homini*),

he is not going to change now. **aetate praecipitata:** a metaphor more frequently used of seasons or night (e.g., Caes. *BCiv.* 3.25.1 *hiems praecipitauerat*; Verg. *Aen.* 2.9–10 *nox ... caelo praecipitat*). Matius emotionally exaggerates his age and fragility. **retexam:** the metaphor of unweaving one's life or one's actions is a powerful one, and ultimately derives from Penelope's weaving and unweaving in the *Odyssey*; cf. *Luc.* 95 *quasi Penelopae telam retexens.* **quod displiceat:** that is, something objectionable to the *boni*; cf. 28.1 *quod boni cuiusquam offenderet animum.* **praeterquam quod ... grauem casum:** the one exception Matius makes to his promise of future good behavior is exactly what is objectionable, his continuing grief for Caesar, which also involves his cooperation with Caesar's followers. As throughout the letter, Matius carefully describes his actions in personal rather than political terms; that he calls Caesar *uiri amplissimi* is a reminder that not everyone thought as badly of Caesar as did C. **quod si aliter essem animatus** "if I were differently disposed; if I had something else in mind." Matius is again carefully vague; presumably he means "if I were minded to oppose the liberators," that is, take a public stance rather than grieve in private. **numquam quod facerem ... uanus existimarer:** Matius states that he has no secret agenda: he has been, and always will be, straightforward about his actions, thus displaying the virtues of trustworthiness and good faith. **et in peccando ... timidus ac uanus** "simultaneously wicked in doing wrong and cowardly and untrustworthy (*OLD uanus* 4) in denying it."

6 At ludos ... Caesaris uictoriae: Matius assisted Caesar's heir (*Caesar adulescens*, the future Augustus) in organizing the games celebrated in late July 44 (*ludi funebres* combined with the *Ludi Veneris Genetricis*, not yet formally *Ludi Victoriae Caesaris*: see Ramsey and Licht 1997: 48–54); cf. 27.7n. *de curatione ludorum. At ludos ... curaui* is parallel to 5 *At debeo ... uelle saluam*; repeated *at* can introduce a series of imagined objections, as here (cf., e.g., *Flac.* 57; *Brut.* 256; *Sen.* 68) or a series of responses to such objections (cf., e.g., *Mur.* 62; *Sull.* 55; *Planc.* 11). *at id ... pertinet* in the next sentence is a response, not an objection; the mixing of the two uses of *at* is fairly common (cf., e.g., *Flac.* 6; *Fin.* 2.88; *Sen.* 35; *Fam.* 6.6.10). **priuatum officium ... statum rei publicae:** Matius once more maintains that his motivations are private not political. For *officium*, see 4n. *ab officio aut ab humanitate.* As so much in this letter, this claim is disingenuous: whatever Matius' motivation, the *ludi* themselves had considerable political significance. **quod tamen munus ... negare non potui:** Matius claims that he was morally bound both to honor the memory of Caesar and to oblige Octavian, hyperbolically described as a "young man of the greatest hope

and most worthy of Caesar." **munus:** the word's polyvalence fits the situation: Matius' *munus* is a dutiful tribute or offering to the dead Caesar (*OLD* 3), as well as a gift to Octavian (*OLD* 5); *munus* also means a public show, including funeral games (*OLD* 4).

7 **Veni etiam ... salutandi causa:** M. Antonius was Caesar's colleague in the consulate in 44 and was for a time the most powerful figure in Rome after Caesar's assassination – and one whom C. began to attack in his *Philippics* shortly after the probable date of these letters. The *salutatio* was a regular social ritual, where people assembled at the house of a person of importance to greet him in the morning; see *OCD salutatio.* Matius mentions Antony's status as consul to stress that there is nothing strange about calling on a man of high office. **ad quem ... uentitare reperies:** Matius' visits to Antony are a gesture of courtesy, while others frequently go to him (*frequentes uentitare*) to gain something. Hypocritically, the men who try to gain advantages from Antony are the very ones who accuse Matius of not being patriotic enough (*parum patriae amantem*; cf. 2n. *patriam amicitiae praeponendam esse*, 4n. *At debeo ... rem publicam uelle saluam*). **sed quae haec est ... quos uelim diligam** "What kind of arrogance is this, given that (*quod*) Caesar never hindered me from being friendly with anyone I wanted, including people he himself had no regard for, for those men who snatched my friend from me to try through their complaining to keep me from having regard for anyone I want to!" The syntax is somewhat unclear: *eos ... conari* is an indirect statement, appositive to the opening exclamation *quae haec est arrogantia*; the *quod*-clause is often taken as a relative clause defining the much later phrase *ne quos uelim diligam* (i.e., "something that Caesar never objected to") with the *quin* clause explanatory of that, but it seems easier and more in harmony with the word order to take *quod* as "whereas" or "given the fact that" and *interpellauit* as intransitive (as it is in 8 below, cf. *OLD* 4c) or with *me* understood. For *uterer* "be friendly with," cf. *Amic.* 2n. *utebare multum.*

8 **non uereor:** followed by two parallel fear clauses, the first introduced by *ne*, the second by *ne ... non.* **meae uitae modestia:** while C. had referred to Matius' *dignitas* (27.7) as exposing him to criticism, Matius rejects that: he leads a quiet (i.e., non-political) life, like C.'s friend Atticus, and therefore whatever criticisms are made of him will not be convincing. **meam in Caesarem constantiam:** once more, Matius stresses his constancy and faith toward his dead friend. This line of argument, that Matius is nothing more than a faithful friend, is the one that C. says he himself uses in Matius' defense: 27.8 *laudandam esse fidem et humanitatem tuam, qui amicum etiam mortuum diligas.* **non malint mei**

quam sui similes amicos habere: Matius once more points to the hypocrisy of those who criticize him: in reality, they would like to have friends like him. By stressing his unwavering dedication to Caesar, even in adversity, Matius has painted himself as the perfect friend (for his similar constancy in his relationship with C., see C.'s own account in 27.2–6, which highlights Matius' 6 *fides in amicitia* and *constantia*); he now maintains that this ideal of friendship is shared by everybody, including his opponents. It is this exact model of friendship as absolute loyalty that C. seeks to dismantle in *Amic.* 33–44. **Rhodi:** Rhodes was not only a *ciuitas foederata* (and thus technically independent, a safe place of refuge for a Roman citizen) but an intellectual center where both C. and Caesar had spent some time. Matius had been away from Rome when he was young (cf. 27.2), and it is possible that he stayed on Rhodes then. He now hopes to retire there and enjoy the rest of his life in *otium*, away from the political turmoil of Rome. **ita ero Romae ... semper cupiam:** if Matius has to remain in Rome, he will continue to wish for "things to go right" (for *recte fieri*, cf. 5n. *si sentis expedire recte fieri*); once more, what the content of this ethical stance would be is not spelled out. **Trebatio nostro:** cf. 27.1 and 27.8; Matius echoes C.'s concluding sentence, *quare habeo gratiam Trebatio, familiari nostro.* It was Trebatius who brought C. the report of Matius' unhappiness and was thus the cause of C.'s writing to Matius. Both men stress not only their own friendship with each other, but the important role of Trebatius as a third friend. **animum simplicem atque amicum:** on *simplicitas* as a virtue of friendship, see *Amic.* 65n. *simplicem ... communem ... consentientem.* Matius' conclusion is filled with the language of friendship: *diligere* (2×), *colere, obseruare* all apply to the relationships between friends. **eum:** C., not Trebatius. **libenter ... iure:** Matius has always enjoyed his friendship with C. (*libenter dilexi*); C.'s letter has made him feel that it is also right (*iure*) to do so. **eum ... quo magis iure colere atque obseruare deberem fecit** "brought it about that I by rights ought to cherish and respect him even more." **bene uale et me dilige:** neither formula of conclusion is ever used by C. *bene uale* is colloquial, found frequently in Plautus and in a letter from Curius to C. (*Fam.* 7.29.2). Munatius Plancus concluded five of his letters to C. with *fac ualeas meque mutuo diligas* (*Fam.* 10.4.4, 10.7.2, 10.11.3, 10.15.4, 10.21.6, the last omitting *mutuo*), but C. thought *diligere* weaker than *amare*: cf. *Ad Brut.* fr. 4 *uale et nos ama uel, si id nimis est, dilige* (cf. also fr. 5).

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Cicero's last dialogue, *De amicitia*, is a work of stylistic brilliance containing the fullest examination of the values and problems of friendship to survive from the Greco-Roman world. How do we make (and lose) friends? If a conflict arises between personal affection and ethical behavior, how do we decide what is right? What kinds of people make the most suitable friends? Written in 44 BCE, *De amicitia* provides both a striking analysis of the conflicts between personal and civic loyalty and a strong statement about the close links between friendship, wisdom, and virtue. In the first full commentary on *De amicitia* in more than a century, Katharina Volk and James Zetzel provide an illuminating guide to the dialogue, explaining language and style, philosophy, and historical context. An appendix contains a text with commentary of Cicero's famous correspondence with Matius about political and personal loyalty after the assassination of Caesar.

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

ISBN 978-1-108-94085-6